ORDER : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. The instant petition has been filed for the grant of following substantive reliefs: “(i) to direct the respondents to release the monetary benefits due and payable to the applicant w.e.f. 17.7.2009-28.7.2015, accordingly without any further delay. (ii) to direct the respondents to re-fix the pension of the applicant accordingly without any further delay.” 2. Mother of the present petitioners (hereinafter referred to as “the original petitioner”) was initially appointed on 1.7.1977 and thereafter absorbed as regular Constable in Establishment Branch (ECC) on 17.2.2000. Thereafter, she was promoted as Head Constable on 24.12.2002. 3. The next promotion to the post of Assistant Sub Inspector (ASI) was due to the original petitioner in the year 2007. Juniors of the original petitioner got promoted in the year 2007, but her name was not considered as there was a criminal case pending against her. She made a representation on 9.6.2015 requesting respondent No.2 to consider her case for promotion to the post of ASI on adhoc basis, but to no avail. 4. On 28.2.2009, on the recommendations of the departmental promotion committee, the case of the original petitioner was kept in a sealed cover in view of the pendency of the criminal case. Eventually, she was acquitted and exonerated of all the charges in the criminal case vide judgment dated 25.5.2015 passed by the then learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Shimla and thereafter no further appeal was filed in the case, meaning thereby, that the order of acquittal attained finality. 5. Upon such acquittal, respondent No.2 opened the sealed cover and ordered the promotion of the original petitioner to the rank of ASI, (ECC) w.e.f. 17.7.2009, but only on notional basis. 6. It is not in dispute that no departmental enquiry of any nature was ever instituted or conducted against the original petitioner. She retired from service on 31.3.2016 and was granted retiral benefits and pension, however the actual monetary benefits, which she was to get on account of being promoted as ASI w.e.f. 17.7.2009, were not paid to her. The original petitioner died during the pendency of the instant petition and it is thereafter that her legal heirs (hereinafter referred to as the “present petitioners”) were brought on record. 7. The original petitioner died during the pendency of the instant petition and it is thereafter that her legal heirs (hereinafter referred to as the “present petitioners”) were brought on record. 7. Now, the moot question, in the given background, is whether the respondents on the principle of “no work no pay” can deny the actual monetary benefits to the original petitioner, as sought for in the instant petition. 8. We are of the considered opinion that the respondents by not considering the case of the original petitioner in accordance with law have dragged her and thereafter her legal heirs to unnecessary and otherwise avoidable litigation. 9. The issue in question regarding payment of actual monetary benefits as against notional benefits was settled more than three decades back by the Three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Janikraman, 1991 (4) SCC 109 as is evident from paras 25 & 26 of the judgment, which read as under:- “25. We are not much impressed by the contentions advanced on behalf of the authorities. The normal rule of "no work no pay" is not applicable to cases such as the present one where the employee although he is willing to work is kept away from work by the authorities for no fault of his. This is not a case where the employee remains away from work for his own reasons, although the work is offered to him. It is for this reason that F.R. 17(1) will also be inapplicable to such cases. 26. We are, therefore, broadly in agreement with the - finding of the Tribunal that when an employee is completely exonerated meaning thereby that he is not 'found blameworthy in the least and is not visited with the penalty even of censure, he has to be given the benefit of the salary of the higher post along with the other benefits from the date on which he would have normally been promoted but for the disciplinary/ criminal proceedings. However, there may be cases' where the proceedings, whether disciplinary or criminal, are, for example, delayed at the instance of the employee or the clearance in the disciplinary proceedings or acquittal in the criminal proceedings is with benefit of doubt or on account of non-availability of evidence due to the acts attributable to the employee etc. However, there may be cases' where the proceedings, whether disciplinary or criminal, are, for example, delayed at the instance of the employee or the clearance in the disciplinary proceedings or acquittal in the criminal proceedings is with benefit of doubt or on account of non-availability of evidence due to the acts attributable to the employee etc. In such circumstances, the concerned authorities must be vested with the power to decide whether the employee at all deserves any salary for the intervening period and if he does, the extent to which he deserves it. Life being complex, it is not possible to anticipate and enumerate exhaustively all the circumstances under which such consideration may become necessary. To ignore however, such circumstances when they exist and lay down' an inflexible rule that in every case when an employee is exonerated in disciplinary/ criminal proceedings he should be entitled to all salary for the intervening period is to undermine discipline in the administration and jeopardize public interests. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the Tribunal that to deny the salary to an employee would in all circumstances be illegal. While, therefore, we do not ap- prove of the said last sentence in the first sub-paragraph after clause (iii) of paragraph 3 of the said Memorandum, viz.. "but no arrears of pay shall be payable to him for the period of notional promotion preceding the date of actual promotion", we direct that in place of the said sentence the following sentence be read in the Memorandum: "However, whether the officer concerned will be entitled to any arrears of pay for the period of notional promotion preceding the date of actual promotion, and if so to what extent, will be decided by the concerned authority by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the disciplinary proceeding/criminal prosecution. Where the authority denies arrears of salary or part of it, it will record its reasons for doing so." 10. The respondents in this case happen to be the Secretary (Personnel) and Director General of Police, who cannot feign ignorance and are expected or deemed to be having adequate knowledge of law and, therefore, it does not at all behove upon the respondents to have dragged initially the original petitioner and thereafter the present petitioners to this litigation. 11. The respondents in this case happen to be the Secretary (Personnel) and Director General of Police, who cannot feign ignorance and are expected or deemed to be having adequate knowledge of law and, therefore, it does not at all behove upon the respondents to have dragged initially the original petitioner and thereafter the present petitioners to this litigation. 11. We say no further, but, while allowing the instant petition, would direct the respondents to release the actual monetary benefits, due and admissible to the original petitioner as ASI, w.e.f. 17.7.2009 to 28.7.2015 as against notional benefits, in favour of the present petitioners within a period of 30 days, failing which the respondents shall be liable to pay interest @ 9% per annum till the payment is made. 12. The petition is disposed, in the aforesaid terms, so also the pending application(s), if any. For compliance, list on 27.10.2022.