JUDGMENT : SUDHIR SINGH, J. 1. This criminal appeal has been filed on behalf of the appellant against the judgment and order dated 31-10-1995, passed by learned 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Banka, in Sessions Trial No. 575 of 1993, arising out of Rajoun P.S. Case No. 198 of 1992 whereby and whereunder the appellant, namely, Ram Bilas Sharma and one Etwari Sharma having been convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. The appeal as against Etwari Sharma got abated by order dated 11.03.2022, passed in this criminal appeal, as he died during pendency of this appeal. Therefore, this appeal is now surviving only against the sole appellant, namely, Ram Bilas Sharma. 2. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that fardbeyan of the informant was recorded at 7.30 A.M. on 21-12-1992 at Rajoun Hospital, wherein he stated that the informant has got two brothers and all three brothers including the informant used to live separately. One of the brothers, namely, Amik Sharma (deceased) used to live in his house constructed near the pond (Pokhar) situated in the west of the village. On 21-12-1992 at 5.00 A.M. the informant hearing some alarm from pond side, ran towards the pond and saw his brother Amik Sharma lying injured in north to his house and his wife was taking care of him. The injured Amik Sharma told the informant that while he was returning to his house after urinating, the accused Ram Bilas Sharma (appellant) and Etwari Sharma having bombs in their hands reached there and one bomb was thrown by Ram Bilas Sharma (appellant) which injured him (Amik Sharma). As per the prosecution, the palm, scrotum and both legs of Amik Sharma were injured. On hearing the sound of explosion of bomb, one Doman Sharma and Murari Sharma along with some villagers also came there and with their help, the informant took the injured to Rajoun State Dispensary where the injured succumbed to the injuries. Disclosing the motive behind the occurrence, it is stated in the fardbeyan that there was a dispute since earlier with the accused persons relating to the land of Bajrang Bali. Disclosing the motive behind the occurrence, it is stated in the fardbeyan that there was a dispute since earlier with the accused persons relating to the land of Bajrang Bali. The accused persons were demanding some more land on which the informant was not agreed and for the said reason, the accused persons with intent to commit murder of the deceased, hurled bomb upon him. On the basis of fardbeyan, a formal F.I.R. was drawn up and Rajoun P.S. Case No. 198 of 1992 was registered against the appellant and Etwari Sharma under Sections 302/34 of the I.P.C. and Sections 3/4 of the Explosive Substances Act. 3. After completion of investigation, the police submitted charge sheet against the accused persons and cognizance was taken by the Jurisdictional Magistrate. The case was committed to the Court of Sessions. Charges were framed against the accused persons for the offences under Sections 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code and under Section ¾ of the Explosive Substances Act. Thereupon, they were put to trial. 4. In course of trial, the prosecution examined as many as 11 witnesses viz. PW-7 is the informant, PWs. 1 & 2 are his parents, PW-3 is informant’s wife, PW-5 is wife of the deceased, PWs. 4, 8 & 9 are witnesses on seizure lists. PW-6 is a witness on Inquest report. PW-10 is the doctor and PW-11 is the Investigating Officer. The documentary evidence brought on record by the prosecution are fardbeyan (Ext.2), endorsement and signature of PW-11 on Ext.2 (Ext.3), formal F.I.R. (Ext.4). Inquest report (Ext.5), seizure list with regard to blood stained soil (Ext.6/1), Sanction order of the District Magistrate for prosecution under Explosive Substances Act (Ext.7) and charge sheet (Ext.8). Different signatures are Ext.1 series. Exts.1 & 1/1 are signatures of PW-4 on Exts.5 & 6 respectively, Ext.½ is signature of PW-6 on Ext.5, Ext.1/3 is signature of PW-2 on Ext.2, Exts.¼ and 1/5 are signatures of PWs. 8 & 9 respectively on Ext.6/1, Exts.1/6 to 1/9 and 1/11 are signatures of PW-11 on Exts.2, 4, 5, 6 & 6/1 respectively and Ext.1/10 is signature of PW-6 on Ext.6. No oral evidence has been adduced on behalf of the defence. However, the postmortem report of the deceased has been marked as Ext.A in this case at the instance of the defence. 5. No oral evidence has been adduced on behalf of the defence. However, the postmortem report of the deceased has been marked as Ext.A in this case at the instance of the defence. 5. It has been argued by the learned counsel of the appellant that during the trial, no independent witness has been examined by the prosecution and apart from official witnesses all the prosecution witnesses are family members of the deceased and hence they are relatives/partisan interested witness. Therefore, their testimony cannot be relied upon. Further, there is no eye witness to the alleged occurrence and it is only after hearing the sound of explosion the witnesses have reached to the place of occurrence. The wife of the deceased (PW-5) has only seen the appellant running away from the place of occurrence. It has been contended that admittedly there was previous enmity between the accused persons and the deceased and therefore they have been falsely implicated in this case. Learned counsel for the appellant has also contended that the prosecution has failed to establish the place of occurrence. It has been submitted by him that as per the defence, the place of occurrence happens to be inside the house of the deceased and the deceased was involved in making of bombs, which accidentally exploded in his hand causing his death. In support of the version of the defence, learned counsel has drawn attention towards the testimony of the Investigating Officer (PW-11) wherein in paragraph 12 of the testimony, the Investigating Officer has deposed that the place of occurrence is the hut of the deceased situated near pond (Pokhar) which is at a distance of 50 yards towards West from the village. He also submits that there is contradiction in the testimony of the Investigating Officer (PW-11) with regard to the place of occurrence and therefore the prosecution has not been able to establish the place of occurrence beyond doubt. Lastly, learned counsel has submitted that PW-8 and PW-9, who are seizure list witness have also supported the version of the defence in their testimony. 6. Lastly, learned counsel has submitted that PW-8 and PW-9, who are seizure list witness have also supported the version of the defence in their testimony. 6. Learned A.P.P. appearing for the State has submitted that the prosecution has been able to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and, if at all, there are minor inconsistencies in the testimony of the witnesses not relating to the ‘facts in issue’ the same cannot be a ground to disbelieve the case of prosecution, so as to warrant any interference in the order of conviction passed by the trial court. 7. After hearing both the sides and perusing the materials available on record, following issues arise for consideration: (i) Whether the trial court has fallen in error of law by placing reliance upon the testimonies of related/partisan or interested witnesses and has the non-examination of any independent witness caused prejudice to the appellant? (ii) Whether it is a case of false implication on account of previous enmity between the deceased and the accused persons? (iii) Whether the prosecution has established the place of occurrence beyond reasonable doubt? (iv) Whether the statement of the informant is an admissible piece of evidence and can it be relied upon to convict the appellant? 8. While considering the first issue as formulated above, from perusal of record, we find that apart from seizure and official witness, all the prosecution witnesses are relatives of the deceased. However, from meticulous scrutinization of the evidence adduced by them it is apparent that all the witnesses are consistent in their deposition and the defence has not been able to elicit anything in their cross-examination which could make their evidence doubtful. Therefore, we are of the opinion that for the sole reason that the prosecution has not examined any independent witness and all the witnesses are relatives of the deceased will not adversely affect the case of the prosecution. If the testimony of related or interested witnesses is consistent and the defence has failed to bring out any material contradiction in their testimony, the same can be relied upon and it will not cause any prejudice to the appellant and shall not be fatal to the case of prosecution. If the testimony of related or interested witnesses is consistent and the defence has failed to bring out any material contradiction in their testimony, the same can be relied upon and it will not cause any prejudice to the appellant and shall not be fatal to the case of prosecution. In this regard, we would like to rely upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in Raju and Others vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2012) 12 SCC 701 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court after referring several decisions on this issue has held in Para 37 and 38 as follows: “37. More recently, in Waman vs. State of Maharashtra, MANU/SC/0733/2011 : (2011) 7 SCC 295 this Court dealt with the case of a related witness (though not a witness inimical to the assailant) and while referring to and relying upon Sarwan Singh vs. State of Punjab, MANU/SC/0169/1976 : (1976) 4 SCC 369 , Balraje vs. State of Maharashtra, MANU/SC/0352/2010 : (2010) 6 SCC 673 , Prahlad Patel vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, MANU/SC/0164/2011 : (2011) 4 SCC 262 , Israr vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, MANU/SC/1031/2004 : (2005) 9 SCC 616 , S. Sudershan Reddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, MANU/SC/3139/2006 : (2006) 10 SCC 163, State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Naresh, MANU/SC/0228/2011 : (2011) 4 SCC 324 , Jarnail Singh vs. State of Punjab, MANU/SC/1584/2009 : (2009) 9 SCC 719 and Vishnu vs. State of Rajasthan, (2009) 10 SCC 477 it was held: It is clear that merely because the witnesses are related to the complainant or the deceased, their evidence cannot be thrown out. If their evidence is found to be consistent and true, the fact of being a relative cannot by itself discredit their evidence. In other words, the relationship is not a factor to affect the credibility of a witness and the courts have to scrutinise their evidence meticulously with a little care. 38. The sum and substance is that the evidence of a related or interested witness should be meticulously and carefully examined. In a case where the related and interested witness may have some enmity with the assailant, the bar would need to be raised and the evidence of the witness would have to be examined by applying a standard of discerning scrutiny. In a case where the related and interested witness may have some enmity with the assailant, the bar would need to be raised and the evidence of the witness would have to be examined by applying a standard of discerning scrutiny. However, this is only a rule of prudence and not one of law, as held in Dalip Singh and pithily reiterated in Sarwan Singh in the following words: The evidence of an interested witness does not suffer from any infirmity as such, but the courts require as a rule of prudence, not as a rule of law, that the evidence of such witnesses should be scrutinized with a little care. Once that approach is made and the court is satisfied that the evidence of interested witnesses have a ring of truth such evidence could be relied upon even without corroboration.” 9. The second issue is with regard to false implication of the appellant due to previous enmity which is admitted by the prosecution. We find no hesitation in saying that the ground of previous enmity, as raised by learned counsel for the appellant, is a double-edged sword. The previous enmity between the deceased and the appellant can also be the motive behind the occurrence. The possibility of the appellant killing the deceased on account of previous enmity can also not be ruled out. Moreover, the fact that deceased and appellant were having inimical terms towards each other, by itself would not be a valid ground to discredit the testimony of the relatives of the deceased who are otherwise truthful. Therefore, it cannot be said that the appellant has been falsely implicated in this case only because of previous enmity between the deceased and the appellant. 10. So far as third issue regarding the place of occurrence is concerned, we have minutely examined the testimony of the Investigating Officer (PW-11) and the testimony of seizure list witness viz. PW-8 and PW-9. The Investigating Officer in his examination-in-chief has given a vivid description of the place of occurrence. Initially he has deposed that the place of occurrence is the hut of the deceased. However, in his examination-in-chief, he has further clarified, by being more specific, that it was an open space (Sahan) in front of the hut of the deceased where the occurrence had actually taken place. Initially he has deposed that the place of occurrence is the hut of the deceased. However, in his examination-in-chief, he has further clarified, by being more specific, that it was an open space (Sahan) in front of the hut of the deceased where the occurrence had actually taken place. He has also deposed that there was sign of explosion of bomb and its smoke on the wall of the hut of the deceased as well as on the wall of a Hanuman Temple situated in front of the open space (Sahan) of the hut of the deceased. When the Investigating Officer was cross-examined by the defence, it has come during his cross-examination that he had mentioned the place of occurrence to be the hut of the deceased because the occurrence had taken place in the Sahan (open space) of the hut. Further, in his cross-examination he has said that he had inspected all the three rooms of the hut of the deceased but he had not found any incriminating article related to this case. Moreover, from perusal of the seizure list of the blood-stained soil and the remnants of bomb, marked as Ext.6/1, it is clear that the place of occurrence is the Sahan (open space) of the hut of the deceased. So far as the testimony of seizure list witnesses PW-8 and PW-9 is concerned, they have proved the seizure-list in their examination-in-chief. However, in their cross-examination they have developed the case by supporting the case of the defence and have went on to state that the place of occurrence is inside the house of the deceased and the bomb had exploded in the hand of the deceased while he was keeping it inside the house. It is evident from the records that PW-8 and PW-9 are seizure list witness. They are not eye witness to the occurrence. Therefore, their narration regarding the manner of occurrence cannot be taken into consideration whereas other prosecution witnesses have supported the place of occurrence as indicated in the F.I.R. In view of the above discussion, we are of the opinion that the prosecution has established the place of occurrence beyond doubt and there is no material contradiction in the evidence adduced by the prosecution regarding the place of occurrence. 11. 11. Now adverting to the fourth issue as formulated above, that whether the statement of the informant narrating the manner of occurrence is admissible piece of evidence. From the records, it is apparent that there is no eye witness to the occurrence. The informant had reached the place of occurrence after hearing the sound of explosion and his statement regarding the occurrence that the appellant has hurled bomb upon his brother is based on information made by the injured brother himself soon after the bomb attacks and died later. The general rule of evidence is that hearsay evidence is not admissible. However, the law has carved out an exception to the general rule which is codified in Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The same is reproduced herein-below: “Section 6 - Relevancy of facts forming part of same transaction-Facts which, though not in issue, are so connected with a fact in issue as to form part of the same transaction, are relevant, whether they occurred at the same time and place or at different times and places. Illustrations (a) A is accused of the murder of B by beating him. Whatever was said or done by A or B or by the by standers at the beating, or so shortly before or after it as to form part of the transaction, is a relevant fact.” 12. The principle underlying Section 6 is the Rule of res gestae, an exception to the principle that hearsay evidence is no evidence. The requirement of Section 6 is that the statement must have been made spontaneous with the act or immediately thereafter. A statement made after lapse of sometime would allow fabrication and cannot be treated as res gestae. It is the spontaneity and immediate nature of such statement or fact in relation to the fact in issue which makes that statement or fact admissible. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sukhar vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1999) 9 SCC 507 in a similar factual matrix, after discussing several landmark judgments on the Rule of res gestae has held as under: “10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sukhar vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1999) 9 SCC 507 in a similar factual matrix, after discussing several landmark judgments on the Rule of res gestae has held as under: “10. Applying the ratio of the aforesaid two cases to the evidence of PW-2, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that his statement indicating that the injured told him that his nephew has fired at him, would become admissible under Section 6 of the Evidence Act.” 13. Therefore, applying the law as stipulated under Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act and the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court referred above, we are of the considered opinion that the statement of the informant is admissible in the eyes of law. There is immediacy in the statement of the informant and there is no time interval in making of the statement of informant which would create a possibility of fabrication. So far as the reliability of his evidence is concerned, it is evident from the record that he has been consistent in his statement and the defence in cross-examination has not elicited anything which could bring his evidence under the shadow of doubt. Further, his testimony is corroborated with the evidence of other prosecution witnesses, particularly PW-5 (wife of the deceased) who had seen the appellant running away from the place of occurrence and has stated in her examination-in-chief that her husband had told her that the appellant and Etwari Sharma had ran away towards North after throwing bomb on him. Moreover, the evidence adduced by the informant also gets duly corroborated with the medical evidence available on record. Therefore, the evidence of the informant is reliable and suffers from no infirmity, this being duly proved. 14. After giving anxious consideration to the materials available on record, we have reached to the conclusion that the appellant has been rightly held guilty of the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, therefore, the order of the trial court is upheld so far conviction of the appellant under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned. 15. 15. In course of hearing of this appeal, we have found that though the charges were also framed under Section ¾ of the Explosive Substances Act, however, the trial court acquitted the appellant under Section ¾ of the Explosive Substances Act on the ground that the sanction order under the Explosive Substances Act has not been legally proved. The trial court in this regard has held that in cross-examination of the Investigating Officer (PW-11), he has stated that he does not identify the signature of the then District Magistrate, Smt. Shila Kisku and therefore, the sanction order not proved. 16. At this juncture, we have carefully examined the testimony of the Investigating Officer (PW-11). We find that the Investigating Officer (PW-11) has in his examination-in-chief stated that he identifies the signature of Smt. Shila Kisku, the then District Magistrate. In his cross-examination, he has stated that the sanction order (Ext.7) bears initial signature of Smt. Shila Kisku. However, he does not identify her signature but since the sanction order is signed by the then District Magistrate and at that point of time, it was Smt. Shila Kisku who was the District Magistrate, therefore, he has said in his examination-in-chief that sanction order (Ext.7) is signed by Smt. Shila Kisku. 17. Be that as it may, the prosecution in course of trial produced the sanction order before the trial court but it was marked as Exhibit-7 with objection but by the defence without specifying the ground for objection. The learned trial court proceeded with the matter without deciding the validity of the objection. Such tendency to postpone the decision to avoid interruption in the process of recording evidence, resorted to marking of document with the objection, sometimes leads to such situation that even the original copies of the public document are not taken into consideration. 18. In the instant appeal i.e., appeal against conviction, this Court cannot pass such order reversing the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial court in respect of the appellant for the offence under Section ¾ of the Explosive Substances Act. This Court is not unmindful of the provisions contemplated under Section 386(b) read with Section 401(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which nowhere authorise a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. This Court is not unmindful of the provisions contemplated under Section 386(b) read with Section 401(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which nowhere authorise a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. However, we are of the considered opinion that the failure of prosecution to prove the charge under Section ¾ of the Explosive Substances Act against the appellant for the reason that the sanction for prosecution under Explosive Substances Act has not been duly proved, does not have any bearing upon the judgment of conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and the sentence awarded, since the murder has already been proved. 19. Therefore, the judgment of conviction and the order of sentence dated 31.10.1995 passed against the appellant by the court below requires no interference, thus, accordingly, affirmed and this appeal is dismissed. 20. The bail bonds of the appellant are hereby cancelled. The appellant is directed to be taken into custody and sent to prison for undergoing the remaining part of his sentence. I agree - Chandra Prakash Singh, J.