JUDGMENT ANIL KUMAR SINHA, J.:– The present First Appeal has been filed against judgment and decree dated 05.04.2019 passed in Title Suit (Probate) No. 01/1993 by which the Probate Application of Respondent No. 5 herein has been allowed in respect of Will dated 05.10.1985 executed in her favour by late Ishwar Dayal. 2. In the instant First Appeal, Interlocutory Application No. 03/2020 has been filed by the partners of M/s Shrestha Aditya Construction for addition of their name as party respondents in the present appeal, inter alia, on the facts that Ishwar Dayal (Testator) executed a Will dated 05.10.1985 in favour of Respondent No.5, Meena Devi with respect to his entire movable and immovable properties and Meena Devi was also appointed as executor authorizing her to obtain probate from competent court. Meena Devi was executor as well as legatee under the Will dated 05.10.1985. 3. On 19.12.1988 the said testator died and after his death on 31.01.1989, Probate Case No. 13/1989 was filed by the legatee with respect to Schedule-1 properties. On the basis of objection filed by the appellant and one Munshi Rai (since deceased), the probate proceeding was registered as Title Suit No. 01/1993. Munshi Rai died during pendency of Title Suit No. 01/1993 and his name was deleted. 4. On 04.07.2020, Respondent No.5, Meena Devi entered into the Development Agreement (Annexure-1 to the I.A. No. 03/2020) with respect to Plot No. 1716 having an area of 18 ½ Decimals with the interveners/petitioners for development of land. On the basis of application filed by Meena Devi, map was sanctioned by the competent authority (Annexure-2 of I.A. petition) on 04.01.2021. 5. Real Estate Regulatory Authority, Bihar (in short ‘RERA’) registered the project for development over the plot in question namely, Aditya Meena Enclave New Project. On the basis of application filed by Meena Devi, map was sanctioned by the competent authority (Annexure-2 of I.A. petition) on 04.01.2021. 5. Real Estate Regulatory Authority, Bihar (in short ‘RERA’) registered the project for development over the plot in question namely, Aditya Meena Enclave New Project. The intervenor applicants namely, Sumit Kumar and Ashok Kumar, partners of M/s Shrestha Aditya Construction had no knowledge about the pendency of the First Appeal No. 102/2019 against the judgment and decree dated 05.04.2019 passed in Title Suit No.01/1993 (arising out of Probate Case No. 13/1989) and having learnt about filing of an application under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 of the CPC in First Appeal No. 102/2019, the interveners have filed the Interlocutory Application under Order 01 Rule 10(2) of the CPC impleading them as party in the aforesaid First Appeal on the ground that they have acquired a substantial interest in the properties/Estate of deceased testator after grant of probate. 6. The appellant opposed the Interlocutory Application filed by the interveners and according to the appellant, the same is not maintainable on the ground that the interveners are not necessary parties in the present appeal keeping in view the scope of the probate proceeding. 7. The probate case was contested by the appellant on various grounds including that one of the properties mentioned in the probate petition being plot no. 1716, Khata No. 467, Tauji No. 5236 was not the property of testator, Late Ishwar Dayal and the same is not the part and parcel of the estate of late Ishwar Dayal. The court below held that it has got no jurisdiction to enter into the issue of title. However, the Will has been held to be genuine and accordingly, probate was granted in favour of Respondent No.5. 8. Learned senior counsel for the appellant submits that probate case is not a regular suit and is not guided by the procedure prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure but the same is guided and controlled by the Indian Succession Act, 1925 (for brevity ‘the Act’) which is a self-contained Act in which provisions have been given as to filing of the probate case, caveat objections and as to the procedure to be adopted for disposal of such cases. It has been contended that the order granting probate is sub-judice in the present appeal but the Respondent No. 5 having full knowledge of the same has entered into the development agreement with the interveners/petitioners who were also having full knowledge about the pendency of the appeal but have deliberately taken a calculated risk to enter into the development agreement. The question of title cannot be decided in a probate case nor has been decided by the court below and since the appellant has raised the dispute that one of the plots in question bearing plot No. 1716 does not belong to late Ishwar Dayal and this issue is yet to be decided in an appropriate suit by a competent civil court. As such, on the basis of grant of probate, the claim of title upon the aforesaid plot and entering into the development agreement by Respondent No.5 with regard to said plot is not sustainable nor it will create any title in favour of the interveners/ applicants. 9. It has further been argued that by virtue of development agreement no title is passed in favour of developer and in fact for transferring a title in favour of a person passing payment/ of consideration amount is essential and in a development agreement consideration passes only when the building is complete and built up area of the share of land is given to the owner. The developer cannot start construction of building on the land in question inasmuch as neither any plan has been sanctioned nor can be sanctioned because as per the provisions of Bihar Municipal Act and Building Bylaws, 2014, it is essential that the land must be free from encumbrances and there should not be any litigation pending in that regard as per Clause 8(i) thereof, even a sanction map shall automatically be cancelled if any litigation arises upon the land in question. Admittedly, the present First Appeal is pending and therefore, it is completely within the teeth of the provisions of the said Bylaws of 2014. 10. Lastly, it has been submitted that from any angle interveners are neither necessary, nor proper party, nor they may be added as party to the present appeal. Learned senior counsel has placed reliance upon the following judgments:— 1. (2007) 8 SCC 506 (Sunil Gupta Vs. Kiran Girhota & Ors) 2. 10. Lastly, it has been submitted that from any angle interveners are neither necessary, nor proper party, nor they may be added as party to the present appeal. Learned senior counsel has placed reliance upon the following judgments:— 1. (2007) 8 SCC 506 (Sunil Gupta Vs. Kiran Girhota & Ors) 2. (1993) 2 SCC 507 , (Chiranji Lal Shri Lal Goenka Vs. Jasjit Singh & Ors.) 3. (2003) 7 SCC 301 : AIR 2003 SC 3669 (Delhi Development Authority Vs. Vijaya C. Gurushawney) 11. Mr. Ganpati Trivedi, learned senior counsel appearing for the interveners/petitioners referring to Section 307 of the Act submits that this Section deals with the power of the executor to dispose the property. In so many words, it says that as long as the disposition of the property by the executor is compatible with the administration of the estate, the act of disposition by the executor is binding upon the estate of the deceased. Meena Devi is the executor and legatee both, as the properties have been bequeathed in her favour and hence it cannot be said that the disposition in the form of development agreement is incompatible with the administration of the estate of the testator inasmuch as interveners entered into the agreement bonafidely with the legatee, Meena Devi who has been the executor also. Accordingly, transaction by way of development agreement cannot be said to be invalid. The interveners/petitioners have entered into the development agreement with the executor/legatee under the Will with respect to the properties under the Will. Accordingly, some interests have been created in the property/estate of the deceased which is the subject matter of the Will. He next submits that in the present case, the petitioner’s legal right to proceed with the development of the land under agreement is directly dependent upon the result of the appeal as the authority of the executor is itself an issue in the aforesaid appeal and the result of the litigation may affect him legally i.e., by curtailing his legal right. In the present case, the plaintiff/respondents have not raised any objection regarding impleadment of the interveners as party and hence, the appellants who are defendants cannot raise any objection to the impleadment. 12. Lastly, it has been submitted that interveners have only sought impleadment in appeal to protect their interest which they have acquired by virtue of development agreement. In the present case, the plaintiff/respondents have not raised any objection regarding impleadment of the interveners as party and hence, the appellants who are defendants cannot raise any objection to the impleadment. 12. Lastly, it has been submitted that interveners have only sought impleadment in appeal to protect their interest which they have acquired by virtue of development agreement. The probate court has been granted unfettered discretion under Section 283 of the Act to issue notice while granting probate calling all persons claiming to have interest in the estate of the deceased to come and see the proceeding, of course, before the grant of probate. The very purpose of such notice is to watch the proceedings either by filing objection or to support the proceedings. 13. In the present case, the interveners have acquired interest in the properties and estate of the deceased on the basis of grant of probate and the said order granting probate is under challenge in the appeal. Hence, interveners, though, may be called hit by the doctrine of lis pendense, can be impleaded by this Hon’ble Court by exercising its power under Order 22 Rule 10 of the CPC. 14. Learned senior counsel has placed reliance upon the following references:— (1) AIR 1983 SC 123 (Gafoor Ahmad Khan Vs. Bashir Ahmad Khan (Dead). (2) (1992) 2 SCC 524 (Ramesh Hira Chand Kunda Mal Vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay). (3) (2013) 5 SCC 397 (Thomsan Press India Ltd Vs. Nanak Builder and Investors) (4) (2018) 15 SCC 614 (Ramjee Bhai Patel Vs. Anandi Bai Rama & Ors. (5) 2017 (3) PLJR 791 (Kusheshwar Purvey Vs. Shri Shri 108 Ram Janaki Jee S) (6) (2018) 15 SCC 164 (Rabin Ram Jee Bhai Patel Vs. Anandi Bai Rama) (7) 2013(2) PLJR 684 (Raj Kumar Prasad Vs. Vandana Kumari) (8) 2013 (1) PLJR 944 (Ekta Sahkari Grih Nirman Samiti Vs. The Estate of Ram Parikshan Singh). 15. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. 16. In the case of Ramesh Hira Chand Kunda Mal Vs. Anandi Bai Rama) (7) 2013(2) PLJR 684 (Raj Kumar Prasad Vs. Vandana Kumari) (8) 2013 (1) PLJR 944 (Ekta Sahkari Grih Nirman Samiti Vs. The Estate of Ram Parikshan Singh). 15. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. 16. In the case of Ramesh Hira Chand Kunda Mal Vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay reported in (1992) 2 SCC 524 , the Hon’ble Apex Court made a distinction between direct interest, legal interest and commercial interest and quoting the case of Razia Begum in para-10 of this judgment, it has been held that a person may be added as party to the suit, he should have interest in the subject matter of litigation whether it be a question relating to movable or immovable property. The same paragraph is hereby quoted for ready reference:— “10. The power of the Court to add parties under Order I Rule 10, CPC, came up for consideration before this Court in Razia Begum ( AIR 1958 SC 886 ). In that case it was pointed out that the Courts in India have not treated the matter of addition of parties as raising any question of the initial jurisdiction of the Court and that it is firmly established as a result of judicial decisions that in order that a person may be added as a party to a suit, he should have a direct interest in the subject-matter of the litigation whether it be the questions relating to moveable or Immovable property. 17. In paragraph-14 of the said judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down the true test for addition of parties which is as follows:— “14. It cannot be said that the main object of the rule is to prevent multiplicity of actions though it may incidentally have that effect. But that appears to be a desirable consequence of the rule rather than its main objectives. The person to be joined must be one whose presence is necessary as a party. What makes a person a necessary party is not merely that he has relevant evidence to give on some of the questions involved; that would only make him a necessary witness. It is not merely that he has an interest in the correct solution of some questions involved and has thought of relevant arguments to advance. What makes a person a necessary party is not merely that he has relevant evidence to give on some of the questions involved; that would only make him a necessary witness. It is not merely that he has an interest in the correct solution of some questions involved and has thought of relevant arguments to advance. The only reason which makes it necessary to make a person a party to an action is that he should be bound by the result of the action and the question to be settled, therefore, must be a question in the action which cannot be effectually and completely settled unless he is a party. The line has been drawn on a wider construction of the rule between the direct interest or the legal interest and commercial interest. It is, therefore, necessary that the person must be directly or legally interested in the action in the answer, i.e., he can say that the litigation may lead to a result which will affect him legally that is by curtailing his legal rights. It is difficult to say that the rule contemplates joining as a defendant a person whose only object is to prosecute his own cause of action. Similar provision was considered in Amon Vs. Raphael Tuck & Sons Ltd. (1956) 1 All E.R. 273, wherein after quoting the observations of Wynn-Parry, J. in Dollfus Mieg et Compagnie S.A. Vs. Bank of England (1950) 2 All E.R. 611, that the true test lies not so much in an analysis of what are the constituents of the applicants' rights, but rather in what would be the result on the subject-matter of the action if those rights could be established, Devlin, J. has stated: The test is 'May the order for which the plaintiff is asking directly affect the intervener in the enjoyment of his legal rights.'” 18. The pendente lite purchaser has been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Thomsan Press India Ltd Vs. Nanak Builders and Investors reported in (2013) 5 SCC 397 . The Hon’ble Apex Court considering the various judgments dealing on the issue has taken into consideration the distinction between exercise of jurisdiction under Order 1 Rule 10 of the CPC as that conferred under Order 22 Rule 10 of the CPC. Nanak Builders and Investors reported in (2013) 5 SCC 397 . The Hon’ble Apex Court considering the various judgments dealing on the issue has taken into consideration the distinction between exercise of jurisdiction under Order 1 Rule 10 of the CPC as that conferred under Order 22 Rule 10 of the CPC. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that an alienee pendente lite can be impleaded as party under Order 22 Rule 10 of the CPC if his interest is substantial. 19. In the case of Ramjee Bhai Patel Vs. Anandi Bai Rama & Ors. reported in (2018) 15 SCC 614 relying upon the ‘Kasturi’ case, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that if the plaintiff wants to implead certain person, even if he be a subsequent purchaser, he can be impleaded as party. 20. The Division Bench of Patna High Court in the case of Kusheshwar Purvey Vs. Shri Shri 108 Ram Janaki Jee S as reported in 2017(3) PLJR 791 has held in para-8 and 9 which are as follows:— “8. After considering the submissions on behalf of the parties, it is quite limpid that the adjudication in a proceeding for grant of probate or letters of administration involves determination of certain rights of the parties. This is also the view expressed by the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Mrs. Panzy Fernandas Vs. Mrs. M.F. Queoros, A.I.R. 1963 All. 153 observing that an order passed in an application for probate or letters of administration does adjudicate on certain rights of the parties conclusively. This facet has been now finally settled by the Apex Court in Subal Paul Vs. Malina Paul, (2003)10 SCC 361 [: 2003(3) PLJR (SC)1] where their lordships have observed as follows:- "31..........The order passed under Section 299 of the Act may be an interlocutory order determining the rights of the parties or a final order. When a final order is passed in a contentious suit, as would be evident from the provisions contained in Section 295 of the Act, the procedures of the Code of Civil Procedure are required to be followed. When a final order is passed in a contentious suit, as would be evident from the provisions contained in Section 295 of the Act, the procedures of the Code of Civil Procedure are required to be followed. Therefore, a final order passed between the parties adjudicating upon the rights and obligations which are binding between the parties thereto and are enforceable, although may not be stricto sensu a decree within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure but it is beyond any cavil that the same would be a judgment within a meaning of Section 2(9) thereof........" 9. The controversy pertaining to the nature and legal effect of a final adjudicatory order in a proceeding for grant of probate or letters of administration has been also highlighted by the Apex Court in Smt. Rukmani Devi Vs. Narendra Lal Gupta, A.I.R. 1984 SC 1866 where their lordships have opined as follows:-- "2...........It is well-settled that the decision of the probate court is a judgment in rem. The High Court rightly held that till the order granting probate remains in force it is conclusive as to the execution and validity of the will till the grant of probate is revoked. Apart from the fact that a decision of the probate court would be a judgment in rem not only binding on the parties to the probate proceedings but it will be binding on the whole world. Therefore, a solemn duty is cast on the probate court. Section 41 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 provides that a final judgment or order of a competent court in the exercise of probate jurisdiction is conclusive proof of what is decided therein that is about the genuineness of the will. To be precise, a probate granted by a competent court is conclusive of the validity of such will until it is revoked and no evidence can be admitted to impeach it except in a proceeding taken for revoking the probate..................." 21. The appellant heavily relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sunil Gupta Vs. Kiran Girhotra & Ors as reported in (2007) 8 SCC 506 where two Wills were brought on record, one executed by Har Bhagwan on 09.09.1997 in favour of the beneficiaries and another said to have been executed on 30.10.1997 in favour of Raj Kumar. Kiran Girhotra & Ors as reported in (2007) 8 SCC 506 where two Wills were brought on record, one executed by Har Bhagwan on 09.09.1997 in favour of the beneficiaries and another said to have been executed on 30.10.1997 in favour of Raj Kumar. Raj Kumar did not take action for grant of probate of the Will said to have been executed in his favour on 30.10.1997 by Har Bhagwan. Even no objection was obtained from heirs of late Har Bhagwan and on the contrary, he executed the sale deed on 20.06.2003 and 27.06.2002 in favour of Amit Pahwa. The said Amit Pahwa, in turn, executed an agreement of sale with respect to one property and in furtherance thereof, a sale-deed was executed on 29.08.2003. The purchasers filed an application for impleadment in the probate proceeding initiated by the beneficiaries on the basis of Will executed on 09.09.1997. This judgment i.e., Sunil Gupta (supra) relied upon by the appellant is not applicable in the facts of the present case inasmuch as Raj Kumar though claimed on the basis of Will said to have been executed in his favour on 30.10.1997 by Har Bhagwan did not obtain the probate and without obtaining probate, he executed sale deeds on 20.06.2003 and 27.06.2003. The interveners on the basis of agreement of sale executed by Amit Pahwas the purchaser from Raj Kumar purchased the property on 29.08.2003 whereas in the present case, the admitted fact is that the Will was executed in favour of Respondent No.5, Meena Devi on 05.10.1985 and she was executor as well as legatee under the Will and accordingly, probate was granted in her favour on 05.04.2019. Being executor as well as legatee under the Will she acquired right under Section 307 of the Act to dispose of the property of the deceased vested in her under Section 211 of the Act either wholly or in part in such manner she may think fit and thus on the basis of such authority acquired by Meena Devi, the interveners, in the present case, acquired interest in the estate of the deceased. The interveners acquired interest after grant of probate in favour of executor and legatee, namely, Meena Devi, on the basis of which, development agreement was executed on 04.07.2020. Hence, the question of putting the clock back does not arise. 22. The interveners acquired interest after grant of probate in favour of executor and legatee, namely, Meena Devi, on the basis of which, development agreement was executed on 04.07.2020. Hence, the question of putting the clock back does not arise. 22. The other judgment which has been relied upon by the appellant in the case of Chiranji Lal Shri Lal Goenka Vs. Jasjit Singh & Ors reported in (1993) 2 SCC 507 is also not applicable in the facts of the present case. 23. In the aforesaid judgment in paragraph-20, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has come to the conclusion that the probate court alone has exclusive jurisdiction to prove the Will and the Civil court on original side or the arbitrator does not get jurisdiction even if consented by the parties, to adjudicate upon the proof or validity of the Will propounded by the executrix, the applicant. 24. Another judgment relied upon, by the appellant in the case of Delhi Development Authority (supra) is not applicable in the facts of this case. 25. On conspectus of facts and law discussed hereinabove, it is clear that in the present case, the petitioner’s legal right to proceed with the development of the land under agreement is directly dependent upon the result of the appeal as the authority of the executor is itself an issue in the aforesaid appeal and the result of the litigation may affect the interveners legally i.e., by curtailing their legal right. In the present case, plaintiff has not raised objection for impleading the interveners as party and hence, the appellant who is defendant cannot raise any objection to the impleadment of the interveners as party. The probate court has been granted unfettered discretion under Section 283 of the Act to issue notice while granting probate calling all persons claiming to have interest in the estate of the deceased to come and see the proceeding, of course, before the grant of probate. However, the very purpose of such notice is to watch the proceedings either by filing objection or to support the proceedings. 26. In the present case, interveners have acquired interest in the properties and estate of the deceased on the basis of grant of probate and the said order granting probate is under challenge in the aforesaid appeal. However, the very purpose of such notice is to watch the proceedings either by filing objection or to support the proceedings. 26. In the present case, interveners have acquired interest in the properties and estate of the deceased on the basis of grant of probate and the said order granting probate is under challenge in the aforesaid appeal. Hence, interveners, though, may be called hit by the doctrine of lis pendens, can be impleaded as party by exercising power under Order 22 Rule 10 of the CPC. The same view has been reiterated in the case of Raj Kumar Prasad Vs. Vandana Kumari reported in 2013(2) PLJR 684 and in the case of Ekta Sahkari Grih Nirman Samiti Vs. The Estate of Ram Prikshan Singh reported in 2013(1) PLJR 944 . 27. In the present case, in substance, grant of probate is an issue and the interveners/applicants have filed Interlocutory Application No. 03/2022 for their impleadment as party/respondents. Interveners having acquired some interest in the property and the estate of the deceased on the basis of grant of probate in favour of Respondent No.5, Meena Devi, and the development agreement executed by her, in my opinion, at least, interveners can be allowed to be impleaded as party/respondents in order to watch the proceedings before this Court, so that they may protect their interest. 28. In the result, Interlocutory Application No. 03/2022 is allowed and the interveners/applicants are directed to be added as party/respondents in the appeal.