JUDGMENT : 1. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking following reliefs :- (a) Issue a writ, order or direction/declaration in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction for call of the records of the present case from the Respondents; and (b) Issue a writ, order or direction/declaration in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction directing that the Impugned Order dated 30.12.2021 [ANNEXURE NO.XXXIII] is wholly arbitrary, illegal and contrary to well established legal principles and being so also amount to a serious violation of the Fundamental Rights of the Petitioner No.2 and further direct the Respondents to forthwith amend the Agreement dated 05.09.2014 [ANNEXURE No. XV] to include with effect from the year 2016, land admeasuring 1122.59 sq. mtrs. in addition to 5414.40 sq. mtrs. Already allotted in terms of the Joint Inspection Report dated 04.04.2016 [ANNEXURE No.XX]; and (c) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction quashing the Impugned Order dated 30.12.2021 [ANNEXURE No.XXXIII] being wholly arbitrary, illegal and contrary to well established legal principles and amount to a serious violation of the Fundamental Rights of the Petitioner No.2; and (d) Award costs of the petition and Counsel's fee of the Petitioners. Perusal of the reliefs as sought in the present writ petition reveals that the petitioners are insisting for writ order or direction/declaration in nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ order or declaring the order dated 30.12.2021 arbitrary, illegal as well as contrary well established legal principles and in violation of the fundamental rights of the petitioner no. 2 and to further direct the respondents herein to forthwith amend the agreement dated 5.9.2014 so as to include it w.e.f. the year 2016 ad-measuring 1122.59 square meters in addition to 5414.40 square meters already allotted in terms of Joint Inspector Report dated 4.4.2016. 2. As per the pleadings so set forth in the writ petition the petitioner no.1 claims itself to be a company engaged in manufacturing of PSC Sleepers for railways and registered with Government of India, Ministry of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises as a MSME. 3. 2. As per the pleadings so set forth in the writ petition the petitioner no.1 claims itself to be a company engaged in manufacturing of PSC Sleepers for railways and registered with Government of India, Ministry of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises as a MSME. 3. Petitioners have further pleaded that for the purposes of manufacturing Brand Gauge Monoblock Concrete Sleepers contract was executed on 27.4.1998 between the Railway Board on one hand and the petitioner no.1 on the other hand. It has further been pleaded that from time to time fresh contracts have been entered into on 31.12.2002, 14.12.2009 and 11.6.2019. 4. Agreements were also executed between the respondents herein and the petitioners from time to time including the agreement dated 5.9.2014 which finds place at page 278 of the paper book containing Clause 23 at page 281. ^^23- i{kdkjks ds chp djkjukeksa es fn, x, uhyheh uksfVl es i{kks ds vf/kdkjksa vkSj nkf;Roksa vFkok izLrqr blds fdUgh /kkjkvks ;k 'krksZ ds mnns'; rFkk vk'k; ds laca/k es dksbZ fookn ;k erHksn mRiUu gksus ij] ¼,slh ekeys dks NksMdj ftuds lEc/k es bl djkj es fo'ks”k :i ls O;oLFkk gSA rRdkyhu egkizca/kd] iwoksZrj jsyos }kjk fdlh jktif=Rk jsy vf/kdkjh dks fu;qfDr fookpd ¼vkchVsªVj½ dk ,d ek= fookpd dks lanfHkr dj fn, tk;saxs vkSj mldk fu.kZ; i{kdkjks ds fy, vafre fu.kkZ;d ,oa vkc}dj gksxkA bl djkj ds laca/k es egkizcU/kd ls iwoksZŸkj jsyos iz'kklu dk iz/kku vfHkizsr gksxkA^^ 5. Heard Sri Uday Gupta through online mode assisted by Sri Ravi Kant and Sri Adarsh Bhushan, learned counsels for the petitioners and Sri Krishna Agarwal learned counsel for the respondents. 6. Learned counsels for the petitioners have argued that certain dispute arose with respect to the land so allotted to them for manufacturing BG PSC sleepers and excess possession of the land beyond the land allotted to them entailed to correspondence being exchanged from time to time. 7. As per learned counsels for the petitioners, a contract in writing had been executed between the respondents and the petitioners on 27.4.1998 with respect to execution of the contractuals/obligations wherein the area of the land so allotted to the petitioner no.1 by the respondents was 5414.40 square meters and the petitioners on the basis of the same enjoyed the benefits of the said land for manufacturing purposes and paid annual licence fee of Rs.5,02,103/-. Subsequently, as per the provisions contained in the contract dated 27.4.1998, there was an increase of payment of annual licence fee 10% annually which swell to Rs.27,40,119/-. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners that by virtue of the communication dated 3.11.2006, the petitioners were informed that petitioners were in possession of 964.34 square meters of additional land and steps were to be undertaken to get the said additional land included in the contract. It has further been argued that the same was disputed by the petitioners on 10.2.2007 and on 27.2.2007 another communication was issued to the petitioners mentioning that an amount of Rs.6,75,423/-has been deducted from the bill so raised by the petitioners on the pretext that the petitioners were in possession of extra land. Various correspondences were also extended by the petitioners, one of the same being dated 24.10.2007 admitting the fact that the petitioners are possessing 144 square meters of additional land. 8. Eventually a fresh formal agreement was executed renewing the parent contract wherein the licenced land was shown to be 5414.40 sq. mtrs. It has also been argued that the petitioners disputed the said fact regarding possession of the land being 5414.40 sq. mtrs vide letter dated 15.1.2006 and thereafter a joint inspection team was constituted compromising of the representative of the petitioner company and the authorised officers of the railways which conducted joint spot inspection on 4.4.2016 wherein it was found that the petitioners were in possession of 1122.59 square meters of extra land. Even it has also come on record that a letter was written by the petitioners to the railways on 16.5.2016 to regularise 1122.59 square meters on extra land and on 27.1.2018, petitioners vide covering letter remitted licence fee for extra land treating 1122.59 square meters for the year 2016-17 and 2017-18. It has also been placed on record that the petitioners company also made request for allotment of said extra part of land in their favour. 9. On 15.10.2019 Chief Engineer of the railways sent a communication to the Senior Divisional Engineer Coordination Eastern Railways, Lucknow clearly setting out the fact that in joint inspection 1122.59 Sq. mtrs. of extra land was found in possession of the petitioners. 9. On 15.10.2019 Chief Engineer of the railways sent a communication to the Senior Divisional Engineer Coordination Eastern Railways, Lucknow clearly setting out the fact that in joint inspection 1122.59 Sq. mtrs. of extra land was found in possession of the petitioners. Further the petitioner company also requested for allotment of the said land and also submitted lay out plan which mentioned that the extra land would be 1863.34 sq. mtrs. Thereafter, on 18.2.2021 an order was passed demanding licence fee from the petitioners treating extra land as 4156.87 sq. mtrs. since 2006-07. 10. Being aggrieved against the same, petitioners herein instituted Writ Petition No.17230 of 2021 M/s Calstar Steel Ltd. & another Vs. North Eastern Railway seeking following reliefs:- a) Call for the records of the present case from the Respondent-North Eastern Railway; and b) Issue a writ, order or direction/declaration in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction directing that the impugned communication dated 18.02.2021 and 15.06.2021 are wholly arbitrary, illegal and contrary to well established legal principles and being so also amount to a serious violation of the Fundamental Rights of the Petitioner No.2 and further direct the Respondent-North Eastern Railway to forthwith amend the Agreement dated 05.09.2014 to include with effect from the year 2016, land admeasuring 1122.59 sq. mtrs. In addition to 5414.40 sq. mtrs. already allotted in terms of the Joint Inspector Report dated 04.04.2016 ; and c) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction quashing the impugned communication dated 18.02.2021 and 15.06.2021 being wholly arbitrary, illegal and contrary to well established legal principles and amount to a serious violation of the Fundamental Rights of the Petitioner No.2; and d) Award costs of the petition and Counsel's fee of the Petitioners. 11. On 7.10.2021 this Court proceeded to pass the following order and relevant extract is quoted below : “It is not in dispute that extra land was in possession of the Company over and above 5414.40 sq. meters in relation to which contract was executed in its favour. The main dispute is regarding the extent of extra land in possession of the Company. It is evident that initially the respondent alleged that the extra area was 964.34 sq. meters as mentioned in the communication dated 03.04.2006 addressed to the Company. The Company disputed the same. meters in relation to which contract was executed in its favour. The main dispute is regarding the extent of extra land in possession of the Company. It is evident that initially the respondent alleged that the extra area was 964.34 sq. meters as mentioned in the communication dated 03.04.2006 addressed to the Company. The Company disputed the same. At a later point of time, in October, 2015, the respondent claimed that the extra area is 4165.87 sq. meters. Again the Company disputed the same by raising a written protest. Thereafter, a joint inspection was carried out on 04.04.2016, in which it transpired that extra land in possession of the Company is 1122.59 sq. meters. Thereafter, the Company requested for including the said area in the agreement. It is also evident that the respondent renewed the licence on 05.09.2014 for an area 5414.40 sq. meters without settling the issue relating to extra land used by the Company. In due course of time, the Company started paying licence fee by treating the additional area as 1122.59 sq. meters as was found in joint inspection and also made request for allotment of 1863.34 sq. meters of extra land over and above the area licensed under the contract. While the said request remained pending, the impugned demand has been raised in which the finding of the joint inspection report dated 04.04.2016 has not been noted nor considered nor even the stand of the petitioner which was there before the respondent in shape of several protest letters and representations. At this stage, Sri Rajnish Kumar Rai on query made by the Court as to whether the respondent is ready to pass a fresh order after considering the joint inspection report and other relevant material submitted that the respondent shall pass a speaking order in this regard within such time as may be directed by this Court. Accordingly and having regard to the stand taken by learned counsel for the respondent before this Court, we dispose off the writ petition as follows: (a) The Company shall file a fresh representation along with supporting material and true attested copy of the instant order before the respondent within two weeks from today. (b) On receipt of the representation, the competent authority shall examine the representation, the joint inspection report and other relevant evidence and, thereafter, pass a speaking order within a further period of four weeks. (b) On receipt of the representation, the competent authority shall examine the representation, the joint inspection report and other relevant evidence and, thereafter, pass a speaking order within a further period of four weeks. (c) The impugned demand shall abide by the decision that shall be taken on the representation. In case, the Company defaults in making representation within two weeks, as stipulated above, the instant order shall stand discharged and the writ petition would be treated to be dismissed.” 12. (c) The impugned demand shall abide by the decision that shall be taken on the representation. In case, the Company defaults in making representation within two weeks, as stipulated above, the instant order shall stand discharged and the writ petition would be treated to be dismissed.” 12. Thereafter, it appears that the petitioners preferred representation before the railways and the same has been rejected by virtue of the order dated 30.12.2021 holding as under:- para (xviii) vkids vuqjks/k ij fnukad 08-11-2021 dks O;fDrxr lquokbZ dh tk pqdh gSA Para (xix) vkids }kjk izLrqr fd;s x;s lk{;] O;fDrxr lquokbZ esa fn;s x;s rdZ ,oa lHkh miyC/k dkxtkrks dk xgu v/;;u djds ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; ds }kjk fjV laŒ17230@2021 es ikfjr vkns'k fnukad 07-10-2021 ds vuqikyu es fuEu fu.kZ; fn;k tkrk gS& ¼1½ QeZ }kjk 2006 ls gh dwfyx VSad dk fuekZ.k djds eSVfj;y ,oa Lyhij j[kus gsrq vfrfjDr Hkwfe ij vfrØe.k fd;k x;k gSA ijarq mDr Hkwfe dk lgh eki] lHkh i{kks ds lkFk la;qDr fujh{k.k u gksus ds dkj.k] orZeku es izekf.kr ugha fd;k tk ldrkA vr% 432 oxZehVj ds vfrØe.k¼QeZ }kjk Lohdk;Z½ dks 01-06-2006 ls ¼jsyos }kjk mDr en ds lEca/k es izFke i= dh frfFk½ 2014 rd ¼djkjukesa ds uohuhdj.k rd½ fy;k tkuk mfpr gS] ijUrq o"kZ 2006&07 ls 2016 rd 432 oxZehVj Hkwfe ij VSad dk cukuk Lohdkj fd;k x;k gS tcfd 432 oxZehVj 3 VSadks dk vkarfjd {ks=Qy 3x9x16 gSA tcfd okLrfod :i es bu VSadksa dks cukus ds fy, 28.40x16.62=472 oxZehVj dh Hkwfe dk bLrseky fd;k x;k gSA vr% 472 oxZehVj Hkwfe dk ykblsal 'kqYd rFkk fyfDoMsVsM MSest ns; gksxkA ¼2½ o”kZ 2014 es iqjkus ykblsal ds djkjukesa¼5414-40 oxZehŒ½ dk uohuhdj.k fd;k x;k Fkk] ftl djkjukesa es vfrfjDr Hkwfe vfrØfer gksus dk dksbZ o.kZu ugh gSA ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; us Hkh mDr ij fVIi.kh dh gSA ijarq ekStwn lk{;ks ,oa vkids i= fnaukd 10-02-2007 ds vk/kkj ij ;g Li"V gksrk gS fd vkids }kjk 472 oxZehŒ vfrfjDr Hkwfe o"kZ 2006 ls mi;ksx es FkhA ¼3½ fnukad 04-04-2016 ds la;qDr tkap fjiksVZ es ik;s x;s vfrØe.k ,fj;k 1122-59 oxZehŒ ;g fl) djrk gS fd QeZ }kjk iwoZ jsyos Hkwfe ij vfrØe.k fd;k x;k FkkA mDr 1122-59 oxZehVj vfrfjDr Hkwfe dk ykblsal 'kqYd o"kZ 2016 ls QeZ }kjk tek fd;k tk jgk gSA ¼4½ o"kZ 2006&07 ls 2016 rd 432 oxZehVj Hkwfe ij VSad dk cukuk Lohdkj fd;k x;k gS tcfd 432 oxZehVj 3 VSdksa dk vkarfjd {ks=Qy 3x9x16 gSA tcfd okLrfod :i es bu VSadks dks cukus ds fy, 28.40x16.62=472 oxZehVj dh Hkwfe dk bLrseky fd;k x;k gSA vr% fnukad 10-02-2007 ls 04-04- 2016 rd 472 oxZehVj Hkwfe dk ykblsal 'kqYd rFkk fyfDoMsVsM MSest ns; gksxkA 13. Challenging the order now the petitioners are before this Court. 14. Learned counsels for the petitioners have argued that that the order under challenge is perverse contrary to material on record and even in fact is in violation of principles of natural justice. 15. According to learned counsel for the petitioners reliance and reference so made by the respondents upon R.D.S.O. letter dated 15.7.2005 without confronting the same with petitioners and making as one of the basis for passing of the order in challenge vitiates the entire proceedings. 16. In nutshell argument of learned counsel for the petitioners is to the effect that the order under challenge is liable to be set aside and matter be remanded back to the railways to decide a fresh after furnishing the necessary documents which were made the basis of passing the order which is under challenge. 17. Sri Krishna Agarwal learned counsel for the respondents has at the very outset argued that the present writ petition is not maintainable as the petitioners has an alternative efficacious remedy of taking recourse to arbitration as contemplated in Clause 23 of the agreement dated 15.5.2014. According to him disputed question of facts are involved in the present petition which are of complex nature and requires production of documentary evidence which cannot be resorted to in the present proceedings. 18. On being confronted with the said position learned counsel for the petitioners could not dispute the existence of alternative efficacious remedy by means of arbitration. However, according to the learned counsel for the petitioners, the petitioners can though take recourse to arbitration but as the respondents are insisting for the payment of annual licence fees for the excess land so shown to be occupied by the petitioners being 1050 sq. mtrs. for the period from 15.7.2005 to 23.6.2014, thus, according to them arbitration may not be efficacious remedy. 19. We have heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioners, learned counsel for the respondents and perused the record. 20. mtrs. for the period from 15.7.2005 to 23.6.2014, thus, according to them arbitration may not be efficacious remedy. 19. We have heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioners, learned counsel for the respondents and perused the record. 20. The Parliament in exercise of powers as conferred therein enacted an Act by the name in the nomenclature of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (In short Act of 1996) in order to consolidate and amend the law relating to domestic arbitration, international commercial arbitration and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards as also to define the law relating to conciliation and for the matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. 21. For the kind perusal of this Court Sections 7, 9 and 17 of the Act of 1996 are being quoted below 7. Arbitration agreement.—(1) In this Part, “arbitration agreement” means an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not. (2) An arbitration agreement may be in the form of an arbitration clause in a contract or in the form of a separate agreement. (3) An arbitration agreement shall be in writing. (4) An arbitration agreement is in writing if it is contained in— (a) a document signed by the parties; (b) an exchange of letters, telex, telegrams or other means of telecommunication 1 [including communication through electronic means] which provide a record of the agreement; or (c) an exchange of statements of claim and defence in which the existence of the agreement is alleged by one party and not denied by the other. (5) The reference in a contract to a document containing an arbitration clause constitutes an arbitration agreement if the contract is in writing and the reference is such as to make that arbitration clause part of the contract. 9. (5) The reference in a contract to a document containing an arbitration clause constitutes an arbitration agreement if the contract is in writing and the reference is such as to make that arbitration clause part of the contract. 9. Interim measures, etc., by Court.—3 [(1)] A party may, before or during arbitral proceedings or at any time after the making of the arbitral award but before it is enforced in accordance with section 36, apply to a court— (i) for the appointment of a guardian for a minor or person of unsound mind for the purposes of arbitral proceedings; or (ii) for an interim measure of protection in respect of any of the following matters, namely:— (a) the preservation, interim custody or sale of any goods which are the subject-matter of the arbitration agreement; (b) securing the amount in dispute in the arbitration; (c) the detention, preservation or inspection of any property or thing which is the subject-matter of the dispute in arbitration, or as to which any question may arise therein and authorising for any of the aforesaid purposes any person to enter upon any land or building in the possession of any party, or authorising any samples to be taken or any observation to be made, or experiment to be tried, which may be necessary or expedient for the purpose of obtaining full information or evidence; (d) interim injunction or the appointment of a receiver; (e) such other interim measure of protection as may appear to the Court to be just and convenient, and the Court shall have the same power for making orders as it has for the purpose of, and in relation to, any proceedings before it. (2) Where, before the commencement of the arbitral proceedings, a Court passes an order for any interim measure of protection under sub-section (1), the arbitral proceedings shall be commenced within a period of ninety days from the date of such order or within such further time as the Court may determine. (3) Once the arbitral tribunal has been constituted, the Court shall not entertain an application under sub-section (1), unless the Court finds that circumstances exist which may not render the remedy provided under section 17 efficacious.] 17. (3) Once the arbitral tribunal has been constituted, the Court shall not entertain an application under sub-section (1), unless the Court finds that circumstances exist which may not render the remedy provided under section 17 efficacious.] 17. Interim measures ordered by arbitral tribunal.—(1) A party may, during the arbitral proceedings or at any time after the making of the arbitral award but before it is enforced in accordance with section 36, apply to the arbitral tribunal— (i) for the appointment of a guardian for a minor or person of unsound mind for the purposes of arbitral proceedings; or (ii) for an interim measure of protection in respect of any of the following matters, namely:— (a) the preservation, interim custody or sale of any goods which are the subject-matter of the arbitration agreement; (b) securing the amount in dispute in the arbitration; (c) the detention, preservation or inspection of any property or thing which is the subject-matter of the dispute in arbitration, or as to which any question may arise therein and authorising for any of the aforesaid purposes any person to enter upon any land or building in the possession of any party, or authorising any samples to be taken, or any observation to be made, or experiment to be tried, which may be necessary or expedient for the purpose of obtaining full information or evidence; (d) interim injunction or the appointment of a receiver; (e) such other interim measure of protection as may appear to the arbitral tribunal to be just and convenient, and the arbitral tribunal shall have the same power for making orders, as the court has for the purpose of, and in relation to, any proceedings before it. (2) Subject to any orders passed in an appeal under section 37, any order issued by the arbitral tribunal under this section shall be deemed to be an order of the Court for all purposes and shall be enforceable under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), in the same manner as if it were an order of the Court.] 22. The Hon. Supreme Court in the case of State of J & K and another Vs. Dev Dutt Pandit (1999) 7 SCC page 339 in para 23 has observed as under:- “23. The Hon. Supreme Court in the case of State of J & K and another Vs. Dev Dutt Pandit (1999) 7 SCC page 339 in para 23 has observed as under:- “23. Arbitration is considered to be an important Alternative Disputes Redressal process which is to be encouraged because of high pendency of cases in the courts and cost of litigation. Arbitration has to be looked up to with all earnest so that litigant public has faith in the speedy process of resolving their disputes by this process. ” 23. Following the said judgments the Hon. Apex Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Varindera Constructions Ltd. and others (2018) 7 SCC 794 in para 12 has observed as under:- “The primary object of the arbitration is to reach a final disposition in a speedy, effective, inexpensive and expeditious manner. In order to regulate the law regarding arbitration, legislature came up with legislation which is known as Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. In order to make arbitration process more effective, legislature restricted the role of courts in case where matter is subject to the arbitration. Section 5 of the Act specifically restricted the interference of the courts to some extent. In other words, it is only in exceptional circumstances, as provided by this Act, the court is entitled to intervene in the dispute which is subject matter of arbitration. Such intervention may be before, at or after the arbitration proceeding, as the case may be. In short, court shall not intervene with the subject matter of arbitration unless injustice is caused to either of the parties.” 24. Hon. Supreme Court in the above noted judgments have consistently held that arbitration is an important alternative dispute redressal process which needs to be encouraged. 25. Here in the present case, learned counsel for the petitioners have not disputed the fact that their exists an arbitration clause and further they are signatories to the agreement which contains arbitration clause and the issue in question itself is also arbitrable and within the scope of arbitration clause which can be entertained and adjudicated by the arbitrator. 26. Learned counsels for the petitioners have placed reliance upon the judgment of Uttar Pradesh Power Transmission Corporation Ltd. and another Vs. 26. Learned counsels for the petitioners have placed reliance upon the judgment of Uttar Pradesh Power Transmission Corporation Ltd. and another Vs. CG Power and Industrial Solutions Ltd. another AIR Online 2021 SC 243 so as to contend while referring to paragraph 67 which reads as under:- It is well settled that availability of an alternative remedy does not prohibit the High Court from entertaining a writ petition in an appropriate case. The High Court may entertain a writ petition, notwithstanding the availability of an alternative remedy, particularly (1) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of a fundamental right; (ii) where there is failure of principles of natural justice or (iii) where the impugned orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or (iv) the vires of an Act is under challenge. Reference may be made to Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and others reported in AIR 1999 SC 22 and Pimpri Chindhwad Municipal Corporation and Ors. V. Gayatri Construction Company and Ors. V. Gayatri Construction Company and Ors. reported in (2008) 8 SCC 172 : (AIR 2008 SC (Supp) 211) cited on behalf of Respondent No.1. 27. Undisputably availability of alternative remedy does not preclude the High Court from entertaining a writ petition in appropriate case. However, this Court while entertaining a writ petition has to bear-in-mind the fact as to whether the dispute so raised does not involve factual issues which comprise complex questions of fact whose determination requires oral evidence or not. 28. In the case of Bal Krishna Ram Vs. Union of India and another 2020 (2) SCC 442 the Hon. Apex Court in paragraph 14 has observed as under:- “14. It would be pertinent to add that the principle that the High Court should not exercise its extraordinary writ jurisdiction when an efficacious alternative remedy is available, is a Rule of prudence and not a Rule of law. The writ courts normally refrain from exercising their extraordinary power if the Petitioner has an alternative efficacious remedy. The existence of such remedy however does not mean that the jurisdiction of the High Court is ousted. At the same time, it is a well settled principle that such jurisdiction should not be exercised when there is an alternative remedy available3. The Rule of alternative remedy is a Rule of discretion and not a Rule of jurisdiction. The existence of such remedy however does not mean that the jurisdiction of the High Court is ousted. At the same time, it is a well settled principle that such jurisdiction should not be exercised when there is an alternative remedy available3. The Rule of alternative remedy is a Rule of discretion and not a Rule of jurisdiction. Merely because the Court may not exercise its discretion, is not a ground to hold that it has no jurisdiction. There may be cases where the High Court would be justified in exercising its writ jurisdiction because of some glaring illegality committed by the AFT. One must also remember that the alternative remedy must be efficacious and in case of a Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO), or a Junior Commissioned Officer (JCO); to expect such a person to approach the Supreme Court in every case may not be justified. It is extremely difficult and beyond the monetary reach of an ordinary litigant to approach the Supreme Court. Therefore, it will be for the High Court to decide in the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case whether it should exercise its extraordinary writ jurisdiction or not. There cannot be a blanket ban on the exercise of such jurisdiction because that would effectively mean that the writ court is denuded of its jurisdiction to entertain such writ petitions which is not the law laid down in L. Chandra Kumar (supra).” 29. Further in the case of Punjab National Bank and others Vs. Atmanand Singh and others reported in (2020) 6 SCC 256 the Hon. Apex Court in paragraphs no. 22, 23, 24, 25 held as under:- 22. We restate the above position that when the petition raises questions of fact of complex nature, such as in the present case, which may for their determination require oral and documentary evidence to be produced and proved by the concerned party and also because the relief sought is merely for ordering a refund of money, the High Court should be loath in entertaining such writ petition and instead must relegate the parties to remedy of a civil suit. Had it been a case where material facts referred to in the writ petition are admitted facts or indisputable facts, the High Court may be justified in examining the claim of the writ Petitioner on its own merits in accordance with law. 23. Had it been a case where material facts referred to in the writ petition are admitted facts or indisputable facts, the High Court may be justified in examining the claim of the writ Petitioner on its own merits in accordance with law. 23. In the next reported decision relied upon by the Respondent No. 1 in Babubhai (supra), no doubt this Court opined that if need be, it would be open to the High Court to cross-examine the affiants. We may usefully refer to paragraph 10 of the said decision, which reads thus: 10. It is not necessary for this case to express an opinion on the point as to whether the various provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to petitions Under Article 226 of the Constitution. Section 141 of the Code, to which reference has been made, makes it clear that the provisions of the Code in regard to suits shall be followed in all proceedings in any court of civil jurisdiction as far as it can be made applicable. The words "as far as it can be made applicable" make it clear that, in applying the various provisions of the Code to proceedings other than those of a suit, the court must take into account the nature of those proceedings and the relief sought. The object of Article 226 is to provide a quick and inexpensive remedy to aggrieved parties. Power has consequently been vested in the High Courts to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any government, within the jurisdiction of the High Court, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari. It is plain that if the procedure of a suit had also to be adhered to in the case of writ petitions, the entire purpose of having a quick and inexpensive remedy would be defeated. A writ petition Under Article 226, it needs to be emphasised, is essentially different from a suit and it would be incorrect to assimilate and incorporate the procedure of a suit into the proceedings of a petition Under Article 226. The High Court is not deprived of its jurisdiction to entertain a petition Under Article 226 merely because in considering the Petitioner's right of relief, questions of fact may fall to be determined. The High Court is not deprived of its jurisdiction to entertain a petition Under Article 226 merely because in considering the Petitioner's right of relief, questions of fact may fall to be determined. In a petition Under Article 226 the High Court has jurisdiction to try issues both of fact and law. Exercise of the jurisdiction is no doubt discretionary, but the discretion must be exercised on sound judicial principles. When the petition raises complex questions of fact, which may for their determination require oral evidence to be taken, and on that account the High Court is of the view that the dispute should not appropriately be tried in a writ petition, the High Court may decline to try a petition (see Gunwant Kaur v. Bhatinda Municipality [MANU/SC/0397/1969 : (1969) 3 SCC 769 ]. If, however, on consideration of the nature of the controversy, the High Court decides, as in the present case, that it should go into a disputed question of fact and the discretion exercised by the High Court appears to be sound and in conformity with judicial principles, this Court would not interfere in appeal with the order made by the High Court in this respect. This decision has noticed Smt. Gunwant Kaur (supra), which had unmistakably held that when the petition raises complex questions of facts, the High Court may decline to try a petition. It is further observed that if on consideration of the nature of the controversy, the High Court decides to go into the disputed questions of fact, it would be free to do so on sound judicial principles. Despite the factual matrix in the present case, the High Court not only ventured to entertain the writ petition, but dealt with the same in a casual manner without adjudicating the disputed questions of fact by taking into account all aspects of the matter. The manner in which the Court disposed of the writ petition, by no stretch of imagination, can qualify the test of discretion having been exercised on sound judicial principles. 24. In Hyderabad Commercials (supra), on which reliance has been placed, it is clear from paragraph 4 of the said decision that the Bank had admitted its mistake and liability, but took a specious plea about the manner in which the transfer was effected. On that stand, the Court proceeded to grant relief to the Appellant therein, the account holder. 24. In Hyderabad Commercials (supra), on which reliance has been placed, it is clear from paragraph 4 of the said decision that the Bank had admitted its mistake and liability, but took a specious plea about the manner in which the transfer was effected. On that stand, the Court proceeded to grant relief to the Appellant therein, the account holder. In the present case, however, the concerned officials of the Bank have denied of being party to the stated agreement and have expressly asserted that the said document is forged and fabricated. It is neither a case of admitted liability nor to proceed against the Appellant Bank on the basis of indisputable facts. 25. Even the decision in ABL International Ltd. (supra) will be of no avail to the Respondent No. 1. This decision has referred to all the earlier decisions and in paragraph 28, the Court observed as follows: 28. However, while entertaining an objection as to the maintainability of a writ petition Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the court should bear in mind the fact that the power to issue prerogative writs Under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provisions of the Constitution. The High Court having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. The Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions in the exercise of this power. (See Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks [MANU/SC/0664/1998 : (1998) 8 SCC 1 ]) And this plenary right of the High Court to issue a prerogative writ will not normally be exercised by the Court to the exclusion of other available remedies unless such action of the State or its instrumentality is arbitrary and unreasonable so as to violate the constitutional mandate of Article 14 or for other valid and legitimate reasons, for which the Court thinks it necessary to exercise the said jurisdiction. 30. Applying the said judgements in the facts of the present case, the Court finds that the dispute so raised by the parties centers around factual issues wherein complex questions of facts are involved whose determination requires oral evidence. This Court in the present proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot make any enquiry into disputed questions of fact while taking evidence. 31. This Court in the present proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot make any enquiry into disputed questions of fact while taking evidence. 31. Even otherwise once there exist arbitration clause in the agreement dated 5.9.2014 so executed between the respondents one hand and the petitioners on the other hand and the petitioners being signatories of the same and are further not disputing it and also admitting that the dispute itself is clearly arbitrable then while applying the principles of law as culled out as Hon. Apex Court, this Court finds its inability to entertain the present writ petition as the petitioners have adequate efficacious remedy of arbitration as provided in Clause 23 of the agreement dated 5.9.2014. 32. Nonetheless Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is self contained code wherein not only necessary safeguards have been provided but also jurisdiction has been vested with the competent court under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and under Section 17 of the same so as to warrant interim protection in suitable cases which are filed or pending before it. Thus, the apprehension of the petitioners that this Court in the present proceedings can only be grant interim protection is out of context as specific remedy as discussed above is available to the petitioners under Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 33. Resultantly, the present writ petition is dismissed as not maintainable on the ground of alternative efficacious remedy as provided under Clause 23 of the agreement dated 5.9.2014 leaving it open to the petitioners to seek remedy as available under Section 23 of the Act of 1996. Needless to say that any of the observations made in the present judgment may not be construed to the expression that this Court has adjudicated the matter on merits.