ORDER : By way of this petition, petitioner has prayed for quashing of FIR No. 138 dated 23.08.2018, under Section 51 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, registered at Police Station Karsog, District Mandi, H.P. and further proceedings of Police Challan No. 45/2019 pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Karsog, District Mandi, H.P. 2. The contention of petitioner is that FIR No.138 dated 23.08.2018 was registered at Police Station Karsog for commission of offence under Section 51 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 (for short “Act”) and on completion of investigation report under Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. has been filed and the case is pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Karsog. According to petitioner, the procedure adopted by respondent is impermissible in law, in view of specific bar under Section 55 of the Act. 3. In response, the factual position has not been denied by the respondents. The factum of registration of FIR for offence under Section 51 of the Act and submission of report under Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. has been admitted. It is submitted that under Section 55(b) of the Act, prosecution could be launched by any officer authorised by the State Government. It is further submitted that the State Government has authorised all police officers above the rank of Sub-Inspectors to file complaint in accordance with law in respect of offence punishable under Section 51 of the Act. As per respondent, since, Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code is also attracted, as such submission of report under Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. is not bad in law. 4. I have heard Mr. G.R. Palsra, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Desh Raj Thakur, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent and have also gone through the record carefully. 5. Section 55 of the Act reads as under:- “55. 4. I have heard Mr. G.R. Palsra, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Desh Raj Thakur, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent and have also gone through the record carefully. 5. Section 55 of the Act reads as under:- “55. Cognizance of offences.—No court shall take cognizance of any offence against this Act except on the complaint of any person other than— (a) the Director of Wild Life Preservation or any other officer authorised in this behalf by the Central Government; or (aa) the Member-Secretary, Central Zoo Authority in matters relating to violation of the provisions of Chapter IVA; or (ab) Member-Secretary, Tiger Conservation Authority; or (ac) Director of the concerned tiger reserve; or (b) the Chief Wild Life Warden, or any other officer authorised in this behalf by the State Government [subject to such conditions as may be specified by that Government]; or (bb) the officer-in-charge of the zoo in respect of violation of provisions of section 38J; or (c) any person who has given notice of not less than sixty days, in the manner prescribed, of the alleged offence and of his intention to make a complaint to the Central Government or the State Government or the officer authorised as aforesaid.” 6. The question arises whether the prosecution for offence under Section 51 of the Act could be launched by submission of report under Section 173 of the Cr.P.C., in view of prohibitory bar created by Section 55 of the Act? 7. In State of Bihar vs. Murad Ali Khan and others, reported in (1988)4 SCC 655, the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with an identical question has held as under:- “13. What emerges from a perusal of these provisions is that cognizance of an offence under the "Act" can be taken by a Court only on the complaint of the officer mentioned in Sec. 55. The person who lodged complaint dated 23.6.86 claimed to be such an officer. In these circumstances even if the jurisdictional police purported to register a case for an alleged offence against the Act, Sec. 210 (1) would not be attracted having regard to the position that cognizance of such an offence can only be taken on the complaint of the officer mentioned in that section. In these circumstances even if the jurisdictional police purported to register a case for an alleged offence against the Act, Sec. 210 (1) would not be attracted having regard to the position that cognizance of such an offence can only be taken on the complaint of the officer mentioned in that section. Even where a Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence instituted otherwise than on a police-report and an investigation by the police is in progress in relation to same offence, the two cases do not lose their separate identity. The section seeks to obviate the anomalies that might arise from taking cognizance of the same offence more than once. But, whereas here cognizance can be taken only in one way and that on the complaint of a particular statutory functionary there is no scope or occasion for taking cognizance more than once and, accordingly, Section 210 has no role to play. The view taken by the High Court on the footing of Section 210 is unsupportable. 8. Thus, where the statute specifically prohibits taking of cognizance in any other manner than by the way of complaint instituted by the prescribed authority, it is imperative to adhere to such procedure. 9. In Rangku Dutt alias Ranjan Kumar Dutta v. State of Assam, reported in (2011)6 SCC 358 , their Lordships approved the statement of law as under:- “18. It is obvious that Section 20(A)(1) is a mandatory requirement of law. First, it starts with an overriding clause and, thereafter, to emphasise its mandatory nature, it uses the expression "No" after the overriding clause. Whenever the intent of a statute is mandatory, it is clothed with a negative command. Reference in this connection can be made to G.P. Singh's Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 12th Edition. At page 404, the learned author has stated: "As stated by CRAWFORD: "Prohibitive or negative words can rarely, if ever, be directory. And this is so even though the statute provides no penalty for disobedience. As observed by SUBBARAO, J.: "Negative words are clearly prohibitory and are ordinarily used as a legislative device to make a statute imperative". At page 404, the learned author has stated: "As stated by CRAWFORD: "Prohibitive or negative words can rarely, if ever, be directory. And this is so even though the statute provides no penalty for disobedience. As observed by SUBBARAO, J.: "Negative words are clearly prohibitory and are ordinarily used as a legislative device to make a statute imperative". Section 80 and Section 87-B of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, section 77 of the Railways Act, 1890; section 15 of the Bombay Rent Act, 1947; section 213 of the Succession Act, 1925; section 5-A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947; section 7 of the Stamp Act, 1899; section 108 of the Companies Act, 1956; section 20(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954; section 55 of the Wild Life Protection Act, 1972, the proviso to section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (as amended in 1956); section 10A of Medical Council Act, 1956 (as amended in 1993), and similar other provisions have therefore, been construed as mandatory. A provision requiring 'not les than three months' notice is also for the same reason mandatory." We are in respectful agreement with the aforesaid statement of law by the learned author. 19. So there can be no doubt about the mandatory nature of the requirement of this Section. Apart from that, since the said section has been amended in order to prevent the abuse of the provisions of TADA, this Court while examining the question of complying with the said provision must examine it strictly.” The provisions of Section 55 of the Act have been mandated to be construed as mandatory. 10. In State (NCT of Delhi) vs. Sanjay, reported in (2014) 9 SCC 772 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with an identical provision contained in Section 22 of Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 has held that in case of attraction of provisions of IPC in addition to the provisions of Act ibid, the provisions of Cr.P.C. for registration of FIR, investigation and submission of report under Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. would apply. It has been clarified that in case of absence of any such situation, the provisions of Section 22 of the MMDR Act are imperative and no exception can be taken. It is apt to have reference to para 70 of the judgment which reads as under:- “70. It has been clarified that in case of absence of any such situation, the provisions of Section 22 of the MMDR Act are imperative and no exception can be taken. It is apt to have reference to para 70 of the judgment which reads as under:- “70. There cannot be any dispute with regard to restrictions imposed under the MMDR Act and remedy provided therein. In any case, where there is a mining activity by any person in contravention of the provisions of Section 4 and other sections of the Act, the officer empowered and authorized under the Act shall exercise all the powers including making a complaint before the jurisdictional magistrate. It is also not in dispute that the Magistrate shall in such cases take cognizance on the basis of the complaint filed before it by a duly authorized officer. In case of breach and violation of Section 4 and other provisions of the Act, the police officer cannot insist Magistrate for taking cognizance under the Act on the basis of the record submitted by the police alleging contravention of the said Act. In other words, the prohibition contained in Section 22 of the Act against prosecution of a person except on a complaint made by the officer is attracted only when such person sought to be prosecuted for contravention of Section 4 of the Act and not for any act or omission which constitute an offence under Indian Penal Code.” 11. Mere incorporation of Section 34 of the IPC will not bring the instant case into the exception carved out in State (NCT of Delhi) Vs Sanjay (supra). Section 34 is not a substantive offence by itself. It makes a person vicariously liable for the acts of others. Since, there is no other offence under IPC attracted in the facts of instant case, no departure from the procedure prescribed under Section 55 of the Act will be permissible. 12. In view of the above discussion, the instant petition is allowed and FIR No. 138 dated 23.08.2018, under Section 51 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, registered at Police Station Karsog, District Mandi, H.P. and consequential proceedings of Police Challan No. 45/2019 pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Karsog, District Mandi, H.P., are ordered to be quashed. 13. Pending applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of.