JUDGMENT : Heard Sri M. Kesava Rao, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Sri V. Ramesh, learned Govt. Pleader for Services – III, appearing for the respondent Nos.1 & 2. 2. The petitioner was initially appointed as Bill Collector on 21.10.1994 and later on was promoted as Junior Assistant, Panchayat Secretary Gr.II and Panchayat Secretary Gr.I in the years 2011, 2013 and 2016 respectively. He moved an application dated 20.08.2018 by registered post with acknowledgment due for voluntary retirement after attaining the age of 50 years and completion of about 24 years of service which was received by the 2nd respondent/the Commissioner of Panchayat Raj and Rural Development Department, Tadepalli, but as the same remained pending without any orders and more than 3 months expired, the petitioner filed W.P.No. 19582 of 2019 questioning the inaction of respondent No.2 which writ petition was disposed of by this Court on 03.02.2020 with direction to the 2nd respondent to consider the petitioner’s application and pass appropriate orders within the specified time. The petitioner also filed contempt case alleging non-compliance with the order dated 03.02.2020 and thereafter, the 2nd respondent issued a charge memo, vide proceedings No.PRR02-12021(38)/13/2018-B1-Commr PRRD/445995, dated 03.06.2020, calling the petitioner’s explanation and reply with respect to the charges mentioned therein. 3. Challenging the said charge memo, the petitioner filed W.P.No. 19663 of 2020 on 20.10.2020 for the following reliefs:- “...to issue an order or direction more particularly one in the nature of writ of Mandamus declare the action of the 2nd respondent in issuing the impugned charge memo No PRR02-12021 (38)/13/2018-B1-COMMR PRRD/445995, dt. 03-06-2020, as highly arbitrary, illegal, contrary to rules, and consequently set aside the same and award all consequential benefits and pass such other order or orders….” 4. Pursuant to the order dated 03.02.2020 passed in W.P.No.19582 of 2019 the 2nd respondent vide proceedings No.PRR02-1202(51)/2/2020-B1-Commr PRRD/1153644, dated 27.08.2020, rejected the petitioner’s application for voluntary retirement. 03-06-2020, as highly arbitrary, illegal, contrary to rules, and consequently set aside the same and award all consequential benefits and pass such other order or orders….” 4. Pursuant to the order dated 03.02.2020 passed in W.P.No.19582 of 2019 the 2nd respondent vide proceedings No.PRR02-1202(51)/2/2020-B1-Commr PRRD/1153644, dated 27.08.2020, rejected the petitioner’s application for voluntary retirement. Challenging the said proceedings, the petitioner filed W.P.No. 19774 of 2020 for the following reliefs:- “...to issue an order or direction more particularly one in the nature of writ of Mandamus declare the action of the 2nd respondent in issuing the impugned proceeding No. PRR02-12021(51)/2/2020-B1-COMMR PRRD/1153644, dt.27-08-2020 as highly arbitrary, illegal, contrary to the facts and Rule 43 of revised pension rules 1980 and consequently set aside the impugned proceeding No.PRR02-12021(51)/2/2020-B1-COMMR PRRD/1153644, dt.27-08-2020 with a further direction to pass formal orders accepting the voluntary retirement when to award all consequential benefits with an interest of 18 percent from the date of expiry of 3 months of the application for voluntary retirement and pass such other order or orders….” 5. As both the writ petitions are related and are by the same petitioner, on the request of the learned counsels for the parties, both were heard together and are being decided by the common judgment. 6. Challenge to the impugned proceedings of charge memo dated 03.06.2020 is only on the ground urged at the time of arguments, that the 2nd respondent had no power to issue the charge memo when the petitioner’s application for voluntary retirement was pending consideration pursuant to the Order dated 03.02.2020 passed in W.P.No.19582 of 2019. 7. The challenge to the order of rejection of the petitioner’s application seeking voluntary retirement dated 27.08.2020 is only on the ground, urged at the time of arguments, that the same is contrary to Rule 43 of the Andhra Pradesh Revised Pension Rules, 1980 (in short ‘the Rules, 1980’) in as much as the competent authority failed to exercise discretion on the petitioner’s application, for acceptance or rejection within the specified period of 3 months and after expiry of the said period, no order could be passed rejecting the prayer of voluntary retirement which, on expiry of such period shall be deemed to have been accepted. 8. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the voluntary retirement application was received by the 2nd respondent on 27.08.2018 and the 3 months period expired on 26.11.2018 and on expiry of such period, no order having been passed, the petitioner shall be deemed to have retired from service voluntarily and consequently, the charge memo could not be issued on 03.06.2020 treating the petitioner in service. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Sayed Muzaffar Mir ( AIR 1995 SC 176 ) in support of his contentions. 9. Sri V. Ramesh, learned GP for Services-III, submitted that the petitioner’s representation dated 20.08.2018 requesting for voluntary retirement was duly considered by the appointing authority and was rightly rejected for the reasons assigned in the order itself. He submitted that the petitioner’s request for voluntary retirement was with retrospective date i.e., from 01.07.2018 which was not in accordance with rules. The disciplinary proceedings with respect to grave financial irregularities were initiated against the petitioner, as per the Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1991 (in short ‘APCS (CC&A) Rules, 1991) by issuing a charge memo, dated 03.06.2020 against which the petitioner has submitted reply dated 16.06.2020. The Chief Executive Officer, Zilla Parishad was appointed as Enquiry Officer and the District Panchayat Officer, East Godavari District was appointed as Presenting Officer vide Office Proceedings dated 18.08.2020. However, the final orders in the disciplinary proceedings have not been passed. 10. Learned GP for Services-III further submitted that as per Rule 43 (4) of the A. P. Revised Pension Rules, 1980, the Government servant opting for retirement shall not retire unless the notice given by him is accepted by the competent authority. The Government employee has to give a notice in writing of his intention to retire voluntarily of at least 3 months to the authority. Such a notice, in his submission, was not given. He further submitted that the A. P. Revised Pension Rules, 1980, nowhere provides that any notice for voluntary retirement if remained unanswered within 3 months, there shall be deemed acceptance of the notice of voluntary retirement by the competent authority, which has the jurisdiction to pass orders even after expiry of 3 months period. 11. He further submitted that the A. P. Revised Pension Rules, 1980, nowhere provides that any notice for voluntary retirement if remained unanswered within 3 months, there shall be deemed acceptance of the notice of voluntary retirement by the competent authority, which has the jurisdiction to pass orders even after expiry of 3 months period. 11. Learned GP for Services-III further submitted that the petitioner has an efficacious alternative remedy to file appeal under Rule 26 of the A. P. State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1996 (in short “the Rules, 1996) and in view thereof the writ petition is not the appropriate remedy. 12. In reply, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that there is no alternative remedy under Rule 26 of the A. P. State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1996 as by the order under challenge neither any seniority of any person has been fixed nor any conditions of service of the petitioner has been affected. 13. I have considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsels for the parties and perused the material available on record. 14. In view of the submissions advanced by the learned counsels for the parties, the following points arise for consideration; i. Whether in view of the submissions advanced based on Rule 26 of the Rules 1996, this Court should not invoke its writ jurisdiction? ii. Whether the rejection of the petitioner’s request for voluntary retirement, vide the impugned order dated 27.08.2020, is without jurisdiction being contrary to Rule 43 (4) of A.P. Revised Pension Rules, 1980? iii. Whether the charge memo dated 03.06.2020 is bad in law? Point No.(i) 15. The writ petition is pending since 2020 and the parties have already exchanged pleadings. The challenge to the impugned order is on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the authority. The alternative remedy, it is well settled in law, is not an absolute bar to the exercise of the writ jurisdiction, which can be entertained, when one of the grounds of challenge is, ‘order being without jurisdiction based on legal provisions’. For considering such point, in my view, any enquiry into the factual position is not required as the basic facts for determining the plea raised are not in dispute. 16. For considering such point, in my view, any enquiry into the factual position is not required as the basic facts for determining the plea raised are not in dispute. 16. In Magadh Sugar & Energy Ltd. v. State of Bihar (2021 SCC Online SC 801) the Hon’ble Apex Court reiterated that while High Court would normally not exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India if an effective and efficacious alternative remedy is available, the existence of an alternative remedy does not by itself bar the High Court from exercising its jurisdiction in certain contingencies. One of the well settled contingencies or exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy stated was, where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction. It is apt to refer paragraph Nos.25 and 26 as under: “25. While a High Court would normally not exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective and efficacious alternate remedy is available, the existence of an alternate remedy does not by itself bar the High Court from exercising its jurisdiction in certain contingencies. This principle has been crystallized by this Court in Whirpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trademarks, Mumbai and Harbanslal Sahni v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd.. Recently, in Radha Krishan Industries v. State of Himachal Pradesh a two judge Bench of this Court of which one of us was a part of (Justice DY Chandrachud) has summarized the principles governing the exercise of writ jurisdiction by the High Court in the presence of an alternate remedy. This Court has observed: “28. The principles of law which emerge are that: (i) The power under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue writs can be exercised not only for the enforcement of fundamental rights, but for any other purpose as well; (ii) The High Court has the discretion not to entertain a writ petition. This Court has observed: “28. The principles of law which emerge are that: (i) The power under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue writs can be exercised not only for the enforcement of fundamental rights, but for any other purpose as well; (ii) The High Court has the discretion not to entertain a writ petition. One of the restrictions placed on the power of the High Court is where an effective alternate remedy is available to the aggrieved person; (iii) Exceptions to the rule of alternate remedy arise where (a) the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of a fundamental right protected by Part III of the Constitution; (b) there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice; (c) the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction; or (d) the vires of a legislation is challenged; (iv) An alternate remedy by itself does not divest the High Court of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution in an appropriate case though ordinarily, a writ petition should not be entertained when an efficacious alternate remedy is provided by law; (v) When a right is created by a statute, which itself prescribes the remedy or procedure for enforcing the right or liability, resort must be had to that particular statutory remedy before invoking the discretionary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution. This rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion; and (vi) In cases where there are disputed questions of fact, the High Court may decide to decline jurisdiction in a writ petition. However, if the High Court is objectively of the view that the nature of the controversy requires the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, such a view would not readily be interfered with.” (emphasis supplied) 26. The principle of alternate remedies and its exceptions was also reiterated recently in the decision in Assistant Commissioner of State Tax v. Commercial Steel Limited. In State of HP v. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd. this Court has held that a writ petition is maintainable before the High Court if the taxing authorities have acted beyond the scope of their jurisdiction. This Court observed: “23. In State of HP v. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd. this Court has held that a writ petition is maintainable before the High Court if the taxing authorities have acted beyond the scope of their jurisdiction. This Court observed: “23. Where under a statute there is an allegation of infringement of fundamental rights or when on the undisputed facts the taxing authorities are shown to have assumed jurisdiction which they do not possess can be the grounds on which the writ petitions can be entertained. But normally, the High Court should not entertain writ petitions unless it is shown that there is something more in a case, something going to the root of the jurisdiction of the officer, something which would show that it would be a case of palpable injustice to the writ petitioner to force him to adopt the remedies provided by the statute. It was noted by this Court in L. Hirday Narain v. ITO [ (1970) 2 SCC 355 : AIR 1971 SC 33 ] that if the High Court had entertained a petition despite availability of alternative remedy and heard the parties on merits it would be ordinarily unjustifiable for the High Court to dismiss the same on the ground of non-exhaustion of statutory remedies; unless the High Court finds that factual disputes are involved and it would not be desirable to deal with them in a writ petition.” 17. The Court, therefore, without entering into merit of the plea, if the order impugned is appealable under Rule 26 of the A. P. State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1996 or not, proceeds to decide the controversy on merits. Point No.(ii) 18. Learned counsel for the petitioner has laid emphasis on proviso to sub-rule (4) of Rule 43 to contend that in view of the proviso, the competent authority must pass an order before the expiry of the notice period i.e., three months, either accepting or rejecting the notice and if no order is passed on such notice, within that period, it shall be deemed to have been accepted and on expiry of the notice period no order could be passed rejecting the notice. 19. Rule 43 of the A.P. Revised Pension Rules, 1980 is being reproduced as under: “43. 19. Rule 43 of the A.P. Revised Pension Rules, 1980 is being reproduced as under: “43. Retirement on completion of 20 years of qualifying service: (1) A Government servant shall have the option to retire from service voluntarily after he has put in not less than twenty years of qualifying service. Provided that he gives a notice in writing of his intention to retire voluntarily of at least three months to the authority which has power to make a substantive appointment to the post from which he retires: Provided further that a notice of less than three months may also be accepted by the competent authority. Provided also that, notwithstanding anything in Rule 21, Extraordinary leave availed, on any ground other than for prosecuting higher studies within the State/outside the State/Country without receiving any payment except stipends during the period of such leave from any source, but including on medical certificate, shall not be reckoned as qualifying service for purposes of arriving at the qualifying service of twenty years referred to in this rule. Note:- A Government servant who has elected to retire under this rule and has given the necessary intimation to that effect to the appointing authority, shall be precluded from withdrawing his election subsequently except with the specific approval of such authority: Provided that the request for withdrawal shall be within the intended date of his retirement. (2) A Government servant retiring under sub-rule (1) shall be entitled to a retiring pension: Provided that such retiring pension shall be subject to the provisions of the Rules 6, 8 and 9. (3) Where a Government servant opts to retire under sub-rule (1) while on leave not due, the retirement in such cases shall take effect from the date when the leave not due commenced and the employee shall refund the leave salary paid in respect of such leave not due availed of by the employee. (4) A Government servant opting for retirement under sub-rule (1), shall not retire unless the notice given by him as per proviso to sub-rule (1) is accepted by the competent authority: Provided that the competent authority shall issue an order before the expiry of the notice period accepting or rejecting the notice. (4) A Government servant opting for retirement under sub-rule (1), shall not retire unless the notice given by him as per proviso to sub-rule (1) is accepted by the competent authority: Provided that the competent authority shall issue an order before the expiry of the notice period accepting or rejecting the notice. (5) Government servants opting for retirement under sub-rule (1) shall be entitled to addition of service for purpose of Pension, a service equal to the difference between the qualifying service actually put in by him and the service he would have put in on the date of superannuation had he continued in service or the difference between such qualifying service and thirty three years whichever is less, subject to the condition that such difference shall be limited to a maximum of five years. Provided further that such a Government servant shall not be eligible for weightage under Rule 29 of these rules. (6) The option under sub-rule (1) shall not be admissible to a Government servant on deputation to autonomous bodies/ corporations/companies/public sector undertakings or institutions wholly or substantially owned by Government who get absorbed in such public undertakings/autonomous bodies or institutions, as the case may be. (7) A Government servant retiring voluntarily under sub-rule (1) of these rules shall be subject to Rule 10 of these rules. Note :- Orders permitting/requiring a Government servant to retire after completing twenty years qualifying service should, as a rule, not be issued until after the fact that the officer has indeed completed qualifying service for twenty years has been verified in consultation with Pay and Accounts Officer, Hyderabad/Head of Department/Head of office as the case may be, who maintains service particulars/Book of the Government servant concerned.” 20. From a bare reading of Rule 43 of the Rules 1980 it is evident that the Government Servant shall have the option to retire from service voluntarily after he has put in not less than 20 years of qualifying service. A Government servant opting to retire voluntarily has to given notice in writing of his intention to retire voluntarily of at least three months to the authority which has power to make a substantive appointment to the post from which the government servant is to retire, however, the competent authority may also accept a notice of less than 3 months. 21. 21. Further, from a plain reading of sub-rule (4) of Rule 43, it is evident that a Government servant shall not retire unless the notice given by him for voluntary retirement is accepted. Acceptance of notice by the competent authority is therefore must for the notice being effective i.e., the voluntary retirement to come into force. Where no order is passed either accepting or rejecting the notice, there will not be an order of acceptance of notice. Rule 43 does not provide that on expiry of the notice period, if no order is passed, it shall be deemed that the notice for voluntary retirement has been accepted by the competent authority. Consequently, in view of this Court, in such a situation, the Government servant shall not retire. 22. In Commissioner of Customs v. Dilip Kumar (2018) 9 SCC 1 ) the Hon’ble Apex Court reiterated the well settled principle that when the words of a statute are clear, plain and un-ambiguous and only one meaning can be inferred the courts are bound to give effect to the said meaning irrespective of the consequences. 23. In LIC v. Shree Lal Meena (2019) 4 SCC 479 ) the Hon’ble Apex Court held that the statutory provisions must be given their clear meaning unless there is ambiguity in the wordings. 24. In the considered view of this Court from the plain reading of the Rule the concept of deemed or automatic acceptance of notice of voluntary retirement on expiry of the notice period upon which no order is passed, does not follow. The Court also does not find any ambiguity in Rule 43 (4) of the A. P. Revised Pension Rules, 1980, to require any other import to be given different from the plain words used. The voluntary retirement notice is therefore required to be accepted by the competent authority by passing an order of acceptance of such notice. 25. Sub-rule (4) of Rule 43 of A. P. Revision Pension Rules, 1980 further shows that it uses the expression ‘shall’ which is followed by the word ‘not’ which is a negative word. 26. In G. C. Patel v. Agricultural Produce Market Committee (1975) 2 SCC 482 ) the Hon’ble Apex Court held that plainly, ‘shall’ must normally be construed to mean ‘shall’ and not ‘may’, for the distinction between the two is fundamental. 26. In G. C. Patel v. Agricultural Produce Market Committee (1975) 2 SCC 482 ) the Hon’ble Apex Court held that plainly, ‘shall’ must normally be construed to mean ‘shall’ and not ‘may’, for the distinction between the two is fundamental. Granting the application of mind, there is little or no chance that one who intends to leave a leeway will use the language of command in the performance of an act. But since, even lesser directions are occasionally clothed in words of authority, it becomes necessary to delve deeper and ascertain the true meaning lying behind mere words. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that the governing factor is the meaning and intent of the Legislature, which should be gathered not merely from the words used by the Legislature but from a variety of other circumstances and considerations. The use of the word ‘shall’ or ‘may’ is not conclusive on the question whether the particular requirement of law is mandatory or directory. 27. It is apt to refer paragraph Nos.11 to 13 of G. C. Patel (supra) as under: “11. Maxwell, Crawford and Craies abound in illustrations where the words “shall” and “may” are treated as interchangeable. “Shall be liable to pay interest” does not mean “must be made liable to pay interest”, and “may not drive on the wrong side of the road” must mean “shall not drive on the wrong side of the road”. But the problem which the use of the language of command poses is: Does the Legislature intend that its command shall at all events be performed? Or is it enough to comply with the command in substance? In other words, the question is: is the provision mandatory or directory? 12. Plainly, “shall” must normally be construed to mean “shall” and not “may”, for the distinction between the two is fundamental. Granting the application of mind, there is little or no chance that one who intends to leave a leeway will use the language of command in the performance of an act. But since, even lesser directions are occasionally clothed in words of authority, it becomes necessary to delve deeper and ascertain the true meaning lying behind mere words. 13. Crawford on Statutory Construction (Edn. But since, even lesser directions are occasionally clothed in words of authority, it becomes necessary to delve deeper and ascertain the true meaning lying behind mere words. 13. Crawford on Statutory Construction (Edn. 1940, Article 261, p. 516) sets out the following passage from an American case approvingly: “The question as to whether a statute is mandatory or directory depends upon the intent of the Legislature and not upon the language in which the intent is clothed. The meaning and intention of the Legislature must govern, and these are to be ascertained, not only from the phraseology of the provision, but also by considering its nature, its design, and the consequences which would follow from construing it the one way or the other.” Thus, the governing factor is the meaning and intent of the Legislature, which should be gathered not merely from the words used by the Legislature but from a variety of other circumstances and considerations. In other words, the use of the word “shall” or “may” is not conclusive on the question whether the particular requirement of law is mandatory or directory. But the circumstance that the Legislature has used a language of compulsive force is always of great relevance and in the absence of anything contrary in the context indicating that a permissive interpretation is permissible, the statute ought to be construed as peremptory. One of the fundamental rules of interpretation is that if the words of a statute are themselves precise and unambiguous, no more is necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense, the words themselves in such case best declaring the intention of the legislature. [Shriram v. State of Bombay, AIR 1961 SC 674 : (1961) 2 SCR 890 , 898 : (1961) 1 Cri LJ 760] Section 6(1) of the Act provides in terms, plain and precise, that a notification issued under the section “shall also” be published in Gujarati in a newspaper. The word “also” provides an important clue to the intention of the legislature because having provided that the notification shall be published in the Official Gazette, Section 6(1) goes on to say that the notification shall also be published in Gujarati in a newspaper. The word “also” provides an important clue to the intention of the legislature because having provided that the notification shall be published in the Official Gazette, Section 6(1) goes on to say that the notification shall also be published in Gujarati in a newspaper. The additional mode of publication prescribed by law must, in the absence of anything to the contrary appearing from the context of the provision or its object, be assumed to have a meaning and a purpose. In Khub Chand v. State of Rajasthan [ AIR 1967 SC 1074 : (1967) 1 SCR 120 , 124-25] it was observed that: “The term “shall” in its ordinary significance is mandatory and the court shall ordinarily give that interpretation to that term unless such an interpretation leads to some absurd or inconvenient consequence or be at variance with the intent of the Legislature, to be collected from other parts of the Act. The construction of the said expression depends on the provisions of a particular Act, the setting in which the expression appears, the object for which the direction is given, the consequences that would flow from the infringement of the direction and such other considerations.” The same principle was expressed thus in Haridwar Singh v. Bagun Sumbrui [ (1973) 3 SCC 889 , 895] : “Several tests have been propounded in decided cases for determining the question whether a provision in a statute, or a rule is mandatory or directory. No universal rule can be laid down on this matter. In each case one must look to the subject-matter and consider the importance of the provision disregarded and the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secured.” Recently in the Presidential Election case [In re Presedential Poll, (1974) 2 SCC 33 , 49], the learned Chief Justice speaking on behalf of a seven-Judge Bench observed: “In determining the question whether a provision is mandatory or directory, the subject-matter, the import of the provision, the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secured by the Act will decide whether the provision is directory or mandatory., It is the duty of the courts to get at the real intention of the Legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the provision to be construed. “The key to the opening of every law is the reason and spirit of the law, it is the animus imponentis, the intention of the law-maker expressed in the law itself, taken as a whole.” 28. In Ganesh Prasad Sah Kesari v. Lakshmi Narayan Gupta (1985) 3 SCC 53 ) the Hon’ble Apex Court held that ordinarily the use of the word ‘shall’ prima facie indicates that the provision is imperative in character. However, it is well established that the Court while considering whether the mere use of the word ‘shall’ would make the provision imperative, it would ascertain the intendment of the legislature and the consequences flowing from its own construction of the word ‘shall’. 29. In Laxmibai v. Collector (2020) 12 SCC 186 ) referring to the judgment in the case of of Union of India v. A. K. Pandey { (2009) 10 SCC 552 } the Hon’ble Apex Court in paragraph-11 held as under: “11. This Court in A.K. Pandey [Union of India v. A.K. Pandey, (2009) 10 SCC 552 : (2010) 1 SCC (L&S) 68] held that the prohibitive or negative words are ordinarily indicative of mandatory nature of the provision although the said fact alone is not conclusive. This Court held as under : (SCC p. 561, para 15) “15. The principle seems to be fairly well settled that…. The Court has to examine carefully the purpose of such provision and the consequences that may follow from non-observance thereof. If the context does not show nor demands otherwise, the text of a statutory provision couched in a negative form ordinarily has to be read in the form of command. When the word “shall” is followed by prohibitive or negative words, the legislative intention of making the provision absolute, peremptory and imperative becomes loud and clear and ordinarily has to be inferred as such.” 30. In SEBI v. Gaurav Varshney (2016) 14 SCC 430 ) the Hon’ble Apex Court reiterated that prohibition and negative words can rarely be directory. Negative, prohibitory and exclusive words are indicative of the legislative intent when the statute is mandatory. 31. It is apt to refer paragraph Nos.32.3, 32.4 & 32.5 of SEBI (supra) as under: “32.3. Thirdly because of the use of negative words in sub-section (1-B)—“No person shall…”, denotes mandatory intent, with reference to those not already engaged in collective investment operations. 32.4. 31. It is apt to refer paragraph Nos.32.3, 32.4 & 32.5 of SEBI (supra) as under: “32.3. Thirdly because of the use of negative words in sub-section (1-B)—“No person shall…”, denotes mandatory intent, with reference to those not already engaged in collective investment operations. 32.4. Fourthly because of the use of negative words in conjunction with the word “shall”, further makes the legislative intent absolutely clear, and also, mandatory, with reference to those not already engaged in collective investment operations. 32.5. And fifthly because, contravention of Section 12(1-B) entails penal consequences, and therefore, cannot be construed as directory….” 32. From the afore said judgments, it clearly follows that the use of expression ‘shall’ by itself is not indicative if the provision is mandatory or directory. There is no universal rule which can be laid down just by seeing the use of word ‘shall’ in a provision. In each case one must look to the subject matter and consider the importance of the provision and the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secured by the act. It is the duty of the Court to get the real intention of the legislation by attending the whole scope of the provision to the statute. 33. At the same time, when the word ‘shall’ is followed by a negative or prohibitive word it has to be read in the form of command making the legislative intent clear that the provision is intended to be absolute, peremptory and imperative, if the context does not show nor demand otherwise. 34. Rule 43 (4) of the A. P. Revised Pension Rules, 1980 therefore by use of the expression ‘shall not’ make the intention of the legislation clear that the Government Servant shall not retire unless the notice of voluntary retirement is accepted. In other words, acceptance of the voluntary notice is a must for voluntarily retirement of the government servant applying for the same, to take effect. If the notice is accepted, the government servant shall retire. If such notice is rejected, certainly, the government servant shall not retire. But if no order is passed on the notice of voluntary retirement, it cannot be said that there is acceptance of the notice of voluntary retirement because there is no order of rejection. If the notice is accepted, the government servant shall retire. If such notice is rejected, certainly, the government servant shall not retire. But if no order is passed on the notice of voluntary retirement, it cannot be said that there is acceptance of the notice of voluntary retirement because there is no order of rejection. In the view of this Court, in the absence of any order of acceptance of notice of voluntary retirement, the government servant shall not retire, even if no order of rejection of notice is passed and the notice period expired. 35. The proviso to Sub-rule (4) of Rule 43 of the A. P. Revised Pension Rules, 1980, also uses the expression ‘shall’ with respect to passing of the order by the competent authority and the time period i.e., the notice period of three months within which it requires for passing of an order on the notice. Passing of the order either accepting or rejecting the notice is mandatory but the time within which such order is to be passed, though should normally be adhered to, which is three months does not seem to be mandatory, for the reason that if no order is passed within that period, Rule 43 does not provide for the consequences to follow. It is not provided that on expiry of the notice period the same shall stand accepted nor that it shall stand rejected. 36. There is another reason for holding so. The government servant has a right to seek voluntary retirement in terms of the Rule 43 of the Rules, 1980 on completion of 20 years of qualifying service. If the proviso is considered as mandatory with respect to the time period also, within which the order is to be passed on notice of voluntary retirement, then if the competent authority fails to pass any order within that period, it would mean that the right conferred on the government servant, to have the option to retire from service after he has put in not less than 20 years of qualifying service, would be lost or defeated, merely because of the inaction of the competent authority in passing the order within the notice period. By such unilateral act the competent authority cannot defeat the right conferred to the government servant to retire voluntarily after completion of 20 years of qualifying service, even where there is nothing against such government servant to refuse his option of voluntary retirement. The default on the part of the competent authority in passing the order within the notice period may also be unintended and on account of circumstances beyond the control of the authority or for such other justifiable reasons. Therefore, such a construction of the word ‘shall’ in the proviso, with respect to the time period, would not advance the object of the Rule 43 (1), which was enacted to give option to the government servant to retire voluntarily on completion of specified qualifying service. 37. It is well settled in law, that a proviso cannot be used to cut down the language of the main enactment where such language is clear, nor to exclude by implication what the main enactment clearly states. 38. In Mabilayi Service Cooperative Bank Ltd. Vs.. CIT (2021) 7 SCC 90 ) the Hon’ble Apex Court reiterated that a proviso to a particular provision of statute only embraces the field which is covered by the main provision. It has further been held that where the language of the main enactment is explicit and unambiguous, the proviso can have no repercussion on the interpretation of the main enactment, so as to exclude from it by implication what clearly falls within its express terms. 39. The language of sub section (4) of Section 43 is explicit and unambiguous. The proviso therefore, can have no repercussion on the interpretation of sub section (4). A plain reading of sub section (4) shows that there is no concept of deemed or automatic acceptance of the notice. The proviso therefore cannot be construed so as to include by implication in sub-section (4) the deemed or automatic acceptance of the notice on expiry of the notice period if no order is passed within the notice period. The proviso specifically provides for passing of an order by the competent authority and therefore it refers to the acceptance or rejection of the notice by an order issued by the competent authority. 40. The proviso specifically provides for passing of an order by the competent authority and therefore it refers to the acceptance or rejection of the notice by an order issued by the competent authority. 40. To interpret the proviso, in the absence of any order passed by the competent authority within the notice period, as providing for deemed or automatic acceptance would be to enlarge the scope of the main sub-section (4), as, in such a case, the main sub section (4) shall have to be read as providing for voluntary retirement of the government servant on expiry of the notice period, even in the absence of an order of acceptance by the competent authority. Giving such a meaning would be doing violence to the plain language of the main sub section (4). 41. In State of U.P. v. Achal Singh (2018) 17 SCC 578 ) the Hon’ble Apex Court held that whether voluntary retirement is automatic or an order is required to be passed would depend upon the phraseology used in a particular rule under which retirement is to be ordered or voluntary retirement is sought. 42. The contention of the petitioner’s counsel that on expiry of notice period it shall be deemed to have been accepted, is not worthy of acceptance for the additional reason that the proviso clearly speaks of an order of acceptance or rejection of notice, both. So, another view may be that as there is no order of acceptance within the notice period, the notice is deemed to be rejected. However, this Court is of the view that there cannot be deemed acceptance or deemed rejection, on the expiry of the notice period. 43. For the aforesaid reasons, this Court is of the considered view; a) The provision of Rule 43 (4) of the A. P. Revised Pension Rules, 1980 is mandatory and the government servant shall not retire unless the notice of voluntary retirement is accepted by the competent authority by passing an order. b) The passing of an order on the notice for voluntary retirement by the competent authority is mandatory under the proviso to Sub-rule (4) of Rule 43 of the A. P. Revised Pension Rules, 1980. c) There is no concept of automatic or deemed acceptance or rejection of the notice of voluntary retirement on expiry of the notice period of three months. c) There is no concept of automatic or deemed acceptance or rejection of the notice of voluntary retirement on expiry of the notice period of three months. d) Even if any order of rejection of notice is not passed within the notice period, acceptance of notice of voluntary retirement within the notice period cannot be inferred thereby. e) The time period for passing an order within the notice period of three months is not mandatory which time period is only directory, to mean that the order can be passed even after expiry of the notice period, although the effort must be made to pass the order within the notice period. f) So long as the notice of voluntary retirement is not accepted by passing an order by the competent authority, the government servant shall not retire voluntarily from service but shall continue in service. g) If the order is passed, even after expiry of the notice period on the notice, either accepting or rejecting the notice, such an order would not be without jurisdiction. 44. In Sayed Muzaffar Mir (supra), upon which the learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance, Articles 1801 (d) and 1802 (b) of the Indian Railways Establishment Code (in short ‘IREC’) were under consideration. Those provisions are reproduced as under: “1801. (F.R. 56): (d) In the absence of specific orders to the contrary, every Railway servant shall demit service on the due date of superannuation. In case, for whatever reason other than specific orders to that effect, a Railway servant continues in service, beyond such due date, the period of over-stay shall be treated as irregular and the pay/allowance etc. drawn during the said period shall be recovered. 1802: (b) (1) Any railway servant may by giving notice of not less than three months in writing to the appropriate authority, retire from service after he has attained the age of fifty years if he is in Group “A” or Group “B” service or post (and had entered Government service before attaining the age of 35 years) and in all other cases after he has attained the age of 55 years: Provided that it shall be open to the appropriate authority to withhold permission to a railway servant under suspension who seeks to retire under this clause. (2) A railway servant, referred to in sub-rule (1) may make a request in writing to the appointing authority to accept a notice of less than three months, giving reasons therefore. On receipt of a request under this sub-rule, the appointing authority may consider such request for curtailment of the period of notice of three months on merits and, if it is satisfied that the curtailment of the period of notice will not cause any administrative inconvenience, the appointing authority may relax the requirement of notice of three months, on the condition that the railway servant shall not apply for commutation of a part of his pension before the expiry of the period of notice of three months.” 45. In Sayed Muzaffar Mir (supra), Article 1802 (b) of IREC specifically provided for voluntary retirement by giving notice of not less than three months. If the competent authority required the railway servant under suspension to continue in service, beyond the date of his voluntary retirement, and not to be permitted to retire from service, the same could be done by passing an order, as provided by Article 1801 (d) of IREC. In view of these provisions, the Hon’ble Apex court held that when no order was passed, despite such right by the competent authority, the employee retired on expiry of the notice period and the order of removal passed after the expiry of the notice period was not-est in the eyes of law. 46. In Achal Singh (supra) it has been held that the factual position of each and every case has to be seen along with applicable rules while applying a dictum of the Court interpreting any other rule which should be in pari materia. 47. Sayed Muzaffar Mir (supra) case is therefore of no help to the petitioner. In the present case, for voluntary retirement to take place acceptance of notice is required by the competent authority in view of sub-rule (4) of Rule 43 of the Andhra Pradesh Revised Pension Rules, 1980. Point No.(iii) 48. In view of what has been considered under Point No.(ii), there is no illegality in serving charge memo on the petitioner as the petitioner continued in service and had not retired by the time charge memo was served upon him. 49. Point No.(iii) 48. In view of what has been considered under Point No.(ii), there is no illegality in serving charge memo on the petitioner as the petitioner continued in service and had not retired by the time charge memo was served upon him. 49. For all the aforesaid reasons, I do not find any illegality in the impugned order dated 27.08.2020 as also in service of the charge memo. 50. Both the writ petitions are devoid of merit and are accordingly dismissed. 51. The respondents are at liberty to expeditiously conclude the departmental proceedings, in accordance with law. 52. No order as to costs. Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed in consequence.