ORDER : 1. Appellants assail the judgment and decree dated 21.5.2015 passed by learned Additional District Judge-II, Solan, Camp at Arki, in Civil Appeal No. 1-AK/13 of 2015, whereby the order dated 1.12.2014 passed by learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, Arki, in CMA No. 346/6 of 2012 (in Execution Petition No. 15/10 of 2011) has been affirmed. 2.1 Brief facts necessary for the adjudication of the appeal are that the Appellants and respondents No. 5 to 7 herein are successors of Sh. Durga. Respondents No. 1 to 4 herein are successors of Sh. Shankar. 2.2 Shankar and Durga were brothers. Shankar filed Civil Suit No. 231/1 of 1994 before learned Sub Judge, 1st Class, Arki, District Solan, H.P. against respondents No. 5 to 7 herein seeking possession of house consisting of one room in upper story, one room in the ground floor and a cow shed and a kitchen situated over part of land bearing Khasra No. 132 measuring 0-8 biswas, situated in village Jakholi, Pargana Deora, Tehsil Arki, District Solan (hereinafter referred to as the suit property). The said suit was filed on the premises that Shankar was the exclusive owner of suit property and the defendants therein were handed over the same under private arrangement, whereby it was agreed that the said defendants would construct their own house within one year and, thereafter, would surrender the possession to Shankar and in lieu there, they would be paid a sum of Rs. 1800/- .Shankar also averred in the plaint that he had provided the defendants of Civil Suit No. 231/1 of 1994 with alternative land to construct the house. They constructed the house and still were not vacating the suit property. 2.3 In defence, the defendants submitted that their predecessor Durga had a share in the suit property and the defendants were holding the same in their own right. It was a joint Hindu Coparcenary Property. 2.4 Learned Sub Judge, 1st Class, Arki, decreed the suit of Shankar by holding that Shankar was the exclusive owner of suit property. Reliance was placed upon Jamabandi Ext. P-1 for the year 1958-59, which showed Durga and Shankar were joint owner in possession of Khasra No. 146, 148 and 183, total measuring 1-8 bighas. Thereafter, a partition had taken place between the two (Shankar and Durga) at the time of consolidation and separate Khatas had been prepared. As per document Ext. Reliance was placed upon Jamabandi Ext. P-1 for the year 1958-59, which showed Durga and Shankar were joint owner in possession of Khasra No. 146, 148 and 183, total measuring 1-8 bighas. Thereafter, a partition had taken place between the two (Shankar and Durga) at the time of consolidation and separate Khatas had been prepared. As per document Ext. P-2 i.e. Jamabandi pertaining to Khasra No. 132, the said land measuring 1-12 bighas was showed to have fallen in the share of Shankar. The source of such revenue entry was mutation 317 of the partition between Shankar and Durga. Durga was shown as exclusive owner in possession of 0-10 biswa land in Khasra No. 158. Learned Sub Judge, 1st Class, Arki further found agreement dated 20.12.1987 as proved, whereby the suit property was handed over to defendants for a period of one year in terms as noticed above. Accordingly, a decree was passed in favour of Shankar and he was held entitled to possession of the suit property from defendants. 2.5 The decree passed by learned Sub Judge 1st Class, Arki was set aside in first appeal, however, the same was affirmed by this Court in RSA No. 527 of 2001, decided on 07.07.2011. It was held that the consolidation proceedings had attained finality and by virtue of provisions of the H.P. Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1971, Shankar and Durga had acquired separate rights and suit property had fallen to the share of Shankar. It was further affirmed that no further instrument was required to be effected for recognition of the ownership right of Shankar and Durga after finalization of consolidation proceedings by virtue of Section 44 of the Act ibid. Thus, the finality was attached to the decree dated 27.12.1999 passed by learned Sub Judge, 1st Class, Arki. 3.1 The aforesaid decree was put to execution. During execution proceedings, appellants herein (hereinafter referred to as objectors) filed objections under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC before the Executing Court with a prayer to protect their possession over the suit property. It was claimed that the objectors were successors of Durga being his widow and daughter. Objectors alleged that the decree passed by learned Sub Judge, 1st Class, Arki was not binding against them, as they were co-owners and co-sharers of the suit property. The said property was stated to be ancestral joint property of Shankar and Durga. It was claimed that the objectors were successors of Durga being his widow and daughter. Objectors alleged that the decree passed by learned Sub Judge, 1st Class, Arki was not binding against them, as they were co-owners and co-sharers of the suit property. The said property was stated to be ancestral joint property of Shankar and Durga. The factum of partition between both was denied. The land between Shankar and Durga was stated to be still joint. Challenge was also laid to the revenue entries which evidenced the existence of partition between Durga and Shankar. The partition affected during consolidation proceedings was also assailed being wrong and illegal on the grounds that Durga had not given any consent. The proceedings were not conducted in accordance with H.P. Land Revenue Act. Neither preliminary nor final order was passed. Shankar was never handed over possession of the suit property. It was also averred in the objection petition that the objectors and the defendants of Civil Suit No. 231/1 of 1994 had already filed a Civil Suit in respect of the same subject matter which was pending. 3.2 In reply to the aforesaid objections, respondents No. 1 to 4 herein (hereinafter referred to as non-objectors) asserted that the objections were not maintainable, as all questions raised therein had already been decided. The objectors had no independent right to possess the suit property. It was further alleged that the objectors were acting at the instance of judgment debtors just to delay the execution of the lawful decree. The possession of the objectors on the suit property was also specifically denied. 4. The executing Court dismissed the objections of the objectors vide order dated 01.12.2014. Objectors assailed the order passed by executing Court before the first Appellate Court. The appeal of objectors has been dismissed vide judgment and decree dated 21.05.2015, hence present appeal. 5. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have gone through the record carefully. 6. Sh. G.D. Verma, learned Senior Counsel assailed the impugned judgment and decree on the grounds that the procedure adopted by Executing Court was not tenable. Various serious triable issues had arisen but the objectors were not afforded any opportunity to prove their contentions. Neither any issue was framed nor the parties were afforded the opportunity to lead the evidence. 6. Sh. G.D. Verma, learned Senior Counsel assailed the impugned judgment and decree on the grounds that the procedure adopted by Executing Court was not tenable. Various serious triable issues had arisen but the objectors were not afforded any opportunity to prove their contentions. Neither any issue was framed nor the parties were afforded the opportunity to lead the evidence. It was further submitted that the findings with respect to partition having been affected between Shankar and Durga during consolidation proceedings were to be ignored in view of the fact that the built-up structure could not be partitioned by consolidation authorities. Further, reliance was placed on the provisions of Order 21 Rules 97 to 103 and Section 2(ii) of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was asserted that the proceedings under Order 21 Rule 99 CPC were an alternative to the Civil Suit and its adjudication amounted to a decree and there could not be any decree without adjudication and determination of issues. As per learned Senior Counsel for the appellants, the adjudication and determination necessarily implied an opportunity to the parties to prove their case. 7. Per contra, Sh. Ashok Sood, learned Senior Counsel for respondents No. 1 to 4 submitted that the appeal was without merit. The order passed by learned Executing Court, as affirmed by the learned lower Appellate Court were in accordance with law. It was submitted that the appellants had not pleaded any independent right to hold possession of the suit property and in absence of such pleadings; the objections under Order 21 Rule 97 or 99 were not maintainable. He further asserted that there was no prima facie material placed on record to maintain the objections, therefore, it was not incumbent upon the executing Court to frame issue and allow the evidence to be led thereon. He also canvassed the proposition that the partition conducted during consolidation between Shankar and Durga had attained finality. The legality of such partition had been stamped by this Court in RSA No. 527 of 2001. Durga, during his lifetime had not assailed the partition proceedings. He also canvassed the proposition that the partition conducted during consolidation between Shankar and Durga had attained finality. The legality of such partition had been stamped by this Court in RSA No. 527 of 2001. Durga, during his lifetime had not assailed the partition proceedings. Shri Ashok Sood, learned Senior Counsel further contended that without admitting the maintainability of objections under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC on behalf of the appellants, the very fact that they alongwith the JDs of Civil Suit No. 231/1 of 1994 had already preferred a Civil Suit in respect of the same subject matter would further disentitle them from maintaining the objections. 8. Rule 99 of Order XXI provides that where any person other than the judgment debtor is dispossessed of immovable property by the holder of a decree for the possession of such property or where such property has been sold in execution of a decree by the purchaser thereof, he may make an application to the Court complaining of such dispossession and where any such application is made, the Court has to adjudicate upon the application in accordance with the provisions contained in succeeding rules. Rule 101 of order 21 further provides that all question (including questions relating to right, title or interest in the property) arising between the parties to a proceeding on an application under Rule 97 or Rule 99 or their representatives, and relevant to the adjudication of the application, shall be determined by the Court dealing with the application and not be a separate suit. Rule 102 provides that nothing in rule 98 and 100 shall apply to resistance or obstruction in execution of a decree for the possession of immovable property by a person to whom the judgment-debtor has transferred the property after the institution of the suit in which the decree was passed or to the dispossession of any such person. Rule 104 further provides that every order made under rule 101 and rule 103 is subject to the result of any suit that may be pending on the date of commencement of the proceedings in which such order is made, if in such suit the party against whom the order under rule 101 or rule 103 is made has sought to establish a right which he claims to the present possession of the property. 9. 9. It is by virtue of the judicial precedents that the provisions of Rule 99 of Order XXI have been interpreted in such a manner that a person can approach the Court even before dispossession. Under this rule, the obstruction raised by third party can be countenanced and adjudicated only if the third party asserts its independent right to hold possession of the property i.e. subject matter of execution. Sine qua non for maintainability of objections under rule 99 is existence of an independent right. In H. Seshadri vs. K.R. Natarajan, (2003) 10 SCC 449 Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under: 13. For the purpose of considering an application under Order 21 Rules 99 and 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure what was required to be considered was as to whether the applicant herein claimed a right independent of the judgment-debtor or not. A person claiming through or under the judgment-debtor may be dispossessed in execution of a decree passed against the judgment-debtor but not when he is in possession of the premises in question in his own independent right or otherwise. In Shamsher Singh vs. Nahar Singh, (2019) 17 SCC 279 it was observed as under: 16. There is a marked difference between Rule 101 as it existed prior to amendment and as it now exists after the 1976 Amendment. Earlier a person who was a bona fide claimant and who satisfied that he was in possession of the property on his own account or on account of some other person than the judgment-debtor could have been put in possession of the property on an application under Rules 100 and 101, whereas now after the amendment for putting back into possession an applicant has not only to prove that he is in bona fide possession rather he has to prove his right, title or interest in the property. What was earlier to be adjudicated in a suit under un-amended Rule 103 is now to be adjudicated in Rule 101 itself, thus, for being put in possession, an applicant has to prove his right, title or interest in the property and by simply proving that he was in possession prior to the date he was dispossessed by decree-holder, he is not entitled to be put back in possession. 10. Independent right cannot be claimed in vacuum. There has to be some factual foundation. 10. Independent right cannot be claimed in vacuum. There has to be some factual foundation. Any claim of right despite its earlier adjudication to the contrary by Court of competent jurisdiction cannot qualify the test of maintainability of objection under said rule. In the facts of instant case, the entire edifies of the case of objectors was based on the premise that they were co-owners of the suit property having inherited the same from Durga. Thus, no adjudication was permissible on the claim of appellants, as the issue had finally been decided in RSA No. 527 of 2001 by this Court. Shankar had been held to be the exclusive owner of suit property. 11. The question is whether in such event also the executing court was bound to frame issues? Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants has placed reliance on the judgment passed by this Court reported in 2013 Latest HLJ HP 9. On the other hand, learned Senior Counsel representing the respondents has placed reliance on judgments reported in 2018 (1) CCC 824 (HP) : 2011 (3) CCC 521 (P&H) : 2012 (1) CCC (P&H) to canvass that it is not in every case that the determination and adjudication can only be by framing of issues. 12. In considered view of this Court the answer to above formulated question will be “No.” Issue will arise when there is possible conflict between facts asserted by the parties respectively. The fact should be such which is still in the realm of conflict. However, a fact which has received the stamp of approval from competent court of jurisdiction, requires no further adjudication. The principle of res-judicata applies. A final adjudication on an issue by Court of competent jurisdiction cannot be re-opened again between the same parties or the parties claiming under them. Durga had accepted the partition held inter-se him and Shankar during consolidation. The said partition has been approved by Civil Court. Thus, the same would be binding on any person claiming under Durga. The objectors were also claiming their right under Durga. They were legally bound by the partition affected between Durga and Shankar. In such view of the matter, the objectors were not entitled to claim any right over the suit property. Save and except as above, no other right was pleaded by appellants in respect of the suit property. 13. The objectors were also claiming their right under Durga. They were legally bound by the partition affected between Durga and Shankar. In such view of the matter, the objectors were not entitled to claim any right over the suit property. Save and except as above, no other right was pleaded by appellants in respect of the suit property. 13. Keeping in view the factual scenario of the case, as also the exposition of law, no issue was required to be framed in the case. The order passed by the Executing Court and upheld by lower Appellate Court cannot be faulted on this count. 14. The contention of learned Senior Counsel for the appellants that the structure could not be partitioned during consolidation and to that extent the order of partition is to be avoided, also deserves to be rejected. The partition was never challenged by Durga during his lifetime. That being so, appellants do not have any right to challenge the partition. Even otherwise, the partition having taken place between Shankar and Durga during consolidation has been held to be lawful by Civil Court as affirmed by this Court in RSA No. 527 of 2001. 15. Further, at the time of filing of objection petition, it was specifically averred on behalf of the appellants that a suit between the parties was already pending on the same subject matter. This was a clear admission on the part of the appellants. During the course of hearing, this Court was apprised that the suit is still pending. The provision of Rule 104 of Order XXI explicitly makes the adjudication of the objections under Order XXI Rule 99 subject to the final outcome of the suit on the same subject matter pending between the parties. 16. In light of the above discussion, there is no merit in the appeal and the same is dismissed. The judgment and decree passed by learned Additional District Judge-II, Solan, Camp at Arki, dated 21.05.2015, in Civil Appeal No. 1-AK/13 of 2015, affirming the order passed by learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, Arki, dated 01.12.2014, in CMA No. 346/6 of 2012 (in Execution Petition No. 15/10 of 2011) is affirmed. Accordingly, the appeal is disposed of, so also pending applications, if any.