JUDGMENT : S.H. Vora, J. 1. Feeling aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and order dated 15.11.2021 passed by the learned Special Judge and Additional Sessions Judge, Anand in Special (POCSO) Case No. 33 of 2018, whereby the respondent accused came to be acquitted for the offences punishable u/s. 363, 366, 376 of the IPC and u/s. 4, 5 and 18 of the POCSO Act, 2012, the appellant - wife of the original complainant has preferred present criminal appeal u/s. 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short "the Code"). 2. Briefly stated, complainant Parshottambhai Vankar lodged the complaint with Borsad Rural Police Station against the respondent accused vide I - C.R. No. 05 of 2018. As per the prosecution case, on 13.1.2018, the complainant was informed by her wife Vimlaben that their daughter went at 9:00 a.m. at bank river for washing clothes and as she did not return till 10:30 a.m. and could not trace nearby and also in the village itself, namely Vahera, the complainant made inquiry from the person residing nearby i.e. respondent accused and as he was not found and both the victim and the accused were knowing each other, present complaint came to be filed against the respondent accused for abduction and kidnapping. In pursuance of the complaint lodged by the complainant, the investigating agency collected the evidence in form of statement of witnesses and documentary evidence and after having found material against the respondent accused, charge-sheet came to be filed in the Special Court and it came to be registered as Special (POCSO) Case No. 33 of 2018. The learned trial Court framed the charge at Exh.5 against the respondent accused for the aforesaid offences. The respondent accused pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. 3. In order to bring home the charge, the prosecution has examined 11 witnesses and also produced documentary evidence in form of complaint, medical certificate of the victim, 164 statement of the victim, FSL report and other documentary evidence before the learned trial Court. 4. On conclusion of trial, the respondent accused was generally examined under the provisions of Section 313 of the Code and in the further statement, the respondent-accused denied his involvement in the crime and further stated that false case is lodged against him. 4. On conclusion of trial, the respondent accused was generally examined under the provisions of Section 313 of the Code and in the further statement, the respondent-accused denied his involvement in the crime and further stated that false case is lodged against him. After hearing both the sides and after analysis of the evidence adduced by the prosecution before the trial Court, the respondent-accused came to be acquitted from the charge of the offences framed against him. 5. We have heard learned advocate Mr. Vicky Mehta for the appellant. According to him, the learned trial Court recorded order of acquittal mainly on the ground that the prosecution failed to explain with regard to discrepancy in the surnames, namely Rathod and Vankar in the birth certificate of the victim and stated by her before the Court and therefore, according to him, the learned trial judge has committed an error in disbelieving the birth certificate of the victim. It is further submitted by him that there is no dispute that the patents' name are correctly recorded. If the birth certificate is to be considered, the birth date of the victim is 15.1.2000 and the incident was occurred on 13.1.2018 and therefore, on the date of the incident, still the victim was minor and therefore, finding of the learned trial Court that the victim was not minor on the date of the incident is contrary to the evidence. Learned advocate for the appellant further submits that the respondent accused forced the victim to join him, otherwise, the accused would commit suicide and under this tactics, she was compelled to abandon her guardianship and therefore, offence punishable u/s. 363 and 366 of the IPC is clearly made out. On these broad submissions, learned advocate Mr. Mehta for the appellant would submit that present appeal may be considered for admission and the judgment and order may be reversed. 6. We have minutely examined the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution before the trial court and we have heard the submissions of the learned advocate Mr. Mehta appearing for the appellant at length. On re-appreciation of the evidence, we have noticed that the complainant's wife could not explain or provide proper explanation with regard to discrepancy in the surname shown in the birth certificate at Exh.9 and disclosed by her. Mehta appearing for the appellant at length. On re-appreciation of the evidence, we have noticed that the complainant's wife could not explain or provide proper explanation with regard to discrepancy in the surname shown in the birth certificate at Exh.9 and disclosed by her. The complainant has disclosed his surname as Vankar, whereas in the birth certificate, her surname is shown as Rathod. No any explanation is forwarded as to why surname of the victim in birth certificate is shown as Rathod. Not only that, the prosecution has not made any attempt to produce any further evidence to clarify the discrepancy with regard to surname of the victim by leading other cogent evidence from other competent authority. Apart from it, we have noticed that the victim has not supported the prosecution case and the complainant is not examined. Similarly, the medical evidence and expert evidence do not prove that any act of intercourse is committed by the respondent accused. Though the victim turned hostile, but she disclosed in the cross-examination by the prosecution that she was compelled to leave her guardianship on account of threat given by the respondent accused. Learned advocate Mr. Mehta's submission in this regard needs not to be taken any further, because when major offences alleged against the respondent accused have not been established, the Court would not like to consider occurrence of other minor offences. Once the Court has agreed with the findings recorded by the learned trial Court with regard to major offence in favour of the accused person, the Court is not required to look into minor offence, as the prosecution has failed to establish the essential ingredients of section 376 of the IPC and offence of the POCSO Act. We do not find any infirmity or compelling reason to interfere with the judgment and order recorded by the learned trial Court. 7. The appellate Court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial Court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. We do not find any infirmity or compelling reason to interfere with the judgment and order recorded by the learned trial Court. 7. The appellate Court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial Court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Keeping in mind the evidence adduced by the trial Court and also settled principle as to scope of appeal against the acquittal order there are no good reasons to interfere with the findings of the trial court as there is no iota of evidence to infer that the respondent-accused has committed an act of rape against the wish and will of the victim or the victim was as alleged. Since the victim has not supported the prosecution case and the complainant is not examined, the prosecution case cannot be believed as to occurrence of the incident on 13.1.2018. 8. It is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that in an acquittal appeal if other view is possible, then also, the appellate Court cannot substitute its own view by reversing the acquittal into conviction, unless the findings of the trial Court are perverse, contrary to the material on record, palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. (Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat (1996) 9 SCC 225 ). In the instant case, the learned APP has not been able to point out to us as to how the findings recorded by the learned trial Court are perverse, contrary to material on record, palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. 9. In the case of Ram Kumar v. State of Haryana, reported in AIR 1995 SC 280 , Supreme Court has held as under: The powers of the High Court in an appeal from order of acquittal to reassess the evidence and reach its own conclusions under Sections 378 and 379, Cr.P.C. are as extensive as in any appeal against the order of conviction. But as a rule of prudence, it is desirable that the High Court should give proper weight and consideration to the view of the Trial Court with regard to the credibility of the witness, the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt and the slowness of appellate Court in justifying a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witness. It is settled law that if the main grounds on which the lower Court has based its order acquitting the accused are reasonable and plausible, and the same cannot entirely and effectively be dislodged or demolished, the High Court should not disturb the order of acquittal." 10. As observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajesh Singh & Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2011) 11 SCC 444 and in the case of Bhaiyamiyan Alias Jardar Khan and Another v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2011) 6 SCC 394 , while dealing with the judgment of acquittal, unless reasoning by the learned trial Court is found to be perverse, the acquittal cannot be upset. It is further observed that High Court's interference in such appeal in somewhat circumscribed and if the view taken by the learned trial Court is possible on the evidence, the High Court should stay its hands and not interfere in the matter in the belief that if it had been the trial Court, it might have taken a different view. 11. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case and law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the scope of appeal under Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, no case is made out to interfere with the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. 12. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, present criminal appeal fails and same deserves to be dismissed and is according dismissed.