ORDER : Anil K. Narendran, J. The petitioner is the respondent-tenant in R.C.P.No.8 of 2001 on the file of the Rent Control Court (Munsiff), Kodungallur, a petition filed by the 1st respondent herein-landlord, under Sections 11(3) and 11(4)(iv) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, seeking an order of eviction of the tenant from the petition schedule shop room. The 1st respondent-landlord has also filed R.C.P.Nos.2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 10, 11 and 12 of 2001 against the tenants in the adjacent shop rooms. During the pendency of these Rent Control Petitions, a compromise petition was filed in R.C.P.No.8 of 2001 and connected matters. The Rent Control Court, by the order dated 19.03.2004, disposed of R.C.P.No.8 of 2001 and connected matters in terms of that compromise. Accordingly, the petitioner-tenant and others gave vacant possession of the shop rooms to the 1st respondent-landlord for reconstruction. As per that compromise, the landlord has to complete the reconstruction of the building within ten months from 19.08.2004 and allot one room each to the respective tenants. 2. The tenant in R.C.P.No.8 of 2001 filed I.A.No.1213 of 2013, invoking the provisions under the second proviso to Section 11(4)(iv) of the Act, seeking permission to reconstruct the tenanted premises and permit him to adjust the cost of construction in the rent which accrues later. On receipt of notice in I.A.No.1213 of 2013, the 1st respondent-landlord entered appearance and filed counter, contending that the tenant is not legally entitled to such a relief on account of the delay of 9 years in filing the application. The landlord has also raised a contention that, due to financial problem, he assigned the property in question to a third party. In view of the said contention, the subsequent purchaser was impleaded as the 2nd respondent in I.A.No.1213 of 2013, who has also filed counter in the said interlocutory application. 3. The Rent Control Court, after considering the rival contentions, dismissed I.A.No.1213 of 2013 in R.C.P.No.8 of 2001, by the order dated 27.03.2017. Feeling aggrieved, the tenant filed R.C.A.No.110 of 2017 before the Rent Control Appellate Authority (Additional District Judge), Irinjalakkuda. That appeal ended in dismissal by the judgment dated 19.02.2020. 3. The Rent Control Court, after considering the rival contentions, dismissed I.A.No.1213 of 2013 in R.C.P.No.8 of 2001, by the order dated 27.03.2017. Feeling aggrieved, the tenant filed R.C.A.No.110 of 2017 before the Rent Control Appellate Authority (Additional District Judge), Irinjalakkuda. That appeal ended in dismissal by the judgment dated 19.02.2020. Challenging the order dated 27.03.2017 of the Rent Control Court in I.A.No.1213 of 2013 in R.C.P.No.8 of 2001 and also the judgment dated 19.02.2020 of the Rent Control Appellate Authority in R.C.A.No.110 of 2017, the petitioner-tenant is before this Court in this Rent Control Revision, invoking the provisions under Section 20 of the Act. 4. On 30.03.2022, when this Rent Control Revision came up for admission, this Court issued notice on admission to the respondents. 5. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant, the learned counsel for the 1st respondent-landlord and also the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent-subsequent purchaser. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that the reasoning of the authorities below, while rejecting the request for re-induction sought for in I.A.No.1213 of 2013 in R.C.P.No.8 of 2001 is perverse and patently illegal, which warrants interference by this Court, in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction under Section 20 of the Act. In view of the provisions under the second proviso to Section 11(4)(iv) of the Act, the landlord has got the statutory obligation to re-induct the tenant in the reconstructed building. Such an obligation of the landlord goes along with the property, on subsequent transfer of the property to a third party. 7. Per contra, the learned counsel for the 1st respondent-landlord and also the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent-subsequent purchaser would contend that I.A.No.1213 of 2013 in R.C.P.No.8 of 2001 filed by the tenant before the Rent Control Court, invoking the provisions under the second proviso to Section 11(4)(iv) of the Act, after long lapse of 9 years from the order of eviction, was highly belated. The landlord disposed of the property to the 2nd respondent due to financial constraints. In such circumstances, the authorities below cannot be found fault with in rejecting the request for re-induction sought for in I.A.No.1213 of 2013 in R.C.P.No.8 of 2001, for the reasons stated therein. 8. The landlord disposed of the property to the 2nd respondent due to financial constraints. In such circumstances, the authorities below cannot be found fault with in rejecting the request for re-induction sought for in I.A.No.1213 of 2013 in R.C.P.No.8 of 2001, for the reasons stated therein. 8. In reply, the learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant would point out that, immediately after the filing of R.C.P.No.8 of 2001, the landlord filed O.S.No.1091 of 2002 before the Munsiff Court, Kodungallur, against the Mandalam President of Indian National Congress, Kodungallur and the Local Committee Secretary of Communist Party of India (Marxist), Kodungallur seeking a decree for mandatory injunction directing them to remove the flag post erected and platform constructed on the southern corner of plaint A schedule property. The trial court granted a decree for mandatory injunction. The judgment and decree of the trial court was confirmed by the Sub Court, Irinjalakuda in A.S.No.188 of 2006 filed by the 2nd defendant. R.S.A.No.813 of 2012 filed by the 2nd defendant was dismissed by this Court on 27.06.2012. After the dismissal of R.S.A.No.813 of 2012, the tenant filed I.A.No.1213 of 2013 in R.C.P.No.8 of 2001, invoking the provisions under the second proviso to Section 11(4)(iv) of the Act, with a request for re-induction. On 06.07.2013, after the receipt of summons in the above interlocutory application, the landlord assigned the property to the 2nd respondent vide document No.2311/2013 of the Sub Registrar Office, Kodungallur. Therefore, the delay on the part of the tenant in invoking the provisions under the second proviso to Section 11(4)(iv) of the Act had occasioned due to the pendency of the proceedings before the civil court. 9. In the instant case, the petitioner-tenant filed I.A.No.1213 of 2013 in R.C.P.No.8 of 2001, invoking the provisions under the second proviso to Section 11(4)(iv) of the Act, seeking permission to reconstruct the tenanted premises and to adjust the cost of construction in the rent which accrues later. The order of eviction in R.C.P.No.8 of 2001 is one dated 19.03.2004. The tenant filed I.A.No.1213 of 2013 nearly 9 years after the order of eviction in R.C.P.No.8 of 2001. The order of eviction in R.C.P.No.8 of 2001 is one dated 19.03.2004. The tenant filed I.A.No.1213 of 2013 nearly 9 years after the order of eviction in R.C.P.No.8 of 2001. The Rent Control Court, by the order dated 27.03.2017, dismissed that interlocutory application on the ground that, though the direction contained in the order dated 19.03.2004 in R.C.P.No.8 of 2001 was to reconstruct the building within 10 months, the tenant has not approached the court with an application under the second proviso to Section 11(4)(iv) of the Act, within a reasonable period, after the expiry of that time limit. In the year 2013, the landlord sold the property to the 2nd respondent, who had constructed a building thereon and leased out the rooms to third parties. All these events happened in the same village, where the tenant is residing. Moreover, in I.A.No.1213 of 2013 the tenant has not sought for any relief against the 2nd respondent. In the order dated 27.03.2017, while dismissing I.A.No.1213 of 2013, the Rent Control Court found that on account of the construction of building by the 2nd respondent the relief sought for in that application has become infructuous. 10. Challenging the order dated 27.03.2017 of the Rent Control Court the tenant filed R.C.A.No.110 of 2017 and that appeal ended in dismissal, by the judgment dated 19.02.2020, on the ground that the application invoking the provisions under the third proviso to Section 11(4)(iv) of the Act has to be filed within a period of three years from the date on which the landlord has been directed to complete reconstruction of the building. In the order dated 19.03.2004 in R.C.P.No.8 of 2001 the Rent Control Court directed the tenant to reconstruct the building within 10 months. The tenant did not file any application for a long period, though the landlord has violated the order dated 19.03.2004. After a period of 9 years, the tenant filed I.A.No.1213 of 2013. In the meantime, the landlord transferred the property to the 2nd respondent, who had constructed a building thereon. The tenant, who is conducting a hotel near the said property did not send any letter to the landlord demanding reconstruction or allotment of room. The Appellate Authority found that there is no proper explanation by the tenant for the delay in filing I.A.No.1213 of 2013 and as such that interlocutory application is barred by limitation. The tenant, who is conducting a hotel near the said property did not send any letter to the landlord demanding reconstruction or allotment of room. The Appellate Authority found that there is no proper explanation by the tenant for the delay in filing I.A.No.1213 of 2013 and as such that interlocutory application is barred by limitation. Therefore, the Appellate Authority dismissed R.C.A.No.110 of 2017, holding that, no interference is warranted on the order of the Rent Control Court dated 27.03.2017 in I.a.No.1213 of 2013 in R.c.P.No.8 of 2001. Accordingly, the Appellate Authority dismissed R.C.A.No.110 of 2017. 11. Section 11 of the Act deals with eviction of tenants. As per sub-section (1) of Section 11, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract a tenant shall not be evicted, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise, except in accordance with the provisions of this Act. As per Section 11(4)(iv), a landlord may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building, if the building is in such a condition that it needs reconstruction and if the landlord requires bona fide to reconstruct the same and if he satisfies the court that he has the plan and licence, if any required, and the ability to rebuild and if the proposal is not made as a pretext for eviction. As per the first proviso to Section 11(4)(iv), the landlord who evicts a tenant and does not reconstruct completely the building within a time which may be fixed or extended by the Rent Control Court, shall on a petition before that court be liable to a fine of rupees five hundred, if it is proved that he has wilfully neglected to reconstruct completely the building within such time. As per the second proviso to Section 11(4)(iv), the court shall have power at any time to issue directions regarding the reconstruction of the building and on failure of compliance by the landlord, to give effect to the order in any manner the Court deems fit and in appropriate cases to put the tenant back in possession or award to the evicted tenant damages equal to the excess rent he has to pay for another building that he is occupying in consequence of such eviction. As per the third proviso to Section 11(4)(iv), the tenant who was evicted shall have the first option to have the reconstructed building allotted to him with liability to pay its fair rent. 12. In Achamma Ittoop v. District Court [ 1988 (1) KLT 690 ] a learned Single Judge of this Court was dealing with a case in which eviction under Section 11(4)(iv) of the Act on the ground of bona fide need for reconstruction was ordered on the application of the landlord. One year's time was granted for reconstruction with option to the two tenants to occupy the building after reconstruction. The existing building was demolished, after evicting the tenants. But, the building was never reconstructed. The tenants thereupon filed applications under the second proviso to Section 11(4)(iv) for award of damages. The landlord resisted the applications on various grounds. Pending the applications, the landlord died, and his legal representatives, i.e., his wife and son were impleaded. They resisted the applications inter alia on the ground that the building in question had been demolished, that there was no landlord-tenant relationship between them and the erstwhile tenants, that they were not parties to the Rent Control Petition and therefore they were under no obligation to reconstruct the building. The above contentions were not accepted by the authorities below and the applications filed by the tenants were allowed. Feeling aggrieved, the legal representatives of the landlord filed original petition before this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, raising a contention that they are not under any obligation to reconstruct the building or to put the tenants in possession of the building after reconstruction. 13. In Achamma Ittoop [ 1988 (1) KLT 690 ] this Court held that the order of eviction was obtained by the petitioners’ predecessor under Section 11(4)(iv) of the Act with the obligation to reconstruct the building within a period of one year. The tenants had the first option to occupy the building after reconstruction. The order of eviction under Section 11(4)(iv) thus casts an obligation on the landlord to reconstruct with a corresponding right to occupy on the tenants. This obligation runs with the land. Persons who acquire right in the property either as heirs at law or by transfer inter vivos are bound by the direction. The order of eviction under Section 11(4)(iv) thus casts an obligation on the landlord to reconstruct with a corresponding right to occupy on the tenants. This obligation runs with the land. Persons who acquire right in the property either as heirs at law or by transfer inter vivos are bound by the direction. The heir or the transferee is as much bound to reconstruct the building as the original landlord himself, subject of course to the defences available under the first proviso. The fact that the building had been demolished by the time the devolution of interest took place or that the default had been committed by the original landlord himself does not in any manner alter the position. The obligation to rebuild is cast on the person in possession of the land where the building stood, so long as he claims through or under the original landlord. 14. In Ratnakara Shenoy v. Rent Controller [ 1989 (2) KLT 690 ] a learned Single Judge of this Court was dealing with a case in which the landlord who evicted his tenant from the building pursuant to an order of eviction granted under Section 11(4)(iv) of the Act did not care to reconstruct the building. The evicted tenant, who took another building on a much higher rent, filed a petition before the Rent Control Court for appropriate directions under the provisos to Section 11(4)(iv) of the Act. The Rent Control Court directed the landlord to reconstruct the building within one year and further directed him to pay damages to the tenant at the rate of Rs.710/- per month, being the difference between the rent which the evicted tenant is now paying and the earlier rent, if the landlord fails to reconstruct the building within the permitted time. The appeal and the revision filed by the landlord ended in dismissal. The landlord challenged the orders of the authorities below in an original petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The landlord took a stand that he could not take up the work of reconstruction due to high escalation of cost of construction. He estimated the cost to be around Rs.1,00,000/-at the time of filing the petition, whereas the present estimation exceeds Rs.5,00,000/-. The landlord took a stand that he could not take up the work of reconstruction due to high escalation of cost of construction. He estimated the cost to be around Rs.1,00,000/-at the time of filing the petition, whereas the present estimation exceeds Rs.5,00,000/-. So, the landlord made a counter offer to the tenant that, if the tenant advances Rs.4,00,000/- as loan, he would start reconstruction of the building and the loan would be repaid with interest at the rate of 12% per annum. This offer was not given any serious consideration either by the tenant or by the authorities below. 15. In Ratnakara Shenoy [ 1989 (2) KLT 690 ] this Court held that the landlord who takes possession of the building pursuant to an order of eviction under Section 11(4)(iv) of the Act and demolishes it, cannot be heard to contend later that he does not have the financial resources to undertake the reconstruction. This is because the landlord must be deemed to have satisfied the Rent Control Court, before the order of eviction, that he has the ability to rebuild. The escalation of cost of construction is not a phenomenon peculiar to this landlord or to this locality or to the particular year. The Rent Control Court has wide powers to issue directions to contain the strategy of the landlord stalling the tenant's right of re-entry. Such powers are conferred by the provisos to Section 11(4)(iv) of the Act and hence it is the duty of the Rent Control Court to use such powers in appropriate cases and prevent mischief being perpetrated. Such powers include even the power to allow the affected tenant to reconstruct the building at his cost, if the landlord declines to reconstruct the building after pulling it down. The second proviso does not contain any restriction or limitation for the Rent Control Court to issue any direction in appropriate cases. 16. In Arunachalam Pillai v. District Court [ 1990 (2) KLT 881 ] a learned Single Judge of this Court held that the second proviso to Section 11(4)(iv) of the Act confers powers on the Rent Control Court to issue directions regarding reconstruction of the building. The landlord is bound to comply with such directions. In case the landlord fails to comply with such directions, the Rent Control Court is empowered to give effect to the order in any manner it deems fit. The landlord is bound to comply with such directions. In case the landlord fails to comply with such directions, the Rent Control Court is empowered to give effect to the order in any manner it deems fit. One of the modes by which it could enforce its order is to put the tenant back in possession in appropriate cases. This may not be possible in a case where the building has already been demolished and the new construction has either been not begun or it has not been completed. In such a case and in other appropriate cases the Rent Control Court can direct damages to be paid to the tenant. Such damages is to be equal to the excess rent the tenant may have to pay in consequence of the eviction. The third proviso deals with the option to the tenant to have the reconstructed building allotted to him. He has the liability to pay fair rent on such allotment It is settled law that the Rent Control Court does not become functus officio the moment an order of eviction under Section 11(4)(iv) of the Act is passed. Even after the passing of such order it continues to have jurisdiction to pass orders giving effect to the provisions contained in various provisos to Section 11(4)(iv) of the Act. The second proviso authorises the court to issue directions at any time regarding the reconstruction of the building. This direction regarding reconstruction of the building can be in relation to the time within which the landlord has to reconstruct. In cases where the eviction is ordered under Section 11(4)(iv) of the Act without fixing any time limit for reconstruction of the building, the Rent Control Court can at any time issue direction regarding the reconstruction of the building. In other words the Rent Control Court can fix a time limit for completing the reconstruction. 17. In Ameer Ali v. S. Koder [ 2004 (2) KLT 104 ] a Division Bench of this Court noticed that the provisos to Section 11(4)(iv) of the Act actually underscore the anxiety of the Legislature to ensure that the eviction order under Section 11(4)(iv) is a temporary affair and the tenant ultimately comes back to the reconstructed building. 17. In Ameer Ali v. S. Koder [ 2004 (2) KLT 104 ] a Division Bench of this Court noticed that the provisos to Section 11(4)(iv) of the Act actually underscore the anxiety of the Legislature to ensure that the eviction order under Section 11(4)(iv) is a temporary affair and the tenant ultimately comes back to the reconstructed building. The first proviso deals with the landlord's liability for fine which he will incur only if it is established by evidence that he has willfully neglected to reconstruct the building completely within the time originally fixed or as extended subsequently. The third proviso deals with actual re-allotment of the reconstructed building and the same comes into operation only after the reconstruction is completed and the building is ready for occupation. The second proviso is an independent proviso which operates differently and in a different area. The second proviso deals with situations subsequent to eviction but prior to re-allotment. The second proviso empowers the Rent Control Court to issue appropriate directions to the landlord regarding reconstruction of the building and to give effect to such directions in any effective manner including in appropriate cases by directing restoration of possession of the old building if the same has not been pulled down or even the situs of the old building. 18. In Sudheer v Raman Menon [ 2018 (1) KLT 791 ] one of the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the respondent-landlord was that, since the proposed construction is a joint venture, the right to re-induction provided under the provisos to Section 11(4)(iv) of the Act cannot be effected. Repelling that contention, the Division Bench held that the right of re-induction provided under Section 11(4)(iv) of the Act is a statutory right and that landlord cannot escape from the statutory mandate after obtaining an order of eviction. To ensure that right of the tenants the court can impose necessary conditions in the order of eviction. 19. In view of the provisions under sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act a tenant shall not be evicted, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise, except in accordance with the provisions of the said Act. 19. In view of the provisions under sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act a tenant shall not be evicted, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise, except in accordance with the provisions of the said Act. Under Section 11(4)(iv) of the Act, the landlord is entitled to an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building, if the building is in such a condition that it needs reconstruction and if the landlord requires bona fide to reconstruct the same and if he satisfies the court that he has the plan and licence, if any required, and the ability to rebuild and if the proposal is not made as a pretext for eviction. 20. The order of eviction under Section 11(4)(iv) of the Act casts an obligation on the landlord to reconstruct the building, with a corresponding right to occupy on the tenants. This obligation runs with the land. Persons who acquire right in the property either as heirs at law or by transfer inter vivos are bound by the direction. The fact that the building had been demolished by the time the devolution of interest took place or that the default had been committed by the original landlord himself does not in any manner alter the position. The obligation to rebuild is cast on the person in possession of the land where the building stood, so long as he claims through or under the original landlord. 21. The provisos to Section 11(4)(iv) of the Act make it explicitly clear that the eviction under Section 11(4)(iv) is a temporary affair to enable the landlord to reconstruct the building and the tenant shall have the first option to have the reconstructed building allotted to him, with the liability to pay fair rent. The right of re-induction provided under Section 11(4)(iv) is a statutory right and the landlord cannot escape from the statutory mandate after obtaining an order of eviction. The Rent Control Court has wide powers to issue directions to contain the strategy of the landlord stalling the tenant's right of re-entry. Such powers are conferred by the provisos to Section 11(4)(iv) and hence it is the duty of the Rent Control Court to use such powers in appropriate cases and prevent mischief being perpetrated. 22. The Rent Control Court has wide powers to issue directions to contain the strategy of the landlord stalling the tenant's right of re-entry. Such powers are conferred by the provisos to Section 11(4)(iv) and hence it is the duty of the Rent Control Court to use such powers in appropriate cases and prevent mischief being perpetrated. 22. Even after the passing of an order under Section 11(4)(iv) of the Act, the Rent Control Court continues to have jurisdiction to pass orders giving effect to the provisions contained in various provisos to Section 11(4)(iv). The second proviso authorises the court to issue directions at any time regarding the reconstruction of the building. The direction regarding reconstruction of the building can be in relation to the time within which the landlord has to reconstruct. Even in cases where the eviction is ordered under Section 11(4)(iv), without fixing any time limit for reconstruction of the building, the Rent Control Court can at any time issue direction regarding the reconstruction of the building. In other words, the Rent Control Court can fix a time limit for completing the reconstruction. 23. When the statutory obligation of the landlord under Section 11(4)(iv) of the Act to reconstruct the building, with a corresponding right to occupy on the tenants, runs with the land, persons who acquire right in the property either as heirs at law or by transfer inter vivos, after the landlord obtaining an order of eviction on the ground of reconstruction, cannot escape from the statutory mandate of Section 11(4)(iv). The second proviso to Section 11(4)(iv) of the Act authorises the court to issue directions at any time regarding the reconstruction of the building. Persons who acquired right in the property either as heirs at law or by transfer inter vivos are bound by such direction, despite the fact that the building had been demolished by the time the devolution of interest took place or that the default had been committed by the original landlord himself. 24. As noticed hereinbefore the second proviso to Section 11(4)(iv) of the Act authorises the Court to issue directions at any time regarding the reconstruction of the building. 24. As noticed hereinbefore the second proviso to Section 11(4)(iv) of the Act authorises the Court to issue directions at any time regarding the reconstruction of the building. As pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant would point out that, immediately after the filing of R.C.P.No.8 of 2001, the landlord filed O.S.No.1091 of 2002 before the Munsiff Court, Kodungallur, against the Mandalam President of Indian National Congress, Kodungallur and the Local Committee Secretary of Communist Party of India (Marxist), Kodungallur seeking a decree for mandatory injunction directing them to remove the flag post erected and platform constructed on the southern corner of plaint A schedule property. The trial court granted a decree for mandatory injunction. The judgment and decree of the trial court were confirmed by the Sub Court, Irinjalakuda in A.S.No.188 of 2006 filed by the 2nd defendant. R.S.A.No.813 of 2012 filed by the 2nd defendant was dismissed by this Court on 27.06.2012. After the dismissal of R.S.A.No.813 of 2012, the tenant filed I.A.No.1213 of 2013 in R.C.P.No.8 of 2001, invoking the provisions under the second proviso to Section 11(4)(iv) of the Act, with a request for re-induction. Therefore, the delay on the part of the tenant in invoking the provisions under the second proviso to Section 11(4)(iv) of the Act had occasioned due to the pendency of the proceedings before the civil court. 25. The statutory obligation of the landlord under Section 11(4)(iv) of the Act to reconstruct the building, with a corresponding right to occupy on the tenants, runs with the land and persons who acquire right in the property either as heirs at law or by transfer inter vivos after the landlord obtaining an order of eviction on the ground of reconstruction, cannot escape from the statutory mandate of Section 11(4)(iv). The authorities below omitted to take note of the statutory obligation of the landlord, which runs with the land, while considering the request made by the tenant in I.A.No.1213 of 2013 in R.C.P.No.8 of 2001, which is one filed invoking the provisions under the second proviso to Section 11(4)(iv) of the Act. As already noticed hereinbefore, after the filing of R.C.P.No.8 of 2001 the landlord filed O.S.No.1091 of 2002 before the Munsiff Court, Kodungallur, seeking a decree of mandatory injunction directing the defendants therein to remove the flag post erected and platform constructed on the southern corner of plait A schedule property. As already noticed hereinbefore, after the filing of R.C.P.No.8 of 2001 the landlord filed O.S.No.1091 of 2002 before the Munsiff Court, Kodungallur, seeking a decree of mandatory injunction directing the defendants therein to remove the flag post erected and platform constructed on the southern corner of plait A schedule property. Though the trial court granted a decree for mandatory injunction the 2nd defendant challenged that decree in A.S.No.188 of 2006 before the Sub Court, Irinjalakkuda and thereafter in R.S.A.No.813 of 2012 before this Court. The Second Appeal ended in dismissal by the judgment dated 27.06.2012. It is after the dismissal of that Second Appeal that the tenant filed I.A.No.1213 of 2013 in R.C.P.No.8 of 2001, invoking the provisions under the second proviso to Section 11(4)(iv) of the Act. On 06.07.2013, after the receipt of summons in I.A.No.1213 of 2013, the landlord assigned the property to the 2nd respondent. When the statutory obligation of the landlord under Section 11(4)(iv) of the Act to reconstruct the building, with the correspondent right to occupy on the tenants, runs with the land, the 2nd respondent, who acquired right over the property on which the petition schedule building situates, cannot escape from the statutory mandate of Section 11(4)(iv). Therefore, the Rent Control Court committed a grave error while rejecting I.A.No.1213 of 2013 filed by the tenant invoking the provisions under the second proviso to Section 11(4)(iv) of the Act by the order dated 27.03.2017. For the aforesaid reason, the reasoning of the Rent Control Appellate Authority while dismissing R.C.A.No.110 of 2017 filed by the tenant against the order dated 27.03.2017 of the Rent Control Court cannot also be sustained. The petitioner-tenant is entitled for a suitable accommodation in the newly constructed building of the 2nd respondent, with the liability to pay fair rent. 26. Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act deals with revision. The petitioner-tenant is entitled for a suitable accommodation in the newly constructed building of the 2nd respondent, with the liability to pay fair rent. 26. Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act deals with revision. As per sub-section (1) of Section 20, in cases, where the appellate authority empowered under Section 18 is a Subordinate Judge, the District Court, and in other cases the High Court, may, at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party, call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act by such authority for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or proceedings, and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit. As per sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Act, the costs of and incident to all proceedings before the High Court or District Court under sub-section (1) shall be in its discretion. 27. In Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana [ (1993) 1 SCC 499 ], the scope of revisional powers of the High Court under Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 came up for consideration before the Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court. While considering whether the High Court could have re-appreciated entire evidence, the Apex Court held that, even the wider language of Section 20 of the Act cannot enable the High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. Otherwise, the distinction between appellate and revisional jurisdiction will get obliterated. Hence, the High Court was not right in re-appreciating the entire evidence both oral or documentary in the light of the Commissioner's report. The High Court had travelled far beyond the revisional jurisdiction. Even by the presence of the word ‘propriety’ it cannot mean that there could be a re-appreciation of evidence. Of course, the revisional court can come to a different conclusion but not on a re-appreciation of evidence; on the contrary, by confining itself to legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it. 28. Even by the presence of the word ‘propriety’ it cannot mean that there could be a re-appreciation of evidence. Of course, the revisional court can come to a different conclusion but not on a re-appreciation of evidence; on the contrary, by confining itself to legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it. 28. In T. Sivasubramaniam v. Kasinath Pujari [ (1999) 7 SCC 275 ] the Apex Court held that, the words ‘to satisfy itself’ employed in Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 no doubt is a power of superintendence, and the High Court is not required to interfere with the finding of fact merely because the High Court is not in agreement with the findings of the courts below. It is also true that the power exercisable by the High Court under Section 25 of the Act is not an appellate power to reappraise or reassess the evidence for coming to a different finding contrary to the finding recorded by the courts below. But where a finding arrived at by the courts below is based on no evidence, the High Court would be justified in interfering with such a finding recorded by the courts below. 29. In Ubaiba v. Damodaran [ (1999) 5 SCC 645 ] the Apex Court considered the exercise of revisional power by the High Court, under Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, in the context of an issue as to whether the relationship of landlord-tenant existed or not. It was urged that whether such relationship existed would be a jurisdictional fact. Relying on the decision in Rukmini Amma Saradamma it was contended that, however wide the jurisdiction of the revisional court under Section 20 of the Act may be, it cannot have jurisdiction to re-appreciate the evidence and substitute its own finding upsetting the finding arrived at by the appellate authority. The Apex Court held that, though the revisional power under Section 20 of the Act may be wider than Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 it cannot be equated even with the second appellate power conferred on the civil court under the Code. The Apex Court held that, though the revisional power under Section 20 of the Act may be wider than Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 it cannot be equated even with the second appellate power conferred on the civil court under the Code. Therefore, notwithstanding the use of the expression ‘propriety’ in Section 20 of the Act, the revisional court will not be entitled to re-appreciate the evidence and substitute its own conclusion in place of the conclusion of the appellate authority. On examining the impugned judgment of the High Court, in the light of the aforesaid ratio, the Apex Court held that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by re-appreciating the evidence and in coming to the conclusion that the relationship of landlord-tenant did not exist. 30. In Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Dilbahar Singh [ (2014) 9 SCC 78 ] a Five-Judge Bench of the Apex Court considered the revisional powers of the High Court under Rent Acts operating in different States. After referring to the law laid down in Rukmini Amma Saradamma the Apex Court reiterated that even the wider language of Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 does not enable the High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. The Constitution Bench agreed with the view of the Three-Judge Bench in Rukmini Amma Saradamma that the word ‘propriety’ does not confer power upon the High Court to re-appreciate evidence to come to a different conclusion, but its consideration of evidence is confined to find out legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it. 31. In Thankamony Amma v. Omana Amma [ AIR 2019 SC 3803 : 2019 (4) KHC 412 ] considering the matter in the backdrop of law laid down in Rukmini Amma Saradamma, Ubaiba and Dilbahar Singh the Apex Court held that the findings rendered by the courts below were well supported by evidence on record and could not even be said to be perverse in any way. The High Court could not have re-appreciated the evidence and the concurrent findings rendered by the courts below ought not to have been interfered with by the High Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction. 32. The High Court could not have re-appreciated the evidence and the concurrent findings rendered by the courts below ought not to have been interfered with by the High Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction. 32. For the reasons stated hereinbefore, we find no reason to sustain the order dated 27.03.2017 of the Rent Control Court, Kodungallur in I.A.No.1213 of 2013 in R.C.P.No.8 of 2001 and also the judgment dated 19.02.2020 in R.C.A.No.110 of 2017 of the Rent Control Appellate Authority, Irinjalakkuda. That order and judgment are set aside and I.A.No.1213 of 2013 in R.C.P.No.8 of 2001 filed by the petitioner-tenant is allowed by holding that he is entitled to get re-induction in the building constructed by the 2nd respondent, who had purchased the said property from the 1st respondent-landlord, in view of the statutory mandate of the second proviso to Section 11(4)(iv) of the Act; however with a liability to pay fair rent. 33. In the result, this Rent Control Revision is allowed by setting aside the order dated 27.03.2017 of the Rent Control Court, Kodungallur in I.A.No.1213 of 2013 in R.C.P.No.8 of 2001 and also the judgment dated 19.02.2020 in R.C.A.No.110 of 2017 of the Rent Control Appellate Authority, Irinjalakkuda and by allowing I.A.No.1213 of 2013 to the extent indicated above. 34. The learned counsel for the 2nd respondent would submit that the 2nd respondent shall provide suitable accommodation to the petitioner-tenant in the newly constructed building, within a period of one month, with liability to pay fair rent. The aforesaid undertaking given by the 2nd respondent is recorded. In case of any default, the petitioner-tenant will be entitled to execute the order for re-induction in the building constructed by the 2nd respondent, by approaching the Munsiff Court, Kodungallur.