JUDGMENT 1. The present Criminal Revision Petition has been filed against judgment and order dated 12.11.2018 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Aishmuqam (for short, the 'trial court') whereby the respondents/accused, facing trial for offences punishable under Sections 447, 427, 336, 354, 436A, 323 RPC were acquitted. The acquittal of the accused/respondents has been challenged on the grounds that the prosecution in the case was not conducted fairly and the judgment has been passed in a haste manner without asking the prosecution to produce the rest of the prosecution witnesses. The impugned judgment also suffers from perversity as the accused has caused damage to the property of the petitioner about which the witnesses have clearly stated that the occurrence had taken place and the accused persons have committed the offences alleged against them and the trial Court has taken a wrong view, as such, the judgment passed by the trial Court deserves to be set aside. 2. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record on the file. 03. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that on 13.08.2012, a written complaint was received by the Police of Police Station, Aishmuqam which was made by the complainant through post. In the complaint, it was alleged that on 12.08.2012 in the evening hours, accused/respondents, while forming an unlawful assembly, forcibly trespassed upon the proprietary land of the complainant without any reason and justification and after entering upon his land, they cut down fruit bearing trees, walnut trees and changed the said strip of land of the complainant into a place meant for offering funeral prayers (Jinazgah). 3. It was further alleged that thereafter, accused entered inside the compound of the complainant and pelted stones on his residential house, broke down the window-panes and also assaulted his family members, outraged the modesty of ladies of his family. His mother was beaten by the accused and Dupatta from her head was snatched and, thus, her modesty was outraged by the accused. 4. The Police of Police Station, Aishmuqam, on receipt of the said written report, registered FIR No. 75/2012 for offences punishable under Sections 436A, 447, 427, 336, 354, 323 RPC and started investigation in the matter. His mother was beaten by the accused and Dupatta from her head was snatched and, thus, her modesty was outraged by the accused. 4. The Police of Police Station, Aishmuqam, on receipt of the said written report, registered FIR No. 75/2012 for offences punishable under Sections 436A, 447, 427, 336, 354, 323 RPC and started investigation in the matter. On completion of the investigation by the Police, the offences punishable under Sections 147, 449, 336, 354, 427, 323 RPC were established whereas offence punishable under Section 436A was not established against the accused/respondents. 5. The accused were charged sheeted for the aforementioned offences. They denied the charges so framed against them and opted for trial. Prosecution was asked to produce evidence to prove the charges and 09 out of 14 witnesses were produced.06. The witnesses who have been produced and examined in this case are PWs - Javid Ahmad Bhat, Mohd. Ramzan Bhat, Ghulam Hassan Lone, Mst. Zeba, Abdul Rehman Bhat, Aijaz Ahmad Bhat, Mohammad Shafi Bhat, Abdul Rehman Hajam. The trial Court on appreciation of evidence produced came to the conclusion that the parties are inimical to each other, the complainant is also facing trial in respect of an incident for which the accused had filed report before the Police, a month prior to the occurrence in question, the witnesses have made contradictory statements and have also made major improvements in their statements. The trial Court held that the prosecution had failed to prove the charges beyond doubt, as such, the trial Court while acquitting the accused dismissed the charges leveled against them. The State did not file any appeal against the acquittal of the accused. The complainant has challenged the order of acquittal through the medium of present Criminal Revision Petition. PW- Javed Ahmad Bhat is the complainant on whose instance the FIR in question was registered. His statement is not only self-contradictory, but also he has made major improvements in the said statement. Similarly, other witnesses have also made contradictory statements and improved version earlier made during the course of investigation.07. Since the statements of the prosecution witnesses had made major contradictions, therefore, the trial Court has rightly held that the witnesses so produced and the statements so recorded do not inspire confidence. Similarly, other witnesses have also made contradictory statements and improved version earlier made during the course of investigation.07. Since the statements of the prosecution witnesses had made major contradictions, therefore, the trial Court has rightly held that the witnesses so produced and the statements so recorded do not inspire confidence. The prosecution has taken about 05 years for the production of the witnesses and in this way sufficient time was granted to the prosecution to produce the witnesses, but they produced only 08 witnesses and thereafter made an application under Section 540 Cr.P.C. which was allowed and one more opportunity was granted to the prosecution to produce the evidence. The trial Court has, thus, provided ample opportunities to the prosecution to produce the witnesses. The complainant was himself a witness and had even witnessed the incident in this case. In case, he found that prosecution has not produced the witnesses, he had an option to produce them before the trial Court for their examination. No fault can be found with the trial Court in so far as trial of the case is concerned or for that matter, even prosecution cannot be held liable for non-production of the witnesses which were then within the control of the complainant the witnesses cited whose named have been mentioned by him have not been produced by the petitioner while the investigation was conducted in the case.08. The incident in question, as per the complaint, took place on 12.08.2012 and the charge sheet was filed in December, 2013 and after conclusion of the trial, the case was decided on 12.11.2018. The accused had, thus, faced the trial in this case for about 05 years. While going through the evidence and the reasoning given by the trial Court, nothing could be found which could suggest that the trial Court has not properly appreciated the evidence or to hold that there was sufficient evidence produced before it for holding the accused guilty. The statements were contradictory and improvements have been made and it was established that there was enmity between the parties as a complaint was already filed against the complainant a month prior to the date of occurrence in which he is an accused. Therefore, contradictions and improvements in the statements of witnesses become relevant for the purposes of appreciating the evidence. Therefore, contradictions and improvements in the statements of witnesses become relevant for the purposes of appreciating the evidence. These improvements and contradictions create doubt with regard to the genuineness of the statements made by such witnesses. The trial Court has taken into account all the material facts while appreciating the evidence and has, thus, rightly concluded that the prosecution had failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused.09. In Bansi Lal & Ors. Vs Laxman Singh, (1986) SCR (3) 191, the Supreme Court, while dealing with revisional jurisdiction of the High Court has observed as under: 'Even in an appeal against an order of acquittal no interference will be made with the judgment of the trial court except in rare and exceptional cases where there has been some manifest illegality in the approach to the case or the appreciation of the evidence or where the conclusion of fact-recorded by the Trial Judge is wholly unreasonable so as to be liable to be characterized as perverse and there has been a resultant miscarriage of justice. The revisional jurisdiction of the High Court while dealing with an order of acquittal passed by the trial court is more narrow in its scope. It is only in glaring cases of injustice resulting from some violation of fundamental principles of law by the trial court, that the High Court is empowered to set aside the order of the acquittal and direct a retrial of the acquitted accused. From the very nature of this power it should be exercised sparingly and with great care and caution. From the very nature of this power it should be exercised sparingly and with great care and caution. In K.C. Reddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1963) 3 SCR 412 , this Court had occasion to consider the scope of the revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court in relation to orders of acquittal passed by the trial court and after referring to two earlier decisions of this Court reported in D. Stenbens vs. Nosibolla, (1951), SCR 284 and Jogendranath Jha vs. Polailal Biswas, (1951) SCR 676 the legal position was explained thus: 'These two cases clearly lay down the limits of the High Court's jurisdiction to interfere with an order of acquittal in revision; in particular, Jogendranath Jha's case stresses that it is not open to a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction in view of the provisions of section 439(4) and that the High Court cannot do this even indirectly by ordering re-trial. What had happened in that case was that the High Court reversed pure findings of facts based on the trial court's appreciation of evidence but formally complied with sub section (4) by directed only a retrial of the appellants without convicting them, and warned that the court retrying the case should not be influenced by any expression of opinion contained in the judgment of the High Court. In that connection this Court observed that there could be little doubt that the dice was loaded against the appellants of that case and it might prove difficult for any subordinate judicial officer dealing with the case to put aside altogether the strong views expressed in the judgment as to the credibility of the prosecution witness and the circumstances of the case in general.' 10. The aforesaid decision was subsequently followed by the Supreme Court in Akalu Ahir and Ors. Vs. Ramdeo Ram (1974) 1 SCR 130 wherein it was observed as under: 'The unrestricted right of appeal from acquittal is specifically conferred only on the State and a private complainant is given this right only when the criminal prosecution was instituted on his complaint and then also subject to special leave by the High Court. Vs. Ramdeo Ram (1974) 1 SCR 130 wherein it was observed as under: 'The unrestricted right of appeal from acquittal is specifically conferred only on the State and a private complainant is given this right only when the criminal prosecution was instituted on his complaint and then also subject to special leave by the High Court. It is further provided in Section 439(S), Cr.P.C. that where no appeal is brought in a case in which an appeal is provided, no proceedings by way of revision would be entertained at the instance of the party who could have appealed. The State Government, therefore, having failed to appeal, cannot apply for revision of an order of acquittal. Again on revision, the High Court is expressly prohibited from converting an acquittal into a conviction. Considering the problem facing the Court in the case background of this scheme, the High Court when approached by a private party for exercising its power of revision from an order of acquittal, should appropriately refrain from interfering except when there is a glaring legal defect of a serious nature which has resulted in grave failure of justice. It is not expected to act under ss. 435/439, Cr.P.C. as if it is a hearing on appeal in spite of the wide language under Section 435 which empowers it to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of a finding, sentence or order and as to the regularity for any proceeding and also in spite of the fact that under Section 439 it can be exercise inter alia the power conferred on a court of appeal under Section 423, Cr.P.C. The power being discretionary, it has to be exercised judiciously, and not arbitrarily. Judicial discretion, as has often been said, means a discretion which is informed by tradition, methodized by analogy and disciplined by system. In Amar Chand Aggarwal v. Shanti Bose, AIR 1973 SC 799 , this Court said that normally the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 439, Cr.P.C. is to be exercised only in exceptional cases when there is a glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on point of law and there has consequently been flagrant miscarriage of justice. In the background of the position just stated a private complainant can only claim a right, in common with all aggrieved parties in a criminal proceedings, to invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court for redress against miscarriage of justice arising from an erroneous order of acquittal.' 11. In the case of Satyandra Nath Dutta and Anr. vs Ram Narain, Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held as under: 'Section 439(1) of the Code which the revisional powers of the High Court provides that in the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction the High Court may exercise any of the powers conferred on a court of appeal, as the Court of appeal. But Subsection (4) of Section 439 provides expressly that nothing contained in section shall be deemed to authorise a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. This provision has been judicially interpreted and it is necessary to refer to the decisions of this Court that the revisional jurisdiction conferred by Section 439 of the Code ought not to be exercised lightly when it is involved by a private complainant against an order of acquittal which could have been appealed against by the Government under Section 417. It could be exercised only in exceptional cases where the interests of public justice require interference for the correction of a manifest illegality, or the prevention of a gross miscarriage of justice. In other words, the revisional view of the law or mis appropriated the evidence on record. In Logendranath Jhav, Polailal 1951 SCR 676 : AIR 1951 SC 316 SC 316 : 52 Cri LJ 1248, the High Court, at the instance of a private complainant, set aside the order of acquittal passed by the Sessions Court and directed that the accused be retried. This Court held that the provision contained in Section 439(4) of the code can not be construed to mean that in dealing with a revision petition by a private party against an order of acquittal the High Court could, in the absence of any error on a point of law, reappraised the evidence and reverse the findings of facts provided only it stops short of finding the accused guilty and passing sentence on him. The order of retrial based on a reappraisal of evidence was characterized by this Court as a formal compliance with the requirement of Section 439(4). The order of retrial based on a reappraisal of evidence was characterized by this Court as a formal compliance with the requirement of Section 439(4). In K. Chinnaswawamy Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, the Court while emphasizing that the revisional jurisdiction should be exercised by the High Court in exceptional cases only when there is some glaring defect in the procedure of a point of law resulting in a flagrant miscarriage of justice observed that it was not possible to lay down the criteria for determining such exceptional cases which would cover all contingencies. The Court, however, indicated in order to illustrate, a few of the cases in which the revisional jurisdiction could properly be used. An acquittal by a court lacking jurisdiction or excluding evidence which was admissible or relying on inadmissible evidence or where material evidence has been over looked are some of the cases indicated by this Court and justifying the exercise of revisional powers. In Mahendra Pratap Singh v. Sarjug Singh, where the High Court in exercise of its revisional power had, at the instance of a private party, directed retrial of the accused, this Court on a review of the previous decision re-affirmed that the High Court was wrong in entering into minute details of evidence while examining the decision of the Sessions Court under Section 439(4) of the Code. The last decision to which reference may be made in Khetradesi Samal v. State of Orissa. The High Court while exercising its revisional jurisdiction had set aside the order of acquittal on the ground that the Magistrate should not have disbelieved the three eye-witnesses, The High Court sought jurisdiction for the course it adopted by observing that the Magistrate had not taken the trouble of sifting the grain from the chaff. The order of the High Court was set aside by this Court.' 12. It is only in glaring cases of injustice resulting from some violation of fundamental principles of law by the trial Court. In the course of trial, that the High Court is empowered to set aside the order of acquittal and direct the re-trial of the acquitted accused persons. The very nature of this power should be exercised sparingly and with great care and caution. Trials are not to be lightly set aside when such orders expose accused persons to afresh trail with all its consequential harassment. The very nature of this power should be exercised sparingly and with great care and caution. Trials are not to be lightly set aside when such orders expose accused persons to afresh trail with all its consequential harassment. It is no longer res integra and has indeed been dealt with in number of judgments. Reference in this regard can also be made to K. C. Reddy vs State of Andhra Pradesh, (1963) 3 SCR 412 , D. Stenbens vs Nosibolla, (1951) SCR 284 and Jogendranath Jha vs Polailal Biswas, (1951) SCR 676 were examined and after quoting certain passages from the decision observed as follows: 'These two cases clearly lay down the limits of the High Court's jurisdiction to interfere with an order of acquittal in revision.' 13. Having regard to the discussions made hereinabove and decisions of Hon'ble the Supreme Court referred hereinabove, I am satisfied that interference with the order of acquittal passed by the trial Court in this case is not justified in exercise of revisional jurisdiction of this Court. Therefore, the revision petition is dismissed and the order of acquittal is upheld.