ORDER : 1. This Criminal Revision Case is filed by the complainant herein under Sections 397 and 401 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 assailing the judgment dated 25.11.2015 passed in Criminal Appeal No. 560 of 2015 on the file of the Special Judge for Trial of Offences under S.C. and S.T. (Prevention of Atrocities) Act-cum-VI Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Secunderabad, confirming the judgment dated 15.06.2015 passed in C.C. No. 396 of 2014 (Old C.C. No. 1261 of 2014) on the file of the X Special Magistrate, Hyderabad. 2. Heard learned counsel for the Revision Petitioner/complainant. None appeared for the 2nd respondent/accused. 3. The parties herein will be referred to as per their array in the Court below. 4. The case of the complainant was that the accused herein was known to him for the past four (04) years and due to friendship developed between them, the accused requested the complainant to arrange for a hand loan of Rs.50,000/- and Rs.60,000 and Rs.90,000/- in different spells. The complainant accordingly provided the said amounts as hand loan to the accused. Again, the accused approached him on 03.12.2013 and requested the complainant for a hand loan of Rs.3,00,000/- for his business urgently. The complainant informed the accused that he was not having the said amount of Rs.3 lakhs, but was having only an amount of Rs.2,43,000/- for which the accused accepted to receive the same and also promised to repay the same within one or two months with interest @ 2% per month. But, the accused did not repay the said amount within the agreed time; but, however, he paid interest thereon for a period of three (03) months and failed to pay any amounts thereafter: 3.1 On persistent demands made by the complainant, the accused issued a cheque bearing No. 013812, dated 14.08.2014, drawn on ICICI Bank, M.G. Road, Hyderabad Branch for an amount of Rs.2,43,000/- towards discharge of legally enforceable debt. 3.2 The complainant presented the above cheque in the bank for realization. However, the said cheque was returned by the bank with endorsement ‘insufficient funds’. 3.3 Thereafter, the complainant issued a legal notice dated 25.08.2014 which was delivered to the accused on 27.08.2014. But, even after receiving the same, the accused neither gave reply nor made arrangements for payment of the amount. 5. Aggrieved thereby, the complainant filed a complaint before the Trial Court. 6. 3.3 Thereafter, the complainant issued a legal notice dated 25.08.2014 which was delivered to the accused on 27.08.2014. But, even after receiving the same, the accused neither gave reply nor made arrangements for payment of the amount. 5. Aggrieved thereby, the complainant filed a complaint before the Trial Court. 6. Trial was conducted by the X Special Magistrate, Hyderabad. The accused pleaded not guilty. The complainant was examined as PW-1 and Exs.P.1 to P.5 were marked on his behalf. No evidence was adduced by the accused. 7. On considering the oral and documentary evidence on record, the Trial Court, by order dated 15.06.2015, found the accused “not guilty” for the offence punishable under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short, ‘the N.I. Act’) and acquitted him. 8. Aggrieved by the order of acquittal passed by the learned X Special Magistrate, Hyderabad in C.C. No. 396 of 2014, dated 15.06.2015, the complainant herein preferred Criminal Appeal, vide Criminal Appeal No. 560 of 2013 before the Special Judge for Trial of Offences under S.C. and S.T. (Prevention of Atrocities) Act-cum-VI Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Secunderabad. 9. On considering the evidence on record, the Appellate Court, by order dated 25.11.2015, also dismissed the Criminal Appeal No. 560 of 2015 and confirmed the judgment of the Trial Court in C.C. No. 396 of 2014, dated 15.06.2015. 10. Aggrieved further, the complainant preferred the present Criminal Revision. 11. 9. On considering the evidence on record, the Appellate Court, by order dated 25.11.2015, also dismissed the Criminal Appeal No. 560 of 2015 and confirmed the judgment of the Trial Court in C.C. No. 396 of 2014, dated 15.06.2015. 10. Aggrieved further, the complainant preferred the present Criminal Revision. 11. Learned counsel for complainant contended that the Appellate Court failed to see that the Trial Court did not consider the presumption as mandated under Section 139 of N.I. Act; in fact, nothing had been considered by the Trial Court except extracting the contentions and citations relied on by the respective parties; it was not stated by the Appellate Court as to how the accused became successful in his rebuttal evidence, and had discharged his burden to disprove the complainant’s case and was able to displace the presumption; except extracting the entire cross-examination of the complainant and listing the citations given by the accused, nothing had been considered by the Court below; the learned Appellate Court also extracted the contentions of complainant but did not advert to the plea of presumption as mandated under Section 139 of N.I. Act; the Trial Court went on to say that no single scrap of paper was produced by the plaintiff to show that he gave money to the accused; the accused asserted that he repaid the amount; it was the specific case of the complainant that on earlier occasion the accused had requested him for a hand loan of Rs.50,000/- Rs.60,000/- and Rs.90,000/- at different spells and, in fact, the accused had repaid the said amount to the complainant during the last two years; the assertion of the accused was that he repaid the amount and the complainant misused the cheque issued at that time; if it was the case of accused, he ought to have issued a reply notice to the statutory legal notice issued by the complainant, and in the absence of the same, it could not be said that the accused had discharged his burden; it was the duty of the accused to adduce evidence to show that he repaid the amount related to the present transaction; therefore, the Courts below have not considered the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in Rangappa vs. Mohan, AIR 2010 SC 1898 properly; in view of presumption under Section 139 of N.I. Act and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court with regard to the existence of legally enforceable debt or liability, there was no necessity to file other supporting documents in respect of debt; both the Courts below had not considered the facts and law in right perspective, and hence, the judgments of the Courts below were liable to be set aside. 12. Learned counsel for the complainant further contended that it was also held in Om Prakash Agarwal vs. Khaja Krishna Prasad, 2014 (6) LAWS (APH) 74 that “not giving a reply to the statutory legal notice would strengthen the case of the complainant and improbabilizes the defence and inference could be drawn from the said conduct in not giving reply” when once presumption was mandated under law, both the Courts below went wrong in arriving at a conclusion that the complainant did not prove prima facie case; the observation of the Trial Court that complainant had not filed any Income Tax Returns which mandated payment of more than Rs.20,000/- by way of cheque or Demand Draft was concerned, the same would be considered if the accused would discharge his rebuttal evidence; and prayed this Court to allow the Criminal Revision Case by setting aside the judgments of the Courts below. 13. Now the point for consideration is “whether there is any illegality or infirmity in the orders passed by the Courts below?” 14. As seen from the judgment of the Trial Court, except extracting the cross-examination of the complainant and the list of the citations relied by both counsel, no reasoning was given by the Trial Court for considering the accused as “not guilty” for the offence under Section 138 of N.I. Act. The Trial Court directly came to the conclusion at Para No. 14 as under: “14. From the oral evidence coupled with documentary evidence on record and facts and circumstances elicited by defence counsel in the cross-examination of PW-1 discussed in foregoing paras and case laws cited supra accused has become successful in his rebuttal evidence and I find that accused had discharged his burden to disprove the complainant’s case and he is able to displace presumption that complainant failed to prove the main ingredient of the offence that the accused issued cheque for discharge of his legally enforceable debt or other liability and that accused is entitled for acquittal. The points are answered accordingly. In the result, accused is found not guilty of the offence under Section 138 of N.I. Act and he is acquitted for the said offence under Section 255(1) of Cr.P.C. Bail bonds of accused shall stand cancelled.” From the above, it can be seen that no reasoning was given by the Trial Court in coming to the said conclusion. 15. In the result, accused is found not guilty of the offence under Section 138 of N.I. Act and he is acquitted for the said offence under Section 255(1) of Cr.P.C. Bail bonds of accused shall stand cancelled.” From the above, it can be seen that no reasoning was given by the Trial Court in coming to the said conclusion. 15. The Appellate Court observed that prima facie burden was on the shoulders of complainant to prove that the accused borrowed money of Rs.2,43,000/- and towards discharge of the same, the accused had issued Cheque (Ex.P.1), and subsequently the same was dishonoured with an endorsement “insufficient funds” and noted that no single scrap of paper was produced by the complainant to show that he gave money to accused. Except the said cheque in question, there was no other document available on record to show that he gave money to the accused, and the accused gave cheque subsequently. In the cross-examination, PW-1 categorically admitted that apart from the cheque he has no document in support of the said cheque for the claim that he made as legally enforceable debt or liability. PW-1 further admitted in his cross-examination that he was an Advocate by profession and got legal knowledge with regard to the offence under Section 138 of N.I. Act, and that he was an Income Tax assessee, but he did not show the earlier transaction in his Income Tax Returns. He stated that the present transaction was shown in his Income Tax Returns, but, no Income Tax Returns were filed and marked on his behalf. It was a constitutional right, even to the accused to maintain silence. There was no need or necessity for him to go into the witness box and to give his evidence. There was no compulsion to the accused to give his evidence. It was for the complainant to establish his case basing on the preponderance of probabilities. The burden was heavily upon the complainant that he had advanced money to the accused. No Income Tax Returns were filed by the complainant, as such, the Appellate Court held that the complainant miserably failed to establish the offence under Section 138 of N.I. Act; and that the accused was entitled for acquittal. 16. The burden was heavily upon the complainant that he had advanced money to the accused. No Income Tax Returns were filed by the complainant, as such, the Appellate Court held that the complainant miserably failed to establish the offence under Section 138 of N.I. Act; and that the accused was entitled for acquittal. 16. In Goa Plast (Pvt.) Ltd. vs. Chico Ursula D’Souza, (2003) 3 SCC 232 the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under: “Chapter XVII containing Sections 138 to 142 was introduced in the Act by Act 66 of 1988 with the object of inculcating faith in the efficacy of banking operations and giving credibility to negotiable instruments in business transactions. These provisions were intended to discourage people from not honouring their commitments by way of payment through cheques. The court should lean in favour of an interpretation which serves the object of the statute. A post-dated cheque will lose its credibility and acceptability if its payment can be stopped routinely. The purpose of a post-dated cheque is to provide some accommodation to the drawer of the cheque. Therefore, it is all the more necessary that the drawer of the cheque should not be allowed to abuse the accommodation given to him by a creditor by way of acceptance of a post-dated cheque. In view of Section 139, it has to be presumed that a cheque is issued in discharge of any debt or other liability. The presumption can be rebutted by adducing evidence and the burden of proof is on the person who wants to rebut the presumption. This presumption coupled with the object of Chapter XVII of the Act leads to the conclusion that by countermanding payment of a post-dated cheque, a party should not be allowed to get away from the penal provision of Section 138. A contrary view would render S. 138 a dead letter and will provide a handle to persons trying to avoid payment under legal obligations undertaken by them through their own acts which in other words can be said to be taking advantage of one's own wrong....” 17. Section 118 of the N.I. Act provides presumption as to the negotiable instruments as under: “118. Section 118 of the N.I. Act provides presumption as to the negotiable instruments as under: “118. Presumptions as to negotiable instruments: Until the contrary is proved, the following presumptions shall be made : (a) of consideration : that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration, and that every such instrument when it has been accepted, endorsed, negotiated or transferred, was accepted, endorsed, negotiated or transferred for consideration.......” 18. Sections 139 of N.I. Act provides presumption in favour of holder of a negotiable instrument as under: “139. Presumption in favour of holder: It shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque, of the nature referred to in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt, or other liability.” 19. In Rangappa vs. Mohan case (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court held that “ordinarily in cheque bouncing cases, what the courts have to consider is whether the ingredients of the offence enumerated in Section 138 of the N.I. Act have been met and if so, whether the accused was able to rebut the statutory presumption contemplated by Section 139 of the Act.” 20. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court on considering the various judgments rendered by it till then on the sad aspect held at Para No. 7 as under: “7. In light of these extracts, we are in agreement with the respondent-claimant that the presumption mandated by Section 139 of the Act does indeed include the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability. To that extent, the impugned observations in Krishna Janardhan Bhat (supra) may not be correct. However, this does not in any way cast doubt on the correctness of the decision in that case since it was based on the specific facts and circumstances therein. As noted in the citations, this is of course in the nature of a rebuttable presumption and it is open to the accused to raise a defence wherein the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability can be contested. However, there can be no doubt that there is an initial presumption which favours the complainant. Section 139 of the Act is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. However, there can be no doubt that there is an initial presumption which favours the complainant. Section 139 of the Act is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While Section 138 of the Act specifies a strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of cheques, the rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. However, it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by Section 138 can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose impact is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the accused/defendant cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard or proof. In the absence of compelling justifications, reverse onus clauses usually impose an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden. Keeping this in view, it is a settled position that when an accused has to rebut the presumption under Section 139, the standard of proof for doing so is that of preponderance of probabilities. Therefore, if the accused is able to raise a probable defence which creates doubts about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. As clarified in the citations, the accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it is conceivable that in some cases the accused may not need to adduce evidence of his/her own.” 21. Learned counsel for the complainant also relied upon the latest judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Oriental Bank of Commerce vs. Prabodh Kumar Tewari, Crl. Appeal No. 1260 of 2022 dated 16.08.2022 wherein it was held that: “15. A drawer who signs a cheque and hands it over to the payee, is presumed to be liable unless the drawer adduces evidence to rebut the presumption that the cheque has been issued towards payment of a debt or in discharge of a liability. The presumption arises under Section 139.” 22. A drawer who signs a cheque and hands it over to the payee, is presumed to be liable unless the drawer adduces evidence to rebut the presumption that the cheque has been issued towards payment of a debt or in discharge of a liability. The presumption arises under Section 139.” 22. Coming to the facts in the present Revision, the accused herein also failed to give reply to the statutory notice given by the complainant under Section 138 of N.I. Act which would lead to an inference that there was merit in the version of the complainant. If the accused repaid the amounts taken by him as hand-loans earlier, then why the accused had not demanded the complainant to return the said cheque which the accused had given as security, was not explained by the accused. Further, no notice was issued by the accused for return of the cheque before the complainant filed this present case nor did he choose to give reply to the legal notice issued by the complainant. When the accused admitted his signatures on the cheque, the reverse onus is placed by the statute upon him to rebut the presumption under Section 139 of N.I. Act to show under what circumstances he issued the said cheque to the complainant. 23. A Division Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in T. Vasanthakumar vs. Vijayakumari, 2015 (4) LAWS (SC) 79 held at Para Nos. 7, 8, 9 and 11 as under: “7........It is of great significance that the cheque has not been disputed nor the signature of the defendant on it. There has been some controversy before us with respect to Section 139 of Negotiable Instruments Act as to whether complainant has to prove existence of a legally enforceable debt before the presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act starts operating and burden shifts to the accused. Section 139 reads as follows: “139. Presumption in favour of the holder: It shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability.” 8. This Court has held in its Three Judge Bench judgment in Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan as under: “The presumption mandated by Section 139 includes a presumption that there exists a legally enforceable debt or liability. This Court has held in its Three Judge Bench judgment in Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan as under: “The presumption mandated by Section 139 includes a presumption that there exists a legally enforceable debt or liability. This is of course in the nature of a rebuttable presumption and it is open to the accused to raise a defence wherein the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability can be contested. However, there can be no doubt that there is an initial presumption which favours the respondent complainant.” 9..........since the cheque as well as the signature has been accepted by the accused respondent, the presumption under Section 139 would operate. Thus, the burden was on the accused to disprove the cheque or the existence of any legally recoverable debt or liability. To this effect, the accused has come up with a story that the cheque was given to the complainant long back in 1999 as a security to a loan; the loan was repaid but the complainant did not return the security cheque. According to the accused, it was that very cheque used by the complainant to implicate the accused....... 11. In light of the above reasoning, we find that the learned High Court was misplaced in putting the burden of proof on the complainant. As per Section 139, the burden of proof had shifted on the accused which the accused failed to discharge. Thus, we find merit in this appeal.” 24. In the present case also, both the Courts below had placed the burden of proof on the complainant to show that it was the complainant who had to establish that there was a legally enforceable debt, even though the accused had not disputed the issuance of cheque to the complainant. As it is not the correct interpretation of law (as stated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the above cited cases), and though the above decisions are cited before the Courts below, they failed to correctly interpret the provisions of law and failed to appreciable the judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court in correct perspective, it is considered fit to allow the Criminal Revision Case by setting aside the orders passed by both the Courts below. 25. 25. As such, it is considered fit to convict the accused and to sentence him to undergo simple imprisonment till rising of the day and to pay a fine of Rs.2,43,000/- with default sentence of three months simple imprisonment. 26. The concerned Magistrate is directed to secure the presence of the accused by issuing a warrant to undergo the sentence in the open court and to cause recover the fine amount; and on such recovery, the fine shall be paid to the complainant as compensation under Section 357 of Criminal Procedure Code. 27. Accordingly, the Criminal Revision Case is allowed as above. No costs. 28. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending if any in this Revision, shall stand closed.