JUDGMENT : 1. By way of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged the legality and validity of an order dated 02.06.2008 passed by respondent authority and sought a consequential reliefs for granting appropriate pay scale, grade and other ancillary benefits. The payers clause contained in the petition are reproduced hereunder: “7.(A). Allow this Petition. (B). Quash and set aside the order dated 2/06/2008 as being illegal, arbitrary, violative of principles of natural justice, unconstitutional and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. (C). Declare that the petitioner is entitled to be placed in the scale of pay and grade on the date of superannuation of 29/02/2004, as if the impugned order of penalty has not been passed. (D). Direct the Respondents to compute and pay pensionary benefits to the petitioner on the basis of last pay drawn as if the impugned order of penalty dated 2/06/2008 has not been passed. (E). Pending admission and final hearing of the petition, suspend the implementation, execution and enforcement of the order dated 2/06/2008. (F). Pass such other or further orders as may be deemed necessary and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case. (FF) The quash and set aside the penalty order dated 2.06.2008 on the ground that it has no bearing of authority based on the Rules of the Respondent Insurance Company and allow the petitioner to be placed in the scale of pay and grade on the date of 29.02.2004 and allow him to retire with all consequential benefits.” 2. The case of the petitioner is that the petitioner was appointed as a Development Inspector with respondent No.2 i.e. United India Insurance Company Limited on 01.03.1974 and superannuated on 29.02.2004. It is the case of the petitioner that the respondent No.2 placed the petitioner under suspension vide order dated 04.04.1991 and the said order of suspension was passed on account of the investigation being conducted by the Central Bureau of Investigation against petitioner in response to the First Information Report dated 02.04.1991 under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act. According to petitioner, two criminal cases were lodged against the petitioner one was dropped in the month of June 1992 on an application made by the CBI to drop the proceedings on the ground that there was no sufficient evidence to prove the charges and accordingly, RC 11/1991 and RC 16/1991, RC 11/1991 were dropped by the agency and RC 16/1991 did not progress further. It is the case of the petitioner that by that time the charge-sheet was issued on 20.02.1992 for contemplating the departmental proceedings against the petitioner and main charge was that petitioner in discharge of his duties as Development Officer had demanded and accepted bribe for settlement of an insurance claim of the claimant. Of-course the said charge leveled against the petitioner was denied by the petitioner vide a letter dated 24.02.199. On 14.05.1992, an Enquiry Officer was appointed to conduct the departmental proceedings against the petitioner and the department appointed a Police Sub-Inspector working with CBI, who had carried out the investigation to prosecute the petitioner, as a Presenting Officer to the case of department. On 19.05.1993, the petitioner made a request in the form of application to Enquiry Officer seeking permission to engage a lawyer as a defense assistance and the said request was made in view of the fact that Police Inspector who was connected with the investigation of the whole incident was appointed as Presenting Officer. However, the said request of engaging a lawyer came to be rejected by the Enquiry Officer. 2.1 According to the petitioner, the departmental proceedings remained pending for more than seven years after issuance of charge-sheet as a result of this, on 20.02.1998 a representation was made to expedite the proceedings since the petitioner was under suspension. In pursuance to the said request, the Enquiry Officer fixed the hearing on 27.07.1998 indicating unavoidable circumstances for delay being caused but then after conducting a departmental inquiry, a report of inquiry was prepared and furnished to the petitioner along with letter dated 27.01.2000. The petitioner against this letter has responded vide communication dated 10.02.2000 but ultimately the disciplinary authority vide order dated 30.06.2000 imposed a punishment of “reduction in pay by 18 steps in the time scale” and also treating the entire period of suspension as “period not spent on duty”. The petitioner against this letter has responded vide communication dated 10.02.2000 but ultimately the disciplinary authority vide order dated 30.06.2000 imposed a punishment of “reduction in pay by 18 steps in the time scale” and also treating the entire period of suspension as “period not spent on duty”. 2.2 It is the case of the petitioner that against the order of penalty dated 30.06.2000 an Appeal came to be filed before the Appellate Authority, namely, the Assistant General Manager, who was pleased to reject the Appeal vide order dated 23.02.2001. A further step was taken by the petitioner to readdress the grievance against penalty by way of filing review but the same also came to be rejected vide order dated 08.11.2001. Since the said remedies have been exhausted, the petitioner was constrained to prefer a Writ Petition being Special Civil Application No.8811 of 2002 before this Court challenging the aforesaid orders of penalty and the subsequent orders passed against the petitioner and on 02-05/07/2004 by a detailed judgment and order, this Court was pleased to allow the petition and set aside the impugned orders and directed the respondents to pay all consequential benefits. 2.3 It is further the case of the petitioner that respondent company was pleased to file an Appeal against the said decision of learned Single Judge which was numbered as Letters Patent Appeal No.1902 of 2004 and the said Letters Patent Appeal came to be partly allowed vide order dated 05.03.2008 whereby a direction was issued to the disciplinary authority to take a decision afresh and in response thereto the respondent authority later on passed an order on 02.06.2008 (Annexure-A), which is made the subject matter of present Writ Petition. 3. The present petition pursuant to the notice having been issued on 29.08.2008 came up for consideration later on and on 08.10.2008 wherein the Rule was issued and the interim relief in terms of para-7(E) came to be granted subject to the result of the petition. Para 7(E) the interim prayer whereby the operation, implementation and execution of the impugned order dated 02.06.2008 came to be suspended. Then after filing of the pleadings and after hearing, on 28.01.2022, the co-ordinate Bench of this Court was pleased to pass an order, which reads as under:- “Learned advocate Mr. Para 7(E) the interim prayer whereby the operation, implementation and execution of the impugned order dated 02.06.2008 came to be suspended. Then after filing of the pleadings and after hearing, on 28.01.2022, the co-ordinate Bench of this Court was pleased to pass an order, which reads as under:- “Learned advocate Mr. Maulik Shelat appearing for the respondents No.1 and 2 requests for some time in order to take sense from the respondent authority with regard to imposing the penalty of reducing the pay-scale on the petitioner by 18 stages. A perusal of the General Insurance (Conduct, Discipline and Appeal, Rule, 1975, more particularly, Rule 23 (E) does not stipulate such reduction of stages. At his request, the matter is kept on 28.02.2020.” 3.1 Later on, the affidavits have been filed and the matter was adjourned from time to time and has then came up for consideration before this Court finally in which Mr.G.M.Joshi, learned senior advocate appearing with Mr. Vyom H. Shah, learned advocate has represented the petitioner and Mr. Maulik J. Shelat, learned advocate has represented respondent Nos. 1 and 2 – authorities. 4. Mr. G.M.Joshi, learned senior advocate appearing for the petitioner has contended that the penalty, which has been passed even after taking afresh decision is too harsh, disproportionate of the gravity of charge and the allegations against the petitioner and as such the impugned order deserves to be quashed and set aside being arbitrary, unreasonable and disproportionate. It has been contended that the impugned order is also suffering from the vice of non-application of mind especially when non of the contentions raised by the petitioner have been dealt with nor the cogent reasons are assigned while passing the impugned order. In any case, while taking fresh decision, order could have been passed with cogent reasons, which is not reflecting. 4.1 Mr. Joshi, learned senior advocate has submitted that even after the order passed by the Division Bench, fresh opportunity ought to have been given which also has not been provided to the petitioner and the decision which has been taken is not appearing to be in true spirit and as such the decision making process is also not just and fair. Mr. Mr. Joshi, learned senior advocate has further submitted that while passing the impugned order Rule 23(e) of the General Insurance (Conduct, Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1975 (hereinafter referred as to the “Rules”) has been resorted to impose reduction in basic pay by 18 steps in the time scale applicable to the petitioner. But even while passing such order, the authority ought to have examined as to whether this kind of penalty is coming within the purview of Rule 23(e) of the Rules or not. The apparent reading of Rule 23(e) of the Rules does not stipulate such reduction of stages and as such the authority by sheer non application of mind in mechanical exercise of their discretion inflicted almost the very same penalty. Hence, the same is beyond the purview of Rule 23(e) of the Rules, the order impugned deserves to be quashed on this count alone. 4.2 Mr. Joshi, learned senior advocate has further submitted that a major penalty cannot be imposed under Rule 23(e) of the Rules which deals with reduction to a lower service or post or to a lower time-scale or to a lower stage in a time scale; this wordings are clearly suggesting that reduction cannot be to the extent of 18 steps and hence, their own service regulations are not providing such penalty hence, the impugned order is not sustainable in the eye of law. Mr. Joshi, learned senior advocate has also submitted that a perusal of the General Clauses Act, 1897 Section 3(50) which defines “Regulation” and these rules which are resorted cannot be said to have similar effect. 4.3 Mr. Joshi, learned senior advocate has then submitted that even in view of the effect of provisions contained under the General Clauses Act particularly Section 3(7), (50) and (51), the service regulations of 1975 can not have the statutory force and even if it be so then also the meaning which is tried to be assigned to Rule 23(e) of the Rules is out of place and words incorporated therein cannot be read in plural. 4.4 Further, to substantiate the contentions, as referred to above, an attention is drawn to the decision delivered by the Division Bench of this Court in Letters Patent Appeal No.1902 of 2004 wherein on 05.03.2008 the Division Bench has held that a fresh decision in respect of disciplinary inquiry deserves to be taken and while taking such view, certain aspects have been brought to the notice from paragraph Nos. 5, 6 and 7 of the said decision. Hence, it is submitted that reliefs prayed for in the petition deserves to be granted and it has been reiterated that in any case plain reading of Rule 23(e) of the Rules would permit the authority to pass present impugned order. 4.5 Mr. Joshi, learned senior counsel has relied upon following decision to strengthen his case:- (i) In the case of M/s Glaxo Laboratories (I) Ltd. versus Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Meerut and others reported in (1984) 1 SCC 1 . 5. Per contra, Mr. Maulik J. Shelat, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 – authorities has vehemently opposed the petition by contended that the petitioner has committed a serious misconduct and faced with a serious charge which has been proved and it is in that respect, the entire inquiry has been conducted against him. By referring to the findings of Enquiry Officer, a contention is raised that misconduct against the petitioner has been proved and has further submitted that full opportunity was given to the petitioner during the course of inquiry and it is not the case that there is any violation of principles of natural justice to a substantial extent. It has been contended further that even the audio-clip also found to be correct by the report of FSL reflecting at page Nos. 82 - 84 of the petition compilation and as such has submitted that when the charges leveled against the petitioner have been proved beyond reasonable doubt, even during the course of inquiry, there is hardly any reason to substitute the penalty which has been imposed upon after due application of mind. 5.1 Mr. Shelat, learned advocate has submitted that it is ill-founded in the mouth of petitioner to contend that Rules of 1975 under which action is taken cannot be resorted to. 5.1 Mr. Shelat, learned advocate has submitted that it is ill-founded in the mouth of petitioner to contend that Rules of 1975 under which action is taken cannot be resorted to. On the contrary, the same have been framed which has a statutory effect and the said Rules have been framed from the central enactment and as such the contentions raised by learned senior advocate is of no significance on the controversy involved in the petition. Further, so far as an attempt is made that since singular word is referred to in Rule 23(e) of the Rules, in respect of penalties, it has been submitted by Mr. Shelat that words in singular shall include plural and for the purpose of contending such, a dictionary meaning assigned to word “a” is referred to from Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary and as such the lowering down to the extent of 18 steps is thoroughly permitted and justified and as such looking to the gravity of charge when the disciplinary authority has thought it fit to inflict an appropriate penalty particularly when serious charges have been established there is hardly any reason for petitioner to agitate unless the same is arbitrary or apparently unreasonable. By referring to the charges which are stated to have been proved, Mr. Shelat, learned advocate has submitted that reasonable penalty on the contrary is inflicted which is just and proper by taking more lenient view instead of removing or dismissing from the services and as such it is not open for the petitioner to went on to agitate the issue with regard to proportionality of penalty by again challenging the fresh decision. 5.2 Mr. Shelat, learned advocate has submitted that it is settled position of law that once the action is initiated in close conformity with principles of natural justice, with due application of mind and after considering the over all circumstances, then what penalty is to be inflicted upon is the domain of the disciplinary authority. As a result of this, no case is made out by the petitioner to call for any interference. 5.3 By referring to the chapter of penalty indicating minor as well as major penalty, a reference is made to clause 23(b) and 23(e) of the applicable Rules and has submitted that when the major penalty clause is using word “a” it denotes to plural. 5.3 By referring to the chapter of penalty indicating minor as well as major penalty, a reference is made to clause 23(b) and 23(e) of the applicable Rules and has submitted that when the major penalty clause is using word “a” it denotes to plural. Hence, that being so, no case is made by the petitioner to call for any interference. Mr. Shelat, learned advocate has further submitted that on the contrary harmonious construction if to be applied such technical pleas raised by the petitioner are of no avail. Hence, when there is no violation of any of the principles of natural justice or any apparent arbitrariness, the order of penalty may not be interfered with. To strengthen his submission, Mr. Shelat, learned advocate has referred to not only the findings of Enquiry Officer but also certain observations which have been made by the Division Bench of this Court and thereby has submitted that when a serious charge is levelled against the petitioner there is hardly any reason for the petitioner to invoke extraordinary equitable jurisdiction as a result of this, the petition being devoid of merit deserves to be dismissed. 5.4 Mr. Shelat, learned advocate has relied upon following to strengthen his case:- (i) A decision delivered by Madhya Pradesh High Court, Jabalpur in the case of Gurudayal Gupta versus Satpura Narmada Kshetriya Gramin Bank, Chhindwara and another passed in Writ Petition No.1531 of 1996 delivered on 02.07.2010. (ii) The Stroud's Judicial Dictionary (Fifth Edition) by John S. James. Relevant extract from the said dictionary is quoted below:- "(3) "A" may sometimes be read as "some", e.g. in an order under the Municipal Elections (Corrupt and Illegal Practices) Act 1884 (c. 70), s.28(5), directing a prosecution for "a" corrupt practice (R. v. Riley, 59 L.J.M.C. 122, cited Corrupt Practice). But more frequently "a" is the equivalent of "any", and therefore where by s.52 of the Agricultural Holdings (England) Act 1883 (c. 61), bailiffs for levying a distress on an agricultural holding were to be appointed in writing "by the judge of a county court," that did not mean "of the county court in the district of which the holding was, " but meant "of any county court"; so that a bailiff appointed by any county court judge might levy an agricultural distress anywhere (Re Sanders, ex p. Sergeant, 54 L.J.Q.B. 331). So, recognisances on an appeal to quarter sessions, "before a court of summary jurisdiction" (Summary Jurisdiction Act 1879 (c.49), s.31(3) might have been before any such court (R. v. Durham Justices [1895] 1 Q.B. 801). So, "notice to appoint an arbitrator" (Arbitration Act 1889 (c.49), s.5 did not require that an arbitrator be named in the notice (per Esher M.R., Re Eyre and Leicester [1892] 1 Q.B. 136, at p. 142). So, semble, "a solicitor" producing a deed is thereby authorised to receive its consideration (Conveyancing Act 1881 (c.41), s.56; now Law of Property Act 1925 (c.20), s.69), means any solicitor (King v. Smith [1900] 2 Ch. 425, commenting on Day v. Woolwich Building society, 40 Ch.D. 491)." 6. No other submissions have been made by both the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties. 7. Having heard learned advocates appearing for the respective parties and having gone through the relevant record, the core issue which has been raised by Mr. Joshi, learned senior advocate appearing for the petitioner in addition to other contentions that the order of penalty which has got the effect of lowering down or reducing basic pay by 18 steps in the time scale it is outside the purview of Rule 23 (e) of the Rules. According to Mr. Joshi, learned senior advocate, rule does not contemplate such reduction of several stages in view of the plain reading of it. In this context, a perusal of Rule 23(e) of the Rules deserves to be noted first, which reads as under:- "23(e) reduction to a lower service or post or to a lower time-scale, or to a lower stage in a time-scale;" 8. The Rule apparently deals with penalty issue and as such the penal clause whenever to be interpreted must be in its strict sense. It is a trite law that the words of a provision if clear and plain unambiguous in nature and if they are reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, the courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of the consequences and duty of a judge is to expound and not to legislate which is a golden rule of interpretation. The said proposition has been settled down time and again and can be reflected even from a decision which is in the case of H.M.Kamaluddin Ansari and Co. The said proposition has been settled down time and again and can be reflected even from a decision which is in the case of H.M.Kamaluddin Ansari and Co. versus Union of India and others reported in AIR 1984 SC 29 . Further there can be no quarrel on the legal proposition that rules which have got the statutory effect are having force of law and it is also well established canon of construction that court should read the section as it is and cannot re-write it to suit its convenience nor does any canon of construction permit the Court to read the section in such a manner as to render it to some extent otiose. Further, the Court also should not to place undue reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the facts situation of the decision and as such whenever there is an issue relating to a penal clause contained in any statute or the relevant rule, the addition of any word is impermissible and Court is not expected to fill-up a gap and the provisions should be read as a whole. With the aforesaid solitary principles on interpretation, a bare perusal the penal clause here in the case on hand in the form of Rule 23(e) of the Rules, it does not prescribe any words which can be read in the plural sense. The entire reading of this Rule if to be made, even as a whole, it comes out that whenever authority wanted to use any words to give its plural meaning, the same has been specifically narrated and clause (e) of this Rule has clearly prescribes reduction to a lower service or post or to a lower time-scale, or to a lower stage in a time-scale and as such the meaning which can be given to these words can suggest that penalty which has been inflicted upon of reduction of the petitioner in basic pay by 18 steps in the time scale appears to be outside the scope which is tried to be emphasized by the respondents authorities and as such in considered opinion of this Court is not possible to be digested. 9. In aforesaid situation, even if the Rule of ejusdem generis is applied, the same is also not possible to be read in the manner in which the respondents authorities want to convey. 9. In aforesaid situation, even if the Rule of ejusdem generis is applied, the same is also not possible to be read in the manner in which the respondents authorities want to convey. Even in this rule of ejusdem generis there must be a distinct genius or category the specific words must have applied not to different objects of the widely different character but to something which can be called a class or kind of object and where this is lacking, the rule will not be applied and mentioned of single specialized will not constitute genius. So considering this situation also, it is not open for respondents authorities to inflict such kind of punishment which is not provided under Rule 23(e) of the Rules and to that extent, Mr. Joshi, learned senior advocate has made out a case to call for interference. 10. However, the seriousness and gravity of charge is also not possible to be ignored by the Court in view of the fact that in earlier round also, the Division Bench has considered the findings arrived at and made certain observations in that regard. The Division Bench while setting aside the order passed by the learned Single Judge has directed the respondent company to reexamine and that appears to have been undertaken by respondent insurance company. The appellant insurance company was given a liberty to decide the matter afresh and while disposing of Letters Patent Appeal, it was observed that in the event disciplinary authority holds the delinquent guilty, the disciplinary authority will not impose punishment afresh which is higher than one which was imposed earlier on 30.06.2000 and the said exercise was directed to be completed within the time stipulated in the said order. The relevant observations contained in paragraph 5 onwards in the order passed by Division Bench of the Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 1902 of 2004 on 05.03.2008, the Court deems it proper to reproduce hereunder:- "5. As can be seen, the act of commission of misconduct by the delinquent is grave. The allegations made against the delinquent have been held to be proved. The prejudice or bias alleged against the above referred Shri Chhajed was the legal bias. No specific allegation of personal bias or prejudice had been made against the said Shri Chhajed. As can be seen, the act of commission of misconduct by the delinquent is grave. The allegations made against the delinquent have been held to be proved. The prejudice or bias alleged against the above referred Shri Chhajed was the legal bias. No specific allegation of personal bias or prejudice had been made against the said Shri Chhajed. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the learned Single Judge ought not to have absolved the delinquent by setting aside the impugned order made by the disciplinary authority. In cases like this, the delay in initiating the disciplinary proceeding or the factum of the delinquent having reached the age of superannuation should not tilt the balance in favour of the delinquent. We do not agree with the observation made by the learned Single Judge that the disciplinary authority, Shri Chhajed must have influenced the report of the enquiry officer. True, the enquiry officer, an Assistant Administrative Officer in the insurance company was lower in rank than Mr. Chhajed. But, evidently he was not immediate subordinate to Shri Chhajed. Besides, there was no allegation made against the said Shri Chhajed that he had in any manner tried to influence the enquiry officer. We, however, do agree that the aforesaid Shri Chhajed having acted as a management witness ought not to have acted as a disciplinary authority also. The said Shri Chhajed, having participated in the disciplinary proceeding at the stage of preliminary enquiry as well as the enquiry proper, as a matter of prudence, refrained from acting as a disciplinary authority. In our opinion, the interest of justice could be served by allowing the insurance company to take the decision afresh in respect of the disciplinary enquiry conducted against the delinquent." 11. In the light of aforesaid observation and direction given by the Division Bench of this Court, it appears that the respondent authorities have taken a fresh decision which is impugned in the present proceedings and after giving fresh look to the issue in controversy, a further fresh office order dated 02.06.2008 is passed, reflecting at page A/17 of the petition compilation and the operative part thereof reads as under: "NOW THEREFORE the undersigned, Disciplinary Authority after careful perusal of Memorandum of charge dated 10/2/1992, reply of Shri R. M. Shah dated 18/2/2000 on the findings of the Enquiry Report. I hereby hold that the enquiry was conducted in a fair manner observing the principle of natural justice and in terms of General Insurance (Conduct, Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1975 and therefore agree with the findings of the enquiry officer in toto. Considering the gravity of misconduct of demanding and accepting bribes, in the exercise of power under Rule 23(e) of General Insurance (Conduct, Discipline and Appeal) Rule, 1975, I hereby impose the penalty of reduction in Basic Pay by 18 steps in the time scale applicable to Shri R.M.Shah and fixing him at the bottom of scale in Grade I. The period of Suspension is to be treated as period not spent on duty in terms of Rule 22 of General Insurance (Conduct, Discipline and Appeal) Rule, 1975 as the period of suspension is fully justified." 12. Thus, it appears that the respondent authority having based upon entire analysis even again, was of the view that petitioner deserves punishment and as such the impugned order came to be passed. A perusal of the earlier order dated 30.06.2000 reflecting at page 98 of the petition compilation, it appears that the authority has chosen to reiterate the very same view and passed almost same kind of punishment which came to be set aside and the powers are exercised under Rule 23(e) of the Rules. So it appears that respondent authority has not passed an order of penalty in the context of observations which have been made by the Division Bench of this Court in earlier round of litigation. No doubt, the Division Bench has directed respondent insurance company to pass a fresh order and to decide afresh whether or not the imputation of charge against the petitioner stood proved and whether or not punishment of reduction in pay imposed upon the delinquent was justify and it was further observed that in case the disciplinary authority holds the delinquent guilty, the disciplinary authority will not impose punishment afresh which is higher than the one which was imposed earlier on 30.06.2000. Taking clue from this observation, it appears that the authority has maintained the similar order as was passed in the year 2000. Taking clue from this observation, it appears that the authority has maintained the similar order as was passed in the year 2000. Since a fresh decision was required to be taken in the context of observation made by the Division Bench, it was obligatory on the part of authority to examine the issue which appears to have not been done in respect of quantum of punishment. 13. So far as charges which are said to have been proved during the course of departmental inquiry and which are even maintained after giving fresh look to the issue the conclusion arrived at by the disciplinary authority even afresh is not deserves to be interfered with in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction. However, the only point which has appealed to the Court that while imposing and reiterating the very punishment under Rule 23(e) of the Rules appears to have not been correctly applied and as such, qua that issue only, the Court is of the opinion that lowering down or reduction in basic pay by 18 steps in the time scale is not possible to be accepted in view of an apparent reading of Rule 23(e) of the Rules. 14. So far as the conclusion and the satisfaction arrived at by the disciplinary authority in respect of its delinquent employee, the scope of judicial review is very limited and as such factual details are not to be examined as if this Court is sitting over as an appellate authority and as such the Court see no reason to interfere with satisfaction of authority for the charges leveled against him and as such would not like to interfere with such findings. At this stage, a reference can be made to a very recent decision delivered by Hon’ble Apex Court which is in the case of Regional Manager, UCO Bank and Another versus Krishna Kumar Bhardwaj reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 202, the scope of judicial review in respect of matters related to disciplinary inquires have been well propounded and as such Court deems it proper to reproduce relevant observations hereunder: "18. The power of judicial review in the matters of disciplinary inquiries, exercised by the departmental/appellate authorities discharged by constitutional courts under Article 226 or Article 136 of the Constitution of India is well circumscribed by limits of correcting errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice and it is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority which has earlier been examined by this Court in B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India and Others; Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board Limited Vs. Mahesh Dahiya and recently by a three-Judge Bench of this Court(of which one of us is a member) in Deputy General Manager(Appellate Authority) and Others Vs. Ajay Kumar Srivastava wherein this Court has held as under:- “24. It is thus settled that the power of judicial review, of the constitutional courts, is an evaluation of the decision making process and not the merits of the decision itself. It is to ensure fairness in treatment and not to ensure fairness of conclusion. The court/tribunal may interfere in the proceedings held against the delinquent if it is, in any manner, inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached or where the conclusions upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority are perverse or suffer from patent error on the face of record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued. To sum up, the scope of judicial review cannot be extended to the examination of correctness or reasonableness of a decision of authority as a matter of fact. 25. When the disciplinary enquiry is conducted for the alleged misconduct against the public servant, the court is to examine and determine: (i) whether the enquiry was held by the competent authority; (ii) whether rules of natural justice are complied with; (iii) whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence and authority has power and jurisdiction to reach finding of fact or conclusion. 26. xxx. 27. xxx. 28. 26. xxx. 27. xxx. 28. The constitutional court while exercising its jurisdiction of judicial review under Article 226 or Article 136 of the Constitution would not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceedings except in a case of mala fides or perversity i.e. where there is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at those findings and so long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained.” 15. As such so far as satisfaction about guilt of the petitioner is concerned, Court is of the considered opinion that no case is made out to interfere with such conclusion arrived at by the respondent authority. 16. At this stage, the quantum of punishment if to be looked into the charges leveled and proved against the petitioner are such which deserves to be visited with major penalty no doubt but while inflicting penalty the clause which has been resorted to from the rules is impermissible as it has been completely misconstrued by the authority. The wordings of punishment order apparently looks like prima facie permissible but a close perusal of Rule 23(e) of the Rules would clearly indicate that such reduction in the basic pay by 18 steps is outside the purview of such clause. At this stage, Mr. The wordings of punishment order apparently looks like prima facie permissible but a close perusal of Rule 23(e) of the Rules would clearly indicate that such reduction in the basic pay by 18 steps is outside the purview of such clause. At this stage, Mr. Shelat, learned advocate appearing for the respondent insurance company has submitted that the decision delivered by Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Gurudayal Gupta (Supra) but the factual details of the said decision is not only quite distinct from present case on hand but even in respect of interpretation of similar rule, this Court is of the opinion that such interpretation is not in consonance with a well settled proposition and principle of interpretation of provision, as discussed above and as such, though an attempt is made to persuade the Court on the basis of said decision, the observation that the rule cannot be given a restrictive meaning appears to be not appealable to this Court and hence, the Court is of the considered opinion that if such meaning is given as has been suggested, the Court would be rewriting the rules of the respondent company in respect of penalties and as such in respectful disagreement of the said proposition canvassed by Madhya Pradesh High Court, this Court is of the view that reduction in basis pay by 18 steps is not sustainable looking to the plain reading of the provision. Hence, the authority while inflecting punishment has committed an illegality in reading the Rule 23(e) of the Rules. Accordingly, punishment deserves to be quashed and set aside. 17. However, as discussed above, the Court is completely of the view that since the serious charges have been proved against the petitioner, the authority is empowered and thoroughly justified to impose punishment upon the petitioner the only circumstance is that present punishment under challenge is not in consonance with Rule 23(e) of the Rules. 18. 17. However, as discussed above, the Court is completely of the view that since the serious charges have been proved against the petitioner, the authority is empowered and thoroughly justified to impose punishment upon the petitioner the only circumstance is that present punishment under challenge is not in consonance with Rule 23(e) of the Rules. 18. At this stage, the Court is having an assistance from a decision delivered by the Hon'ble Apex Court that if punishment ordered by the authority found to be not just and proper or impermissible then it is not for the High Court to substitute the penalty but in case of disagreement matter deserves to be relegated back to disciplinary authority for imposing proper punishment and as such keeping the said observation in mind, the Court is of the opinion that impugned order of penalty in respect of its quantum only is interfered with by this Court with a consequential direction as contained in the operative part of the present order. 19. Following are the observations contained in the case of Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank and another versus Rajendra Singh reported in (2013) 12 SCC 372 , since Court considered it proper to refer to and rely upon deems it proper to reproduce hereunder:- "13. Indubitably, the well ingrained principle of law is that it is the Disciplinary Authority, or the Appellate Authority in appeal, which is to decide the nature of punishment to be given to a delinquent employee keeping in view the seriousness of the misconduct committed by such an employee. Courts cannot assume and usurp the function of the Disciplinary Authority. In the matter of Apparel Export Promotion Council vs. A.K.Chopra reported in 1999 (1) SCC 759 this principle was explained in the following manner: “22 …….The High Court in our opinion fell in error in interfering with the punishment, which could be lawfully imposed by the departmental authorities on the respondent for his proven misconduct. …..The High Court should not have substituted its own discretion for that the authority. What punishment was required to be imposed, in the facts and circumstances of the case, was a matter which fell exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority and did not warrant any interference by the High Court. The entire approach of the High Court has been faulty. The impugned order of the High Court cannot be sustained on this ground alone. The entire approach of the High Court has been faulty. The impugned order of the High Court cannot be sustained on this ground alone. …..” 19. The principles discussed above can be summed up and summarized as follows: 19.1 When charge(s) of misconduct is proved in an enquiry the quantum of punishment to be imposed in a particular case is essentially the domain of the departmental authorities; 19.2 The Courts cannot assume the function of disciplinary/departmental authorities and to decide the quantum of punishment and nature of penalty to be awarded, as this function is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority; 19.3 Limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the Court; 19.4 Even in such a case when the punishment is set aside as shockingly disproportionate to the nature of charges framed against the delinquent employee, the appropriate course of action is to remit the matter back to the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority with direction to pass appropriate order of penalty. The Court by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the penalty in such a case." 20. In view of the above discussion and on interpretation of Rule 23(e) of the Rules of respondent authority, the impugned order of punishment is not sustainable. Accordingly, the Court is inclined to pass following order which would meet the ends of justice:- (i) The impugned order dated 02.06.2008 at Annexure-A to the petition is hereby quashed and set aside with a consequential direction upon respondent authority to pass an appropriate order afresh after considering true effect of Rule 23 of Rules. (ii) Since more than enough time is passed on, it is further directed that fresh exercise of imposition of punishment be undertaken as earlier as possible preferably within a period of three months from the date of receipt of writ of this Court. (iii) It is needless to state that this Court has not expressed any opinion about quantum of punishment which may be imposed upon by the respondents authorities and it is independently left it open for authorities to take appropriate decision in consonance with the Rules. 21. With these observations and directions, petition stands partly allowed. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent.