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2022 DIGILAW 598 (CHH)

Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Ltd. through Shri Arvind Kumar Agrawal, S/o. Shri Raghuveer Sharan Saral v. Union of India, through its Secretary Ministry of Coal, Government of India

2022-12-15

ARUP KUMAR GOSWAMI, ARVIND SINGH CHANDEL

body2022
ORDER : [Arvind Singh Chandel, J.] 1. Heard Dr. Nirmal Shukla, learned senior counsel, assisted by Shri Shailendra Shukla and Shri Himank Saluja, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Shri Ramakant Mishra, learned Deputy Solicitor General, appearing for the respondents. 2. Initially, this petition was preferred by the petitioner as Writ Petition (C) No.3036 of 2022 for the following reliefs: “10. Reliefs Sought:- The Petitioner most humbly prays for the following reliefs:- 10.1. That, the Hon’ble High Court be kindly pleased to issue a direction that the Learned Coal Tribunal, District Judge, Bilaspur (Chhattisgarh) dispose of the matter finally within 90 days from the date of order passed by this Hon’ble Court without fail. 10.2. Any other relief which this Hon’ble Court deems fit and appropriate.” 3. When the matter was taken up by a learned Single Judge on 12.7.2022, it was observed and directed as under: “xxx xxx xxx Considering the nature of dispute, this court is of the opinion that the writ petition has been wrongly classified as WPC. It has to be under the classification of WP(227). The petitioner is directed to appear before the Registrar (Judicial) for taking necessary steps in this regard, who, in turn, after necessary correction may list it before the appropriate Bench having roster.” 4. Thereafter, this petition has been converted into Writ Petition (227) No.436 of 2022. When the matter was heard by another learned Single Judge on 2.8.2022, it was observed as follows: “xxx xxx xxx Considering the submissions, prima-facie, I am of the view that the Tribunal has been constituted under Coal Bearing Area (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957 which is not a Civil Court, therefore, the judgment passed by the coordinate Bench decided on 26.03.2019 in WP 227 No.245 of 2019 has not specifically dealt with the issue as to whether the writ petition under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India is maintainable. Therefore, to settle the legal question, the matter needs to be heard and decided by the larger Bench. The Registrar (Judicial) is directed to place this matter before Hon’ble the Chief Justice for obtaining necessary orders.” 5. On the above factual backgrounds, this petition has been listed before us. 6. Therefore, to settle the legal question, the matter needs to be heard and decided by the larger Bench. The Registrar (Judicial) is directed to place this matter before Hon’ble the Chief Justice for obtaining necessary orders.” 5. On the above factual backgrounds, this petition has been listed before us. 6. As referred to by the learned Single Judge, the only question for consideration before us is that “whether a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution or a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution will lie” in respect of a matter, which relates to the Tribunal constituted under the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957. 7. Vide this petition, a direction was sought by the petitioner that the learned District Judge, Bilaspur (Chhattisgarh) in his capacity as Coal Tribunal, Bilaspur, constituted under the Coal Mines (Special Provisions) Act, 2015 and the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957, be directed to dispose of the matter bearing Part Time Tribunal Case No.24 of 2019 (Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Limited v. Union of India and others) within 90 days as per the mandate of Section 27(3) of the Coal Mines (Special Provisions) Act, 2015. 8. It would be appropriate to first reproduce the provisions of Section 27 of the Coal Mines (Special Provisions) Act, 2015, which run as follows: “27. Dispute settlement and Bar of Jurisdiction of civil courts.—(1) Any dispute arising out of any action of the Central Government, nominated authority or Commissioner of payment or designated custodian, or any dispute between the successful bidder or allottee and prior allottee arising out of any issue connected with the Act shall be adjudicated by the Tribunal constituted under the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957 (20 of 1957). (2) Where the Central Government is of the opinion that any dispute arising out of any issue connected with the Act exists or is apprehended and the dispute should be adjudicated by the Tribunal referred to in sub-section (1), then, the Central Government may by order in writing, refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, the dispute, to the Tribunal for adjudication. (3) The Tribunal referred to in sub-section (1) shall, after hearing the parties to the dispute, make an award in writing within a period of ninety days from the institution or reference of the dispute. (3) The Tribunal referred to in sub-section (1) shall, after hearing the parties to the dispute, make an award in writing within a period of ninety days from the institution or reference of the dispute. (4) On and from the commencement of the Act, no court or other authority, except the Supreme Court and a High Court, shall have, or be entitled to exercise, any jurisdiction, powers or authority, in relation to matters connected with the Act.” 9. The Supreme Court, while dealing with the issue whether a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India will lie against the order of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 620 (Ibrat Faizan v. Omaxe Buildhome Private Limited), observed thus: “21. Whether the National Commission can be said to be a tribunal for the purpose of exercise of powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India by the High Court is concerned, has been considered by a Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Associate Cement Companies Limited (supra), which is required to be referred to. In paragraphs 44 and 45, it is observed and held as under: “44. An authority other than a court may be vested by statute with judicial power in widely different circumstances, which it would be impossible and indeed inadvisable to attempt to define exhaustively. The proper thing is to examine each case as it arises, and to ascertain whether the powers vested in the authority can be truly described as judicial functions or judicial powers of the State. For the purpose of this case, it is sufficient to say that any outside authority empowered by the State to determine conclusively the rights of two or more contending parties with regard to any matter in controversy between them satisfies the test of an authority vested with the judicial powers of the State and may be regarded as a tribunal within the meaning of Article 136. Such a power of adjudication implies that the authority must act judicially and must determine the dispute by ascertainment of the relevant facts on the materials before it and by application of the relevant law to those facts. This test of a tribunal is not meant to be exhaustive, and it may be that other bodies not satisfying this test are also tribunals. This test of a tribunal is not meant to be exhaustive, and it may be that other bodies not satisfying this test are also tribunals. In order to be a tribunal, it is essential that the power of adjudication must be derived from a statute or a statutory rule. An authority or body deriving its power of adjudication from an agreement of the parties, such as a private arbitrator or a tribunal acting under Section 10-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, does not satisfy the test of a tribunal within Article 136. It matters little that such a body or authority is vested with the trappings of a court. The Arbitration Act, 1940 vests an arbitrator with some of the trappings of a court, so also the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 vests an authority acting under Section 10-A of the Act with many of such trappings, and yet, such bodies and authorities are not tribunals. 45. The word “tribunal” finds place in Article 227 of the Constitution also, and I think that there also the word has the same meaning as in Article 136.” 22. Therefore, the National Commission can be said to be a ‘Tribunal’ which is vested by Statute the powers to determine conclusively the rights of two or more contending parties with regard to any matter in controversy between them. Therefore, as observed hereinabove in the aforesaid decision, it satisfies the test of an authority vested with the judicial powers of the State and therefore may be regarded as a ‘Tribunal’ within the meaning of Article 227 and/or 136 of the Constitution of India. Also, in a given case, this Court may not exercise its powers under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, in view of the remedy which may be available to the aggrieved party before the concerned High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, as it is appropriate that aggrieved party approaches the concerned High Court by way of writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.” 10. From a careful reading of the provisions as contained in Section 27 of the Coal Mines (Special Provisions) Act, 2015, it is apparent that any dispute arising out of any action of the Central Government, nominated authority or Commissioner of payment or designated custodian, or any dispute between the successful bidder or allottee and prior allottee arising out of any issue connected with the Act shall be adjudicated by the Tribunal constituted under the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957. 11. As held by the Supreme Court in Ibrat Faizan (supra), the proper thing is to examine in this case as it arises, to ascertain whether the powers vested in the Tribunal can be truly described as judicial functions or judicial powers of the State. In the instant case, the District Judge, Bilaspur has been appointed as the Part Time Tribunal, which has been notified by the Government of India vide notification dated 23.9.2019. As contained in sub-section (3) of Section 27 of the Coal Mines (Special Provisions) Act, 2015, the Tribunal shall after hearing the parties to the dispute make an award in writing within a period of ninety days from the institution or reference of the dispute. It is further contained in sub-section (4) of Section 27 that no Court or other authority, except the Supreme Court and a High Court, shall have, or be entitled to exercise, any jurisdiction, powers or authority, in relation to matters connected with the Act. Meaning thereby, the Tribunal is fully empowered to adjudicate the matter referred to it and it has to follow the procedure of the Civil Court, like hearing of the parties and making of award/judgment. Thus, in our considered view, though the subject Tribunal, constituted under the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957, is not a Civil Court, it has powers of the Civil Court vested by the Statute, i.e., the powers to determine conclusively the rights of two or more contending parties with regard to any matter in controversy between them and the matters relating to such a Tribunal can be challenged under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Thus, it is held that for the instant matter, a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is maintainable. 12. List this matter before the appropriate Bench having roster.