Govindakudy Appakutty Iyer Trust, Represented by its Executive Trustee, Ravichandran v. Thiru Arooran Sugar Factory, Represented by its General Manager, Thirumandangudy
2022-03-07
R.VIJAYAKUMAR
body2022
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT (Prayers:Second Appeal filed under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, against the judgment and decree dated, 06.08.2002, made in A.S.No.10 of 2002, on the file of Principal Sub Court, Kumbakonam, reversing the judgment and decree, dated, 27.08.2001, in O.S.No.73 of 2002 on the file of District Munsif Court, Valangiman at Kumbakonam. Second Appeal filed under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, against the judgment and decree dated, 06.08.2002, made in A.S.No.11 of 2002, on the file of Principal Sub Court, Kumbakonam, reversing the judgment and decree, dated, 27.08.2001, in O.S.No.74 of 2002 on the file of District Munsif Court, Valangiman at Kumbakonam. Second Appeal filed under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, against the judgment and decree dated, 06.08.2002, made in A.S.No.51 of 2002, on the file of Principal Sub Court, Kumbakonam, reversing the judgment and decree, dated, 27.08.2001, in O.S.No.73 of 2002 on the file of District Munsif Court, Valangiman at Kumbakonam. Second Appeal filed under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, against the judgment and decree dated, 06.08.2002, made in A.S.No.52 of 2002, on the file of Principal Sub Court, Kumbakonam, reversing the judgment and decree, dated, 27.08.2001, in O.S.No.74 of 2002 on the file of District Munsif Court, Valangiman at Kumbakonam.) Common Judgment: The plaintiff is the appellant. 2. The plaintiff filed O.S.No.73 of 2000, as against one Ramalingam and Arooran Sugar Mill for the relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendants, their men, agents or employees from taking away the harvested sugarcane from the field without paying 25% of the gross produce of the sugarcane to the plaintiff-Trust. The said suit was decreed by the trial Court. As against which, the 1st defendant filed A.S.No.51 of 2002 before Principal Sub Court, Kumbakonam. The 2nd defendant filed A.S.No.10 of 2002 before Sub Court, Kumbakonam. The learned Subordinate Judge was pleased to allow both the first appeals and dismissed the suit. As against the same, S.A(MD)Nos.477 and 479 of 2003 have been filed by the plaintiff. 3. The plaintiff had filed O.S.No.74 of 2000 with the similar prayer as against one Senthamarai Selvi, Sankar and Arooran Sugar mill for a similar relief. The suit was decreed by the trial Court. The defendants 1 and 2 have filed A.S.No.52 of 2002 before Principal Sub Court, Kumbakonam. The 3rd defendant filed A.S.No.11 of 2002. Both the appeals were allowed by the learned Subordinate Judge.
The suit was decreed by the trial Court. The defendants 1 and 2 have filed A.S.No.52 of 2002 before Principal Sub Court, Kumbakonam. The 3rd defendant filed A.S.No.11 of 2002. Both the appeals were allowed by the learned Subordinate Judge. As against the same, S.A(MD)Nos.478 and 480 of 2003 have been filed. 4. The plaint averments in both O.S.Nos.73 and 74 of 2002 are the same. The plaintiff has contended that the suit schedule properties absolutely belong to the plaintiff-Trust. According to the plaintiff, they have entered into an agricultural lease with the individual defendants in the respective suits. As per the said lease agreement, the defendants have to cultivate only paddy in the leased out property. The defendants have to pay rent at the rate of 25% of the gross produce to the plaintiff-Trust, even at the threshing floor itself. 5. According to the plaintiff-Trust, the individual defendants have cultivated sugarcane instead of paddy in violation of the lease agreement. That apart, the individual defendants, who are the cultivating tenants have entered into an agreement with the sugar mill that they will supply the entire harvested sugarcane to the mill. According to the plaintiff, the plaintiff is entitled to 25% of the gross produce and the balance 75% of the gross produce alone belongs to the cultivating tenant. However, as per the agreement entered into between the cultivating tenant and the sugar mill, the tenant has agreed to transport the entire gross produce to the sugar mill. 6. The plaintiff has further contended that the sugar mill is very well aware of the fact that the suit schedule properties belong to the plaintiff-Trust and the cultivating tenants are entitled to only 75% of the gross produce. Even after having knowledge about the same, the sugar mill has entered into an agreement with the tenant to procure the entire gross produce from the tenant. 7. The plaintiff has further contended that the individual defendants, who are the cultivating tenants have been in arrears for so many years and they have not paid the rental arrears either in cash or in kind for so many fasli years. As per the lease agreement, 25% of the gross produce should have been handed over to the plaintiff-Trust, even at the threshing floor itself. In violation of the said lease agreement, the tenants are transporting the entire produce to the sugar mill.
As per the lease agreement, 25% of the gross produce should have been handed over to the plaintiff-Trust, even at the threshing floor itself. In violation of the said lease agreement, the tenants are transporting the entire produce to the sugar mill. Unless the defendants are prohibited by way of a permanent injunction from taking away the agricultural produce from the field without payment of 25% of the gross produce, the plaintiff-Trust will not be in a position to recover the rent. Hence, the plaintiff-Trust prayed for a permanent injunction as against all the defendants. 8. The cultivating tenants filed a written statement contending that since the water sources have got drained up, the tenants of the plaintiff-Trust are cultivating only sugarcane for so many years and the same has not been objected to by the plaintiff-Trust. According to the tenants, the plaintiff-Trust is having knowledge about the cultivation of sugarcane and they have not objected to the cultivation of the same. The tenants further contended that they are bound to pay only paddy as rent as per the lease agreement and hence, the present contention of the plaintiff that 25% of the gross produce of the sugarcane should be paid is in violation of the lease agreement. The tenants further contended that even though the defendants are cultivating sugarcane, the plaintiff-Trust is in the habit of receiving rent only as paddy and not as sugarcane or its money value. The tenants further contended that the suit is not maintainable in view of the provisions of Tamil Nadu Act 57 of 1961. The tenants further contended that the sugar mill is not a necessary party to the suit. Hence, they prayed for dismissal of the suit. 9. The sugar mill filed a written statement contending that they are neither lessees nor sub-lessees of the plaintiff-Trust. There is no privity of the contract between the plaintiff-Trust and the sugar mill. According to the sugar mill, there is no obligation on that part to measure 25% of the income from the yield. According to the sugar mill, there is no breach of contract by them warranting a decree for permanent injunction. The sugar mill further contended that the suit is liable to be dismissed for mis-joinder of unnecessary parties. Hence, they prayed for dismissal of the suit. 10.
According to the sugar mill, there is no breach of contract by them warranting a decree for permanent injunction. The sugar mill further contended that the suit is liable to be dismissed for mis-joinder of unnecessary parties. Hence, they prayed for dismissal of the suit. 10. Both the suits were tried together and a common evidence was recorded, in view of the similarity of issues in both the suits. The trial Court considered the agreement between the plaintiff-Trust and the tenant. The trial Court also considered the agreement between the cultivating tenants of the sugar mill. The trial Court elaborately considered the provisions of Tamil Nadu Act 57 of 1961. After a combined reading of the various clauses in the agreement and the provisions of the Act, the trial Court arrived at a finding that the agreement between the cultivating tenant and the sugar mill is in violation of the obligation cast upon the cultivating tenant that he would measure 25% of the gross produce to the plaintiff-Trust. The trial Court arrived at a finding that if the entire gross produce is supplied to the sugar mill, that will be in clear violation of the lease agreement between the plaintiff-Trust and the cultivating tenant. The trial Court also found that the entire expenses towards the agricultural operations are borne by the sugar mill and after deducting the expenses, the amount is credited to the account of the cultivating tenant. This is in violation of the lease agreement between the plaintiff-Trust and the cultivating tenant. The trial Court also found that the tenant can enter into an agreement with the sugar mill only with regard to his 75% share and the tenant has no right to enter into an agreement with regard to the 25% share belonging to the plaintiff-Trust. 11. Based upon the above said findings, the trial Court held that the sugar mill is under an obligation to pay 25% of the gross produce to the plaintiff-Trust, even before the harvested sugarcane is taken off from the fields. 12. The trial Court also held that the agreement entered into between the tenant and the sugar mill is clearly in breach of an already existing obligation between the tenant and the plaintiff-Trust. The trial Court rejected the contention of the sugar mill that there is no privity of contract between the plaintiff-Trust and the sugar mill.
12. The trial Court also held that the agreement entered into between the tenant and the sugar mill is clearly in breach of an already existing obligation between the tenant and the plaintiff-Trust. The trial Court rejected the contention of the sugar mill that there is no privity of contract between the plaintiff-Trust and the sugar mill. The trial Court proceeded to hold that the suit is based upon the breach of a statutory obligation and not based upon a contract. Based upon the said finding, the trial Court decreed the suit as prayed for. 13. The First Appellate Court without reversing any of the findings rendered by the trial Court held that the plaintiff-Trust has not established the fact that the cultivating tenants have planted only sugarcane. The First Appellate Court further held that basically this is a dispute between the landlord and the cultivating tenant and hence, the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Based upon the said findings, the First Appellate Court set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court in both the suits and allowed all the first appeals filed by the tenant and the sugar mill. As against the judgments in four first appeals, S.A(MD)Nos.477 to 480 of 2003 have been filed by the plaintiff-Trust. 14. These second appeals have been admitted on the following substantial questions of law: (i) Whether the Lower Court is right in dismissing the suit on the ground that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction as the plaintiff and its tenants are bound by the provisions of Tamil Nadu Public Trust Act 57 of 1961. Section 58 of the Act does not bar the relief prayed for in the suit? (ii) Whether the Lower Court is right in dismissing the suit as the plaintiff has proved that his right is invaded and it would be invaded in future also if the injunction prayed for is not granted? (iii) Is the Lower Court right in dismissing the suit even though the status of the sugar factory is that of a garnishee to the extent of 25% of the sugarcane received by it from the tenant of the plaintiff vis a vis the plaintiff and hence is bound under law to pay the value of the same to the plaintiff and hence the plaintiff is entitled to the injunction prayed for? 15.
15. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the plaintiff-Trust is not attempting to fix fair rent to the leased out property. The plaintiff-Trust is also not attempting to evict the tenants from the respective properties. According to the learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff, there is a contract between the tenant and the landlord. As per the said contract, the tenant is only entitled to 75% of the gross produce. The balance 25% of the gross produce belongs to the plaintiff-Trust. Hence, the cultivating tenant is cannot enter into an agreement with the sugar mill with regard to the 25% of the gross produce of the plaintiff-Trust. The sugar mill is also aware of the fact that the suit properties belong to the plaintiff-Trust and the persons, who have entered into an agreement with the sugar mill are only cultivating tenants under the plaintiff-Trust. The sugar mill cannot enter into an agreement with the cultivating tenant in order to commit a breach of an existing agreement between the tenant and the plaintiff-Trust. 16. The learned counsel for the appellant further contended that except the power of eviction, all the other powers are vested only with the Civil Court. The present suit is for a permanent injunction, restraining the tenant and the sugar mill from taking away the gross produce from the from the field without payment of its share of 25% of the gross produce. The authorities under Tamil Nadu Act 57 of 1961 had no power to grant a decree for permanent injunction. They have got powers only to fix the fair rent or order eviction under certain circumstances. Hence, he contended that Civil Court has got jurisdiction to entertain a suit for permanent injunction and the suit is neither expressly nor impliedly barred under Tamil Nadu Act 57 of 1961. The learned counsel for the appellant further contended that the sugar mill is none other than the garnishee of the plaintiff-Trust and hence, a decree can very well be passed as against a garnishee, not to disturbs the amount to the cultivating tenant before depositing the 25% of the gross produce in favour of the plaintiff-Trust. 17. The learned counsel for the appellant further contended that the First Appellate Court has not reversed any of the findings of the trial Court.
17. The learned counsel for the appellant further contended that the First Appellate Court has not reversed any of the findings of the trial Court. The First Appellate Court has just set aside the judgment of the trial Court on the ground that the dispute in the suit relates to the landlord and the tenant and hence, a civil suit is not maintainable. Apart from that, no other reason has been assigned by the First Appellate Court for dismissing the suit filed by the plaintiff-Trust. When the prayer sought for in the present suit cannot be granted by the authorities in any one of the statutes, the Civil Court has got jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Hence, he prayed for allowing the second appeal. 18. The learned counsel appearing for the sugar mill contended that there is no privity of contract between the plaintiff-Trust and the sugar mill. The contract is only between the cultivating tenant and the sugar mill. If the tenant has not paid 25% of the gross produce as rent to the plaintiff-Trust, the plaintiff-Trust has to invoke Section 19 of Tamil Nadu Act 57 of 1961 in order to evict the cultivating tenant for default in payment of the rent. He further contended that as per the agreement between the plaintiff-Trust and the tenant, there is a clause only for payment of rent by measuring paddy and there is no reference about sugarcane in the lease agreement. 19. Unless there is a money decree as against the tenant, the sugar mill can never be considered a garnishee. He further contended that even for recovery of any rental arrears, only a civil suit can be maintained and the present suit for permanent injunction as against the sugar mill is not maintainable. He further contended that there is neither a contractual obligation or a statutory obligation on the part of the sugar mill to pay 25% of the gross produce or its money value to the plaintiff-Trust. He further contended that the present suit has been filed only for the fasli year 1409. For the said fasli year, 1/4th of the share of the plaintiff-Trust was already deposited under protest by the sugar mill in the Court and hence, the suit has become infructuous even before the trial Court.
He further contended that the present suit has been filed only for the fasli year 1409. For the said fasli year, 1/4th of the share of the plaintiff-Trust was already deposited under protest by the sugar mill in the Court and hence, the suit has become infructuous even before the trial Court. When the suit is for only one fasli year, nothing survives in the suit after deposit of the said amount in the Court. He further contended that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain such a dispute and the First Appellate Court was right in non-suiting the plaintiff on the ground of implied bar. Hence, he prayed for dismissal of the second appeal. 20. I have carefully considered the submissions on either side. 21. The bone of contention between the parties is that whether the sugar mill will be entitled to remove the harvested sugarcane from the field without handing over 25% of the gross produce or its money value to the plaintiff-Trust. 22. A perusal of the agreement between the plaintiff-Trust and the cultivating tenant shows that 25% of the gross produce should be handed over to the plaintiff-Trust at the threshing floor itself. Apart from paddy, no other crop should be cultivated in a leased out properties. 23. A perusal of the agreement between the cultivating tenant and the sugar mill indicates that the entire agricultural produce should be supplied only to the sugar mill. After deducting the transport expenses and other expenses, the balance amount will be credited to the account of the tenant by the sugar mill. 24. The following provisions under Tamil Nadu Public Trusts(Regulation of Administration of Agricultural Lands) Act, 1961 are extracted here under for a better appreciation. “3. Act to override other laws, contracts, etc,- The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force, or any custom, usage or contract or decree or order of a Court or other authority. 23. Rights and liabilities of cultivating tenant and public trust- (4) All the cultivation expenses inclusive of cost of seed, ploughing, manuring, harvesting and threshing shall be borne by the cultivating tenant under the public trust. 24. What is fair rent.-(1) Fair rent shall be 25 per cent of the normal gross produce or its value in money. 25.
23. Rights and liabilities of cultivating tenant and public trust- (4) All the cultivation expenses inclusive of cost of seed, ploughing, manuring, harvesting and threshing shall be borne by the cultivating tenant under the public trust. 24. What is fair rent.-(1) Fair rent shall be 25 per cent of the normal gross produce or its value in money. 25. Fair rent may be paid in case or in kind.-(1) The fair rent in respect of any land may be paid either in cash or in kind or partly in cash and partly in kind, in accordance with the terms of the contract between the public trust and the cultivating tenant; and in the absence of such a contract, the fair rent may be paid at the option of the cultivating tenant in any one of the above ways: Provided that the option shall be exercised within three months from the date on which the tenancy agreement takes effect and if the cultivating tenant does not exercise the option within the period aforesaid, the trustee of the public trust shall, by notice given to the cultivating tenant, specify the way in which the fair rent shall be paid by the cultivating tenant: Provided further that the option once exercised or the way once specified shall not be changed except by mutual agreement: Provided also that where the crop raised is paddy, the public trust shall have the right to insist that the rent shall be paid in kind. (2) Whenever adverse seasonal conditions result in the reduction of the gross produce from any particular crop to the extent of more than 25 per cent, the public trust shall be bound to remit a proportionate part of the fair rent due to it from its cultivating tenant in respect of that land for that period. Provided that before admitting or inquiring into an application made by a cultivating tenant for remission of fair rent under this section, the Rent Court may impose such conditions as it considers reasonable in the circumstances of the case including conditions as to deposit of admitted rent which has become due. 27.
Provided that before admitting or inquiring into an application made by a cultivating tenant for remission of fair rent under this section, the Rent Court may impose such conditions as it considers reasonable in the circumstances of the case including conditions as to deposit of admitted rent which has become due. 27. Sharing of produce.-(1) Where the produce to be shared is grain, no cultivating tenant shall harvest the crop unless he has given in such manner as may be prescribed, not less than ten days' notice in writing intimating the public trust of his decision to harvest and the notice shall expire on the day on which the harvest is to take place. (2) Where the produce to be shared is grain, the sharing shall be done at the threshing floor on which the threshing took place; and no portion of the produce shall be removed therefrom at such time or in such manner as to prevent the due division thereof at the proper time. 58. Bar of jurisdiction of civil courts.-Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no civil court, shall have jurisdiction to decide or deal with any question which is by or under this Act required to be decided or dealt with by the authorized officer, the Registrar, the Rent Court, the Rent Tribunal or other authority”. 25. A careful perusal of the above said provisions will indicate that the Act will have overriding effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent in any contract. Hence, dehors of the agreement between the plaintiff-Trust and the cultivating tenants, the provisions of this Act will prevail. As per Section 23(4), all the cultivation expenses have to be borne by the cultivating tenant alone. As per Section 24, the fair rent shall be 25% of the normal gross produce or its value in money. As per Section 25, the fair rent may be paid either in cash or in kind or partly in cash or partly in kind, in accordance with the terms of the contract between the public trust and the tenant. As per the 3rd proviso to Section 25(1), where the crop raised is paddy, the public trust shall have the right to insist that the rent shall be paid in kind.
As per the 3rd proviso to Section 25(1), where the crop raised is paddy, the public trust shall have the right to insist that the rent shall be paid in kind. Hence, it is evident that the option is on the public trust to insist upon the tenant to pay the rent in kind in the case of cultivation of paddy. As per Section 27, the tenant shall not harvest the crop unless he has given a ten days prior notice in writing about his decision to harvest. Where the produce is share in grain, the sharing shall be done at the threshing floor on which the threshing took place and no portion of the produce shall be removed so as to prevent due division of the produce. Hence, it is clear that the tenant is duty bound to give a clear 10 days notice before the harvest and he should not remove the agricultural produce from the lands without sharing the 25% of the rent in favour of the landlord. 26. In the present case, the main contention of the tenant is that the lease agreement is only pertaining to paddy and hence they are not bound to share the harvested sugarcane with the landlord as per the provisions of the Act. Even in the written statement, the tenants have admitted that almost all the tenants have shifted from paddy to sugarcane cultivation and the Trust has not objected to the same. Hence, we can safely come to a conclusion that there is no agreement between the landlord and the tenant for cultivation of the sugarcane. That apart, as per Section 25 of Tamil Nadu Act 57 of 1961, when there is no contract between the parties, the fair rent may be paid at the option of the cultivating tenant either in cash or in kind or partly in cash and partly in kind. Even assuming that there is no agreement between the landlord and the tenant for cultivation of sugarcane, the tenant will be duty bound to pay 25% of the gross produce as rent. However, in the present case, the tenants have not chosen to pay the rent as contemplated under Section 25 of Tamil Nadu Act 57 of 1961. 27.
Even assuming that there is no agreement between the landlord and the tenant for cultivation of sugarcane, the tenant will be duty bound to pay 25% of the gross produce as rent. However, in the present case, the tenants have not chosen to pay the rent as contemplated under Section 25 of Tamil Nadu Act 57 of 1961. 27. As per Section 25 of Tamil Nadu Act 57 of 1961, the Fair rent shall be 25% of the normal gross produce or its value in money. Hence, it is evident that the cultivating tenant has got right only over the 75% of the gross produce whether it is paddy or sugarcane. The balance 25% of the gross produce belongs to the landlord as a fair rent. A perusal of the agreement between the tenant and the sugar mill would reveal that the entire gross produce is agreed to be supplied to the sugar mill by the tenant. This clearly shows that the tenant had entered into an agreement over and above his 75% of share. The sugar mill cannot feign ignorance on the ground that they were not aware of the terms of the contract between the tenant and the plaintiff-Trust. The sugar mill is supposed to know about Section 25 and 27 of Tamil Nadu Act 57 of 1961. Hence, it is very clear that the sugar mill has entered into an agreement with the tenant in clear violation of Section 24,25 and 27 of Tamil Nadu Act 57 of 1961. 28. Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act reads as follows: “23.What considerations and objects are lawful, and what not.-The consideration or object of an agreement is lawful, unless- it is forbidden by law, or is of such a nature that, if permitted, it would defeat the provisions of any law; or is fraudulent; or involves or implies injury to the person or property of another; or the Court regards its as immoral, or opposed to public policy. In each of these cases, the consideration or object of an agreement is said to be unlawful. Every agreement of which the object or consideration is unlawful is void”. 29. As per Section 24 of Tamil Nadu Act 57 of 1961, the fair rent has been fixed at 25% of the normal gross produce or its value in money.
In each of these cases, the consideration or object of an agreement is said to be unlawful. Every agreement of which the object or consideration is unlawful is void”. 29. As per Section 24 of Tamil Nadu Act 57 of 1961, the fair rent has been fixed at 25% of the normal gross produce or its value in money. As per Section 27(1) of Tamil Nadu Act 57 of 1961, the tenant has to give 10 days prior notice to the landlord of his decision to harvest. As per Section 27(2) of Tamil Nadu Act 57 of 1961, the sharing of the produce shall be done at the threshing floor and no portion of the produce shall be removed there from at such time or in such manner as to prevent the due division thereof at the proper time. 30. A perusal of the agreement between the tenant and the sugar mill indicates that the entire harvested sugarcane should be supplied only to the sugar mill. The tenant cannot retain any portion of the produce. This agreement is clearly in violation of Sections 24 and 27 of Tamil Nadu Act 57 of 1961. The object of the agreement if permitted would defeat the provisions of Sections 24 and 27 of Tamil Nadu Act 57 of 1961. Hence, the clauses in the agreement to the extent that would defeat the provisions of Tamil Nadu Act 57 of 1961 are unlawful and they are void. 31. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in a judgment reported in 1983 (3)SCC 61 in paragraph No.14 as held as follows: "......Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act provides that the consideration or object of agreement was lawful, unless, inter alia, it was of such a nature, that, if permitted, would defeat the provisions of any law. In the instant case, it appears to us that if condition 15 be permitted then it will defeat the provisions of section 10 of the Carriers Act, even in a case where notice in writing of the loss or injury has been given to given to him before the institution of the suit and within six months of the time when the loss or injury first came to the knowledge of the plaintiff.
Even in a case where the plaintiff was unaware of the arrival of the goods at the destination or was unaware of a loss or damage, the plaintiff would not have any right to institute a suit if no claim was made and could not have been made within 30 days as stipulated in condition 15 of the Way Bill. In that view of the matters, we are of the opinion that condition 15 must be held to be void in view of Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act because its object was to defeat the provisions of Section 10 of the Carriers Act..............” 32. Hence, the agreement between the tenant and the sugar mill for the offtake of 100% of the harvested sugarcane to the sugar mill without payment of 25% share of the public trust is void and the same is unenforceable. 33. The contention of the sugar mill that there is no privity of contract between the plaintiff-Trust and the sugar mill is not legally sustainable. In view of the above said provisions of Tamil Nadu Act 57 of 1961, though there may not be any contractual obligation yet there is a statutory obligation on the part of the sugar mill to see that 25% of the gross produce is handed over to the landlord as a fair rent as contemplated under Section 24,25 and 27 of Tamil Nadu Act 57 of 1961. 34. The present suit has not been filed to evict the cultivating tenants alleging default in payment of rent. In fact, the present suits have been filed only to prevent commission of default in payment of rent. Hence, the contention of the learned counsel for the defendants that only Section 19 of Tamil Nadu Act 57 of 1961 has to be invoked for evicting the tenants is not legally sustainable. 35. The learned counsel for the defendants have further contended that the suit has been filed only for one fasli year. The fair rent for the said fasli year has already been deposited before the Court. Hence, nothing survives in the suit beyond the said fasli year. If really nothing survives in the suit, the defendants could not have challenged the decree of the trial Court before the First Appellate Court.
The fair rent for the said fasli year has already been deposited before the Court. Hence, nothing survives in the suit beyond the said fasli year. If really nothing survives in the suit, the defendants could not have challenged the decree of the trial Court before the First Appellate Court. A perusal of the prayer in both the suits would reveal that the prayer in the suits are not restricted to any particular fasli year. The prayer for permanent injunction has been sought for as against the tenant and the sugar mill, not to lift the agricultural produce from the field before payment of its fair rent of 25%. Hence, the contention of the learned counsel for the defendants that the suit is infructuous, is not sustainable in law. 36. The learned counsel for the defendants have further contended that in view of Section 58 of Tamil Nadu Act 57 of 1961, Civil Court has no jurisdiction to decide any question, which is required to be decided by anyone of the authorities under the Act. As per Section 27(1) of Tamil Nadu Act 57 of 1961, ten days prior notice has to be issued by the tenant before harvesting the crop. As per Section 27(2), the tenant is under an obligation to share the produce at the threshing floor itself and he should not remove any portion of the produce without sharing the rent. As per Section 27(4) of Tamil Nadu Act 57 of 1961, if the landlord apprehends removal of the produce from the threshing floor in contravention of the provisions, he can make an application to the authorized officer requesting that officer to depute any one to make division of the produce. On receipt of such obligation, he may depute an officer, who shall exercise such functions and in accordance with such procedure as may be prescribed. In the present proceedings, it is the specific case of the defendants that there is no lease agreement between the landlord and the tenant with regard to cultivation of sugarcane. That apart, as per the agreement between the tenant and the sugar mill, the sugar mill itself will lift the harvested crops at the request of the tenant. The authorized officer will not have any powers to restrain the sugar mill from lifting the harvested crops under the Act.
That apart, as per the agreement between the tenant and the sugar mill, the sugar mill itself will lift the harvested crops at the request of the tenant. The authorized officer will not have any powers to restrain the sugar mill from lifting the harvested crops under the Act. Rules 33 and 34 of Tamil Nadu Public Trusts(Regulation of Administration of Agricultural Lands) Act, 1962, provide certain procedure for dividing the crops as per the lease deed. But in the present case, the sugar mill as well as the tenant are contending that there is no lease agreement between the landlord and the tenant with regard to cultivation of sugarcane. 37. A perusal of Exhibit A.1-lease agreement between the tenant and the landlord will show that the rent to be paid as certain quantity of paddy. Hence, the authorized officer under the Act will not be in a position to effect division of sugarcane, since there is no lease deed for the said cultivation or division of the share in the produce. Hence, the contention of the tenants that there is a bar under Section 58 of Tamil Nadu Public Trusts Act 57 of 1961 with regard to the matters to be dealt with by the authorized officer is not applicable to the facts of the present case. The authorized officer will not be in a position to share the produce of sugarcane when there is no lease deed to the said effect. 38. The trial Court after careful analysis of the oral, documentary evidence and the provisions of the statute has decreed the suit as prayed for and the First Appellate Court has dismissed the suit on the only ground that the civil suit is not maintainable without reversing any one of the findings of the trial Court. 39. In view of the above said discussion, it is clear that the Civil Court has got jurisdiction to entertain such kind of suits, seeking permanent injunction when there is violation of statutory obligations arising out of Tamil Nadu Act 57 of 1961. Especially, when the authorities under the Act will not have any power to grant such a decree for permanent injunction. 40. As per Section 38 of the Specific Relief Act, permanent injunction can be granted to the plaintiff to prevent breach of an obligation existing in his favour whether expressly or by implication.
Especially, when the authorities under the Act will not have any power to grant such a decree for permanent injunction. 40. As per Section 38 of the Specific Relief Act, permanent injunction can be granted to the plaintiff to prevent breach of an obligation existing in his favour whether expressly or by implication. In the present case, there is a breach of an obligation existing in favour of the plaintiff in view of the Sections 24,25 and 27 of Tamil Nadu Public Trusts Act 57 of 1961. That apart, the sugar mill is threatening to invade the plaintiff's right and enjoyment of the property. Right to collect fair rent is also a right to enjoyment of the property. When the sugar mill has already invaded and threatening to invade the plaintiff's right of enjoyment of the property, the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for permanent injunction, even as against the sugar mill. The whole claim of the plaintiff has arisen only out of breach of statutory obligations and not based on the contractual obligations. Hence, the sugar mill cannot take umbrage under the principle of privity of contract. 41. Tamil Nadu Act 57 of 1961 has defined the public trust under Section 2(25) as follows: “2. Definitions.-........ 25. “public trust” means a trust for a public purpose of a religious or charitable, or of an educational nature, and includes- (i) any temple, math, mosque, church or other place by whatever name known, which is dedicated to, or for the benefit of, or used as of right by, any community or section thereof as a place of public religious worship; (ii) any charitable or educational institution of a public nature;” 42. As per Section 4 of the said Act, no public trust shall personally cultivate, or lease out, land held by such trust except in accordance with the provisions of this Act. As per Section 5, a public trust is prohibited from personally cultivating any land in excess of twenty standard acres. 43. A combined reading of the above said provisions will indicate that a separate class of landlords have been created, who are prohibited from during personal cultivation. The Act mandates these landlords to lease out their agricultural lands to the cultivating tenants compulsarily. The terms of agricultural lease are also fixed under the statute.
43. A combined reading of the above said provisions will indicate that a separate class of landlords have been created, who are prohibited from during personal cultivation. The Act mandates these landlords to lease out their agricultural lands to the cultivating tenants compulsarily. The terms of agricultural lease are also fixed under the statute. Any contract between the public trust and the tenant, which is inconsistent with the provisions of the Act cannot be enforced. The agricultural lands belonging to the temple, math, mosque, church, public trusts and lands belonging to charitable or educational institutions of public nature have been brought under the control of the Act. The provisions of the statute have been fully loaded in favour of the tenants and this class of landlords have been forced to be at the mercy of the revenue officials for recovering the lease amount from the tenants. It is high time that this 60 years old enactment is revisited and the rights of the landlords are balanced with the rights of the cultivating tenants. 44. In view of the above said discussion, all the substantial questions of law are answered in favour of the appellants. The judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court in all the first appeals are set aside. The judgment and decree of the trial Court in both the suits are restored. All the Second Appeals are allowed. No costs.