ORDER : 1. The present application is filed under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, [“Cr.P.C.”] seeking quashing of proceedings in C.C. No. 344 of 2012 on the file of Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Macherla, Guntur District. 2. The 2nd Respondent herein filed a private complaint against the Petitioner/Accused for an offence punishable under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act. The allegations in the complaint, are as under: (i) Both, the complainant and the accused are close friends and there were money transactions between them since 2008. It is said that, accused used to borrow money from the complainant as and when he is in need of it. (ii) On 07.05.2008 and 15.05.2008, the accused is said to have received a sum of Rs. 10,00,000/- on both dates from the complainant agreeing to pay the same with interest @ 24% per annum. The said amount was paid by way of cheques through his account at HDFC Bank, Kukatpalli Branch, Hyderabad. Subsequent thereto, there were some transactions between the accused and the complainant. On 27.06.2012, the complainant found the total amount due by the accused was about Rs. 25,75,000/- and with a view to discharge the same, a cheque bearing No. 629816 came to be issued, which was drawn on Syndicate Bank, Snehapuri Colony, Borabonda, Hyderabad, in favour of the complainant. Though the accused represented the account was having sufficient funds to honour the cheque, but when presented, the cheque was dishonoured on the ground of “insufficient funds.” (iii) On 03.09.2012, the complainant again presented the said cheque in his account at HDFC Bank, Macherla Branch and the bank authorities forwarded the cheque to the accused bank for collection, which was returned due to “stop payment instructions” given by the accused. (iv) A legal notice came to be issued on 21.09.2012 demanding repayment of the amount due, which was served on 24.09.2012. Later on, the present complaint came to be filed on 31.10.2012, which was taken on file as C.C. No. 344 of 2012 on the file of Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Macherla, Guntur District. Challenging the same, the present application is filed seeking quashing of proceedings only on the ground that since the debt is time barred, proceedings under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, cannot be continued. 3. In other words, the argument of Sri. Challenging the same, the present application is filed seeking quashing of proceedings only on the ground that since the debt is time barred, proceedings under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, cannot be continued. 3. In other words, the argument of Sri. P. Nagendra Reddy, learned Counsel for the Petitioner is that the accused borrowed Rs. 20,00,000/- in the year 2008 and the repayment period of three years expired in the year 2011. When the complainant cannot enforce the said liability as it is “time barred”, entertaining a complaint filed under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, is bad in law. He relied upon the judgments of this Court in A. Yesubabu vs. D. Appala Swamy and Another, 2003 (2) ALD (Crl.) 707 (AP), Padala Veera Venkata Satyanarayana Reddy vs. State of A.P. 2019 (1) ALT (Crl) 394 (S.B.) and unreported Judgment of another learned Single Judge in Gerard Kollian vs. M/s. Weis Electronics and Industrial Services (P) Limited, Secunderabad and Another, Crl. Appeal No. 1255 of 2008, dated 03.06.2014 in support of his plea. 4. On the other hand, learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent No. 2-Sri. Srikanth Reddy Ambati, opposed the same contending that in view of the subsequent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in A.V. Murthy vs. B.S. Nagabasavanna, (2002) 2 SCC 642 and the recent judgment in S. Natarajan vs. Sama Dharman and Another, (2021) 6 SCC 413 the criminal petition has to be dismissed. 5. The point that arises for consideration is, whether an application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. can be entertained to quash a complaint on the ground that debt is “time barred” or in other words, whether the accused can be prosecuted for dishonour of cheque under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, when there is no subsisting debt? 6. In A. Yesubabu [cited supra] the learned Single Judge of this Court in paragraphs Nos. 10, 11, and 12 held as under: “10. The main contention of the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant-accused is that the debt covered by Ex. P1 and Ex. P2 receipts is time-barred and that there was no legally enforceable debt or liability for the complainant to recover the amount covered under Ex. P1 and Ex. 10, 11, and 12 held as under: “10. The main contention of the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant-accused is that the debt covered by Ex. P1 and Ex. P2 receipts is time-barred and that there was no legally enforceable debt or liability for the complainant to recover the amount covered under Ex. P1 and Ex. P2 receipts through the process of the Court and, therefore, it is evident that the cheque in question was given for a time barred debt and, therefore, the accused has not committed the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. 11. In support of his contention, the learned Counsel for the appellant relied upon a decision of this Court in Girdhari Lal Rathi sv. P.T.V. Ramanujachari and Another, 1997 (2) Crimes 658 , wherein this Court in Para 7 held thus: The alleged loan was advanced in the year 1985 and the cheque was issued in the year 1990. By the time the cheque was issued, the debt appears to have been barred by limitation because no acknowledgement is alleged to have been obtained by the appellant from the first respondent-accused before expiry of three years from the date of loan. Thus it is crystal clear that the debt was not legally enforceable at the time of issuance of the cheque and, therefore, vide explanation to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, which reads as under: Explanation: Until the debt is legally recoverable the drawer of the cheque cannot be fastened with the liability under Section 138 of the Act.” 12. To the same effect, a Division Bench of this Court in Amit Desai and Another vs. Shine Enterprises and Another, 2000 Cri. L.J. 2386, held that the Explanation to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act specifically laid down that the debt or other liability means a legally enforceable debt or other liability and enforcement of legal liability has to be in the nature of civil suit because the debt or other liability cannot be recovered by filing a criminal case and when there is a bar of filing a suit by unregistered firm, the bar equally applies to criminal case as laid down in Explanation (2) of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. 7. In Padala Veera Venkata Satyanarayana Reddy [cited supra] the learned Single Judge of this Court observed as under: 8. 7. In Padala Veera Venkata Satyanarayana Reddy [cited supra] the learned Single Judge of this Court observed as under: 8. The Counsel for the petitioner relies on two judgments of this Court in Rakesh Agarwal vs. K. Narasimha Rao, 2016 (1) ALT (Crl.) 136 (AP) and A. Yesubabu vs. D. Appala Swamy, 2003 (2) ALD (Crl.) 707 (AP). In Rakesh Agarwal's case (supra), the Court held that once the promissory note debt is barred by time, it cannot be brought within Section 25 of the Contract Act treating the cheque as an acknowledgment of the time barred debt. In A. Yesubabu's case (supra), this Court held that if any cheque is issued by the accused after expiry of the limitation for releasing the debt, it cannot be said that it was issued for a legally enforceable debt. In the said case, the cheque was issued on 25.8.1994 nearly 7 years after the taking of the amount from the complainant. The Court considered the earlier ruling of this Court in Giridhar Lai Rathi vs. P.T.V. Ramanujachar, 1997 (2) Crimes 658 , wherein the loan was advanced in the year 1985 and the cheque was issued in the year 1990. It was held therein that by the time the cheque was issued, the debt appears to have been barred by limitation because there no acknowledgment is alleged to have been obtained by the appellant from R1-accused, before expiry of three years from the date of loan. It was held that the debt was not legally enforceable at the time of issuance of cheque and, therefore, vide explanation to Section 138 of N.I. Act, which reads as under: “Explanation - Until the debt is legally recoverable the drawer of the cheque cannot be fastened with liability under Section 138 of N.I. Act” the cheque cannot be said to have been issued towards discharge of legally enforceable debt.” A Division Bench judgment of this Court was also relied upon by the High Court, which is rendered in Amit Desai vs. Shine Enterprises, 2000 (1) ALD (Crl.) 587 (AP) : 2000 Cri. L.J. 2386, wherein it was specifically laid down that the debt or other liability means a legally enforceable debt or other liability and enforcement of legal liability has to be in the nature of civil suit because the debt or other liability cannot be recovered by filing a criminal case and when there is a bar of filing a suit by unregistered firm, the bar equally applies to criminal case as laid down in Explanation (2) of Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act. 9. In these cases, as already observed, the limitation for enforcing the promissory notes expired much prior to the issuance of the cheques in question. Hence, in view of the above, this Court opines that the impugned complaints cannot be sustained and that these are fit cases for quashing of the proceedings against the petitioners.” 8. From the judgments referred to above, it is very much evident that the recovery sought to be made by way of suit, on a time barred debt, proceedings under Section 138 cannot be initiated for the cheques issued in discharge of the said debt. 9. However, in A.V. Murthy [cited 4th supra], the Hon’ble Apex Court was dealing with a situation where the accused is said to have issued a cheque in respect of sum advanced by the complainant four years ago and the same was dishonoured for the reason “account closed.” Summons were issued by the Magistrate to the accused. The Sessions Court quashed the entire proceedings on the ground that the borrowing was barred by limitation [time barred], as at the time of issuance of cheque, there was no legally enforceable debt or liability against the accused and, therefore, the complaint was not maintainable. 10. While dealing with the same, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that, “under Section 118 of N.I. Act, there is a presumption that until the contrary is proved, every negotiable instrument is presumed to have been drawn for a consideration. The Hon’ble Apex Court further held that, in Section 139 of the N.I. Act, it is specifically stated that it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in Section 138 for discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. The Hon’ble Apex Court also referred to Section 25(3) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. The Hon’ble Apex Court also referred to Section 25(3) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Referring to facts, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that, the complainant therein has submitted balance sheet prepared for every year subsequent to the loan advanced by the complainant and as deposits from friends. As the amount borrowed by the accused is shown in the balance sheet, it amounts to acknowledgement and the creditor might have a fresh period of limitation from the date on which the acknowledgement was made and, accordingly, held that it is premature to say that cheque drawn by the accused was in respect of time barred debt or liability, which is not enforceable and, accordingly, set-aside the order passed by the High Court upholding the order of the Sessions Court. 11. In Rangappa vs. Mohan, 2010 (2) ALD (Cri) 234 (SC) : AIR 2001 SC the legal question before the Hon’ble Court pertains to interpretation of Section 139 of the N.I. Act. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that, Section 139 of N.I. Act, includes a presumption that there exists a legally enforceable debt or liability, which is a rebuttal one. 12. In S. Natarajan [cited supra] the Hon’ble Supreme Court was dealing with a situation where accused gave a cheque, dated 01.02.2011, which was presented by the complainant on 02.02.2011. The same was dishonoured on the ground that the accused did not have sufficient funds in his account. It is also to be noted that, the cheque was issued in respect of the amounts received by the accused on 06.05.2006, 04.07.2006 and on 11.01.2007. After the dishonour of the cheque, a notice was issued on 02.03.2011 calling upon the accused to pay the cheque amount of Rs. 3,00,000/- and as no amount was paid, a complaint was filed under Section 138 of N.I. Act. An application was moved before the Madras High Court for quashing of proceedings mainly on the ground that the debt is time barred. The High Court quashed the proceedings holding that the complaint was time barred, which was challenged before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. After referring to Section 25(3) of the Contract Act; Section 139 of N.I. Act and the judgments referred to above, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the High Court could not have quashed the proceedings on the ground that at the time of issuance of cheque, the debt was “time barred.” 13. After referring to Section 25(3) of the Contract Act; Section 139 of N.I. Act and the judgments referred to above, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the High Court could not have quashed the proceedings on the ground that at the time of issuance of cheque, the debt was “time barred.” 13. The main ground on which the Hon’ble Supreme Court opposed the findings of the Madras High Court was that there is a presumption under Section 138 of N.I. Act, which postulates that, in cheque bouncing cases, the initial presumption incorporated in Section 139 of the N.I. Act favours the complainant and the accused has to rebut the said presumption and discharge the reverse onus by adducing evidence. In other words, the defence taken, namely that it is a time barred debt has to be proved during the course of trial and should not be quashed having regard to the presumption under Section 139 of N.I. Act. 14. In view of the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S. Natarajan [cited supra] wherein the facts are identical to the case on hand, I see no ground to quash the proceedings in C.C. No. 344 of 2012 on the file of Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Macherla, Guntur District. Accordingly, the Criminal Petition is dismissed. No order as to costs. 15. Consequently, miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed.