JUDGMENT Dr. K. Manmadha Rao, J. - This Writ Petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking the following relief: '.....to issue a Writ, Order or direction more particularly one in the nature of Writ of Mandamus declare the action of the respondents in not concluding the long pending (3) disciplinary Proceedings pending vide (1) Tribunal Enquiry Case No. 120/2013, dated 21.06.2017 (2) Tribunal Enquiry Case No. 146/2013, dated 15.09.2017 and (3) Tribunal Enquiry Case No. 173/2013, dated 27.11.2017 issued by the 3rd respondent which related to the years 2011-12 in terms of G.O. Ms. No. 679, GA (Ser.C) Department, dated 01.11.2008, due to the delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings on the part of the respondents, the petitioner got prejudiced in depriving his legitimate pension and other Retirement benefits as illegal, arbitrary and in violation of existing specific instructions of the Government and the law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, accordingly set aside the same, on the same analogy of well considered orders passed W.P. Nos. 11776 and 11779 of 2021 dated 19.07.2021, consequently direct the respondents to release full Pension, Gratuity and Encashment of Earned Leave together with 12% p.a interest immediately to the petitioner and pass such other orders'. 2. Heard Mr. Ramalingeswara Rao Kocherla Kota, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Government Pleader for Services-I for the respondents. 3. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner was appointed as Sub-Inspector in Excise Department on 11.05.1995, posted at Singaraya Konda, Prakasam District. Subsequently he got promoted as Prohibition & Excise Inspector in the year 2003 and he was allowed to retire from service on attaining the age of superannuation on 30.06.2018. His retirement is without prejudice to the pending disciplinary proceedings dated 21.06.2017, 15.09.2017 and 27.11.2017, which are related to one incident and which is prior to his retirement. The three charges are identical and related to one place, for the same period of service, rendered by the petitioner at Narasaraopet, Guntur District, even from the date of service of the above Charge Memos, there is no progress in the enquiry and still the same are pending. The delay caused by the respondents in concluding the disciplinary proceedings, even after his retirement and denial of pensionary rights by the respondents as illegal and arbitrary. Hence this writ petition came to be filed. 4. The delay caused by the respondents in concluding the disciplinary proceedings, even after his retirement and denial of pensionary rights by the respondents as illegal and arbitrary. Hence this writ petition came to be filed. 4. No counter is filed by the respondents. 5. In reply to this, learned Government Pleader for Services-I opposes granting of any relief. He submits that as the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings is not functioning, the petitioner cannot take advantage of the alleged delay and claim exoneration/a writ of Mandamus dismissing the charges. He points out that even if there is delay, at best, this Court can direct the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings to conclude the enquiry, but it cannot quash the charges. 6. After hearing the counsels for some time and noticing the law on this subject, this Court posted the matter for further hearing to enable the counsels to argue whether (a) this Court can only give a direction to the Enquiry Officer/Tribunal to complete the proceedings within a time frame or (b) it can also include a default clause in the order by which the proceedings would be automatically closed in case they are completed as directed. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decisions, which given below: (1) State of Punjab and others v. Chamanlal Goyal (1995) 2 SCC 570 (2) P.V. Mahadevan v. M.D. Tamilnadu Housing Board (2005) 6 SCC 636 (3) M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India and others (2006) 5 SCC 88 (4) Secretary, Ministry of Defence and others v. Prabash Chandra Mirdha (2012) 11 SCC 565 (5) Secretary, Forest Department v. Abdur Rasul Chowdury (2009) 7 SCC 305 (6) The Government of A.P. v. A. Rajeswar Reddy (2010) 3 ALD 501 (DB) 7. It is his contention by relying on these cases that the Courts have a duty to quash the proceedings due to the delay. He also points out that despite the provisions of the A.P. Civil Services (Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal) Act, 1960, the respondent-State did not take any action to expedite and complete the enquiries. He argues that even after the learned single Judges passed a series of orders, which are filed as material papers, the respondents did not take steps to expedite the matters. Therefore, he submits that this is a fit case to quash all further proceedings. 8. He argues that even after the learned single Judges passed a series of orders, which are filed as material papers, the respondents did not take steps to expedite the matters. Therefore, he submits that this is a fit case to quash all further proceedings. 8. Learned Government Pleader for Services-I argues that the petitioner is taking advantage of the delay and are seeking this order. According to him and in line with what is submitted earlier, this Court cannot pass any order of quashing the proceedings in case the proceedings are not completed. He also sought time to verify whether any appeals were filed against the judgments of the learned single Judges, which are part of the material papers. 9. Therefore, the case law cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner is in the opinion of this Court applicable to the facts. This Court has to do a balancing act to determine the rights and obligations of the respondents vis-a-vis the petitioner. 10. The alleged three incidents for which the petitioner is charged; took place on 21.06.2017, 15.09.2017 and 27.11.2017. The allegations are essentially in the nature of dereliction of duties. It is alleged that the petitioner from 21.12.2009 to 16.07.2012 actuated by corrupt motive and in abuse of his official position, received bribers/Mamools from the Syndicate leaders and allowed various irregularities in violation of Excise Act/Rules. It is alleged in the Second Charge which was served on the petitioner dated 10.11.2017 that from 21.12.2009 to 16.07.2012, actuated by corrupt motive and in connivance with the leaders of various liquor groups, received mamools and abused your official position by omission of lawful duties, not taken prompt action to control violations of Excise Act/Rules, besides allowing the operation of A4 wine shops in benami names of various liquor groups and thereby caused pecuniary advantage of himself and to the leaders of liquor groups. Further third charge, which is served on the petitioner on 10.12.2017 that from 21.12.2009 to 16.07.2012, actuated by corrupt motive and in connivance with syndicate leader Mr. Nallabothu Srinivasa Rao, received bribes/mamools from the syndicate leader (A-1) Mr. Nallabothu Srinivasa Rao and others and abused his official position by omission of his lawful duties, allowed various irregularities in violation of Excise Act/Rules by the wine shop owners belong to Syndicate of Mr. Nallabothu Srinivasa Rao, received bribes/mamools from the syndicate leader (A-1) Mr. Nallabothu Srinivasa Rao and others and abused his official position by omission of his lawful duties, allowed various irregularities in violation of Excise Act/Rules by the wine shop owners belong to Syndicate of Mr. N. Srinivasa Rao and thereby the petitioner is guilty of misconduct within the meaning of A.P.C.S (Conduct) Rules, 1964 r/w Rule 2(b) of A.P. Civil Services (Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal) Rules, 1989 framed under the A.P. Civil Services (Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal) Act, 1960 as amended in 1993. Subsequent to the service of the above said charge Memos, there is no further progress in the matter till the date of filing the writ petition. These are the gist of the offences charged against the petitioner and many others from the Excise Department. 11. For instances that took place in from 21.12.2009 to 16.07.2012, the charge memo was issued on 21.06.2017, 15.09.2017 and 27.11.2017 fixing the hearing in 4th August, 2017. It is clear that the first hearing was fixed almost five years after the alleged incident took place. Registration of the case itself was in the year 2013. Thereafter, till August, 2017 nothing has been done. From 2017 to 2021, (i.e. for another four years), proceedings did not take place. Therefore, as things stand, there is no conclusion if the petitioner is guilty of the alleged incidents that took place in the year 2009 and after 2012. More than 9 years have elapsed without finality being reached. The Government Order on which the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon is G.O. Ms. No. 679 which is the subject matter of a number of decisions. A reading of the said G.O. makes it clear that the enquiry should be completed within six months of its initiation in case of delay, action can also be taken against the Enquiry Officer. 12. In the case on hand, the proceedings were given to Tribunal in disciplinary proceedings, which was constituted under the A.P. Civil Services (Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal) Act, 1960. The Government in its wisdom decided to allot these cases to Tribunal. Section 4(a) also authorizes the Government to withdraw any case referred to the Tribunal at any time before the enquiry is conducted. The Government in its wisdom decided to allot these cases to Tribunal. Section 4(a) also authorizes the Government to withdraw any case referred to the Tribunal at any time before the enquiry is conducted. He points out that the respondents have not taken any steps to ensure that the proceedings against the petitioner is heard/proceeded with let alone disposed of. He also rightly argues that the power under Section 4 to withdraw the case has not been exercised. He submits that the respondents are not acting despite the orders passed by this Court quashing other proceedings on the ground of delay. Therefore, he argues that this is a fit case for this Court to pass orders on the following among other grounds. (a) initial delay of at-least two years in referring the matter to the Tribunal. (b) delay in the Tribunal from 2013 (when case was registered) to date of first hearing (August, 2017). (c) enormous delay by the Tribunal in concluding the proceedings from February, 2013 till date (more than five years) (d) lastly, failure of the Government to act in terms of G.O. Ms. No. 679 and to heed the warning issued by the learned single Judges of quashing of proceedings. 13. In reply to this, the Government Pleader again submits that as the Tribunal is not in existence, the petitioner cannot take advantage and seek a dismissal of the entire case. He argues that the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings should be allowed to conclude its proceedings. 14. This Court finds what is argued by learned counsel for the petitioner is correct. Delay is clear and is writ large. The case law cited by the learned counsel is also applicable. In P.V. Mahadevan's case (2005) 6 SCC 636 (supra), there was a delay of 10 years in initiating the action. Relying upon other cases which are referred, the Hon'ble Supreme Court clearly held as follows: '11. Under the circumstances, we are of the opinion that allowing the respondent to proceed further with the departmental proceedings at this distance of time will be very prejudicial to the appellant. Keeping a higher government official under charges of corruption and disputed integrity would cause unbearable mental agony and distress to the officer concerned. Under the circumstances, we are of the opinion that allowing the respondent to proceed further with the departmental proceedings at this distance of time will be very prejudicial to the appellant. Keeping a higher government official under charges of corruption and disputed integrity would cause unbearable mental agony and distress to the officer concerned. The protracted disciplinary enquiry against a government employee should, therefore, be avoided not only in the interests of the government employee but in public interest and also in the interests of inspiring confidence in the minds of the government employees. At this stage, it is necessary to draw the curtain and to put an end to the enquiry. The appellant had already suffered enough and more on account of the disciplinary proceedings. As a matter of fact, the mental agony and sufferings of the appellant due to the protracted disciplinary proceedings would be much more than the punishment. For the mistakes committed by the department in the procedure for initiating the disciplinary proceedings, the appellant should not be made to suffer.' Ultimately, the Hon'ble Supreme Court quashed the proceedings. 15. In the case of Prabash Chandra Mirdha (2012) 11 SCC 565 (supra), it is clearly held that before the charge sheet is quashed, this Court must consider the gravity of the charge and all other relevant factors before coming to the said conclusion. Same view is reiterated in other cases also. 16. If this case is viewed against the backdrop of this case law, the charges against the present petitioner is not of a very serious nature. They can be broadly termed as charges involving dereliction of duty as petitioner is said to have allowed unauthorized sale of liquor, sale beyond the stipulated limit etc., along with a large number of other Officers. The fact remains that from 2009 onwards, till date, no 'conclusions' have been reached. From that date, till now, the petitioner is under the imminent threat of punishment. The petition itself refers to the 'Sword of Damocles' hanging over their head. 17. As argued by the learned Government Pleader, the petitioner cannot take advantage of the non-functioning of a Tribunal at this stage. However, the fact remains that in terms of G.O. Ms. No. 679, the case should have finished in a time bound manner. The petition itself refers to the 'Sword of Damocles' hanging over their head. 17. As argued by the learned Government Pleader, the petitioner cannot take advantage of the non-functioning of a Tribunal at this stage. However, the fact remains that in terms of G.O. Ms. No. 679, the case should have finished in a time bound manner. In the opinion of this Court; this gross inaction on the part of the 'State' is enough to put an end to the mental agony of the petitioner. Principles of comity urge this Court to follow the earlier orders passed by the learned single Judges. 18. As pointed out by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, employees, particularly those in senior positions, cannot work under constant and imminent threat of disciplinary proceedings. The very purpose of fixing time schedules like in G.O. Ms. No. 679 will be defeated. Even under 1960 Act, no time limit is fixed, but it is mentioned that in such cases, whether this 1960 Act is silent, A.P.CCA Rules will apply. The CCA Rules and the departmental instructions issued thereunder, make it very clear that the respondents are duty bound to dispose these proceedings within a time stipulated. The same is not done in this case. However a right to a speedy trial and conclusion of proceedings are now recognized as a fact of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The same is violated. 19. Therefore, for all these reasons, this Court is of the opinion that directing the Tribunal to complete the proceedings is not really called for. The inaction on the part of the respondents is glaring and striking. The petitioner is under imminent threat since 2013. Their agony cannot be extended further. Lastly, this Court also notices that no material has been filed to show that the petitioner is responsible for the delay. 20. For all the above reasons, the writ petition is allowed. There shall be an order as prayed for and the disciplinary proceedings vide Tribunal Enquiry Case Nos. 120/2013, dated 21.06.2017; 146/2013, dated 15.09.2017 and 173/2013, dated 27.11.2017 issued by the 3rd respondent respectively are quashed; consequently direct the respondents to release full pension, Gratuity and Encashment of Earned Leave with interest at 7% p.a from the date of petitioner's superannuation till payment made; within a period of eight (08) weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No order as to costs. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending consideration if any in the writ petition shall stand closed.