JUDGMENT Munishwar Nath Bhandari Common Order: The batch of writ petitions challenges the orders passed by the Labour Inspector under the Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishments (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981 [for brevity, "the Act of 1981"]. By the impugned orders, the Labour Inspector issued directions for grant of permanent status to the respondent employees from the date of completion of 480 days in 24 calendar months of their service. 2. The challenge to the said orders has been made on many grounds, but before addressing the issues raised by the petitioner and contested by the respondents, it would be appropriate to give brief facts of the case. 3. It is a case where the union and employees made a claim before the Labour Inspector for grant of permanent status as they rendered continuous service for a period of 480 days in a period of 24 calendar months. The Labour Inspector caused an enquiry in pursuance to the claim and passed orders directing the petitioner corporation to confer permanent status to the members of the petitioner association and even individual employees who approached the Labour Inspector. It was after making adjudication in reference to the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 [for brevity, "the Act of 1970"]. It is alleged by the petitioner corporation that order has been passed without recording the finding on completion of 480 days continuous service in the preceding 24 calendar months by each employee giving out the days and months. On the aforesaid factual background, challenge to the orders passed by the Labour Inspector has been made. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, now Tamil Nadu Generation and Distribution Corporation Limited, submits that the Labour Inspector has passed the impugned orders exceeding his jurisdiction, while adjudicating the issue in reference to the Act of 1970. A dispute in reference to the Act of 1970 can be adjudicated only by the Industrial Adjudicator, which can be the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 [for brevity, "the Act of 1947"]. However, ignoring the aforesaid, the Labour Inspector has recorded finding on the engagement of the respondent employees to be camouflage under the Act of 1970, so as to issue a direction for permanency of the employees. However, ignoring the aforesaid, the Labour Inspector has recorded finding on the engagement of the respondent employees to be camouflage under the Act of 1970, so as to issue a direction for permanency of the employees. It was even ignoring the fact that the employees were not falling within the definition of "workman" and otherwise the Act of 1981 cannot override the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board Service Regulations framed pursuant to Sections 79(c) and (k) of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 [for brevity, "the Act of 1948"]. In case of conflict between the Act of 1981 and the statutory Regulations, the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board Service Regulations framed under the Act of 1948 would prevail. 5. It is further submitted that the Labour Inspector even ignored the settlement arrived between the parties on 10.8.2007 under Section 12(3) of the Act of 1947, despite being upheld by the Division Bench of this court by its judgment dated 24.10.2008. He added that the directions given under the impugned orders are going beyond the terms of the settlement and, thus, deserve to be interfered. 6. Coming to the facts of this case, it is stated that the petitioner Corporation has stopped engagement of contract labour in the year 2008 itself, i.e., after the settlement, and whoever were covered by the settlement had been extended the benefit and thereupon the employment was only on the basis of daily wages. The employees failed to produce any document to prove their engagement and continuous working for 480 days in 24 calendar months, yet based on surmises and conjectures, the impugned orders were passed by the Labour Inspector. It is also by ignoring the fact that a relationship between the employer and employee was required to extend the benefit of permanency under the Act of 1981. The members of the association and the employees were not in service at the time of enquiry and passing the orders by the Labour Inspector, yet a direction for grant of permanency has been given from the date of completion of 480 days service. 7. It is even ignoring the fact that even if the members of the association and employees were engaged by the petitioner corporation, it was for temporary work like digging, poles erection, stretching wires, transformer erection, cutting trees, loading and unloading of electric goods etc. 7. It is even ignoring the fact that even if the members of the association and employees were engaged by the petitioner corporation, it was for temporary work like digging, poles erection, stretching wires, transformer erection, cutting trees, loading and unloading of electric goods etc. Those works cannot be said to be of continuous nature, but without referring to the nature of the work, the impugned orders for grant of permanency have been passed. It is by shifting the burden of proof from employees to employer, though burden of proof was on the employees to prove their continuous service of 480 days in 24 calendar months to seek the benefit under Section 3 of the Act of 1981. 8. In view of the above, the prayer is to set aside the orders of Labour Inspector and if the interference therein is not made, then at least to modify the directions given therein to be in terms of the settlement dated 10.8.2007, which was approved by the Division Bench of this court. The prayer is, accordingly, to allow the writ petitions in terms of the prayer aforesaid. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner made reference of several judgments to support his arguments and would be considered at the time of discussion of the rival submission of the parties. 10. The writ petition has been contested by learned counsel appearing for the side opposite on the ground that none of the issues raised by the petitioner corporation are made out on facts as well as law. The Labour Inspector had rightly directed grant of permanent status to the members of the petitioner association and employees who approached him. It is by exercising his power under Sections 3 and 5 of the Act of 1981 read with Rule 6(4) of the Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishments (Conferment of Permanent Status to workmen) Rules, 1981. The Labour Inspector has recorded finding on being satisfied that the employees worked for a period of 480 days in 24 calendar months and thereby interference with the order may not be made. 11. Section 3 of the Act of 1981 provides for grant of permanent status to the employees who has completed 480 days of continuous service in a period of 24 calendar months. 11. Section 3 of the Act of 1981 provides for grant of permanent status to the employees who has completed 480 days of continuous service in a period of 24 calendar months. The obligation to grant benefit under the Act of 1981 was on the petitioner corporation, but when they ignored, the Labour Inspector exercising jurisdiction under the Act of 1981 passed appropriate orders as all the employees were covered by the definition of "worker" given under the Factories Act, 1948. The finding has been recorded after proper consideration of the documents and evidence produced by both the sides. Thus, it is incorrect to state that the order passed by the Labour Inspector is based on surmises and conjectures. The documents were considered to arrive at the finding of working for continuous 480 days in a period of 24 calendar months. It was after framing the issues. Thus, a contest on the factual issue has also been made and, accordingly, referring to several judgments of this High Court, the prayer was made to dismiss the writ petitions. 12. We have considered the rival submissions of the parties and scanned the records carefully. 13. For convenience, we would be referring to the facts in the case of W.P.No.4061 of 2013, which was referred by both the parties during the course of arguments. 14. A perusal of the order passed by the Labour Inspector reveals it to be in exercise of the powers conferred on him under the Act of 1981. The Act of 1981 provides for grant of permanent status to those who have completed 480 days continuous service in 24 calendar months and for ready reference Section 3 of the Act of 1981 is quoted hereunder: "3. Conferment of permanent status to workmen.— (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force every workman who is in continuous service for a period of four hundred and eighty days in a period of twenty four calendar months in an industrial establishment shall be made permanent. Conferment of permanent status to workmen.— (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force every workman who is in continuous service for a period of four hundred and eighty days in a period of twenty four calendar months in an industrial establishment shall be made permanent. (2) A workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorized leave or an accident or a strike, which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman. Explanation I.-- For the purposes of computing the continuous service referred to in sub-sections (1) and (2), a workman shall be deemed to be continuous service during the days on which --- ; (i) he has been laid off under an agreement or as permitted by standing orders made under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (Central Act XX of 1946) or under any other law applicable to the industrial establishment; (ii) he has been on leave with full wages, earned in the previous years; (iii) he has been absent due to temporary disablement caused by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment ; and (iv) in the case of a female, she has been on maternity leave; so, however, that the total period of such maternity leave does not exceed twelve weeks. Explanation II. – For the purposes of this section, ‘law’ includes any award, agreement, settlement, instrument or contract of service whether made before or after the commencement of this Act." 15. A further reference to Section 5 of the Act of 1981 would also be relevant, as the said provision stipulates the powers and duties on the Labour Inspector. Section 5 of the Act of 1981 reads as under: "5. Power and duties of Inspectors. A further reference to Section 5 of the Act of 1981 would also be relevant, as the said provision stipulates the powers and duties on the Labour Inspector. Section 5 of the Act of 1981 reads as under: "5. Power and duties of Inspectors. – Subject to any rules made by the Government in this behalf, the Inspector may, within the local limits for which he is appointed,-- (a) enter at all reasonable times and with such assistants, if any, who are persons in the service of the Government or of any local authority as he thinks fit to take with him, any industrial establishment; (b) make such examination of the industrial establishment and of any registers, records and notices and take on the spot or elsewhere the evidence of such person as he may deem necessary, for carrying out the purposes of this Act: and (c) exercise such other powers as may be necessary for carrying out the purpose of this Act." 16. The provisions quoted above would be considered along with Rule 6(4) of the Rules of 1981 for adjudication of the issues raised by both the parties. "6. Maintenance of registers by employers.-- (1) to (3) .... (4) Any employee who finds his name not entered in the list referred to in sub-rule (2) or finds that the entries have not been made correctly or finds that though entries regarding his service have been made correctly but he has not attested the entries in the register of workmen in Form 1 may make a representation to the Inspector concerned. The Inspector after examining the representation or after making enquiries may issue suitable directions to the employer for the rectification of the register in Form 1 or for the issue of orders conferring permanent status to the workman concerned." 17. Learned counsel for the petitioner corporation submits that the Act of 1981 could not have been applied in ignorance of the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board Service Regulations framed under the Electricity (Supply) Act of 1948. It was submitted that the Regulations provides the mode of selection, the minimum educational qualification and appointment only against the sanctioned post. However, the Labour Inspector ignoring the Regulations issued directions for grant of permanent status even in favour of those who were not engaged by the petitioner corporation, but by others not known to the petitioner corporation. 18. It was submitted that the Regulations provides the mode of selection, the minimum educational qualification and appointment only against the sanctioned post. However, the Labour Inspector ignoring the Regulations issued directions for grant of permanent status even in favour of those who were not engaged by the petitioner corporation, but by others not known to the petitioner corporation. 18. The argument aforesaid has been contested by the side opposite and we find that the Act of 1981 is not in conflict with the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board Service Regulations, rather both the legislations are occupying different fields of operation. The Regulations provides for the mode of selection, apart from the qualification, etc., but other than the mode provided therein when employees are engaged by the petitioner corporation, then he cannot be denied the benefit of the Act of 1981. It is more so when both the legislations are not in conflict with each other and otherwise the similar benefit, as claimed by the employees in this case, has been given in the past. The petitioner corporation entered into settlement on 10.8.2007, which would not have been required if the Act of 1981 could not have been applicable. The settlement aforesaid has already been upheld by the Division Bench of this court by its judgment dated 24.10.2008. In view of the above, we are unable to accept the first argument raised by learned counsel for the petitioner corporation. 19. The other issue raised is as to whether the Labour Inspector is having power to determine the controversy in reference to the Act of 1970. It is submitted that the nature of engagement and as to whether it was a genuine contract or camouflage could not have been adjudicated by the Labour Inspector. The adjudicatory authority does not exist with him under the Act of 1981. It remains with the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal. A reference of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Steel Authority of India Limited and others v. National Union Waterfront Workers and others (2001) 7 SCC 1 has been given. 20. The argument aforesaid has been contested by learned counsel for the respondents by referring to the judgment of this court in the case of Superintending Engineer, Vellore Electricity Distribution Circle, Vellore and others v. Inspector of Labour, Perambalur and others, 2004 (3) LLN 598. 20. The argument aforesaid has been contested by learned counsel for the respondents by referring to the judgment of this court in the case of Superintending Engineer, Vellore Electricity Distribution Circle, Vellore and others v. Inspector of Labour, Perambalur and others, 2004 (3) LLN 598. It is submitted that a claim to seek the benefit under the Act of 1981 cannot be sent for adjudication under the Act of 1947. This High Court in the case supra, held that the Labour Inspector has power to cause summary enquiry for passing appropriate order and, accordingly, the argument that adjudication can be made only under the Act of 1947 was not accepted. The issue is no more res integra in the facts aforesaid. 21. We have considered the submission aforesaid and for appreciation of the arguments we have perused the order passed by the Labour Inspector and the provisions of the Act of 1981. The Act of 1981 was brought to extend certain benefits to the employees who work for a continuous period of 480 days in 24 calendar months and for that purpose, the employer has to maintain records. The power has been conferred on the Labour Inspector to issue directions for maintenance of record and to grant permanency. In view of the above, we find that the Labour Inspector is empowered to issue order to grant permanency to the employee. However, it cannot be after addressing the complicated issue on facts and law. Whenever a serious dispute on facts and law is raised, the adjudication thereupon is permissible only by the Industrial Adjudicator, i.e., the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal. The reference of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Steel Authority of India Limited and others, supra, would be relevant for the aforesaid and paragraphs 125 and 126 are quoted hereunder to show that the issues of the nature referred to above can be determined only by the "industrial adjudicator". Referring to the word "industrial adjudicator", it was defined to be an Industrial tribunal or Labour Court. Paragraphs 125 and 126 are reproduced hereunder: "125. Referring to the word "industrial adjudicator", it was defined to be an Industrial tribunal or Labour Court. Paragraphs 125 and 126 are reproduced hereunder: "125. The upshot of the above discussion is outlined thus: (1)(a) Before 28-1-1986, the determination of the question whether the Central Government or the State Government is the appropriate Government in relation to an establishment, will depend, in view of the definition of the expression “appropriate Government” as stood in the CLRA Act, on the answer to a further question, is the industry under consideration carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government or does it pertain to any specified controlled industry, or the establishment of any railway, cantonment board, major port, mine or oilfield or the establishment of banking or insurance company? If the answer is in the affirmative, the Central Government will be the appropriate Government; otherwise in relation to any other establishment the Government of the State in which the establishment was situated, would be the appropriate Government; (b) After the said date in view of the new definition of that expression, the answer to the question referred to above, has to be found in clause (a) of Section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act; if (i) the Central Government company/undertaking concerned or any undertaking concerned is included therein eo nomine, or (ii) any industry is carried on (a) by or under the authority of the Central Government, or (b) by a railway company; or (c) by a specified controlled industry, then the Central Government will be the appropriate Government; otherwise in relation to any other establishment, the Government of the State in which that other establishment is situated, will be the appropriate Government. (2)(a) A notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act prohibiting employment of contract labour in any process, operation or other work in any establishment has to be issued by the appropriate Government: (1) after consulting with the Central Advisory Board or the State Advisory Board, as the case may be, and (2) having regard to (i) conditions of work and benefits provided for the contract labour in the establishment in question, and (ii) other relevant factors including those mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 10; (b) Inasmuch as the impugned notification issued by the Central Government on 9-12-1976 does not satisfy the aforesaid requirements of Section 10, it is quashed but we do so prospectively i.e. from the date of this judgment and subject to the clarification that on the basis of this judgment no order passed or no action taken giving effect to the said notification on or before the date of this judgment, shall be called in question in any tribunal or court including a High Court if it has otherwise attained finality and/or it has been implemented. (3) Neither Section 10 of the CLRA Act nor any other provision in the Act, whether expressly or by necessary implication, provides for automatic absorption of contract labour on issuing a notification by the appropriate Government under sub-section (1) of Section 10, prohibiting employment of contract labour, in any process, operation or other work in any establishment. Consequently the principal employer cannot be required to order absorption of the contract labour working in the establishment concerned. (4) We overrule the judgment of this Court in Air India case [ (1997) 9 SCC 377 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1344] prospectively and declare that any direction issued by any industrial adjudicator/any court including the High Court, for absorption of contract labour following the judgment in Air India case [ (1997) 9 SCC 377 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1344] shall hold good and that the same shall not be set aside, altered or modified on the basis of this judgment in cases where such a direction has been given effect to and it has become final. (5) On issuance of prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act prohibiting employment of contract labour or otherwise, in an industrial dispute brought before it by any contract labour in regard to conditions of service, the industrial adjudicator will have to consider the question whether the contractor has been interposed either on the ground of having undertaken to produce any given result for the establishment or for supply of contract labour for work of the establishment under a genuine contract or is a mere ruse/camouflage to evade compliance with various beneficial legislations so as to deprive the workers of the benefit thereunder. If the contract is found to be not genuine but a mere camouflage, the so-called contract labour will have to be treated as employees of the principal employer who shall be directed to regularise the services of the contract labour in the establishment concerned subject to the conditions as may be specified by it for that purpose in the light of para 6 hereunder. (6) If the contract is found to be genuine and prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act in respect of the establishment concerned has been issued by the appropriate Government, prohibiting employment of contract labour in any process, operation or other work of any establishment and where in such process, operation or other work of the establishment the principal employer intends to employ regular workmen, he shall give preference to the erstwhile contract labour, if otherwise found suitable and, if necessary, by relaxing the condition as to maximum age appropriately, taking into consideration the age of the workers at the time of their initial employment by the contractor and also relaxing the condition as to academic qualifications other than technical qualifications. 126. We have used the expression “industrial adjudicator” by design as determination of the questions aforementioned requires enquiry into disputed questions of facts which cannot conveniently be made by High Courts in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Therefore, in such cases the appropriate authority to go into those issues will be the Industrial Tribunal/Court whose determination will be amenable to judicial review." 22. In view of the above, while we are of the view that the Labour Inspector has the power to issue appropriate order to grant permanency to the workmen, it cannot be by adjudicating the complicated questions of fact and law. In view of the above, while we are of the view that the Labour Inspector has the power to issue appropriate order to grant permanency to the workmen, it cannot be by adjudicating the complicated questions of fact and law. A perusal of the Act of 1981 does not provide power in Labour Inspector of the nature given to the Industrial Adjudicator, i.e., the Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court, as complete framework with procedure for it has been given under the Act of 1947. Certain provisions of the Civil Procedure Code have been made applicable therein for proper adjudication which does not exist under the Act of 1981. 23. If the facts of this case are taken into consideration, we find that the Labour Inspector has recorded his finding in reference to the Act of 1970 while adjudicating the issue. Such powers have not been conferred on him, rather he can pass appropriate order after summary enquiry. The view expressed by the Single Judge of this court in the case of Superintending Engineer, Vellore Electricity Distribution Circle, Vellore and others, supra, is not in conflict with the view aforesaid, rather in paragraph 35 of the said judgment, the difference between the power of Labour Inspector and Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal under the Act of 1947 has been made. Paragraph (35) of judgment, referred supra, is extracted hereunder: "35. Therefore, I am unable to accept the submission made on behalf of the Board that the exercise of the power by the Inspector of Labour in conferring permanent status after holding necessary enquiries contemplated under S. 5 read along with rule 6(4) should be construed as arrogating to himself the powers available to the other adjudicatory forums created under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It will have to be stated that while the exercise of powers vested with the Inspector under the provisions of the Act is summary in nature, the one under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act may be an elaborate one. Nevertheless the same does not mean that by exercising the power under the provisions of the Act the Inspector of Labour would be trespassing into the adjudication process contemplated under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. Nevertheless the same does not mean that by exercising the power under the provisions of the Act the Inspector of Labour would be trespassing into the adjudication process contemplated under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. In this context, if the judgment of the Supreme Court in Nirchiliya case [ 1990 (2) L.L.N. 4 ] (vide supra) is applied, it can be safely held that where there is no prohibition under the provisions of either the Industrial Disputes Act or the Act, exercise of the power in the manner in which it can be done by the Inspector of Labour under the Act cannot be found fault with. It will have to be stated that such an exercise would be well within the statutory limitations provided under the Act. In fact, in the above-referred to judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the question for consideration was whether the workmen who initially raised an industrial dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act and who did not pursue it till its logical end when chose to move the authority under the then Madras Shops and Commercial Establishment Act, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that in the absence of any prohibition under either of the enactments, such a course adopted by the workmen cannot be faulted. Therefore, applying the said ratio to the case on hand, it can be safely held that the concerned workmen here were placed in a better footing when they chose to straightaway move the Inspector of Labour under the Act, inasmuch as according to the workmen, having regard to the facts prevailing as on date, they were entitled for the conferment of permanent status as provided under the Act. If such a claim of the workmen was not factually maintainable, it was for the Board to have resisted the said claim with all available materials and could have convinced the Inspector of Labour as the claim ought not to have been countenanced. The Board having miserably failed to perform its duties in the manner expected of it, it cannot be now allowed to contend or complain against the powers exercised by the Inspector of Labour which was within the provisions of the Act. The Board having miserably failed to perform its duties in the manner expected of it, it cannot be now allowed to contend or complain against the powers exercised by the Inspector of Labour which was within the provisions of the Act. In this context, if the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Metal Powder Company, Ltd. case [1985 (2) L.L.N. 738] (vide supra), is applied, then also it can be safely held that the Inspector of Labour was well within his jurisdiction in holding the proceedings in the manner it was held and in passing the order by directing the petitioner/Board to confer permanent status on the workmen." [emphasis supplied] 24. The Labour Inspector vested with the power under the Act of 1981 is said to be having a summary power of enquiry, while an elaborate adjudication of questions of fact and law can be only under the Act of 1947. 25. In view of the above, we can safely hold that the Labour Inspector can exercise jurisdiction only in the nature of summary enquiry, while a case involving complicated question of fact and law to be left for its adjudication under the Act of 1947. The Labour Inspector can exercise his power under the framework of the Act of 1981. He has no power to adjudicate the issue in reference to other statutes, which includes the Act of 1970. 26. Since we have analyzed the issue aforesaid, we would like to refer to the impugned order of the Labour Inspector to find out as to whether he has caused a summary enquiry or has travelled beyond his jurisdiction to adjudicate the questions of fact and law pertaining to the other statute. 27. A perusal of the order passed by the Labour Inspector in the case on hand shows an adjudication of the issue in reference to the Act of 1970 also, though it was not within his competence. He is not having powers to comment on the nature of employment and the policy adopted by the petitioner corporation. He was required to simply see whether the workman has rendered continuous service for 480 days in 24 calendar months. Thus, on the aforesaid issue, the interference therein may require to be made. 28. He is not having powers to comment on the nature of employment and the policy adopted by the petitioner corporation. He was required to simply see whether the workman has rendered continuous service for 480 days in 24 calendar months. Thus, on the aforesaid issue, the interference therein may require to be made. 28. The other ground for challenge to the order of the Labour Inspector is that without any discussion to show continuous service of an employee for 480 days in 24 calendar months, the finding has been recorded. The order under challenge does not refer to the 24 calendar months of each workman to record its finding about his continuous working for 480 days therein by giving details of the days and months. 29. From a perusal of the order of the Labour Inspector, we find that after referring to the testimonies of the parties and the documents, a finding has been recorded, without disclosing the period of 24 calendar months and 480 days working of each workman therein. The finding has been recorded in a superficial manner. The aforesaid could not be contested by learned counsel appearing for the workmen. However, it is submitted that while setting aside the order passed by the Labour inspector, the matter may be remanded with a direction for fresh enquiry with liberty to the workmen to produce the material. 30. After going through the order passed by the Labour Inspector, we find that the Labour Inspector has not recorded his finding in reference to each workman about his continuous service for 480 days in 24 calendar months. Thus, we need to cause interference with the order. 31. As we recorded a finding about the jurisdiction of the Labour Inspector and applicability of the Act of 1981, we accept the argument of learned counsel for the respondents to remand the case for fresh enquiry by the Labour Inspector to find out the continuous working of each employee for continuous period of 480 days in a period of 24 calendar months for passing the appropriate orders. 32. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that even if the matter is remanded, it should be with a clarity of the fact that the benefit under Section 3 of the Act of 1981 be given only if the workman is still in employment and not otherwise. 32. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that even if the matter is remanded, it should be with a clarity of the fact that the benefit under Section 3 of the Act of 1981 be given only if the workman is still in employment and not otherwise. It is also keeping in mind the terms of settlement and thereby the benefit may not be extended beyond what has been provided in the settlement. 33. The argument aforesaid has been contested. It is submitted that even if any of the workman is not in service, though stated to be in service, the benefit of permanency under Section 3 of the Act of 1981 being automatic should not be denied to any of the workman if discontinued, rather it should be with liberty to challenge the discontinuance, but till then and for the intervening period, he remained in service after becoming eligible for permanency, consequential benefits may be allowed. 34. We have considered the submission aforesaid and find that the order passed by the Labour Inspector needs to be interfered with remand of the case. It is, however, to be made clear that the Labour Inspector would not cause enquiry beyond the powers given under the Act of 1981 and thereby would not be having jurisdiction to adjudicate the complicated questions of fact and law in reference to any other statute than the Act of 1981. The Labour Inspector may, for the purpose of conducting summary enquiry, allow the parties to produce documents and if any of the workmen has completed 480 days of continuous service in 24 calendar months, appropriate directions can be issued for granting permanency. However, even if such an order is issued, it should be with a clear finding about each workman and the number of working days by referring to the period of 24 calendar months. The benefit as to the consequences thereupon would be only for the period of employment and if any of the workman is discontinued or not in service, he would be entitled to the benefit only for the period of service and not beyond that and, that too, after the completion of continuous service of 480 days in 24 calendar months, and not for a prior period. The direction aforesaid is not driven by the settlement for the reason that the workmen herein are those who were not extended the benefit of settlement and, therefore, sought claims by maintaining claim separately. However, it would not preclude both the sides from entering into settlement, if they so choose, during the period of summary enquiry by the Labour Inspector. The issue as to whether the respondents fall within the definition of "workman" is however decided against the petitioner Corporation, as not only a settlement was entered, but adjudication about claim to seek permanency has been decided earlier in reference to similarly placed. 35. With the aforesaid directions, all the writ petitions are disposed of by causing interference with the order passed by the Labour Inspector. The orders passed by the Labour Inspector are set aside with remand of the case to the Labour Inspector for passing orders afresh, after summary enquiry. There will be no order as to costs. Consequently, all miscellaneous petitions are closed.