ORDER : By way of instant petition filed under Section 482 Cr.PC, prayer has been made by the petitioner for quashing of FIR No. 17/2020, dated 28.3.2020 and orders dated 31.8.2020 and 17.1.2022, passed by the learned JMFC-3, Shimla, District Shimla, HP, whereby charges under Sections 188, 269, 270 and 34 IPC, came to be framed against the petitioner. Despite sufficient opportunity, no reply has been filed by the respondents. 2. Precisely, the facts of the case as emerge from the record are that on 28.3.2020, petitioner herein was found strolling on the road during curfew imposed by the District Administration on account of COVID-19. Allegedly, petitioner alongwith his friend not only violated the restriction qua the movement imposed on account of curfew, but he was also not wearing mask and as such, case under Section 188 of IPC came to be registered against him. Petitioner has denied the aforesaid allegation by stating that he was not strolling on the main road, rather was walking outside his house alongwith pet. After completion of investigation, police presented challan in the competent court of law, but before same could be decided on its own merits, petitioner has approached this Court in the instant proceedings, praying therein to quash the FIR as well as orders dated 31.8.2020 and 17.1.2022, whereby court below took contingence and issued process against the petitioner. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the records. 4. Precisely, the ground as has been raised in the instant petition for quashing of FIR as well as orders dated 31.8.2020 & 17.1.2022, whereby charges under Sections 269 and 270 came to be framed, is that no case under Sections 188, 269 and 270 IPC, could be initiated without there being written complaint to the higher ups. Careful perusal of provision contained in Section 195 of CrPC clearly reveals that no Court shall take cognizance of the offence punishable under Sections 172 to 188 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860 ), except on the complaint in writing by the complainant. Section 195 reads as under: “195. Prosecution for contempt of lawful authority of public servants, for offences against public justice and for offences relating to documents given in evidence. Section 195 reads as under: “195. Prosecution for contempt of lawful authority of public servants, for offences against public justice and for offences relating to documents given in evidence. (1) No Court shall take cognizance- (a) (i) of any offence punishable under sections 172 to 188 (both inclusive) of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860 ), or (ii) of any abetment of, or attempt to commit, such offence, or (iii) of any criminal conspiracy to commit such offence, except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or of some other public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate; (b) (i) of any offence punishable under any of the following sections of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860 ), namely, sections 193 to 196 (both inclusive), 199, 200, 205 to 211 (both inclusive) and 228, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, or (ii) of any offence described in section 463, or punishable under section 471, section 475 or section 476, of the said Code, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any Court, or (iii) of any criminal conspiracy to commit, or attempt to commit, or the abetment of, any offence specified in sub-clause (i) or sub- clause (ii), except on the complaint in writing of that Court, or of some other Court to which that Court is subordinate. (2) Where a complaint has been made by a public servant under clause (a) of sub- section (1) any authority to which he is administratively subordinate may order the withdrawal of the complaint and send a copy of such order to the Court; and upon its receipt by the Court, no further proceedings shall be taken on the complaint: Provided that no such withdrawal shall be ordered if the trial in the Court of first instance has been concluded. (3) In clause (b) of sub-section (1), the term" Court" means a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court, and includes a tribunal constituted by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act if declared by that Act to be a Court for the purposes of this section. (3) In clause (b) of sub-section (1), the term" Court" means a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court, and includes a tribunal constituted by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act if declared by that Act to be a Court for the purposes of this section. (4) For the purposes of clause (b) of sub-section (1), a Court shall be deemed to be subordinate to the Court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the appealable decrees or sentences of such former Court, or in the case of a Civil Court from whose decrees no appeal ordinarily lies, to the principal Court having ordinary original civil jurisdiction within whose local jurisdiction such Civil Court in situate: Provided that- (a) where appeals lie to more than one Court, the Appellate Court of inferior jurisdiction shall be the Court to which such Court shall be deemed to be subordinate; (b) where appeals lie to a Civil and also to a Revenue Court, such Court shall be deemed to be subordinate to the Civil or Revenue Court according to the nature of the case or proceeding in connection with which the offence is alleged to have been committed.” 5. Learned Additional Advocate General has been not able to dispute that before initiating complaint under Section 188 of IPC, written complaint, if any, was lodged by the complainant in the case and as such, order dated 31.8.2020, whereby court below proceeded to frame the charges against the petitioner under Section 188 IPC is not sustainable. 6. Perusal of order dated 17.1.2022, passed by the JMFC-3 reveals that aforesaid question was raised by the petitioner before the court below, but court below having taken note of the fact that it has no power to recall or review its order expressed its inability to delete Section 188 IPC. While passing order dated 17.1.2022, learned trial court deferred the matter, enabling the petitioner to approach this court under Section 482 Cr.PC. In the aforesaid background, petitioner has approached this Court praying therein to quash the FIR as well as orders dated 31.8.2020 and 17.1.2022, whereby charges under Sections 188, 269 and 270 read with Section 34 of the IPC came to be framed against the petitioner. 7. In the aforesaid background, petitioner has approached this Court praying therein to quash the FIR as well as orders dated 31.8.2020 and 17.1.2022, whereby charges under Sections 188, 269 and 270 read with Section 34 of the IPC came to be framed against the petitioner. 7. Having taken note of the provisions contained in Section 195 CrPC, which has been reproduced in the earlier part of the order, this Court finds that no court shall take cognizance of the Sections 172 to 188 (both inclusive) of the IPC, except on the complaint in writing of that Court, or of some other Court to which that Court is subordinate. Where a complaint is made by a public servant under clause (a) of sub-section (1), any authority to which he is subordinate may order the withdrawal of the complaint and send copy of the such order to the Court and upon its receipt by the Court, no further proceedings shall be taken on the complaint, provided no such withdrawal shall be ordered if the trial in the first instance has been concluded. Since in the case at hand, public servant while initiating action against the petitioner did not send the copy of the complaint to the higher ups, enabling it to apply its mind, prosecution lodged against the petitioner under Section 188 is otherwise not sustainable. In the event of copy being supplied to the higher-ups, there was a possibility that such authority could order the public servant to withdraw the complaint. Since in the case at hand, aforesaid procedure never came to be followed/adopted, case registered against the petitioner under Sections 269 and 188 of IPC is otherwise not sustainable. 8. The Gujarat High Court in judgment dated 15.2.2019, titled Mohmadmohsin mohmadirfan Chhalotiya v. State of Gujarat, in R/Special Criminal Application No. 4105 of 2017 2019(2) RCR (Criminal) 397, has held as under: “7 In order to appreciate the rival contentions on the aforesaid issue, it will be apposite to have closer look at some of the decisions of the Supreme Court for ascertaining the true nature and import of the provisions of section 195 of the Code. Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. reads as under: Section 195: Prosecution for contempt of lawful authority of public servants, for offences against public justice and for offences relating to documents given in evidence: (1) No Court shall take cognizance-(a) (i) of any offence punishable under sections 172 to 188 (both inclusive) of the Indian Penal Code, or (ii) of any abetment of, or attempt to commit, such offence, or (iii) of any criminal conspiracy to commit such offence, except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or of some other public servant to whom he is administrative subordinate; (b) (i) of any offence punishable under any of the following sections of the Indian Penal Code, namely, sections 193 to 196 (both inclusive), 199, 200, 205 to 211 (both inclusive) and 228, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, or (ii) of any offence described in section 463, or punishable under section 471, section 475 or section 476, of the said Code, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any Court, or (iii) of any criminal conspiracy to commit, or attempt to commit, or the abetment of, any offence specified in sub-clause (i) or sub-clause (ii), a [except on the complaint in writing of that Court or by such officer of the Court as that Court may authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court is subordinate.] (2) Where a complaint has been made by a public servant under clause (a) of subsection (1) any authority to which he is administratively subordinate may order the withdrawal of the complaint and send a copy of such order to the Court; and upon its receipt by the Court, no further proceedings shall be taken on the complaint: Provided that no such withdrawal shall be ordered if the trial in the Court of first instance has been concluded. (3) In clause (b) of sub-section (1), the term "Court" means a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court, and includes a tribunal constituted by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act if declared by that Act to be a Court for the purposes of this section. (3) In clause (b) of sub-section (1), the term "Court" means a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court, and includes a tribunal constituted by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act if declared by that Act to be a Court for the purposes of this section. (4) For the purposes of clause (b) of sub-section (1), a Court shall be deemed to be subordinate to the Court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the appealable decrees or sentences of such former Court, or in the case of a Civil Court from whose decrees no appeal ordinarily lies to the principal Court having ordinary original civil jurisdiction within whose local jurisdiction such Civil Court is situate: Provided that- (a) where appeals lie to more than one Court, the Appellate Court of inferior jurisdiction shall be the Court to which such Court shall be deemed to be subordinate; (b) where appeals lie to a Civil and also to a Revenue Court, such Court shall be deemed to be subordinate to the Civil or Revenue Court according to the nature of the case or proceeding in connection with which the offence is alleged to have been committed. (Emphasis supplied by me)” 8. The first in point of time is the decision of the Supreme Court is in the case of Basir-ul-Haq (supra). (The relevant sections considered are sections 182, 297 and 500 of the IPC). The relevant observations are incorporated as under: 14. Though, in our judgment, Section 195 does not bar the trial of an accused person for a distinct offence disclosed by the same facts and which is not included within the ambit of that section, it has also to be borne in mind that the provisions of that section cannot be evaded by resorting to devices or camouflages. The test whether there is evasion of the section or not is whether the facts disclose primarily and essentially an offence for which a complaint of the court or of the public servant is required. The test whether there is evasion of the section or not is whether the facts disclose primarily and essentially an offence for which a complaint of the court or of the public servant is required. In other words, the provisions of the section cannot be evaded by the device of charging a person with an offence to which that section does not apply and then convicting him of an offence to which it does, upon the ground that such latter offence is a minor offence of the same character, or by describing the offence as being one punishable under some other section of the Indian penal Code, though in truth and substance the offence falls in the category of sections mentioned in Section of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Merely by changing the garb or label of an offence which is essentially all offence covered by the provisions of Section 195 prosecution for such an offence cannot be taken cognizance of by mis-describing it or by putting a wrong label on it. 9. Thus, the Supreme Court has approved the decision of the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Satis Chandra Chakravarti v. Ram Dayal De, AIR 1921 Cal 1, and has held that section 195 of the Cr.P.C does not bar the trial of an accused person for a distinct offence disclosed by the same facts and which is not included within the ambit of that section, it has also to be borne in mind that the provisions of that section cannot be evaded by resorting to devices or camouflages.” 9. Leaving everything aside, this Court finds that there is no independent witness associated by the prosecution to prove the case against the petitioner. Since evidentiary material place on record is not sufficient to connect the petitioner with the offence alleged to have been committed by him, there is no justification to let the petitioner face the ordeal of protracted trial, which would otherwise culminate in the acquittal. 10. Since evidentiary material place on record is not sufficient to connect the petitioner with the offence alleged to have been committed by him, there is no justification to let the petitioner face the ordeal of protracted trial, which would otherwise culminate in the acquittal. 10. Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled State of Haryana and others vs. Bhajan Lal and others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 has held that the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding, if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. Relevant para is being reproduced herein below:- “7....In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court’s inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the 510 inherent powers of the High Court to do justice, between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction.” 11. Subsequently, Hon’ble Apex Court in Vineet Kumar and Ors. Subsequently, Hon’ble Apex Court in Vineet Kumar and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Anr., while considering the scope of interference under Sections 397 Cr.PC and 482 Cr.PC, by the High Courts, has held that High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding, if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceedings ought to quashed. The Hon’ble Apex Court has further held that the saving of the High Court’s inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose i.e. a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In the aforesaid case, the Hon’ble Apex Court taking note of seven categories, where power can be exercised under Section 482 Cr.PC, as enumerated in Bhajan Lal (supra), i.e. where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with malafides and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge, quashed the proceedings. 12. In view of the detailed discussion made herein above and law taken into consideration, there appears to be sufficient ground for this Court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C, for quashing of FIR and consequent criminal proceedings against the petitioners, to prevent abuse of process of law and to prevent unnecessary harassment to the petitioner against whom there is no evidence to connect him with the commission of offences as incorporated in the FIR. Otherwise also, continuance of the criminal proceedings against the petitioner in the present case would be a sheer wastage of time of the learned trial Court and the same would amount to subjecting the petitioner to unnecessary and protracted ordeal of trial, which is bound to culminate in acquittal. If the evidentiary material collected on record to prove the guilt of the petitioner is perused in its entirety, this is no sufficient material to connect the petitioner with the offence alleged to have been committed by him. If the evidentiary material collected on record to prove the guilt of the petitioner is perused in its entirety, this is no sufficient material to connect the petitioner with the offence alleged to have been committed by him. To the contrary if on the basis of material adduced on record by the investigating agency, trial is allowed to continue, great prejudice would be caused to the petitioner and same would amount to sheer abuse of process of law. 13. Consequently, in view of the detailed discussion made herein above as well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, present petition is allowed and FIR No. 17/2020 dated 28.30.2020 as well as consequent proceedings i.e. orders dated 31.8.2020 and 17.1.2022, passed by the JMFC-3, Shimla in Police Challan No. 305 of 2020 are quashed and set-aside. Petitioner is acquitted of the charges framed against him. Accordingly, present petition is a disposed of, so also pending applications, if any.