JUDGMENT : Judgment and order, dated 18.05.2018, passed by the learned Member MACT, at Bomdila, West Kameng District in MAC Case No. 01/2017, is challenged in this appeal by National Insurance Company Ltd. It is to be noted here that vide impugned judgment and order, the learned Member MACT, Bomdila, has awarded a sum of Rs 14,24,000/-(Rupees fourteen lakhs twenty four thousand) under different heads, payable by the appellant along with interest @ 6% per annum, from the date of filing of the claim petition till actual realization. 2. The factual background, leading to filing of this present appeal is briefly stated as under :- “On 09.05.2016, at about 9:00 PM, Bhim Pradhan, since deceased, a private driver of a Tipper, bearing Registration No. AR-04-6438, was proceeding from Bhalukpong towards Kimin, by driving the said vehicle. But, unfortunately, on the way he met with an accident and the vehicle driven by him fell into a deep gorge and he sustained severe injuries. He was evacuated to the District Hospital Bomdila, but, he succumbed to the injuries at the Hospital. Thereafter, Bhalukpong, Police Station, registered a case, being Bhalukpong P.S. Case No. 10/2016, under Sections 279/304(A)/427 IPC, and investigation was carried out. During investigation, it has been found that the accident took place due to mechanical defect i.e. ‘steering failure’ as per the reports of the Motor Vehicle Inspector (MVI). At the time of his death the deceased had a valid Driving License, bearing No. AR-0420050003349, which was valid up-to 18.11.2032, and was issued by the District Transport Officer (DTO), Bomdila, on 19.11.2012, vide No. LMV-NT(NT)MCWG(NT). The vehicle was insured with National Insurance Company Ltd. and the policy was in force at the relevant point of time. Thereafter, the mother of the deceased, Smt. Maya Pradhan, filed a claim petition before the learned Member MACT, Bomdila under Section 166 of the M.V. Act. The appellant, National Insurance Company Ltd. and the owner of the vehicle M/s Argi Enterprises, represented by Smt. Rina Saksa (Proprietor), had contested the claim by filing written statements. Thereafter, hearing both the parties, the learned Court below, vide impugned judgment and order, awarded a sum of Rs. 14,24,000/-(Rupees fourteen lakhs twenty four thousand) being the compensation to the claimant”. 3. Being highly aggrieved, the appellant, National Insurance Company Ltd., preferred this appeal on the following grounds:- (i) That, the claim petition is not maintainable. Thereafter, hearing both the parties, the learned Court below, vide impugned judgment and order, awarded a sum of Rs. 14,24,000/-(Rupees fourteen lakhs twenty four thousand) being the compensation to the claimant”. 3. Being highly aggrieved, the appellant, National Insurance Company Ltd., preferred this appeal on the following grounds:- (i) That, the claim petition is not maintainable. (ii) That, the learned Member MACT, have committed gross error by entertaining the claim petition as the same ought to have been preferred before the Commissioner appointed under the Workman Compensation Act, 1923. (ii) That, the learned Member MACT, had converted the claim petition suomotufrom section 166 M.V. Act to section 163(A) of the M.V. Act which is not permissible. (iv) That, the claim was made for a sum of Rs 10,00,000/-( Rupees ten lakhs,) but, the learned Court below has awarded a sum of Rs. 14,24,000/-(Fourteen Lakhs Twenty Four Thousand). (v) That, the learned Member MACT, had accepted the monthly income of the deceased at Rs. 8000/-, without any documentary proof of income. (vi) That, the learned Member MACT, have failed to take into account that not a single paisa has been paid as premium for the driver. 4. I have heard Mr. B. Ghosh, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. R. L. Thungon, learned counsel for the respondent. 5. Mr. Ghosh, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the learned Court below has converted the petition under Section 166 M.V. Act to Section 163(A) M.V. Act, suomotu without filing a petition by the petitioner. In support of his submission, Mr. Ghosh, has referred one case law in National Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Bijaya Bhuyan and Ors. reported in MANU/GH/1014/2018. Secondly, Mr. Ghosh, submits that the claim was made for a sum of Rs. 10,00,000/-, but, the learned Court below has awarded Rs. 14,24,000/-being the compensation, which is not permissible. Thirdly, Mr. Ghosh, submits that the learned Court below, without any documentary proof, has fixed the monthly salary of the deceased driver at Rs. 8000/-per month, which is not permissible. Fourthly, Mr. Ghosh, submits that the claim petition ought to have been preferred before the Commissioner appointed by the Workman Compensation Act, but, without doing so, the claimant has preferred the application under Section 166 M.V. Act, which is not at all maintainable. Mr. Ghosh, therefore, contended to allow the appeal by setting aside the impugned award. 6. Fourthly, Mr. Ghosh, submits that the claim petition ought to have been preferred before the Commissioner appointed by the Workman Compensation Act, but, without doing so, the claimant has preferred the application under Section 166 M.V. Act, which is not at all maintainable. Mr. Ghosh, therefore, contended to allow the appeal by setting aside the impugned award. 6. On the other hand, Mr. R. L. Thungon, learned counsel for the respondent submits that the petition has been filed under Section 166 M.V. Act and the award has been passed by the learned Member MACT, Bomdila under Section 166 M.V. Act, and the petition had never been converted to petition under section 163(A) MV Act. Mr. Thungon, further, pointed out that though, the learned Member MACT, had mentioned Section 163(A) in the judgment, yet, the judgment was passed under Section 166 M.V. Act only. Referring to a decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Chandra @ Chanda @ Chandraram and Anr. vs. Mukesh Kumar Yadav and Others reported in (2022) 1 SCC 198, Mr. Thungon, submits that some guess work is permissible in fixing monthly salary/income of the deceased driver in absence of any documentary proof, and in the case in hand, the learned Member MACT, had determined the salary of the deceased driver at a sum of Rs. 8000/-in absence of documentary proof and the same is permissible. Mr. Thungon, further submits that at the relevant time, the vehicle was insured with the appellant and the policy was in force and the driver was covered by the said policy and he had a valid driving licence and as such, Mr. Thungon, submits that the learned Court below has committed no illegality in awarding the compensation and therefore, contended to uphold the same. 7. Having heard the submissions of learned Advocate of both sides, I have carefully gone through the appeal and the documents placed on record and the judgments referred by learned Advocates of both sides and also carefully gone through the impugned judgment and order of the learned Member MACT, Bomdila, dated 18.05.2018. 8. Here in this case the issue of maintainability of the petition is seriously disputed by the learned counsel for the appellant. Therefore, first, let the issue of maintainability be decided. 8. Here in this case the issue of maintainability of the petition is seriously disputed by the learned counsel for the appellant. Therefore, first, let the issue of maintainability be decided. The learned court below while dealing with the issue had held that since the deceased died on account of an accident, arising out of use of motor vehicle, the claim petition is maintainable under section 166 of the M. V. Act. But, the contention of learned counsel for the appellant is that the driver was the employee of the Owner of the vehicle in question. Therefore, a petition by the mother of the driver is neither maintainable under section 166 M.V. Act nor it is maintainable under section 163(A) M.V. Act. It is also the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the Claim Tribunal has no power to convert a petition under section 166 MV Act to 163(A) M.V. Act. Besides, the accident took place due to steering failure not due to fault on the part of the driver and as such the claimant cannot maintain a petition before the Tribunal. 9. However, having gone through the record of the Tribunal, I find that the claim petition was filed under section 166 M.V. Act and it also appears that the impugned judgment and order was passed under Section 166 M.V. Act, not under Section 163(A) of the M.V. Act. Though, section 163(A) has been mentioned in the judgment, along with section 166 M.V. Act, yet, from a perusal of the same left this court un-impressed that it was passed under section 163(A) M.V. Act. Therefore, the submissions of Mr. B. Ghosh, learned counsel for the appellant got no legs to stand upon. 10. It also appears from the record of the learned court below that there is clear evidence that the accident took place due to ‘steering failure’ . It is clearly stated in the report of the Motor Vehicle Inspector, which is exhibited as P/Ext.3. The FIR and the report of Police also supported the same. What comes through loud and clear from the record of Tribunal is that there was no fault on the part of the driver and the accident took place purely on account of mechanical defect i.e. steering failure. The FIR and the report of Police also supported the same. What comes through loud and clear from the record of Tribunal is that there was no fault on the part of the driver and the accident took place purely on account of mechanical defect i.e. steering failure. But, there is no dispute that the driver died on account of the accident that arose out of the use of the Motor vehicle, without any negligence or fault on the part of the driver. Now, what left to be seen is whether the legal representative of the deceased person can maintain a petition since the element of wrongful act, which is the basis for tortiuous action, is not there. 11. While dealing with the issue a Division Bench of Kerela High Court in Oriental Fire And Genl. Ins. Co. vs. P.P. Misri And Ors. : 1993 ACJ 25 , relying upon a decision of a Full Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Rajpal Singh vs. Union of India: 1986 ACJ 344 (P&H) held that a claim petition can be filed for personal injuries and the Tribunal can adjudicate the matter even if it is not against the driver. 12. The Kerela High Court further held that-creating Rules or Law is no part of function of the Judges. But, situations may arise where the law is not clear, it may have different shapes, some clouding the decision process. This mechanical type of reasoning may lead to injustice in individual cases. But in uncertain cases, the court will be tempted to break the new ground. It is also held that Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330, is a typical example where it was held that where there was no rule already in existence to the effect that if a person accumulates on his land anything likely to do harm if it escapes, then he is liable if it escapes and causes damage and the court's problem in that case is to develop just such a rule. To formulate a rule on the basis of existing rules and precedents to apply to novel situations is really difficult and once a rule is formulated, it may be possible to apply the syllogism automatically. But, in cases creating such a situation, the chief difficulty is to establish the premises of the syllogism. To formulate a rule on the basis of existing rules and precedents to apply to novel situations is really difficult and once a rule is formulated, it may be possible to apply the syllogism automatically. But, in cases creating such a situation, the chief difficulty is to establish the premises of the syllogism. There may be other kinds of cases where the general rule may be well established, but it will be difficult and doubtful whether the facts presented before the court brings it within the rule. These types of cases occur usually with reference to statutory interpretation. 13. It is further observed by the Kerela High Court that the Supreme Court has made it very clear that the owner has got a liability and that it arises out of his failure to discharge a duty cast on him by law. It is possible to put the case now at hand under the principle that the owner has failed to discharge a duty cast on him by law insofar as he has entrusted a vehicle with mechanical defects to a driver for a hazardous journey in a precarious track over which the lorry has to be driven. There is ample evidence in this case that the accident occurred on account of mechanical failure. There is a clear finding that the accident happened not due to the rashness and negligence of the driver. He happened to be an innocent victim. It is further held that-anyhow, the insurer is liable to indemnify the owner if he is found liable to pay any amount either under the Workmen's Compensation Act or under the Motor Vehicles Act. 14. Thereafter, it has opined that accepting that part of the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Minu B. Mehta v. Balkrishna Ramchandra Nay an 1977 ACJ 118 (SC), the owner is liable to compensate the driver on the principle that he has failed to discharge a duty cast on him by law and also on the principle that the owner is liable to the legal representatives of a deceased workman, if the workman dies in the course of employment, not on account of his negligence. 15. 15. The Allahabad High Court also in the case of Union of India v. Sushila Devi 1990 ACJ 1 (Allahabad), held that Claims Tribunal is not confined in its jurisdiction to claims for compensation which are directed only against the driver, owner and insurer of the vehicle. Where the claim is founded on the assertion that the accident was caused by the use of the motor vehicle, the Tribunal shall undoubtedly have jurisdiction to entertain the claim even though it is directed against a third party. We are of opinion that the crucial aspect to be looked into in deciding the question of jurisdiction is that the claim must be in respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons caused or contributed by the use of motor vehicle whether wholly or conjointly with some third party. 16. The Bombay High Court in Marine and General Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Dr. Balakrishna Ramachandra Nayan : 1976 ACJ 288 (Bombay), took the view that the Act provides liability arising out of the use of the motor vehicle and if one person suffers any loss, which has to be compensated and if that loss is occasioned on account of the use of the vehicle in spite of lack of negligence on the part of any person, the owner of the vehicle is liable. 17. In another case, in Kesavan Nair v. State Insurance Officer 1971 ACJ 219 (Kerala), Justice Krishna Iyer, as he then was, of the Kerela High Court, observed thus:- "Out of a sense of humanity and having regard to the handicap of the innocent victim in establishing the negligence of the operator of the vehicle a blanket liability must be cast on the insurer." 18. In the case of Motor and General Finance (India) Ltd. Vs. Mary Mony : 1991 ACJ 101 (Ker) the Kerela High Court has held that :- “Though the fundamental principle on which the liability is fasten can be traced to the law of Torts, many of the crucial aspects of that liability have been now made statutory by the Act. Even then the principles of law of Torts are relevant in the quantification of damages.” 19. Even then the principles of law of Torts are relevant in the quantification of damages.” 19. In another case a Full Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Rajpal Singh vs. Union of India: 1986 ACJ 344 (P&H) held that a claim petition can be filed for personal injuries and the Tribunal can adjudicate the matter even if it is not against the driver. 20. In Kaushnama Begum and Ors. vs. New India Assurance Company Ltd. Appeal (Civil) No. 6 of 2001, Special Leave Petition (Civil) 1431 of 2000, Hon’ble Supreme Court had inter-alia held that the issue of wrongful act or omission on the part of the driver of the motor vehicle involved in the accident has been left to a secondary importance and mere use or involvement of motor vehicle in causing bodily injury or death of human being or damage to property would make the petition maintainable under section 166 and 140 of the Motor vehicle Act. 21. In Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, Ahmedabad vs. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai and anr. { 1987 (3) SCC 234 } while dealing with the issue Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that :- “Even if there is no negligence on the part of the driver or owner of the motor vehicle, but accident happens while the vehicle was in use, should not the owner be made liable for damages to the person who suffered on account of such accident ? This question depends upon how the Rule of Ryland vs. Fletcher (supra) can apply in motor accident cases.” 21.1. Thereafter, it has been held that-the question considered was regarding the application of the Rule in cases arising out of motor accidents wherein it has been observed that :- “Today, thanks to the modern civilization, thousands of motor vehicles are put on the road and the largest number of injuries and deaths are taking place on the roads on account of the motor vehicles accidents. In view of the fast and constantly increasing volume of traffic, the motor vehicles upon the roads may be regarded to some extent as coming within the principle of liability defined in Rylands v. Fletcher. From the point of view of the pedestrian the roads of this country have been rendered by the use of the motor vehicles highly dangerous. In view of the fast and constantly increasing volume of traffic, the motor vehicles upon the roads may be regarded to some extent as coming within the principle of liability defined in Rylands v. Fletcher. From the point of view of the pedestrian the roads of this country have been rendered by the use of the motor vehicles highly dangerous. Hit and run cases where the drivers of the motor vehicles who have caused the accidents are not known are increasing in number. Where a pedestrian without negligence on his part is injured or killed by a motorist whether negligently or not, he or his legal representatives as the case may be should be entitled to recover damages if the principle of social justice should have any meaning at all. In order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents there has been a continuous agitation throughout the world to make the liability for damages arising out of motor vehicles accidents as a liability without fault.” 21.2. It was further held that:- “Like any other common law principle, which is acceptable to our jurisprudence, the Rule in Rylands vs. Fletcher can be followed at least until any other new principle which excels the former can be evolved, or until legislation provides differently. Hence, we are disposed to adopt the Rule in claims for compensation made in respect of motor accidents.” 22. Further, Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mangla Ram vs. The Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors., in Civil Appeal No. 2499-2500 of 2018 (arising out of SLP(Civil) Nos. 28141-42 of 2017, it has discussed the responsibility of the owner and insurance company when the negligence is not established on the part of the driver. Thereafter, discussing its earlier decision in Kaushunma Begum (supra) held that - “we are therefore, of the opinion that even apart from section 140 of the MV Act, a victim in an accident which occurred while using a motor vehicle, is entitled to get compensation from a Tribunal unless any one of the exceptions would apply. The Tribunal and the High Court have, therefore, gone into error error in divesting the claimants of the compensation payable to them”. 23. The Tribunal and the High Court have, therefore, gone into error error in divesting the claimants of the compensation payable to them”. 23. Thus, the legal proposition, that can be crystallized from the decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court, as discussed herein above, especially in Kaushnama Begum (supra) Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation (supra) and of the Kerela High Court in P.P. Misri And Ors.(supra), is that - a victim of an accident, that takes place on account of use of the motor vehicle, is entitled to get compensation from the owner of the vehicle even though there is no fault or negligence on the part of the driver, in view of the rule of strict liability as propounded in the case of Ryland vs. Fletcher(supra). And that the claim petition is maintainable before Motor Accident Claim Tribunal under section 166 and 140 M.V. Act. The learned, Tribunal, thus, had rightly held that the claim petition before the Motor Accident Claim Tribunal is maintainable. The submission, so advanced by Mr. Ghosh, learned counsel for the appellant, thus, appears to be devoid of merit, and accordingly, the same stands repelled. 24. Though, Mr. Ghosh, the learned counsel for the appellants submits that the learned Court below has awarded a sum of Rs. 14,24,000/-being the compensation to the claimant, whereas the claim was for a sum of Rs. 10,00,000/-, yet, it is a settled position of law that the learned Tribunal can determine the compensation which appears to be just and proper and as such, if the awarded amount exceeds the claim amount the same would not be fatal. Reference in this context can be made to a decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Nagappa vs. Gurudayal Singh: (2003) 2 SCC 274 . 25. It is a fact that without any documentary proof, the learned Tribunal had fixed the monthly salary of the deceased at Rs.8000/ (Rupees Eight Thousand). Mr. Ghosh, learned counsel for the appellant had rightly pointed this out during argument. The oral evidence of the claimant reveals that the salary of the deceased was Rs.10,000/ per month and the same remained undisputed in cross-examination. But, the learned Tribunal had fixed the salary @ Rs. 8000/ per month. Mr. Ghosh, learned counsel for the appellant had rightly pointed this out during argument. The oral evidence of the claimant reveals that the salary of the deceased was Rs.10,000/ per month and the same remained undisputed in cross-examination. But, the learned Tribunal had fixed the salary @ Rs. 8000/ per month. Therefore, it cannot be said that the learned Tribunal had committed any error in fixing the quantum, as some amount of guess work is permissible, in view of principle laid down in the case of Chandra @ Chanda @ Chandraram (supra). 26. It also appears that the claimant is the mother of the deceased driver. Further, it appears that at the relevant time of accident, the policy was in force. A careful perusal of the policy document reveals that the policy was in force from 29.03.2016, to mid-night of 28.03.2017. The accident took place on 09.05.2016. On the relevant date the policy was in force and it was an act policy and it also appears that additional premium was paid for owner/driver, and as such, the contention of the appellant that not a single paisa as additional premium has been paid by the insured, is totally unfounded, rather it appears to be misleading and an irresponsible submission on the part of the learned counsel for the appellant. 27. It is not in dispute that the deceased driver died in the accident, which took place as a result of mechanical defect i.e., steering failure of the motor vehicle. The Post-mortem report of the deceased reveals that, he died due to Hypo-volumic shock and due to internal bleeding. The report of the Motor Vehicle Inspector (MVI), which is exhibited as P/Ext.(3), reveals that the accident occurred due to steering failure. Further it appears that the deceased, at the relevant time had possessed a valid driving license. These facts have not been disputed by the appellant side. 28. The learned Tribunal had arrived at a finding that the monthly income of the driver was Rs. 8000/-, (Rupees Eight Thousand) and thereafter, relied upon the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sarla Verma and Ors. vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and Anr., reported in (2009) 6 SCC 121 and Rajesh & Ors. Vs.-Rajbir Singh and Ors. (2013) 1403 ACJ, the learned Court below, has work out the compensation as under:-monthly of the deceased Rs. 8000/-, (Rupees Eight Thousand) and thereafter, relied upon the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sarla Verma and Ors. vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and Anr., reported in (2009) 6 SCC 121 and Rajesh & Ors. Vs.-Rajbir Singh and Ors. (2013) 1403 ACJ, the learned Court below, has work out the compensation as under:-monthly of the deceased Rs. 8000/- as the driver was bachelor, deducted one half of his income towards his personal expenses and after deduction of one half, his monthly income remains at Rs. 4000/-and the loss of annual dependency is work out as 4000x12=48,000/-thereafter, the learned Court below, has added 50% of annual dependency towards his future prospects, i.e., Rs. 24,000/-. Thereafter, added the same to his annual loss of dependency and thereafter, work out the annual dependency at Rs. 24000+48000=72,000/-. As the deceased, at the relevant time was 27 years old, the learned Member MACT, has used the multiplier “17” and thereafter, workout the annual loss of dependency at Rs. 12,24,000/-. Thereafter, it has incorporated funeral and incidental expenses of Rs. 2,00,000/-and as such, determined the total quantum of Rs. 14,24,000/-(Rupees Fourteen Lacs Twenty Four Thousand) and accordingly, ordered the appellant to pay the compensation to the claimant. 29. However, in view of the judgment of Constitutional Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Company Limited vs. Pranoy Sethi And Others, : (2017) 16 SCC 680 , the calculation is being worked out as under:- 29.1. The deceased was working as driver and his salary was Rs.8000/ per month. He was a person of fixed wage. His age at the time of death was 27 years. Therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Pranoy Sethi (supra), 40% of above has to be added as future prospect with respect to his age, as he was below 40 yrs. and he was a person fixed wages. After addition of 50%, the amount would be Rs.8,000/- + Rs.3200/-= Rs.11,200/-. The deceased left behind his mother/the claimant, to succeed his estate. He was unmarried. Therefore, the deduction towards his personal expenses will be 50% of above, in view of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sarala Verma’s case - (2009) 6 SCC 121 , and after deduction of 50%, the amount would be Rs.11,200/ - Rs.5,600/-= Rs.5,600/. The deceased left behind his mother/the claimant, to succeed his estate. He was unmarried. Therefore, the deduction towards his personal expenses will be 50% of above, in view of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sarala Verma’s case - (2009) 6 SCC 121 , and after deduction of 50%, the amount would be Rs.11,200/ - Rs.5,600/-= Rs.5,600/. The multiplier applicable here, in this would be 17, since the deceased was 27 years old at the relevant time, and after application of the multiplier, the loss of dependency will be Rs. 5,600/ x 12 x 17 = Rs.11,42,400/-. Besides, in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pranoy Sethi (supra), the claimant will entitle to a sum of Rs. 15,000/, under the head loss of estate, of Rs.15,000/-being the funeral expenses. Thus, the total amount of compensation is assessed at Rs./-11,72,400/-. (Rupees Eleven Lacs Seventy Two Thousand Four Hundred) only, and to our considered opinion, this amount would be the just and proper amount of compensation here in this case. The whole calculation is shown as under. SL. No. HEADS CALCULATIONS (i) Income Rs.8,000/ (ii) 40% of (i) above to be added as future prospects, Pranoy Sethi’s case) Rs.8,000/+Rs.3,200/- =Rs11,200/- per month (iii) 50% is to be deducted as personal expenses of deceased, Rs.11,200/- Rs.5,600/ = Rs.5,600/- (iv) Compensation after multiplier 17 is applied Rs.5,600/- x 12 x 17 =Rs. 11,42,400/- (v) Loss of love and affection Rs.15,000/- (vi) Funeral expenses, Rs.15,000/- TOTAL AMOUNT OF COMPENSATION Rs. 11,72,400/-. 30. In the result, we have find, no merit in this appeal and accordingly, the same stands dismissed. However, the quantum of compensation, which, the claimant is entitled to, is modified to the extent as indicated above. The appellant is directed to pay a sum of Rs./- 11,72,400/-(Rupees Eleven Lacs Seventy Two Thousand Four Hundred), to the claimant within 30 days from today, adjusting the amount which has already been paid. The learned Tribunal has directed to pay interest @ 6%, from the date of filing the claim petition i.e. 09.01.2017. However, in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. The learned Tribunal has directed to pay interest @ 6%, from the date of filing the claim petition i.e. 09.01.2017. However, in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Upahar Tragedy Victims Association and Ors, (2011) 14 SCC 481 and also in Kalpanaraj vs. Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation: (2014) Acci.C.R.693 (S.C.), it is provided that the amount shall carry interest @ 9%, till realization of the amount. 31. It is submitted at the Bar, half of the award has already been paid to the claimant by the appellant and the appellant has already withdrawn the same. 32. The appellant, is directed to pay the balance amount of compensation, within a period of 1(one) month from the date of this judgment and order.