JUDGMENT anoop Kumar Dhand, J. - The present appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles act, 1988 has been preferred by the appellant against the judgment and award dated 21.02.2012, passed by the Court of Motor accident Claims Tribunal (additional District & Sessions Judge, Fast Track No.1), Bharatpur (for short 'Tribunal') in Civil Misc. (MaC) Case No.266/2004, whereby, the Tribunal has awarded a sum of Rs. 5,22,950/- to the claimant-appellant. 2. Learned Tribunal after framing the issues, evaluating the evidence available on record and hearing both the sides, decided the claim petition of the claimant-appellant and awarded compensation of Rs.5,22,950/- under various heads in favour of the appellant-claimant. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the claimant has sustained 83.2 percent permanent disability and his age was about 45 years on the date of the accident. Learned counsel further submitted that the claimant-appellant remained admitted in hospital for 152 days. Learned counsel further submitted that the learned Tribunal has erred in determining the disability of the claimant as 60% without any basis simply by saying that the Doctor was not examined. Learned counsel further argued that when disability certificate issued by the medical board of three Doctors was available on the record, there was no need to examine the doctor to prove the permanent disability certificate. 4. In support of his contentions, learned counsel placed reliance on a judgment passed by this Court in Civil Misc. appeal No.3537 of 2018 in "Pappu Saini Vs. Sumer Singh Gurjar & Ors." wherein this Court has held that the Doctor is not required to be examined to prove the permanent disability certificate when the certificate has been issued by the medical board. Learned counsel further submitted that admittedly the age of the claimant was 45 years, hence, multiplier of 14 should have been applied, but without any basis, the learned Tribunal has applied the multiplier of 13. 5. Learned counsel further submitted that the claimant was having his own shop and also used to do the business of tours and travelling and because of 83.2 percent permanent disability, he is not able to do his business and daily activities. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance upon a judgment passed by this Court in S.B. Civil Mis. appeal No.4615/2017 in "Leelaram Vs. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance upon a judgment passed by this Court in S.B. Civil Mis. appeal No.4615/2017 in "Leelaram Vs. Deshraj & Ors." decided on 09.12.2021, wherein the injured sustained 90 percent disability and this Court awarded Rs.3,00,000/- towards loss of amenities in life. 7. Lastly, learned counsel submitted that as per the judgment of Hon'ble apex Court in the case of Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation: (2009) 6 SCC 121 , the claimant is also entitled for 25 percent amount of compensation under the head of future prospects. 8. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent-Insurance Company submitted that the learned Tribunal while deciding the claim petition of the claimant-appellant has rightly taken into consideration the factors while calculating the amount of compensation, in the case after evaluating the evidence available on the record. Learned counsel further submitted that the judgment dated 21.02.2012 does not call for any intereference by this Court. 9. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, is not in a position to controvert the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant with respect to re-computation of the award in the present case in the light of the judgments passed by this Court in the cases of "Pappu Saini" (supra), "Sarla Verma" (supra) and "Leelaram" (supra). 10. I have considered the rival submissions made by the counsel at Bar and gone through the judgment dated 21.02.2012, as well as the other relevant documents available on the record. It is not in dispute that the claimant was 45 years of age at the time of accident, therefore, the learned Tribunal was not right in applying the multiplier of 13 and looking to the age of the claimant, multiplier of 14 is applicable. 11. The learned Tribunal has erred in determining the disability of the claimant as 60 percent without any basis, when the disability certificate of the claimant indicates that he sustained 83.2 permanent disability and the disability certificate was issued by the medical board of three doctors. The learned Tribunal has also erred in not granting 25 percent future prospects to the claimant and not a single penny has been awarded towards 152 days of treatment spent in the hospital. 12. The learned Tribunal has also erred in not granting 25 percent future prospects to the claimant and not a single penny has been awarded towards 152 days of treatment spent in the hospital. 12. While the permanent disability as certified by the doctors stands at 83.2%, the same by no means, adequately reflects the travails the impaired claimant will have to face all his life. The 45 years old aged person's dreams and future hopes were snuffed out by the serious accident. The claimant's impaired condition has certainly impacted his family members. Their resources and strength are bound to be stressed by the need to provide full time care to the claimant. For the appellant to constantly rely on them for stimulation and support is destined to cause emotional, physical and financial fatigue for all stakeholders. 13. The Motor Vehicles act is in the nature of social welfare legislation and its provisions make it clear that the compensation should be justly determined. In "Helen C. Rebello and others V. Maharashtra SRTC and anr., reported in 1999(1) SCC 90 , the Hon'ble apex Court has held the following on the contours of 'just' compensation, 'The word 'just', as its nomenclature, denotes equitability, fairness and reasonableness having a large peripheral field. The largeness is, of course, not arbitrary; it is restricted by the conscience which is fair, reasonable and equitable, if it exceeds; it is termed as unfair, unreasonable, unequitable, not just.' 14. a person therefore is not only to be compensated for the injury suffered due to the accident but also for the loss suffered on account of the injury and his inability to lead the life he led, prior to the life-altering event. Three Judges' Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in "Jagdish Vs. Mohan and others" reported in 2018(4) SCC 571 , made the following relevant observation on the intrinsic value of human life and dignity that is attempted to be recognised, through such compensatory awards, '..the measure of compensation must reflect a genuine attempt of the law to restore the dignity of the being. Our yardsticks of compensation should not be so abysmal as to lead one to question whether our law values human life. If it does, as it must, it must provide a realistic recompense for the pain of loss and the trauma of suffering. awards of compensation are not law's doles. Our yardsticks of compensation should not be so abysmal as to lead one to question whether our law values human life. If it does, as it must, it must provide a realistic recompense for the pain of loss and the trauma of suffering. awards of compensation are not law's doles. In a discourse of rights, they constitute entitlements under law.' 15. The Courts should strive to provide a realistic recompense having regard to the realities of life, both in terms of assessment of the extent of disabilities and its impact including the income generating capacity of the claimant. 16. The extent of economic loss arising from a disability may not be measured in proportions to the extent of permanent disability. 17. This aspect was noticed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in "Raj Kumar Vs. ajay Kumar and anr.", reported in 2011 (1) SCC 343 that:- '10. Where the claimant suffers a permanent disability as a result of injuries, the assessment of compensation under the head of loss of future earnings would depend upon the effect and impact of such permanent disability on his earning capacity. The Tribunal should not mechanically apply the percentage of permanent disability as the percentage of economic loss or loss of earning capacity. In most of the cases, the percentage of economic loss, that is, the percentage of loss of earning capacity, arising from a permanent disability will be different from the percentage of permanent disability. Some Tribunals wrongly assume that in all cases, a particular extent (percentage) of permanent disability would result in a corresponding loss of earning capacity, and consequently, if the evidence produced shows 45% as the permanent disability, will hold that there is 45% loss of future earning capacity. In most of the cases, equating the extent (percentage) of loss of earning capacity to the extent (percentage) of permanent disability will result in award of either too low or too high a compensation. 11. What requires to be assessed by the Tribunal is the effect of the permanent disability on the earning capacity of the injured; and after assessing the loss of earning capacity in terms of a percentage of the income, it has to be quantified in terms of money, to arrive at the future loss of earnings (by applying the standard multiplier method used to determine loss of dependency). We may however note that in some cases, on appreciation of evidence and assessment, the Tribunal may find that the percentage of loss 4 (2011)1 SCC 343 of earning capacity as a result of the permanent disability, is approximately the same as the percentage of permanent disability in which case, of course, the Tribunal will adopt the said percentage for determination of compensation.' 18. The test for determining the effect of permanent disability on future earning capacity involves the following 3 steps as was laid down in Raj Kumar (supra) and reiterated by Hon'ble apex Court in "Chanappa Nagappa Muchalagoda Vs. Divisional Manager, New India Insurance Company Limited" reported in 2020 (1) SCC 796 that:- '13. ascertainment of the effect of the permanent disability on the actual earning capacity involves three steps. The Tribunal has to first ascertain what activities the claimant could carry on in spite of the permanent disability and what he could not do as a result of the permanent disability (this is also relevant for awarding compensation under the head of loss of amenities of life). The second step is to ascertain his avocation, profession and nature of work before the accident, as also his age. The third step is to find out whether (i) the claimant is totally disabled from earning any kind of livelihood, or (ii) whether in spite of the permanent disability, the claimant could still effectively carry on the activities and functions, which he was earlier carrying on, or (iii) whether he was prevented or restricted from discharging his previous activities and functions, but could carry on some other or lesser scale of activities and functions so that he continues to earn or can continue to earn his livelihood.' 19. The above yardstick was reaffirmed by Hon'ble apex Court in "Pappu Deo Yadav Vs. Naresh Kumar and others" reported in 2020 SCC online 752. The following was set out by the three Judges' Bench: '13. The factual narrative discloses that the appellant, a 20-year-old data entry operator (who had studied up to 12th standard) incurred permanent disability, i.e. loss of his right hand (which was amputated). The disability was assessed to be 89%. However, the tribunal and the High Court re-assessed the disability to be only 45%, on the assumption that the assessment for compensation was to be on a different basis, as the injury entailed loss of only one arm. The disability was assessed to be 89%. However, the tribunal and the High Court re-assessed the disability to be only 45%, on the assumption that the assessment for compensation was to be on a different basis, as the injury entailed loss of only one arm. This approach, in the opinion of this court, is completely mechanical and entirely ignores realities. Whilst it is true that assessment of injury of one limb or to one part may not entail permanent injury to the whole body, the inquiry which the court has to conduct is the resultant loss which the injury entails to the earning or income generating capacity of the claimant. Thus, loss of one leg to someone carrying on a vocation such as driving or something that entails walking or constant mobility, results in severe income generating impairment or its extinguishment altogether. Likewise, for one involved in a job like a carpenter or hairdresser, or machinist, and an experienced one at that, loss of an arm, (more so a functional arm) leads to near extinction of income generation. If the age of the victim is beyond 40, the scope of rehabilitation too diminishes. These individual factors are of crucial importance which are to be borne in mind while determining the extent of permanent disablement, for the purpose of assessment of loss of earning capacity.' '20. Courts should not adopt a stereotypical or myopic approach, but instead, view the matter taking into account the realities of life, both in the assessment of the extent of disabilities, and compensation under various heads. In the present case, the loss of an arm, in the opinion of the court, resulted in severe income earning impairment upon the appellant. as a typist/data entry operator, full functioning of his hands was essential to his livelihood. The extent of his permanent disablement was assessed at 89%; however, the High Court halved it to 45% on an entirely wrong application of some 'proportionate' principle, which was illogical and is unsupportable in law. What is to be seen, as emphasized by decision after decision, is the impact of the injury upon the income generating capacity of the victim. The loss of a limb (a leg or arm) and its severity on that account is to be judged in relation to the profession, vocation or business of the victim; there cannot be a blind arithmetic formula for ready application. The loss of a limb (a leg or arm) and its severity on that account is to be judged in relation to the profession, vocation or business of the victim; there cannot be a blind arithmetic formula for ready application. On an overview of the principles outlined in the previous decisions, it is apparent that the income generating capacity of the appellant was undoubtedly severely affected. Maybe, it is not to the extent of 89%, given that he still has the use of one arm, is young and as yet, hopefully training (and rehabilitating) himself adequately for some other calling. Nevertheless, the assessment of disability cannot be 45%; it is assessed at 65% in the circumstances of this case.' 20. In "Govind Yadav V. The New India Insurance Company Ltd.", reported in 2011 (10) SCC 683 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that: '18. In our view, the principles laid down in arvind Kumar Mishra v. New India assurance Company Ltd. (supra) and Raj Kumar v. ajay Kumar (supra) must be followed by all the Tribunals and the High Courts in determining the quantum of compensation payable to the victims of accident, who are disabled either permanently or temporarily. If the victim of the accident suffers permanent disability, then efforts should always be made to award adequate compensation not only for the physical injury and treatment, but also for the loss of earning and his inability to lead a normal life and enjoy amenities, which he would have enjoyed but for the disability caused due to the accident.' (emphasis supplied) 21. In "K. Suresh v. New India assurance Company Ltd.", reported in 2012 (12) SCC 724, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that:- '10. It is noteworthy to state that an adjudicating authority, while determining quantum of compensation, has to keep in view the sufferings of the injured person which would include his inability to lead a full life, his incapacity to enjoy the normal amenities which he would have enjoyed but for the injuries and his ability to earn as much as he used to earn or could have earned. Hence, while computing compensation the approach of the tribunal or a court has to be broad based. Needless to say, it would involve some guesswork as there cannot be any mathematical exactitude or a precise formula to determine the quantum of compensation. Hence, while computing compensation the approach of the tribunal or a court has to be broad based. Needless to say, it would involve some guesswork as there cannot be any mathematical exactitude or a precise formula to determine the quantum of compensation. In determination of compensation the fundamental criterion of 'just compensation' should be inhered.' (emphasis supplied) 22. This Court finds that the compensation awarded to the appellant is insufficient. The appellant has sustained 83.2% permanant disability and not a single penny has been awarded to him towards the head of 'loss of future amenities in life' and 'loss of future prospects', hence, the impugned award needs suitable enhancement. In view of the material available on record, the appellant-claimant is entitled to get compensation in the following terms:- Monthly income Rs. 3450 X 83/100 = Rs.2863.5/- annual income Rs. 2863.5 x12 = Rs.34,362/- per annum Multiplier to be applied 14 34,362 X 14 = Rs.4,81,068/- add 25 per cent towards future prospects Rs.4,81,068 + Rs. 1,20,267 = Rs. 6,01,335/- add medical expenses Rs. 1,00,000/- add transportation expenses Rs.25,000/- add hospital charges Rs.600 (per day) X 152 (days)= 91,200/- add loss of amenities in life Rs.3,00,000/- Total compensation awardable Rs. 11,17,535/- Less amount awarded by the Tribunal Rs. 11,17,535 - Rs.5,22,950 = Rs.5,94,585/- Enhanced amount of compensation Rs. 5,94,585/- 23. In view of the above, the appellant-claimant would be entitled to get a further sum of Rs. 5,94,585/-, which shall carry interest @ 6% per annum from the date of filing the claim petition till the actual payment is made. 24. Consequently, the appeal is disposed of. The enhanced compensation shall be paid by the Insurance Company within a period of six weeks of this judgment. The Tribunal shall disburse Rs.2,00,000/- in the Saving Bank account of the claimant and the balance amout of the enhanced compensation be invested in any Nationalised Bank for a period of three years and interest accrued on the deposit shall be paid to the appellant on monthly basis. 25. Record of the trial Court be sent back forthwith.