JUDGMENT Ajai Tyagi, J. 1. This appeal has been preferred by the claimants-appellants against the judgment & award dated 30.9.2013 passed by learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/District Judge, District Bijnor in Motor Accident Claim Petition No.43 of 2012 (Ompal Singh Sharma and others Vs National Insurance Company Ltd. and others), whereby the learned Tribunal has denied the compensation for the death of Prince Sharma in a road accident, holding the accident to be the result of ‘Act of God’, and awarded Rs.50,000/-under no fault liability under Section 140 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as 'Act, 1988'). 2. The claimants-appellants have preferred this appeal for grant of quantum of compensation under Section 166 of Act, 1988. 3. The brief facts of the case are that claimants-appellants filed a Motor Accident Claim Petition before the Tribunal for seeking compensation under Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 for the death of Prince Sharma (deceased) who lost his life in a road accident. As per averments made in claim petition, on 30.7.2011, the deceased – Prince Sharma was traveling in a Wagon-R Car No. U.P.-21 S-1101 with Mohd. Arif Jameel, Assistant Excise Commissioner, Bijnor, after performing their duties from Bijnor to Moradabad. The car was driven by driver-Jameel Ahmad-respondent no. 3. At about 2:30 p.m., when the car reached a little ahead of Gol Bag Tiraha within the jurisdiction of Police Station, Haldaur, suddenly a wild animal Maha (Blue bull/Neelgay), came in front of car, the driver of Car had lost his control over the Car and dashed against the tree and fell down in a ditch. In this accident, Prince Sharma and Mohd. Jameel Ahmad sustained serious injuries and Prince Sharma (deceased) died on the spot. 4. It is also averred that the age of the deceased was 23 years and he was posted as constable in Excise Department, Bijnor was receiving salary of Rs.12,000/- per month. 5. Aggrieved mainly with the non grant of compensation under Section 166 of Motor Vehicles Act awarded, the appellants have preferred this appeal. 6. Heard learned counsel for the appellants-claimants and learned counsel for the respondents. Perused the record. 7. Learned counsel for the appellants-claimants has submitted that impugned judgment and award is against the law. 5. Aggrieved mainly with the non grant of compensation under Section 166 of Motor Vehicles Act awarded, the appellants have preferred this appeal. 6. Heard learned counsel for the appellants-claimants and learned counsel for the respondents. Perused the record. 7. Learned counsel for the appellants-claimants has submitted that impugned judgment and award is against the law. Learned Tribunal has held that the driver of the car was not negligent but this finding is erroneous because if the vehicle would have been driven with proper care and caution, the accident could have been avoided. Learned Tribunal has adopted incorrect approach, because the vehicle was not being driven at a normal speed. In fact, the driver lost the control on staring and the vehicle dashed into the tree. 8. Per contra, learned counsel for the Insurance Company has vehemently objected the submissions of learned counsel for the appellants-claimants and submitted that it is established on record that a blue bull appeared in front of car, tired his best to save the accident but the car dashed into a tree. Hence, in this accident, the car driver was not negligent. It is next submitted by learned counsel that the father of the deceased is produced before the Tribunal as PW-1 and a so called eye witness Brijesh Sharma is produced as PW-2. Both these witnesses have deposed in their testimony that in the said accident, the car driver was not negligent and the accident had taken place due to sudden appears of blue bull. Hence, the appellants have failed to prove that the car driver was negligent under Section 166 of Motor Vehicle Act, 1988, the claim petition can succeeds if the negligence of the driver is proved. 9. Learned counsel for the insurance company has submitted that the information of the accident was reported to police station of which entry is made in General Diary (GD). This GD entry also says that the accident took place due to sudden appears of blue bull. Hence, learned Tribunal has rightly concluded that in the aforesaid accident, the car driver was not negligent and rightly dismissed the claim petition by awarding a sum of Rs.50,000/-, under No Fault Liability, hence there is no illegality in the impugned order which calls for interference by this Court. 10. Hence, learned Tribunal has rightly concluded that in the aforesaid accident, the car driver was not negligent and rightly dismissed the claim petition by awarding a sum of Rs.50,000/-, under No Fault Liability, hence there is no illegality in the impugned order which calls for interference by this Court. 10. In addition to the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel for Insurance Company has vehemently submitted that the accident took place as blue bull came on the road all of sudden which was beyond the control of driver of the car and in order to save the blue bull caused the accident. Hence, there was no negligence and the accident in question was result of 'Act of God'. 11. The question which arises is whether the accident was the result only because the blue bull came on the road as held by Tribunal or it was 'human negligence'. While deciding the claim petition, learned Tribunal has not kept in mind the standard of proof required in Motor Accident Claim Petition. 12. In Anita Sharma and Others Vs. The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and Another, (2021) 1 SCC 171 , the Full Bench of Hon’ble Apex Court reiterated the view taken in Parmeshwari Vs. Amir Chand, (2011) 11 SCC 635 , that it is very difficult to trace the witnesses and collecting information for an accident which took place many hundreds of kilometers away and further it is held by Hon’ble Apex Court in Anita Sharma and Others (Supra) that in a situation of this nature, the Tribunal has to take a holistic view of the matter. It was necessary to be borne in mind that strict proof of an accident caused by a particular vehicle in a particular manner may not be possible to be done by the claimants. The claimants were merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability. 13. The Division Bench of Madras High Court also held in Reliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Subbulakshmi and Others, passed in C.MA. No. 1482 of 2017 [C.M.P. No. 7919 of 2017. (CMA Sr. No. 76893 of 2016)] has referred the case of Puspabai Purshottam Udeshi Vs. 13. The Division Bench of Madras High Court also held in Reliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Subbulakshmi and Others, passed in C.MA. No. 1482 of 2017 [C.M.P. No. 7919 of 2017. (CMA Sr. No. 76893 of 2016)] has referred the case of Puspabai Purshottam Udeshi Vs. Ranjit Ginning and Pressing Co., 1977 ACJ 343 (SC), in which it is observed that the normal rule is that it is for the plaintiff to prove negligence but as in some cases considerable hardship is caused to the plaintiff as the true cause of the accident is not known to him but is solely within the knowledge of the defendant who caused it, the plaintiff can prove the accident but cannot prove how it happened to establish negligence on the part of the defendant. This hardship is sought to be avoided by applying the principle of res ipsa loquitur. The general purport of the words res ipsa loquitur is that the accident 'speaks for itself or tells its own story. There are cases in which the accident speaks for itself so that it is sufficient for the plaintiff to prove the accident and nothing more. It will then be for the defendant to establish that the accident happened due to some other cause than his own negligence. Where the maxim is applied the burden is on the defendant to show either that in fact he was not negligent or that the accident might more probably have happened in a manner which did not connote negligence on his part. For the application of the principle it must be shown that the car was under the management of the defendant and that the accident is such as in ordinary course of things does not happen if those who had the management used proper care. 14. In Bimla Devi and Others VS. Himachal RTC reported in 2009 (13) SCC 530 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that it was necessary to be borne in mind that strict proof of an accident caused by a particular vehicle in a particular manner may not be possible to be done by the claimants. The claimants were merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability. The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied. 15. The claimants were merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability. The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied. 15. In our case, the deceased was traveling in the car, with Assistant Excise Commissioner, Bijnor and Mohd Arif Jameel and the car was being driven by driver Jameel Ahmad-respondent no.3. The deceased died on the spot. The driver of the car has not stepped into the witness box while he was the best witness to depose and prove the manner in which the accident took place. It is not disputed that the accident had taken place due to coming of blue bull on the road but the evidence has been misread by the learned Tribunal. 16. It is the version of appellants-claimants as well as respondents and learned Tribunal also reached to the conclusion that accident took place in order to save the vehicle from blue bull which came on the road all of sudden. Now here comes the question, if the blue bull came on the road before a vehicle whether it can be held that negligence was not proved. 17. While considering the question of inevitable accident, it will be useful to reproduce a passage from celebrated treaties on the Law of Torts, by Justice G.P. Singh. "All causes of inevitable accidents may be divided into two classes. (1) Those which are occasioned by the elementary forces of nature unconnected with the agency of man or other cause; and (2) Those which have their origin either in the whole or in part in the agency of man, whether in acts of commission or omission, non-feasance or mis-feasance or in any other causes independent of the agency of natural forces. The term 'act of God' is applicable to the former class." 18. Act of God is one arising from natural causes. Some of the well-known instances of “Act of God” are the storms, the tides and the volcanic eruptions. They are, in a sense, inevitable accidents beyond the control of man. What is urged in this case is that all inevitable accidents must be taken as acts of God. Matters which are not within the power of any party to prevent are to be considered as acts of God as per the Insurance Company. We are unable to concur with the aforesaid argument of learned counsel for the Insurance Company. What is urged in this case is that all inevitable accidents must be taken as acts of God. Matters which are not within the power of any party to prevent are to be considered as acts of God as per the Insurance Company. We are unable to concur with the aforesaid argument of learned counsel for the Insurance Company. In our view, the accident may happen by reason of the play of natural forces or by intervention of human agency or by both. It may be that in either of these cases accidents may be inevitable. But it is only those acts which can be traced to natural forces and which have nothing to do with the intervention of human agency that could be said to be Acts of God. Cockburn C. J.. in the leading case in Nugent v. Smith. (1876-1 CPD 423) said. "It is at once obvious, as was pointed out by Lord Mansfield in Forward v. Pittard, that all causes of inevitable accident--" "fortuitus" --may be divided into two classes -those which are occasioned by the elementary forces of nature unconnected with the agency of man or other cause, and those which have their origin either in the whole or in part in the agency of man, whether in acts of commission or omission, of nonfeasance or of misfeasance, or in any other cause independent of the agency of natural forces. It is obvious that it would be altogether incongruous to apply the term "act of God" to the latter class of inevitable accident. It is equally clear that storm and tempest belong to the class to which the term "act of God" is properly applicable." 19. In Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 8, 3rd Edition, page 183, this question is dealt with as under: "An act of God. In the legal sense of the term, may be defined as an extraordinary occurrence or circumstance which could not have been foreseen and which could not have been guarded against; or. more accurately, as an accident due to natural causes, directly and exclusively without human intervention, and which could not have been avoided by any amount of foresight and pains and care reasonably to be expected of the person sought to be made liable for it or who seeks to excuse himself on the around of it. more accurately, as an accident due to natural causes, directly and exclusively without human intervention, and which could not have been avoided by any amount of foresight and pains and care reasonably to be expected of the person sought to be made liable for it or who seeks to excuse himself on the around of it. The occurrence need not be unique, nor need it be one that happens for the first time; it is enough that it is extraordinary, and such as could not reasonably be anticipated. The mere fact that a phenomenon has happened once, when it does not carry with it or import any probability of a recurrence (when, in other words, if does not imply any law from which its recurrence can be inferred) does not prevent that phenomenon from being an act of God. It must, however, be something overwhelming and not merely an ordinary accidental circumstance, and it must not arise from the act of man." 20. Coming of blue bull on the road before a vehicle, as in the case on hand, cannot be termed to hold that claimant did not prove negligence. It is admitted fact that the car, in which, the deceased was traveling dashed into the tree even if it is believed that it was while saving the blue bull and overturned in a big pit. The driver could not control his vehicle and lost control and dashed with tree. This is not the case that vehicle dashed into blue bull but it dashed into tree, when the driver tried to save the blue bull from hitting the car, which goes to show that the car was being plied at a high speed, had the car being driven at normal speed, the accident could have been avoided or its impact could be minimized. This fact itself shows the negligence of the driver, who was driving the vehicle at an excessive speed. The Rule propounded in Rylands Vs. Fletcher, 1868 Law Reports (3) HL 330, can apply to accidents of vehicles in such cases and in motor accident cases. 21. The above Rule eventually gained approval in a large number of decisions rendered by Courts in England and abroad. Winfield on Torts has brought out even a Chapter on the “Rule in Rylands Vs. Fletcher. At page 543 of the 15th Edn. 21. The above Rule eventually gained approval in a large number of decisions rendered by Courts in England and abroad. Winfield on Torts has brought out even a Chapter on the “Rule in Rylands Vs. Fletcher. At page 543 of the 15th Edn. Of the calibrated work the learned author has pointed out that “over the years Rylands Vs. Fletcher has been applied to a remarkable variety of things; fire gas, explosions, electricity, oil, noxious, fumes, colliery spoil, rusty wire from a decayed fence, vibrations, poisonous vegetation. 22. Act of God or vis major are the forces which no human foresight can provide most and of which human prudence is not bound to recognize the possibility. We are, therefore, of the opinion that even apart from Section 140 of Motor Vehicles Act, a victim in an accident which occurred while using motor vehicle is entitled to get compensation from the Tribunal, unless any exception applies. 23. We are of the considered opinion that if the driver of the vehicle would have taken proper care and caution while plying the vehicle at normal speed, the accident could have been avoided because it is not the case that the car hit the blue bull directly but in order to save the blue bull, it rammed into a tree and overturn in a ditch. 24. Hence, the finding of learned Tribunal holding the accident to be the result of ' No Negligence' is not sustainable in eye of law and we hold that the accident had taken place due to the negligence of the driver of car involved in the accident. 25. The policy being in vogue and though orally submitted by counsel for respondents that there is breach of policy and the insurance company did not challenge the award as the amount awarded was under Section 140 M.V. Act, if this Court decides not to relegate the appellants to Tribunal. The oral objection be heard. We have perused the record, there is no breach of policy proved which can either exonerate the Insurance Company or permit this Court to grant recovery rights to Insurance Company. The finding of fact that the driver of the vehicle had proper driving licence is concurred with us. The finding that the vehicle was insured on the date of accident is also answered against insurance company. 26. The finding of fact that the driver of the vehicle had proper driving licence is concurred with us. The finding that the vehicle was insured on the date of accident is also answered against insurance company. 26. The quantum of compensation payable to the appellants-claimants will have to be decided as record is before this Court and accident is decade old. We first thought that the matter can be relegated to the learned Tribunal for fixation of the quantum of compensation but we are mindful of the fact that this is a case in which the accident happened more than 10 years ago. Hence, we incline to fix the quantum of compensation here itself in view of the judgment of Bithika Mazumdar and another Vs. Sagar Pal and Others, (2017) 2 SCC 748 and of this Court in F.A.F.O. No. 1999 of 2007 (Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Smt. Ummida Begum and others) and also in F.A.F.O. No. 1404 of 1999 (Smt. Ragini Devi and others Vs. United India Insurance Company Ltd. and another) decided on 17.04.2019 wherein it has been held that if the record is with the appellate Court, it can decide the compensation instead of relegating the parties to the Tribunal. 27. We find it very strange that the learned Tribunal has opined that the claimants – appellants have failed to prove that the deceased was an employee in the police department as per finding of issue no. 5, while on this issue the learned Tribunal has perused the salary certificate of the deceased which is duly issued by the excise department holds that the same is not proved. Learned Tribunal has disbelieved this salary certificate only on the basis that the father of the deceased PW-1 Om Pal Singh Sharma has not deposed even a single word in his testimony to prove the alleged salary certificate. If it is so then also, in our opinion the learned Tribunal has lost site of the provision of Section 169 of Act, 1988. The learned Tribunal has all the powers of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 with regard to summon any witness to prove a particular document who award just compensation to the claimants, learned Tribunal in suo moto summoned the concerned employee of Excise Department as a witness to prove the salary certificate of the deceased but the Tribunal has failed to do so. 28. 28. Moreover, the salary certificate is on record which is duly issued by Assistant Excise Commissioner, Bijnor under his signature and official stamp. Moreover, the standard of proof in the motor accident claim petition is not as strict as in civil or criminal law. Proving any document in order to award just compensation, there is no requirement of law to prove the matter or document beyond reasonable doubt. 29. In this case, the father of the deceased, PW-1 has specifically deposed in his cross examination that ^^esjs yM+ds dh ukSdjh izkscslu ij Fkh^^ Moreover, in his examination-in-chief, he has disclosed the salary of his deceased son at Rs.12,000/-per month. This testimony of PW-1 is fully corroborated with the copy of salary certificate issued by Excise Department which is not proved otherwise but even then the learned Tribunal did not take any pain to summon the concerned employee/accountant of the department with regard to salary certificate. Hence, it can be said that the learned Tribunal did not award just compensation to the claimants and has lost sight of beneficial legislative intention. 30. Keeping in view the oral and documentary evidence on record, we are of the considered opinion that the deceased was a constable in excise department although he was on probation. Copy of his last salary certificate shows his gross salary at Rs.9,947/-per month, wash allowance at the rate of Rs.29/-and cycle allowance at the rate of Rs.48/-will not be admissible for the purpose of computation of salary. Hence, we take the income of the deceased at Rs.9,870/- per month. 31. Since the age of the deceased was below 40 years and he was just 23 years old and he was in permanent job, 50% would be added towards future loss of income as held by Hon'ble Apex Court in National Insurance Company vs. Pranay Sethi [2014 (4) TAC 637 (SC)]. Keeping in view the 23 years of age of the deceased, multiplier of 18 would be applied in the light of the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Smt.Sarla Verma vs. Delhi Transport Corporation [2009 (2) TAC 677 (SC)]. The deceased is survived by his parents but the appellant nos. 3 and 4 are brother of the deceased and both are major, hence, it cannot be assumed that they would have been dependant on the deceased. The deceased is survived by his parents but the appellant nos. 3 and 4 are brother of the deceased and both are major, hence, it cannot be assumed that they would have been dependant on the deceased. Hence, as per the judgment of Apex Court in Munna Lal Jain & Anr. Vs. Vipin Kumar Sharma & Ors. 2015 (6) SCALE 552, ½ half would be deducted for the personal expenses. 32. In the light of judgment of Pranay Sethi (Supra), appellant shall be entitled to get Rs.15,000/-for loss of estate and Rs.15,000/-for funeral expenses. The father and mother of the deceased will also get Rs.40,000/-each for loss of love and affection as they had lost their young son in the road accident. 33. Hence, the total amount of compensation, in view of the above discussions, payable to the appellants is being computed herein below: 1. Annual income i.e. Rs.9,870/-(per month) X 12 Rs.1,18,440/- P/A 2. Percentage towards future prospect : 50% Rs.59,220/- 3. Total income : Rs.1,18,440/- + Rs.59,220/- = Rs.1,77,660/- 4. Income after deduction of ½ half : Rs.1,77,660/- - Rs.88,830/- Rs.88,830/- 5. Multiplier applicable : 18 :- Rs.88,830/- X 18 Rs.15,98,940/- 6. Amount under non pecuniary head : Rs.15,000 + Rs.15,000 + Rs.40,000/- + Rs.40,000 + 10 % upward revision of every three years. Rs.1,10,000/- 7. Total compensation: Rs.15,98,940/-+ Rs.1,10,000/- Rs. 17,10,000/-(rounded up) 8. Amount after deduction of no fault liability : Rs.17,10,000/- – Rs.50,000/- Rs.16,60,000/-. 34. It is pointed out by learned counsel for the Insurance Company that the appeal is delayed by 1263 days and the interest of the aforesaid period would not be paid to the appellants-claimants. 35. It is rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the Insurance Company that appeal is delayed by 1263 days, hence, interest of one year should be deducted. As far as issue of rate of interest is concerned, it should be 7.5% in view of the latest decision of the Apex Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Mannat Johal and Others, 2019 (2) T.A.C. 705 (S.C.) wherein the Apex Court has held as under: "13. The aforesaid features equally apply to the contentions urged on behalf of the claimants as regards the rate of interest. The Tribunal had awarded interest at the rate of 12% p.a. but the same had been too high a rate in comparison to what is ordinarily envisaged in these matters. The aforesaid features equally apply to the contentions urged on behalf of the claimants as regards the rate of interest. The Tribunal had awarded interest at the rate of 12% p.a. but the same had been too high a rate in comparison to what is ordinarily envisaged in these matters. The High Court, after making a substantial enhancement in the award amount, modified the interest component at a reasonable rate of 7.5% p.a. and we find no reason to allow the interest in this matter at any rate higher than that allowed by High Court." 36. We fix the rate of interest as 7.5% per annum till the date of judgment by the learned Tribunal. No interest would be paid for one year after the judgment of learned Tribunal and 6% per annum rate of interest would be paid thereafter. 37. In view of the above, the appeal is partly allowed. Judgment and award passed by the Tribunal shall stand modified to the aforesaid extent. The respondent-Insurance Company shall deposit the amount within a period of 12 weeks from today with interest as discussed above from the date of filing of the claim petition till the amount is deposited. The amount already deposited be deducted from the amount to be deposited. 38. In view of the ratio laid down by Hon'ble Gujarat High Court, in the case of Smt. Hansagori P. Ladhani vs. The Oriental Insurance Company Ltd., [ 2007(2) GLH 291 ] and this High Court in total amount of interest, accrued on the principal amount of compensation is to be apportioned on financial year to financial year basis and if the interest payable to claimant for any financial year exceeds Rs.50,000/-, insurance company/owner is/are entitled to deduct appropriate amount under the head of 'Tax Deducted at Source' as provided u/s 194A (3) (ix) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and if the amount of interest does not exceeds Rs.50,000/-in any financial year, registry of this Tribunal is directed to allow the claimants to withdraw the amount without producing the certificate from the concerned Income-Tax Authority. The aforesaid view has been reiterated by this High Court in Review Application No.1 of 2020 in First Appeal From Order No.23 of 2001 (Smt. Sudesna and others Vs. Hari Singh and another) and in First Appeal From Order No.2871 of 2016 (Tej Kumari Sharma v. Chola Mandlam M.S. General Insurance Co. The aforesaid view has been reiterated by this High Court in Review Application No.1 of 2020 in First Appeal From Order No.23 of 2001 (Smt. Sudesna and others Vs. Hari Singh and another) and in First Appeal From Order No.2871 of 2016 (Tej Kumari Sharma v. Chola Mandlam M.S. General Insurance Co. Ltd.) decided on 19.3.2021 while disbursing the amount. 39. The Tribunal shall follow the guidelines issued by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Company Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India and Others, vide order dated 27.01.2022, as the purpose of keeping compensation is to safeguard the interest of the claimants. Since long time has elapsed, the amount be deposited in the Saving Bank Account of claimant(s) in a nationalized Bank without F.D.R.