JUDGMENT : Sanjay Prasad, J. The present criminal appeal has been preferred against the order dated 20.06.2020 passed in Special (NIA) Case No. 02 of 2018, corresponding to R.C. No. 02/2018/NIA/DLI dated 19.01.2018 registered under Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code and Section 21 of Unlawful Activist (Prevention) Act, 1967 aginst the appellant, arising out of Bero P.S. Case No. 67 of 2016 registered under Section 212/213/414/34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 13/17/40 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 and Section 17 of Criminal Law Amendment Act by the learned Judicial Commissioner-cum-Special Judge NIA at Ranchi, whereby the Learned Court below has rejected the bail application of appellant being Miscellaneous Criminal Application No. 932 of 2019. 2. Prosecution case, in brief, is that on 10.11.2016, on receiving secret information, the informant namely Mr. Bindeshwari Das, Officer In-charge of Bero P.S. registered an information received regarding the associates of Supremo of PLFI depositing ill-gotten money of crime proceed realized as extortion of levy at SBI, Bero, Ranchi. After having informed his superior authorities and having received their directives, he proceeded for its verification alongwith other police officials and reserve guards. At about 03.15 PM, he reached along with his team at SBI, Bero, Ranchi, and after surrounding the same waited in ambush. In the meantime, after having seen the police party, 3-4 persons making hue and cry attempted to flee away with bag having articles carrying in their hand, and one of the persons was apprehended from campus of the Bank and three persons were apprehended while boarding Safari Vehicle No. JH01Y 2898. On asking, the persons apprehended disclosed their name as co-accused Binod Kumar, Chandra Shekhar Kumar, Nand Kishore Mahto and Mohan Kumar. The Informant conducted search of these persons in presence of independent witnesses and alleged levy/extorted amount of Rs. 25,38,000/-was recovered. The co-accused were unable to show any document and one of the co-accused confessed before the Informant that the PLFI Supremo Dinesh Gope had instructed him on mobile phone after the Central Government Policy of demonetization to deposit the amount. It was further confessed by a co-accused that levied, extorted money was given by PLFI extremist organization for getting it converted white money by depositing in the name of the said petrol pump. Accordingly, all the said articles were seized in presence of independent witnesses and seizure list was prepared. It was further confessed by a co-accused that levied, extorted money was given by PLFI extremist organization for getting it converted white money by depositing in the name of the said petrol pump. Accordingly, all the said articles were seized in presence of independent witnesses and seizure list was prepared. On these grounds, the informant claimed that these accused persons were involved in the extortion of levied amount and such ill-gotten money was being converted by hardcore outlawed PLFI extremist people which is dangerous to the national interest and helpful for the extremist organization. Accordingly, a First Information Report was instituted against six accused persons including four arrested persons namely Binod Kumar, Chandra Shekhar Kumar, Nand Kishore Mahto and Mohan Kumar. 3. Heard Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned counsel for the N.I.A. 4. It is submitted that the appellant is innocent and has committed no offence. It is submitted that the appellant has been falsely implicated in the case due to ulterior motive. The appellant has no connection with Supremo of PLFI nor the other members of PLFI. It is further submitted that the appellant has not been apprehended from the spot and his name does not find place in the accused column of Bero P.s. Case No. 67 of 2016, which is the genesis of the case. 5. It is submitted that there is no evidence to connect the appellant with any terrorist group or person involved in the terrorist activates. Further, there is no evidence to show that the appellant received/held any money that was proceeds of any terrorist act or was acquired through the terrorist fund, It is submitted that it is not the case of the prosecution that the appellant was a part of PLFI. It is further submitted that the appellant admittedly is a businessman. 6. It is submitted that the appellant has no nexus with the PLFI outfit members and even the call records also show that the appellant was never in touch with any PLFI member at any time. The allegation of knowingly holding any property derived or obtained from commission of any terrorist act or acquired through the terrorist fund is thus without any basis. The allegation of knowingly holding any property derived or obtained from commission of any terrorist act or acquired through the terrorist fund is thus without any basis. There is absolutely no evidence to show that the appellant was involved in holding the proceeds of terrorism in the light of Section 2 (1) (g) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. 7. It is submitted that there is no evidence to show that any payment was made to the appellant. The appellant had no connection with the PLFI supremo Dinesh Gope or anyone else. There is no evidence to establish that the appellant had held any proceeds of terrorism at any point in time. 8. It is submitted that other accused persons namely Binod Kumar (A-1), Chandrashekhar Kumar (A-2), Nand Kishor Mahto (A-3) have already been granted bail by this Hon'ble Court. It is submitted that the appellant has no criminal antecedent as has been recorded in Para 17.13 (B) of the First Supplementary Charge Sheet dated 21.10.2019. 9. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that maximum a sum of Rs. Two lakh from the Axis Bank is alleged to have transferred in the bank account of the appellant in Yes Bank from the bank account of the co-accused Sumant Kumar, who is ‘bahnoi’ (i.e. brother in-law) of the terrorist Dinesh Gope. It is submitted that the appellant has got no knowledge that Rs. Two Lakh, which had been given to the appellant, was from terrorist fund as defined under Section 21 of the UAP Act, 1967. It is submitted that mere transfer of Rs. Two Lakh in the bank account of the appellant will not amount to construe that it was an amount of terrorist fund as defined under Section 21 of the UAP Act. It is submitted that Section 21 of the UAP Act wide term in the definition of terrorist, sale and purchase of terrorist fund as it would include everything and nothing remains. It is further submitted that there is no documentary evidence of receiving Rs. Forty Eight Lakh (Rs. 48 lakh) by this appellant as it was stated by P. W.-67, Satyan Bhai Joshi. It is further submitted that evidence of P.W.-56, Faisal Musa is also not reliable. It is further submitted that there is no documentary evidence of receiving Rs. Forty Eight Lakh (Rs. 48 lakh) by this appellant as it was stated by P. W.-67, Satyan Bhai Joshi. It is further submitted that evidence of P.W.-56, Faisal Musa is also not reliable. It is submitted that P.W. -56, Faisal Musa and P.W.-67, Satyan Bhai Joshi have falsely implicated this appellant by alleging that he has received Rs. Forty Eight (48) Lakh by Hawala through U.P. Bhawan and the appellant has convened a meeting with the political leaders, but the name of the political leader have not been disclosed by the NIA in its charge-sheet. 10. It is further submitted that occurrence has taken place as early as on 10.11.2016 giving rise to Bero P. S. Case No. 67 of 2016, which was instituted under Sections 212/213/414/34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 17(ii) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act and Sections 13/17/40 of the UAP Act on recovery of Rs. 25.38 lakh (demonetized notes) of PLFI Chief-Dinesh Gope, which was going to be deposited in S.B.I. Bero Branch and on receiving secret information, the police has arrested four accused persons namely Vinod Kumar, Chandrashekhar Kumar, Nand Kishore Mahto and Mohan Kumar @ Rajesh Kumar, who tried to flee away, but they were apprehended by the police and on their confession, they have disclosed that recovered cash is extorted cash, which was arrived in the PLFI. It is further submitted that the above occurrence was first module of the crime of PLFI in the year 2016 and thereafter 2nd module of alleged crime started in the year 2018, when for the first time, the appellant is said to have come in contact with A-11 namely Jitendra Kumar on 01.04.2018, A-9 namely Chandra Shekhar Singhon on 01.05.2018, A-8 namely Nandlal Swarnkar on 22.05.2018 and A-7 namely Sumant Kumar on 01.07.2018 till 18.05.2019. It is further submitted that even if for the sake of argument, it is presumed for the sake of argument that the appellant had obtained Rs. Two lakh for managing surrender of the accused-Dinesh Gope, then it was to be done for better cause for bringing the harmony in society. The appellant had not committed any wrong act, even if for the sake of the argument, he was arranging a meeting with the political leaders for making arrangement of surrender of the accused Dinesh Gope. Two lakh for managing surrender of the accused-Dinesh Gope, then it was to be done for better cause for bringing the harmony in society. The appellant had not committed any wrong act, even if for the sake of the argument, he was arranging a meeting with the political leaders for making arrangement of surrender of the accused Dinesh Gope. It is submitted that the NIA has named 167 witnesses in its chargesheet, who are yet to be examined during the trial and the trial is likely to be protracted for a long period. It is submitted that the appellant is in custody since 01.06.2019 and he is ready to abide by the terms and conditions imposed by this Court and as such, he may be enlarged on bail. 11. It is submitted that notice under Section 160 of Code of Criminal Procedure was issued upon the appellant. The appellant was summoned to give his statement as a witness and was apprehended thereafter on 31.07.2019. The appellant being once treated as a witness was subsequently wrongly arrayed as an accused. It is submitted that vide order dated 05.11.2019, the learned Court of the Judicial Commissioner-cum-Special Judge NIA in Special (NIA) Case No. 02/2018 took cognizance of offence under Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code and Section 21 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention)Act, 1967 against the appellant. 12. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Kerala Vs. Raneef reported in (2011) 1 SCC 784 and has submitted that in the above case the accused was granted bail by the Hon’ble Court after 66 days. 13. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Indra Das Vs. State of Assam reported in (2011) 3 SCC 380 and has submitted that in the above case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had allowed the bail to the appellant by coming to the conclusion that even if a person is a member of banned organization that will not prove that he was an active member and had participated in the crime. 14. Learned counsel for the appellant has also relied upon the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of People’s Union for Civil Liberties and Anr. Vs. 14. Learned counsel for the appellant has also relied upon the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of People’s Union for Civil Liberties and Anr. Vs. Union of India reported in (2004) 9 SCC 580 and has submitted that in absence of mens rea, the appellant cannot be prosecuted for the offence under Section 21 of the UAP Act as he was not an active member of PLFI. Relevant para-46 to 49 and 75 to 76 of the said judgment were placed during argument and as such, said paras are being quoted hereinbelow, which are as follows: “Para. 46:-The Petitioners assailed Sections 20, 21 and 22 mainly on the ground that no requirement of mens rea for offences is provided in these Sections and the same is liable to misuse therefore it has to be declared unconstitutional. The Learned Attorney General argued that Section 21 and its various subsections are penal provisions and should be strictly construed both in their interpretation and application; that on a true interpretation of the Act having regard to the well settled principles of interpretation Section 21 would not cover any expression or activity which does not have the element or consequence of furthering or encouraging terrorist activity or facilitating its commission; that support per se or mere expression of sympathy or arrangement of a meeting which is not intended or designed and which does not have the effect to further the activities of any terrorist organization or the commission of terrorist acts are not within the mischief of Section 21 and hence is valid. Para. 47:-Here the only point to be considered is whether these Sections exclude mens rea element for constituting offences or not. At the outset it has to be noted that Sections 20, 21 and 22 of POTA is similar to that of Sections 11, 12 and 15 of the Terrorism Act, 2000 of United Kingdom. Such provisions are found to be quite necessary all over the world in anti-terrorism efforts. Sections 20, 21 and 22 are penal in nature that demand strict construction. These provisions are a departure from the ordinary law since the said law was found to be inadequate and not sufficiently effective to deal with the threat of terrorism. Moreover, the crime referred to herein under POTA is aggravated in nature. Hence special provisions are contemplated to combat the new threat of terrorism. These provisions are a departure from the ordinary law since the said law was found to be inadequate and not sufficiently effective to deal with the threat of terrorism. Moreover, the crime referred to herein under POTA is aggravated in nature. Hence special provisions are contemplated to combat the new threat of terrorism. Support either verbal or monetary, with a view to nurture terrorism and terrorist activities is causing new challenges. Therefore Parliament finds that such support to terrorist organizations or terrorist activities need to be made punishable. Viewing the legislation in its totality it cannot be said that these provisions are obnoxious. Para.48-But the Petitioners apprehension regarding the absence of mens rea in these Sections and the possibility of consequent misuse needs our elucidation. It is the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that mens rea element is necessary to constitute a crime. It is the general rule that a penal statute presupposes mens rea element. It will be excluded only if the legislature expressly postulate otherwise. It is in this context that this Court said in Kartar Singh's case (supra) (at page 645 para 115 of SCC) that: "Unless a statue either expressly or by necessary implication rules out 'mens rea' in case of this kind, the element of mens rea must be read into the provision of the statute." Para.49:-Mens rea by necessary implication could be excluded from a statue only where it is absolutely clear that the implementation of the object of the Statue would otherwise be defeated. Here we need to find out whether there are sufficient grounds for inferring that Parliament intended to exclude the general rule regarding mens rea element. (See: State of Maharashtra V. M H George, AIR 1965 SC 722 , Nathulal V. State of MP, AIR 1966 SC 43 , Inder Sain V. State of Punjab, (1973) 2 SCC 372 , for the general principles concerning the exclusion or inclusion of mens rea element vis-a-vis a given statute). The prominent method of understanding the legislative intention, in a matter of this nature, is to see whether the substantive provisions of the Act requires mens rea element as a constituent ingredient for an offence. Offence under Section 3(1) of POTA will be constituted only if it is done with an -'intent'. The prominent method of understanding the legislative intention, in a matter of this nature, is to see whether the substantive provisions of the Act requires mens rea element as a constituent ingredient for an offence. Offence under Section 3(1) of POTA will be constituted only if it is done with an -'intent'. If Parliament stipulates that the 'terrorist act' itself has to be committed with the criminal intention, can it be said that a person who 'profess' (as under Section 20) or 'invites support' or 'arranges, manages, or assist in arranging or managing a meeting' or 'addresses a meeting' (as under Section 21) has committed the offence if he does not have an intention or design to further the activities of any terrorist organization or the commission of terrorist acts? We are clear that it is not. Therefore, it is obvious that the offence under Section 20 or 21 or 22 needs positive inference that a person has acted with intent of furthering or encouraging terrorist activity or facilitating its commission. In other words, these Sections are limited only to those activities that have the intent of encouraging or furthering or promoting or facilitating the commission of terrorist activities. If these Sections are understood in this way, there cannot be any misuse. With this clarification we uphold the constitutional validity of Sections 20, 21 and 22. 75. We have upheld the constitutional validity of Section 21 of POTA in the decision pronounced by us in Writ Petition (C) No. 389 of 2002 above and, therefore, the first question does not survive for consideration. 76. So far as the second question is concerned, we have heard Shri F.S. Nariman and Shri Anil B. Divan, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, apart from Shri Rajinder Sachhar and Shri B.S. Malik, the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner in connected matters, on the interpretation of Section 21 of POTA. Shri P.P. Rao, appearing for the State of Tamil Nadu, has made elaborate submissions and adverted to various affidavits filed by the Union of India. However, it is not necessary for us to examine any of these aspects in these proceedings. We have carefully considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel and that of the learned Attorney General for India on this aspect of the matter. However, it is not necessary for us to examine any of these aspects in these proceedings. We have carefully considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel and that of the learned Attorney General for India on this aspect of the matter. We think, the proper course that has to be adopted in a case of this nature where a criminal case has already been lodged and the same is pending consideration before the Special Court, it would not be appropriate for us to express our views on the question of facts arising in this case. We are sure that the Special Court will decide the matter in the light of decision pronounced by us in Writ Petition (C) No. 389 of 2002 above.” 15. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Pulin Das @ Panna Koch Vs. State of Assam reported in (2008) 5 SCC 89 . Relevant para-12 and 13 of the said judgment are quoted hereinbelow, which are as follows: “Para. 12:-Now, let us consider whether prosecution has established the charge under Section 3(2) (ii) of the TADA Act. Before going into the oral evidence examined on the side of the prosecution in support of their claim, since learned counsel appearing for the respondent/State insisted us to see the contents of charge-sheet (Annexure 3), we verified the same. The written ejahar received from the complainant has been treated as FIR. The following materials available under clause 7 of the charge-sheet read thus:- "The fact of the case is that on 8.12.93 on secret information, it is known that some ULFA outfit members have taken shelter in the house of Uday Chetry situated at Christian Pura under Dhekiajuli P.S. Accordingly, the said house was gheroed by the outfit members. Thereafter the outfit members (1) Pulin Das @ Panna Koch, (2) Mohendra Saikia @ Dilip Saikia were arrested. From their possession, one revolver, one 303 rifle, one stand gun and some cartridges were recovered. Be it mentioned while they were nabbed, they opened fire upon police for which there were exchange of fire from both sides. Accordingly, a case under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of TADA Act was registered and started investigation." The charge-sheet proceeds that the accused are ULFA outfit members. Be it mentioned while they were nabbed, they opened fire upon police for which there were exchange of fire from both sides. Accordingly, a case under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of TADA Act was registered and started investigation." The charge-sheet proceeds that the accused are ULFA outfit members. In order to prove the charge against the accused persons, the prosecution has examined as many as nine witnesses. Para. 13:-P.W.1 -Abdul Rahman, a Constable, who proceeded along with the other members of the police party to Christianbasti has not stated anything about the accused particularly their activities. He merely stated that "police arrested two inmates of that house and seized some arms and ammunitions". In the cross-examination, he admitted that he was away from the house and did not see who made the firing and he did not know whether any gun was fired or not. He also admitted that he did not know whether any arms and ammunitions or any other articles were seized from the accused persons.” 16. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of National Investigation Agency Vs. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali reported in (2019) 5 SCC 1 and has submitted that the appellant can be granted bail, if the trial is not likely to be concluded within a short period and the trial is likely be continued for a long period or where the protracted trial is likely to take place. 17. On the other hand, learned Special. P. P. appearing on behalf of the NIA has opposed the bail of the appellant and has submitted that the order passed by the learned Judicial Commissioner-cum-Special Judge NIA at Ranchi. It is submitted that the appellant was fully aware that the amount of Rs. Two (2) Lakh was a terrorist fund amount and which was received by the appellant in his Yes Bank account for getting surrender of the accused Dinesh Gope, who is Supremo of banned organisation and terrorist of PLFI Group in the State of Jharkhand. 18. It is submitted that the appellant was fully aware that the amount of Rs. Two (2) Lakh was a terrorist fund amount and which was received by the appellant in his Yes Bank account for getting surrender of the accused Dinesh Gope, who is Supremo of banned organisation and terrorist of PLFI Group in the State of Jharkhand. 18. It is submitted that on 10.11.2016 at about 14:30 hrs in afternoon, a secret information was received, through reliable source, at P.S. Bero that Dinesh Gope, self-styled Chief of People's Liberation Front of India (PLFI), an unlawful association declared by Jharkhand State as per provisions of the Criminal law Amendment Act, 1908 was trying to deposit the old demonetized currency worth Rs. 25.38 Lakhs. collected through extortion/Levy for further channelizing into legitimate means, through his associates and his associates in a Safari car bearing registration number JH01-Y-2898, were attempting for depositing the extorted money in SBI, Bero branch. On receipt of this information, inner/outer vicinity of the SBI branch was covered and a secret watch was kept on the suspects. After seeing the police party, four suspects namely Vinod Kumar, Chandrashekhar Kumar Singh, Nand Kishor Mahto & Mohan Kumar @ Rajesh Kumar, who were trying to escape from the bank, were apprehended, and Rs.25.38 Lakhs (Demonetized currency) alongwith other incriminating materials were recovered from their possession. Upon being asked about the recovered cash and other belongings from all apprehended persons, they could not produce any relevant/supporting documents nor could give any satisfactory replies about the source of the cash recovered from them. 19. It is further submitted that during custodial interrogation, apprehended persons admitted that recovered cash i.e. Rs. 25.38 Lakhs(Old demonetized currency) was the extorted/levy amount which had been collected by way of levy by the PLFI and they were trying to deposit the money, derived from illegitimate sources into legal means, in the name of carnings from Petrol Pump (there being waiver for the petrol pumps to accept the demonetized notes of Rs. 500 and 1000) in conspiracy with the operatives of the PLFI. Any legal documents or any details in respect of recovered cash and other belongings could not be produced by the apprehended persons, therefore, the cash and other articles, including Tata Safari car bearing registration number JH01-Y-2898, were seized by the Jharkhand police. 20. 500 and 1000) in conspiracy with the operatives of the PLFI. Any legal documents or any details in respect of recovered cash and other belongings could not be produced by the apprehended persons, therefore, the cash and other articles, including Tata Safari car bearing registration number JH01-Y-2898, were seized by the Jharkhand police. 20. It is submitted that FIR No. 67/2016 dated 10.11.2016 was registered u/s 212/213/414/34 of IPC and sections 13/17/40 of UA(P) Act, 1967 and section 17 of CLA Act, 1908 at P.S. Bero, District Ranchi, Jharkhand, against (1) Vinod Kumar @ Binod Kumar, (2) Chandrashekhar Kumar, (3) Nand Kishor Mahto, (4) Mohan Kumar @ Rajesh Kumar and (5) Yamuna Prasad and after investigation, the local Police filed charge-sheet vide Charge-sheet No. 01/2017 dated 09.01.2017 in the court of Learned Judicial Magistrate, Ranchi against the accused Vinod Kumar @ Binod Kumar, Chandrashekhar Kumar, Nand Kishor Mahto & Mohan Kumar @ Rajesh Kumar under section 212/213/414/34 of IPC, Sections 13/17/40 of the UA(P) Act1967 and Section 17(ii) of the CLA Act, 1908, however, the investigation was kept open to unravel the larger conspiracy 21. It is submitted that in compliance of Order No. F.NO 11011/51/2017/IS-IV dated 16.01.2018 of the Ministry of Home affairs, Government of India, National Investigation Agency (NIA) formally re-registered the case vide FIR No. RC 02/2018/NIA/DLI dated 19.01.2018 under sections 212/213/ 414/34 of IPC, sections 13/17/40 of the UA (P) Act and sections 17 of the CLA Act, 1908 against the name accused persons of the original FIR and other suspected members/supporters of PLFI. 22. It is submitted that after conducting further investigation, NIA filed First Supplementary Charge Sheet against 11 accused persons namely (1) Vinod Kumar @ Binod Kumar, (2) Chandrashekhar Kumar, (3) Nand Kishor Mahto, (4) Mohan Kumar @ Rajesh Kumar (5) Dinesh Gope, (6) Sumant Kumar (7) Nandlal Swarnkar, (8) Charndrashekhar Singh (9) Arun Gope (10) Navinbhai Patel and (11) Jitender Kumar on 21.10.2019. It would be pertinent to mention that in order to unearth the larger criminal conspiracy, further investigation is continuing under Section 173 (8) of the Cr.P.C. in the instant case. 23. It would be pertinent to mention that in order to unearth the larger criminal conspiracy, further investigation is continuing under Section 173 (8) of the Cr.P.C. in the instant case. 23. It is submitted that on 06.11.2019, cognizance of the offences enumerated in the 1st supplementary charge sheet was taken (against additional set of accused persons and also under additional sections against those accused persons who were figuring therein in the initial Charge Sheet submitted by Bero Police on 09.01.2017) by the learned court of Judicial Commissioner-cum-Special Judge, (N.I.A.) at Ranchi and case has been posted for further proceedings. 24. It is submitted that these accused persons were directly involved for holding and channelizing the collected funds from illegitimate sources despite knowing the fact that the said funds are proceeds of levy collected from viz. Contractors, businessmen etc., and were being used for the procurement of explosives, arms and ammunitions and for committing disruptive activities so as to threaten the security, sovereignty and integrity of the State and the Nation. It has been further unearthed during investigation that the appellant knowingly held the amount, which was derived and obtained from the operatives of PLFI and Dinesh Gope (A-6) from commission of Terrorist Act ( levy, extortion). It is further submitted that the appellant also attended various meeting and facilitated/participated in the criminal conspiracy of the alleged surrender of Dinesh Gope, chief of PLFI. Therefore, for his alleged role, the appellant was charge-sheeted under Section 120B of IPC and Section 21 of UA (P) act. 25. It is submitted that purportedly appreciating the gravity of offence in the instant crime due to seizure of cash, the Central Government in exercise of the power conferred under subsection (5) of Section 6 read with Section 8 of the National Investigating Agency Act, 2008 vide M.H.A. New Delhi CTCR Division Order No. 11011/51/2017/IS-IV dated 16.01.2018 directed the NIA to take up the investigation of the case, and accordingly, Bero P.S Case No. 67 of 2016 dated 10.11.2016 was re-registered as RC 02/2018/NIA/DLI dated 19.01.2018 under section 13/17/40 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, Sections 212/213/414/34 of Indian Penal Code and Section 17 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act. 26. 26. It is submitted that after taking over the investigation, the National Investigating Agency submitted the First Supplementary Charge Sheet dated 21.10.2019 against 11 persons under Sections 120B/385/386/414/419/471 of Indian Penal Code and Sections 17/18/20/21/22C of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1967. The appellant was arrayed as A-12 in the First Supplementary Charge Sheet. 27. It is submitted that the appellant conspiracy with Co-accused Sumant Kumar and in association with other accused persons of the instant organized crime, was seemingly involved in the alleged criminal conspiracy and in the commission of the crime and thereby aiding in the design knitted by PLFI Supremo Dinesh Gope and has also liable for punishment. He had held the funds acquired through acts of terrorism. This fact has also been established by the evidences collected and gets corroborated from the CDR analysis, disclosures of the co-accused persons and statements of other witnesses. 28. It is submitted that NIA will make all endeavour to conclude the trial as expeditiously as possible, if some time framed is fixed by this Court. It is further submitted that the judgments mentioned above i.e. in the case of State of Kerala Vs. Raneef reported in (2011) 1 SCC 784 , in the case of Indra Das Vs. State of Assam reported in (2011) 3 SCC 380 , in the case of People’s Union for Civil Liberties and Anr. Vs. Union of India reported in (2004) 9 SCC 580 , in the case of Pulin Das @ Panna Koch Vs. State of Assam reported in (2008) 5 SCC 89 and in the case of National Investigation Agency Vs. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali reported in (2019) 5 SCC 1 are not applicable in the facts of the present appeal and as such, bail of the appellant is fit to be rejected. 29. Perused the records of the case and considered the submission of both the sides. 30. The appellant has filed this Criminal Appeal for grant of bail mainly on the ground that the appellant is not named in the FIR nor any incriminating articles seized from him nor he has received any proceeds of sales derived from the terrorist fund. He has raised plea that he was treated as a witness and subsequently made an accused and he has no connection with the PLFI Supremo Dinesh Gope. 31. He has raised plea that he was treated as a witness and subsequently made an accused and he has no connection with the PLFI Supremo Dinesh Gope. 31. At this stage, it will be relevant to quote Section 27 and Section 43(D) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, which are as follows: “Para. 27:-Issue of show cause notice before forfeiture of proceeds of terrorism.-(1) No order forfeiting any proceeds of terrorism shall be made under section 26 unless the person holding or in possession of such proceeds is given a notice in writing informing him of the grounds on which it is proposed to forfeit the proceeds of terrorism and such person is given an opportunity of making a representation in writing within such reasonable time as may be specified in the notice against the grounds of forfeiture and is also given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the matter. (2) No order of forfeiture shall be made under sub-section (1), if such person establishes that he is a bona fide transferee of such proceeds for value without knowing that they represent proceeds of terrorism. (3) It shall be competent for the Court to make an order in respect of the property seized or attached,- (a) directing it to be sold if it is a perishable property and the provisions of section 459 of the Code shall, as nearly as may be practicable, apply to the net proceeds of such sale; (b) nominating any officer of the Central Government or the State Government, in the case of any other property, to perform the function of the administrator of such property subject to such conditions as may be specified by the Court. Section 43-D:-Modified application of certain provisions of the Code. — (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code or any other law, every offence punishable under this Act shall be deemed to be a cognizable offence within the meaning of clause (c) of section 2 of the Code, and “cognizable case” as defined in that clause shall be construed accordingly. Section 43-D:-Modified application of certain provisions of the Code. — (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code or any other law, every offence punishable under this Act shall be deemed to be a cognizable offence within the meaning of clause (c) of section 2 of the Code, and “cognizable case” as defined in that clause shall be construed accordingly. (2) Section 167 of the Code shall apply in relation to a case involving an offence punishable under this Act subject to the modification that in sub-section (2),— (a) the references to “fifteen days”, “ninety days” and “sixty days”, wherever they occur, shall be construed as references to “thirty days”, “ninety days” and “ninety days” respectively; and (b) after the proviso, the following provisos shall be inserted, namely:— “Provided further that if it is not possible to complete the investigation within the said period of ninety days, the Court may if it is satisfied with the report of the Public Prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation and the specific reasons for the detention of the accused beyond the said period of ninety days, extend the said period up to one hundred and eighty days: Provided also that if the police officer making the investigation under this Act, requests, for the purposes of investigation, for police custody from judicial custody of any person in judicial custody, he shall file an affidavit stating the reasons for doing so and shall also explain the delay, if any, for requesting such police custody.”. (3) Section 268 of the Code shall apply in relation to a case involving an offence punishable under this Act subject to the modification that— (a) the reference in sub-section (1) thereof— (i) to “the State Government” shall be construed as a reference to “the Central Government or the State Government”, (ii) to “order of the State Government” shall be construed as a reference to “order of the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be”; and (b) the reference in sub-section (2) thereof, to “the State Government” shall be construed as a reference to “the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be”. (4) Nothing in section 438 of the Code shall apply in relation to any case involving the arrest of any person accused of having committed an offence punishable under this Act. (4) Nothing in section 438 of the Code shall apply in relation to any case involving the arrest of any person accused of having committed an offence punishable under this Act. (5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no person accused of an offence punishable under Chapters IV and VI of this Act shall, if in custody, be released on bail or on his own bond unless the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity of being heard on the application for such release: Provided that such accused person shall not be released on bail or on his own bond if the Court, on a perusal of the case diary or the report made under section 173 of the Code is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is prima facie true. (6) The restrictions on granting of bail specified in sub-section (5) is in addition to the restrictions under the Code or any other law for the time being in force on granting of bail. (7) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (5) and (6), no bail shall be granted to a person accused of an offence punishable under this Act, if he is not an Indian citizen and has entered the country unauthorisedly or illegally except in very exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing.” 32. Learned counsel for the appellant has strenuously argued that the appellant is not connected with Dinesh Gope PLFI Supremo nor he has received direct money from him nor anything incriminating has been recovered from him. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the several judgments and as such, the same is being considered and will be discussed later on. 33. On the other hand, NIA has also filed counter affidavit and pointed out that Rs. Two (2) Lakh was furnished to the Yes Bank account of the appellant from the associates of Dinesh Gope. It has also been pointed out that P.W.-56, Faizal Moasa, P.W.-67, Diribandhu Bhai Joshi and P.W.-133, Anand Khot have supported the receiving of Rs. Two (2) lakh by the present appellant in his bank account of the Yes Bank. Two (2) Lakh was furnished to the Yes Bank account of the appellant from the associates of Dinesh Gope. It has also been pointed out that P.W.-56, Faizal Moasa, P.W.-67, Diribandhu Bhai Joshi and P.W.-133, Anand Khot have supported the receiving of Rs. Two (2) lakh by the present appellant in his bank account of the Yes Bank. It has also been pointed out in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the NIA that the certain various disclosure have been made by the accused D-55, Sumant Kumar, D-66, Nand Lal Swarnkar, D-75, Chandresekhar Singh, D-83, Jitendra Kumar, D-91, Navin Bhai Patel. 34. Now on the basis of averment made on behalf of the appellant and also documents filed on behalf of the NIA, the case of the appellant has to be considered. It is the fact that FIR before Bano Police Station was lodged on 10.11.2016 bearing Bano P. S. Case No. 67 of 2016 registered under Section 212/213/414/34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 13/17/40 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 and Section 17 of Criminal Law Amendment Act on recovery of Rs. 25.38 Lakh of demonetized note, which is said to be of Dinesh Gope i.e. PLFI Supremo and the appellant is not named in the FIR. However, the name of the appellant figured when the accused Sumant Kumar, D-55 was trying to make arrangement for surrendering the said Dinesh Gope and then he came with contact with the persons namely Nandlal Swarnkar, Chandresekhar Singh, Jitendra Kumar (D-83) and the present appellant Navin Bhai Patel, which have been arrayed as D-66, D-75, D-83 and D-91 respectively. 35. It is also admitted on record that in view of the instruction, D-55, Sumant Kumar has transferred Rs. Two (2) lack in the bank account of the appellant, which was opened in the Yes Bank and the same has also been proved by the document marked as D-93, which is receipt of depositing the said amount to the tune of Rs. Two (2) Lakh. This is a case in which the appellant can be treated as different from the other co-accused, who were running businessman. The appellant has been set up at the instant D-55, Sumant Kumar and other accused persons as named above. 36. The appellant is the recipient of Rs. Two (2) Lakh and Rs. Forty Eight (48) Lakh and Rs. This is a case in which the appellant can be treated as different from the other co-accused, who were running businessman. The appellant has been set up at the instant D-55, Sumant Kumar and other accused persons as named above. 36. The appellant is the recipient of Rs. Two (2) Lakh and Rs. Forty Eight (48) Lakh and Rs. Five (5) Lakh from Sumant Kumar, which can be treated at this stage as a fund of terrorist organisation and which has been supported by D-55, Sumant Kumar and also supported by P. W.-56, Faizal Moasa and P.W.-67, Diribandhu Bhai Joshi and P.W.-133, Anand Khot, which are being discussed hereinbelow:- P. W.-56, Faizal Moasa is one of the witness examined by NIA, has stated that he used to maintain mail of the accused-Sumant Kumar and also working with Sumant Kumar and on 08.05.2018, he on the instruction of Sumant Kumar has transferred Rs. Two (2) Lakh from his Axis Bank account in the Yes Bank account of the present appellant. P.W.-67, Satyesh Dinbandhu Bhai Joshi has also stated that he was in touch with one Chandresekhar Singh, Patna-Bihar, who had introduced him to the accused-Sumant Kumar as an Industrialist and it was also disclosed by Sumant Kumar to him that he wanted to keep arrangement of surrender of Dinesh Gope before the Central Government. Thereafter, he came in touch with the appellant-Navinbhai Jayantibhai Patel, who claimed to be having good relation with the political leader at New Delhi and the appellant also got introduced the accused Sumant Kumar to Nandlal Swarnkar and learnt that Dinesh Gope wanted to surrender and the appellant has demanded Rs. Two (2) Crore from Chandresekhar Singh, but it was settled to Rs. One(1) Crore towards making surrender of arrangement of Dinesh Gope and thereafter the accused Jitendra Kumar (D-83), informed him that he has received Rs. Forth Eight (48) Lack through Hawala for the purpose of surrender of Dinesh Gope and the appellant demanded Rs. Five (5) Lakh for fixing meeting with some politicians and Five (5) Lakh was paid to the appellant at Ashoka Hotel, New Delhi. Thereafter the accused-Sumant Kumar informed after 5-6 days that he had paid Rs. Forty Eight (48) Lakh to the appellant-Navinbhai Jayantibhai Patel. However, the matter could not be materialized. Thus P.W.-67, Diribandhu Bhai Joshi corroborated the statement of P. W.-56, Faizal Moasa. Thereafter the accused-Sumant Kumar informed after 5-6 days that he had paid Rs. Forty Eight (48) Lakh to the appellant-Navinbhai Jayantibhai Patel. However, the matter could not be materialized. Thus P.W.-67, Diribandhu Bhai Joshi corroborated the statement of P. W.-56, Faizal Moasa. P.W.-133, Anand Khot, who was having initial link with the appellant-Navinbhai Jayantibhai Patel and then he got introduced the appellant-Navinbhai Jayantibhai Patel to Dr. Soni @ Nand Lal Sawrankar and he also corroborated that Rs. Sixteen (16) Lakh has been paid to the appellant in the name of surrender of Dinesh Gope i.e. PLFI Chief. However, they had quarrelled and the matter could not be materialized. 36. NIA has further filed D-55, D-66, D-75, D-83, D-91 and D-92, although the said are the disclosure memorandum o the accused persons namely Sumant Kumar, Nand Lal Swarnkar, Chandresekher Singh, Jitendra Kumar, Navin Bhai Patel and the Faisal Moosa respectively. It also shows that there was deep connivance and conspiracy with all the above accused persons for making surrender of Dinesh Gope though high profile persons of the Central Government as well as the State Government. 37. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of National Investigation Agency Vs. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali reported in (2019) 5 SCC 1 . Relevant para-26, 46, 47, 53 and 54 are as follows: “Para. 26:-Be it noted that the special provision, Section 43D of the 1967 Act, applies right from the stage of registration of FIR for offences under Chapters IV and VI of the 1967 Act until the conclusion of the trial thereof. To wit, soon after the arrest of the accused on the basis of the FIR registered against him, but before filing of the chargesheet by the Investigating Agency; after filing of the first chargesheet and before the filing of the supplementary or final chargesheet consequent to further investigation under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C., until framing of the charges or after framing of the charges by the Court and recording of evidence of key witnesses etc. However, once charges are framed, it would be safe to assume that a very strong suspicion was founded upon the materials before the Court, which prompted the Court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged against the accused, to justify the framing of charge. However, once charges are framed, it would be safe to assume that a very strong suspicion was founded upon the materials before the Court, which prompted the Court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged against the accused, to justify the framing of charge. In that situation, the accused may have to undertake an arduous task to satisfy the court that despite the framing of charge, the materials presented along with the chargesheet (report under Section 173 of Cr.P.C.), do not make out reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against him is prima facie true. Similar opinion is required to be formed by the Court whilst considering the prayer for bail, made after filing of the first report made under Section 173 of the Code, as in the present case. Para. 46:-In Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi, the Court essentially considered the scope and ambit of the enquiry by the Trial Court at the stage of “discharge”. In that context, the Court made observations in paragraphs 6 and 8 of the said judgment which must be understood accordingly. In the present case, however, we are called upon to consider the prayer for bail in the context of the purport of the proviso to Section 43D(5) of the 1967 Act which mandates that the accused person involved in the commission of offence referable to Chapters IV and VI of the 1967 Act shall not be released on bail or on bond. However, the Court may release such accused on bail only if it is of the opinion, on perusal of the case diary and/or the report made under Section 173 of Cr.P.C. that there are “no reasonable grounds” for believing that the accusation against such person is prima facie true. Conversely, if in the opinion of the Court, there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is prima facie true, the question of granting bail would not arise as the bar under the first part of the proviso of no bail in such cases would operate. Para. Conversely, if in the opinion of the Court, there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is prima facie true, the question of granting bail would not arise as the bar under the first part of the proviso of no bail in such cases would operate. Para. 47:-The fact that there is a high burden on the accused in terms of the special provisions contained in Section 43D(5) to demonstrate that the prosecution has not been able to show that there exists reasonable grounds to show that the accusation against him is prima facie true, does not alter the legal position expounded in K. Veeraswami (supra), to the effect that the chargesheet need not contain detailed analysis of the evidence. It is for the Court considering the application for bail to assess the material/evidence presented by the Investigating Agency along with the report under Section 173 of Cr.P.C. in its entirety, to form its opinion as to whether there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the named accused is prima facie true or otherwise. Para, 53:-The appellant has relied on the exposition in Salim Khan, to contend that in cases where the High Court adopted a totally erroneous approach, as in the present case, discarding the crucial material/evidence which is referred to in the report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. and presented before the Designated Court, then the order granting bail by the High Court cannot be countenanced. The argument of the respondent is that the said decision would make no difference as it is concerning an application for cancellation of bail made by the informant. However, we find force in the argument of the appellant that the High Court, in the present case, adopted an inappropriate approach whilst considering the prayer for grant of bail. The High Court ought to have taken into account the totality of the material and evidence on record as it is and ought not to have discarded it as being inadmissible. The High Court clearly overlooked the settled legal position that, at the stage of considering the prayer for bail, it is not necessary to weigh the material, but only form opinion on the basis of the material before it on broad probabilities. The Court is expected to apply its mind to ascertain whether the accusations against the accused are prima face true. The Court is expected to apply its mind to ascertain whether the accusations against the accused are prima face true. Indeed, in the present case, we are not called upon to consider the prayer for cancellation of bail as such but to examine the correctness of the approach of the High Court in granting bail to the accused despite the materials and evidence indicating that accusations made against him are prima facie true. Para-54 :-In a decision of this Court in Chenna Boyanna Krishna Yadav, to which reference has been made, the Court has restated the twin conditions to be considered by the Court before grant of bail in relation to MCOCA offences. We are of the view that in the present case, the Designated Court rightly opined that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the respondent is prima facie true. As we are not inclined to accept the prayer for bail, in our opinion, it is not necessary to dilate on other aspects to obviate prolixity.” 38. So far as the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India Vs. K. A. Najeeb reported in (2021) 3 SCC 713 is concerned, the same is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case of the appellant as in the above case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has refused to cancel the bail granted earlier by the High Court mainly on the ground that the appellant has remained in custody for about five and half years and several accused persons were acquitted during trial and even the accused was found assaulted and attacking one Professor, who has set up question paper in B.Com examination, which resulted in fighting between two groups and as such the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that Constitutional Court can grant bail under provisions of Section 43-D(5) of UA (P) Act, 1967. 39. So far as the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sudesh Kedia Vs. Union of India reported in (2021) 4 SCC 704 is concerned, the same is also not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case of the appellant. In this case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has granted bail mainly on the ground that the appellant had remained in custody for a considerable period and was a businessman. 40. Union of India reported in (2021) 4 SCC 704 is concerned, the same is also not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case of the appellant. In this case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has granted bail mainly on the ground that the appellant had remained in custody for a considerable period and was a businessman. 40. However, in the present case, the appellant has clearly tarnishing not only the image of high profile people, but also receiving the claim to met them and also received terrorist amount on different occasions to the extent of Rs. Two(2) Lakh by in his bank account and Rs. Forty Eight (48) Lakh on different dates and as such the case of the appellant is different from the case rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India Vs. K. A. Najeeb reported in (2021) 3 SCC 713 and in the case of Sudesh Kedia Vs. Union of India reported in (2021) 4 SCC 704 . 41. Moreover, D-91 is disclosure statement of the appellant himself, who had vividly disclosed that as to how he was trying to earn money in the name of managing surrender of PLFI Supremo Dinesh Gope and introduced the other accused to pay huge amount for making the arrangement of surrender of PLFI Supremo Dinesh Gope. The appellant has himself stated that he has received Rs. Two (2) Lakh, Rs. Five (5) Lakh and Rs. Forty Eight (48) Lakh along with Nand Lal Swarnkar and Sumant Kumar. 42. Therefore, in view of the above, We are of the view that the appellant-Navinbhai Jayantibhai Patel is not entitled to bail and accordingly the prayer for bail of the appellant-Navinbhai Jayantibhai Patel is rejected at this stage. 43. However, the learned Court below is directed to conclude the trial as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of one year.