ORDER : [Parth Prateem Sahu, J.] 1. Appellant by this writ appeal has questioned the correctness and sustainability of impugned order dated 03.10.2017 passed in W.P. No. 850 of 2000, where by learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition holding that there is no illegality in the order of Commissioner warranting interference in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of Constitution of India. 2. Facts relevant for disposal of this writ appeal are that Lachhinder, father of appellants purchased land bearing No. 33, 42, 51/8, 58, total area 8.30 acres situated in village Chopawand, R.I. Circle Kondagaon, Tahsil Kondagaon from one Pilu S/o Ayatu Gond, a tribal person, vide registered sale deed dated 02.05.1967. After coming into force of provisions under Section 170B of C.G. Land Revenue Code, 1959 (Earlier M.P. Land Revenue Code) (hereinafter referred to as the “the Code of 1959”), father of appellants/petitioners submitted details of his possession over the land originally recorded in the name of a person belonging to scheduled tribe community. The Competent Authority i.e. Sub- Divisional Officer (Revenue), issued notice. As the seller remained absent, therefore, he was proceeded ex-parte. Father of Appellant/petitioner herein also not produced any document and consequently the proceedings initiated based on purchaser’s application was dismissed by the S.D.O.(R). The Additional Collector upon receiving direction issued by the Collector initiated suo-motu revision proceedings in the year 1993 with respect to transfer of lands by members of scheduled tribe community. Additional Collector vide order dated 18.10.1993 ordered for reversion of land in favour of tribal person (seller). Order of Collector was challenged further in a revision before Commissioner, Bastar Division, Jagdalpur, which came to be allowed on 22.08.1996, considering that the finding recorded by SDO(R) that both the parties have not taken any interest in the proceedings for closing the case and remitted back the case to S.D.O.(R) for deciding the case afresh after giving opportunity of hearing to all the parties. After remand, S.D.O.(R) came to conclusion that transfer of land by tribal to non-tribal was not bonafide and ordered for reversion of land in favour of tribal person. Order of S.D.O.(R) dated 29.07.1998 was again challenged before Collector in an appeal, which came to be allowed and the order of S.D.O(R) was set-aside vide order dated 29.06.1999. After remand, S.D.O.(R) came to conclusion that transfer of land by tribal to non-tribal was not bonafide and ordered for reversion of land in favour of tribal person. Order of S.D.O.(R) dated 29.07.1998 was again challenged before Collector in an appeal, which came to be allowed and the order of S.D.O(R) was set-aside vide order dated 29.06.1999. The legal representatives of seller of land preferred revision before the Commissioner, Bastar Division, Jagdalpur, which came to be allowed on 25.11.1999 restoring the order of S.D.O.(R) dated 29.07.1998 and setting aside the order passed by the Additional Collector, Jagdalpur. The order of Commissioner was challenged in writ petition. 3. The writ Court after discussing merits of the case, dismissed the writ petition holding that the order passed by Commissioner recording finding that transaction was not bonafide does not suffer from any illegality calling for interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of Constitution of India. 4. Learned counsel for respondents raised an objection of maintainability of writ appeal referring to proviso to Section 2 of the Chhattisgarh High Court (Appeal to Division Bench) Act, 2006 (in short 'the Act, 2006”). He contended that under proviso to Section (2) of Act, 2006, appeal against an order passed in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of Constitution of India is barred. 5. Mr. Parag Kotecha, learned counsel appearing on behalf of appellants would submit that by an order passed by the revenue Court, appellants are deprived of their property, which is a fundamental right. Initially writ petition was filed under Article 226 & 227 of Constitution of India both, but without there being any order of the Court or any correction made by appellants, the words “226” mentioned in the heading of the writ petition was circled by red pen (deleted). As the correction/amendment in the cause title of writ petition was without there being any order passed by the Court or was not done by petitioners/appellants, writ petition is to be treated under Article 226 and 227 of Constitution of India. He further pointed out that petition was filed under Article 226 & 227 of Constitution of India and therefore, looking to the nature of relief sought for in the writ petition, it ought to have been treated as under Article 226 of Constitution of India. 6. He further pointed out that petition was filed under Article 226 & 227 of Constitution of India and therefore, looking to the nature of relief sought for in the writ petition, it ought to have been treated as under Article 226 of Constitution of India. 6. On merits of appeal, counsel for appellants submits that after obtaining prior permission of Competent Authority, sale deed was executed by seller in favor of Lachhinder, father of appellants, in the year 1967. Seller, an aboriginal tribe or his successor, had never made any complaint alleging that fraud was practiced upon seller of the lands. After payment of agreed consideration, sale deed was executed and therefore, transaction is bonafide. Purchaser of land submitted statement before Sub- Divisional Officer, as mandated under Section 170-B of the Code, 1959, immediately after coming into force of the said provisions. Learned Single Judge only appreciated the amount of sale consideration i.e. Rs.1500/- as mentioned in the sale deed, to be too less and did not take into consideration the period or year when the sale deed was executed, which was way back in the year 1967. He contended that the sale deed executed in favour of Lachhinder was never challenged, therefore, there is valid presumption in favour of appellants of the bonafide transaction of sale. Learned Single Judge failed to consider that respondent Revenue Authorities have not observed the principles of natural justice. 7. Mr. Trivikram Nayak, learned State counsel would submit that from the contents of impugned order, it is apparent that the learned Single Judge exercised jurisdiction under Article 227 of Constitution of India and not under Article 226 of Constitution of India, hence, writ appeal is not maintainable in view of specific bar under proviso to Section 2 of Act, 2006. In support of his contention, he places reliance upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Shalini Shyam Shetty & Anr. Vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil, reported in (2010) 8 SCC 329 , Radhe Shyam & Anr. Vs. Chhabi Nath & Ors, reported in (2015) 5 SCC 423 , Life Insurance Corporation of India Vs. Nandini J. Shah & Ors., reported in (2018) 15 SCC 356 , and the judgment of M.P. High Court in case of Dangalia & Ors. Vs. Vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil, reported in (2010) 8 SCC 329 , Radhe Shyam & Anr. Vs. Chhabi Nath & Ors, reported in (2015) 5 SCC 423 , Life Insurance Corporation of India Vs. Nandini J. Shah & Ors., reported in (2018) 15 SCC 356 , and the judgment of M.P. High Court in case of Dangalia & Ors. Vs. Deshraj & Ors., reported in 1973 SCC Online M.P. 42, and judgment of this Court passed in Writ Appeal No.316 of 2020 Steel Authority of India Vs. Vs. Indian Oil Corporation, decided on 14.09.2020, Writ Appeal No. 489 of 2017 Gopal Kumar (died) through Lrs. Vinod Kumar and Others Vs. State of C.G. decided on 22.11.2017. 8. Learned counsel for State further contended that learned Single Judge took note of the fact that the Revenue Authorities in their orders have come to conclusion that separate order granting permission was not passed by Collector in favour of Lachhinder. Even if it is presumed that there was permission, area of land mentioned in the sale deed is more than the area for which permission was granted in favour of Chaitram, son of Lachhinder. Learned Single Judge considering entirety of the facts of the case, rightly dismissed writ petition vide order impugned, which does not call for any interference. 9. We have heard learned counsel for parties and perused the records of writ petition as well as writ appeal. 10. So far as the objection with regard to maintainability of writ appeal is concerned, perusal of memo of writ petition would show that initially writ petition was filed under “Article 226 and 227 of Constitution of India”. The figure ‘226’ is scored off by red colour ink and right tick mark was put on ‘227’. There is no endorsement as to when, who and under whose order correction was made. 11. In the above background, we have perused the order-sheets of writ petition. First order sheet was recorded on 07.02.2000. Interim order in the writ petition was passed on 14.07.2000, which was further extended on 11.08.2003. Order-sheet dated 31.08.2007 records that “Learned counsel appearing for the parties jointly submit that this case falls within the ambit of Article 227 of Constitution of India. Registry to verify and place the same before appropriate Bench.” The aforementioned order sheet dated 31.08.2007 only records submission made by counsel appearing for the parties on the said date. Order-sheet dated 31.08.2007 records that “Learned counsel appearing for the parties jointly submit that this case falls within the ambit of Article 227 of Constitution of India. Registry to verify and place the same before appropriate Bench.” The aforementioned order sheet dated 31.08.2007 only records submission made by counsel appearing for the parties on the said date. The Court has not directed either to the counsel or to the Registry to carry out any correction in the heading of memo of petition. In absence of any order granting permission to carry out necessary corrections in writ petition or directions to the Registry to delete any word or portion of heading of writ petition, no amendment/correction could have been carried out in the writ petition. There is no observation, order or direction of the writ Court for making amendment, correction or deletion of word/figure ‘226’ from cause title. 12. Learned counsel for appellants made submissions before this Court that writ petition was filed under Article 226/227 of Constitution of India both and not only under Article 227 only. Under aforementioned facts, reliefs sought in writ petition would become more relevant to be considered, which are as under :- “(I). The Hon’ble Court be pleased to quash the order dated 29.07.1998 passed by the Sub Divisional Officer (Annexure P-8) and the order dated 25.11.1999 passed by Commissioner, Jagdalpur (Annexure P-12) by issuing a writ of certiorari. (II). The Hon’ble Court be further pleased to declare that the order passed by the Additional Collector on 29.06.1999 (Annexure P-11) is perfectly valid and that the sale of the land made by late Shri Pilu to the petitioner vide registered sale deed dated 02.05.1967 was bonafide after having obtained permission from the Collector. (III) Any other relief which may be deemed just and proper under the circumstances of the case.” 13. Perusal of above relief sought for in this petition shows that petitioner sought quashment of order of Sub-Divisional Officer (R) dated 29.07.1998, order of Commissioner, Jagdalpur dated 25.11.1999 and also the order of Commissioner, Jagdalpur by issuing writ of certiorari. Revenue Authorities are made parties to the writ petition. The issue involved in the writ petition was of transfer of land measuring 8.30 acres. The orders under challenge were passed by Revenue Authorities in exercise of their jurisdiction under the Code, 1959. Revenue Authorities are made parties to the writ petition. The issue involved in the writ petition was of transfer of land measuring 8.30 acres. The orders under challenge were passed by Revenue Authorities in exercise of their jurisdiction under the Code, 1959. In light of aforementioned facts of the case, now it is to be examined whether writ petition can be treated to be filed only under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, as submitted by learned counsel for State-respondents. 14. We have discussed in preceding paragraph that no specific order was passed by the writ Court for making any amendment or correction in the cause title of writ petition based on statement of the counsel for the parties appearing on particular date. There is no bar in filing writ petition under both Article 226 and 227 of Constitution of India, and therefore, when once writ petition is filed under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India both, in our considered view even if figure ‘226’ is scored off by red colour ink, it cannot be read or treated that writ petition is filed only under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Once writ petition is filed and listed before the Court for hearing, then unless permission is sought, either oral or by filing an application for making correction/amendment, and the same was allowed by the Court, neither counsel nor officers of the Registry could have corrected or made amendment in the pleadings. Therefore, in the larger interest of justice we are inclined to accept submission of learned counsel for appellants that writ petition was filed under both Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 15. Second objection raised by learned State counsel regarding maintainability is that learned Single Judge recorded in the impugned order that “it was not a fit case to exercise jurisdiction under Article 227 of Constitution of India” and therefore, in view of proviso to Section 2 of the Act, 2006 writ appeal is not maintainable. 16. To appreciate the submission of learned counsel for State-respondents we find it appropriate to have a look at some decisions on the issue in question. 17. In case of Jogenderasinhji Vijaysinghji Vs. 16. To appreciate the submission of learned counsel for State-respondents we find it appropriate to have a look at some decisions on the issue in question. 17. In case of Jogenderasinhji Vijaysinghji Vs. State of Gujrat & Ors, reported in (2015) 9 SCC 1 , while dealing with an appeal arising out of dismissal of Letter Patent Appeal, prescribed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, by the Division Bench of High Court of Gujrat, Hon’ble Supreme Court considering its earlier decisions, held as under :- “20. In Umaji Keshao Meshram and Others v. Radhikabai and Another, this Court has held thus:- “106. The non obstante clause in Rule 18, namely, “Notwithstanding anything contained in Rules 1, 4 and 17 of this chapter”, makes it abundantly clear why that rule uses the words “finally disposed of”. As seen above, under Rules 1 and 17, applications under Articles 226 and 227 are required to be heard and disposed of by a Division Bench. Rule 4, however, gives power to a Single Judge to issue rule nisi on an application under Article 226 but precludes him from passing any final order on such application. It is because a Single Judge has no power under Rules 1, 4 and 17 to hear and dispose of a petition under Article 226 or 227 that the non obstante clause has been introduced in Rule 18. The use of the words “be heard and finally disposed of by a Single Judge” in Rule 18 merely clarifies the position that in such cases the power of the Single Judge is not confined merely to issuing a rule nisi. These words were not intended to bar a right of appeal. To say that the words “finally disposed of” mean finally disposed of so far as the High Court is concerned is illogical because Rules 1, 4 and 7 use the words “be heard and disposed of by a Divisional Bench” and were the reasoning of the Full Bench correct, it would mean that so far as the High Court is concerned, when a Single Judge hears a matter and disposes it of, it is finally disposed of and when a Division Bench disposes it of, it is not finally disposed of. The right of appeal against the judgment of a Single Judge is given by the Letters Patent which have been continued in force by Article 225 of the Constitution. If under the Rules of the High Court, a matter is heard and disposed of by a Single Judge, an appeal lies against his judgment unless it is barred either under the Letters Patent or some other enactment. The word “finally” used in Rule 18 of Chapter XVII of the Appellate Side Rules does not and cannot possibly have the effect of barring a right of appeal conferred by the Letters Patent. As we have seen above, an intra-court appeal against the judgment of a Single Judge in a petition under Article 226 is not barred while clause 15 itself bars an intra-court appeal against the judgment of a Single Judge in a petition under Article 227. 107. Petitions are at times filed both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The case of Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque before this Court was of such a type. Rule 18 provides that where such petitions are filed against orders of the Tribunals or authorities specified in Rule 18 of Chapter XVII of the Appellate Side Rules or against decrees or orders of courts specified in that rule, they shall be heard and finally disposed of by a Single Judge. The question is whether an appeal would lie from the decision of the Single Judge in such a case. In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution, and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226, and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Such was the view taken by the Allahabad High Court in Aidal Singh v. Karan Singh and by the Punjab High Court in Raj Kishan Jain v. Tulsi Dass and Barham Dutt v. Peoples’ Cooperative Transport Society Ltd., and we are in agreement with it.” 21. Similar view was reiterated in Sushilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar and others v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha, which arose from the High Court of Bombay. 22. In Mangalbhai and Others v. Radhyshyam the dismissal of an application for eviction by the Deputy Collector and Rent Controller and its assail in appeal not resulting in success, compelled the landlord to file a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India before the Bombay High Court. Before this Court, an objection was raised with regard to the maintainability of the letters patent appeal. This Court referred to the decision in Umaji Keshao Meshram case (supra) and opined as follows:- “6. Applying the correct ratio laid down in Umaji Keshao Meshram case (supra) and perusing the writ petition filed in the present case as well as the order passed by the learned Single Judge we are clearly of the view that the present case clearly falls within the ambit of Article 226 of the Constitution. In Umaji Keshao Meshram case (supra) it was clearly held that: “Where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution, and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 ….” 7. The learned Single Judge in his impugned judgment dated December 11, 1987 nowhere mentioned that he was exercising the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution. The learned Single Judge examined the matter on merit and set aside the orders of the Rent Controller as well as the Resident Deputy Collector on the ground that the aforesaid judgments were perverse. The findings of the Rent Controller and Resident Deputy Collector were set aside on the question of habitual defaulter as well as on the ground of bona fide need. The findings of the Rent Controller and Resident Deputy Collector were set aside on the question of habitual defaulter as well as on the ground of bona fide need. Thus in the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, the pleadings of the parties in the writ petition and the judgment of the learned Single Judge leaves no manner of doubt that it was an order passed under Article 226 of the Constitution and in that view of the matter the Letters Patent Appeal was maintainable before the High Court.” 23. In Lokmat Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. v. Shankarprasad, the controversy arose from the order passed by the Labour Court which had secured affirmation from the Industrial Tribunal. The said orders were challenged by the respondent therein by filing a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India before the High Court. The Court adverted to the facts and also the order passed by the learned Single Judge and in that context ruled:- “16…...As seen earlier, he was considering the aforesaid writ petition moved under Article 226 as well as Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Under these circumstances, it is not possible to agree with the contention of learned counsel for the appellant that the learned Single Judge had refused to interfere only under Article 227 of the Constitution of India when he dismissed the writ petition of the respondent.” 24. Thereafter, the learned Judges referred to the authority in Umaji Keshao Meshram (supra) and ruled:- “16. ………...The aforesaid decision squarely gets attracted on the facts of the present case. It was open to the respondent to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. Once such a jurisdiction was invoked and when his writ petition was dismissed on merits, it cannot be said that the learned Single Judge had exercised his jurisdiction only under Article 226 (sic 227) of the Constitution of India. This conclusion directly flows from the relevant averments made in the writ petition and the nature of jurisdiction invoked by the respondent as noted by the learned Single Judge in his judgment, as seen earlier. Consequently, it could not be said that clause 15 of the Letters Patent was not attracted for preferring appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge.” 25. Consequently, it could not be said that clause 15 of the Letters Patent was not attracted for preferring appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge.” 25. In Kishorilal v. District Land Development Bank, a recovery proceeding was initiated by the respondent- Bank therein and the land mortgaged to the Bank were sold. An appeal preferred before the Joint Registrar, Cooperative Societies was dismissed and a further appeal was preferred before the Board of Revenue which interfered with the order passed by the Joint Registrar. The order passed by the Board of Revenue was called in question by the District Land Development Bank, which was allowed by the learned Single Judge. A letters patent appeal was preferred challenging the order of the learned Single Judge which opined that the order passed by the learned Single Judge was not maintainable as he had exercised the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 26. Dealing with the maintainability of the appeal, the two-Judge Bench held that:- “13. “The learned Single Judge of the High Court, in our opinion, committed an error in interfering with the findings of fact arrived at by the Board of Revenue. The Division Bench of the High Court also wrongly dismissed the LPA without noticing that an appeal would be maintainable if the writ petition was filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India as was held by this Court in Sushilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha.” 27. In Ashok K. Jha v. Garden Silk Mills Ltd., as the factual matrix would reveal, the employees had approached the Labour Court for certain reliefs. The Labour Court on consideration of the facts and law, declined to grant the relief. Being dissatisfied, the employees and the Union preferred a joint appeal before the Industrial Court, Surat which set aside the order of the Labour Court and issued certain directions against the employer. The employer called in question the defensibility of the order of the Industrial Court by filing a Special Civil Application under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India before the High Court of Gujarat. The learned Single Judge dismissed the petition. Being grieved by the aforesaid order, a letters patent appeal was preferred under clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The Division Bench allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge dismissed the petition. Being grieved by the aforesaid order, a letters patent appeal was preferred under clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The Division Bench allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge. A contention was raised before this Court pertaining to maintainability of letters patent appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent. 28. R.M. Lodha, J. (as His Lordship then was) speaking for the Court, referred to the authorities in Umaji Keshao Meshram (supra), Ratnagiri Dist. Central Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Watve, Ramesh Chandra Sankla v. Vikram Cement and stated thus:- “36. If the judgment under appeal falls squarely within four corners of Article 227, it goes without saying that intra-court appeal from such judgment would not be maintainable. On the other hand, if the petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court for issuance of certain writ under Article 226, although Article 227 is also mentioned, and principally the judgment appealed against falls under Article 226, the appeal would be maintainable. What is important to be ascertained is the true nature of order passed by the Single Judge and not what provision he mentions while exercising such powers. 37. We agree with the view of this Court in Ramesh Chandra Sankla (supra) that a statement by a learned Single Judge that he has exercised power under Article 227, cannot take away right of appeal against such judgment if power is otherwise found to have been exercised under Article 226. The vital factor for determination of maintainability of the intra-court appeal is the nature of jurisdiction invoked by the party and the true nature of principal order passed by the Single Judge.” 29. At this juncture, we think it appropriate to reproduce a passage from Ramesh Chandra Sankla (supra) which has been quoted in Ashok Jha (supra). In the said case, the two-Judge Bench while dealing with the maintainability of letters patent appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent has ruled that:- “35. ……..”47, In our judgment, the learned counsel for the appellant is right in submitting that nomenclature of the proceeding or reference to a particular article of the Constitution is not final or conclusive. He is also right in submitting that an observation by a Single Judge as to how he had dealt with the matter is also not decisive. ……..”47, In our judgment, the learned counsel for the appellant is right in submitting that nomenclature of the proceeding or reference to a particular article of the Constitution is not final or conclusive. He is also right in submitting that an observation by a Single Judge as to how he had dealt with the matter is also not decisive. If it were so, a petition strictly falling under Article 226 simpliciter can be disposed of by a Single Judge observing that he is exercising power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. Can such statement by a Single Judge take away from the party aggrieved a right of appeal against the judgment if otherwise the petition is under Article 226 of the Constitution and subject to an intra- court/letters patent appeal? The reply unquestionably is in the negative….” 30. From the aforesaid pronouncements, it is graphically clear that maintainability of a letters patent appeal would depend upon the pleadings in the writ petition, the nature and character of the order passed by the learned Single Judge, the type of directions issued regard being had to the jurisdictional perspectives in the constitutional context. Barring the civil court, from which order as held by the three-Judge Bench in Radhey Shyam (supra) that a writ petition can lie only under Article 227 of the Constitution, orders from tribunals cannot always be regarded for all purposes to be under Article 227 of the Constitution. Whether the learned Single Judge has exercised the jurisdiction under Article 226 or under Article 227 or both, needless to emphasise, would depend upon various aspects that have been emphasised in the aforestated authorities of this Court. There can be orders passed by the learned Single Judge which can be construed as an order under both the articles in a composite manner, for they can co-exist, coincide and imbricate. We reiterate it would depend upon the nature, contour and character of the order and it will be the obligation of the Division Bench hearing the letters patent appeal to discern and decide whether the order has been passed by the learned Single Judge in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution or both. We reiterate it would depend upon the nature, contour and character of the order and it will be the obligation of the Division Bench hearing the letters patent appeal to discern and decide whether the order has been passed by the learned Single Judge in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution or both. The Division Bench would also be required to scrutinize whether the facts of the case justify the assertions made in the petition to invoke the jurisdiction under both the articles and the relief prayed on that foundation. Be it stated, one of the conclusions recorded by the High Court in the impugned judgment pertains to demand and payment of court fees. We do not intend to comment on the same as that would depend upon the rules framed by the High Court.” 18. In case of State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. Vs. Visan Kumar Shiv Charan Lal, reported in (2008) 15 SCC 233 , while dealing with an appeal arising out of Letter Patent Appeal dismissed by Division Bench of High Court of M.P. as not maintainable because the order passed by learned Single Judge was in terms of Article 227 of Constitution of India, Hon’ble Supreme Court considering its earlier decision in Umaji Keshao Meshram Vs. Radhikabai, reported in (1986) Supp. SCC 401, Sushilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar Vs. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha, reported in 1993 Supp. (1) SCC 11, Mangalbhai Vs. Dr. Radheshyam, reported in (1992) 3 SCC 448 , Lokmat Newspapers (P) Ltd. Vs. Shankarprasad, reported in (1999) 6 SCC 275 , Surya Dev Rai Vs. Ram Chander Rai, reported in (2003) 6 SCC 675 and other decisions, allowed the appeal, setaside the order of Division Bench of High Court of Madhya Pradesh and remitted back the case for hearing on merits. 19. Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Lokmat Newspapers (P) Ltd. (supra), at para -16 has held as under :- "16. It is, therefore, obvious that the writ petition invoking jurisdiction of the High Court both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution had tried to make out a case for the High Court's interference seeking issuance of an appropriate writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Basic averments for invoking such a jurisdiction were already pleaded in the writ petition for the High Court's consideration. Basic averments for invoking such a jurisdiction were already pleaded in the writ petition for the High Court's consideration. It is true, as submitted by learned counsel for the appellant, that the order of the learned Single Judge nowhere stated that the Court was considering the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is equally true that the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition by observing that the courts below had appreciated the contentions and rejected the complaint. But the said observation of the learned Single Judge did not necessarily mean that the learned Judge was not inclined to interfere under Article 227 of the Constitution of India only. The said observation equally supports the conclusion that the learned Judge was not inclined to interfere under Articles 226 and 227. As seen earlier, he was considering the aforesaid writ petition moved under Article 226 as well as Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Under these circumstances, it is not possible to agree with the contention of learned counsel for the appellant that the learned Single Judge had refused to interfere only under Article 227 of the Constitution of India when he dismissed the writ petition of the respondent. In this connection, it is profitable to have a look at the decision of this Court in the case of Umaji Keshao Meshram v. Radhikabai. In that case O. Chinnappa Reddy and D.P. Madon, JJ., considered the very same question in the light of clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court. Madon, J., speaking for the Court in para 107 of the Report at p. 473, made the following pertinent observations: "107. Petitions are at times filed both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The case of Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque before this Court was of such a type. Rule 18 provides that where such petitions are filed against orders of the tribunals or authorities specified in Rule 18 of Chapter XVII of the Appellate Side Rules or against decrees or orders of courts specified in that rule, they shall be heard and finally disposed of by a Single Judge. The question is whether an appeal would lie from the decision of the Single Judge in such a case. The question is whether an appeal would lie from the decision of the Single Judge in such a case. In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution, and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226, and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Such was the view taken by the Allahabad High Court in Aidal Singh v. Karan Singh and by the Punjab High Court in Raj Kishan Jain v. Tulsi Dass and Barham Dutt v. Peoples' Coop. Transport Society Ltd. and we are in agreement with it." The aforesaid decision squarely gets attracted on the facts of the present case. It was open to the respondent to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. Once such a jurisdiction was invoked and when his writ petition was dismissed on merits, it cannot be said that the learned Single Judge had exercised his jurisdiction only under Article 226 (sic 227) of the Constitution of India. This conclusion directly flows from the relevant averments made in the writ petition and the nature of jurisdiction invoked by the respondent as noted by the learned Single Judge in his judgment, as seen earlier. Consequently, it could not be said that clause 15 of the Letters Patent was not attracted for preferring appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge. It is also necessary to note that the appellant being the respondent in letters patent appeal joined issues on merits and did not take up the contention that the letters patent appeal was not maintainable. For all these reasons, therefore, the primary objection to the maintainability of the letters patent appeal as canvassed by learned counsel for the appellant, has to be repelled. For all these reasons, therefore, the primary objection to the maintainability of the letters patent appeal as canvassed by learned counsel for the appellant, has to be repelled. Point 1 is, therefore, answered in the affirmative against the appellant and in favour of the respondent. It takes us to the consideration of points arising for our decision on merits." 20. In light of above decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court, if the facts of present case are considered, as discussed above, it is clear that writ petition was initially filed under Article 226/227 of Constitution of India both. There was no order for amendment, however, “226” was deleted later on without endorsement as to on whose order or direction said amendment was made. 21. In case of Umaji Keshao Mesharam (supra), question for determination was whether an appeal would lie from the decision of Single Bench in a petition filed under Article 226 and 227 of Constitution of India. In such case Hon’ble Supreme Court held that where the facts justified a party in filing an application under either Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal, the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226, and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. 22. In another decision, rendered in case of Ramesh Chandra Sankala Vs. Vikram Cement, reported in (2008) 14 SCC 58 , Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that an observation by a Single Judge as to how he had dealt with the matter is also not decisive. If it were so, a petition strictly falling under Article 226 simpliciter can be disposed of by a Single Judge observing that he is exercising the power of superintendence under Article 227 of Constitution and formulating a question whether such a statement of Single Judge can take away from party aggrieved a right of appeal against the judgment if otherwise petition is under Article 226 of the Constitution and subject to intra Court/Letter Patent Appeal, answered in negative. 23. 23. In view of aforementioned decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court and the fact that writ petition was initially filed under Article 226 and 227 of Constitution of India, we are of the view that objection raised by counsel for respondents with regard to maintainability of appeal is not sustainable and it is hereby repelled. We hold writ appeal to be maintainable. 24. Now this will take us to deal with the grounds raised on merits of appeal. 25. So far as submissions made with regard to delay in exercising revisional jurisdiction i.e. after about 13-15 years of closing of the case by S.D.O. (R) is concerned, it is not in dispute that alleged sale deed was stated to have been executed on 02.05.1967. Provision under Section 170B of Code, 1959 was brought into force on 24.10.1980, which prescribes that every person who on the date of commencement of the M.P. Land Revenue Code (Amendment) Act, 1980), is in possession of agricultural land, which belong to a member of tribe which has been declared to be an aboriginal tribe under sub-Section 6 of Section 165 between the period commencing on the 2nd October, 1959 and ending on the date of commencement of Amendment Act, 1980 shall, within two years of such commencement, notify to the Sub- Divisional Officer. “Two years” is inserted replacing “One year” on 23.10.1981. 26. It is under aforementioned provision, purchaser of land had submitted statement before the Sub-Divisional Officer (R) on 20.03.1981, as reflecting from the order of SDO (R) dated 20.06.1982, and this is how the proceedings were initiated. If any proceeding is initiated pursuant to any law that came into force subsequently, then unless and until that provision of law is challenged, it cannot be said that proceedings have been initiated after lapse of long time and it cannot continue on the ground of delay. In the above proceeding, seller aboriginal tribe was proceeded exparte, and the purchaser also who is having the burden to prove the transaction, a bonafide transaction not produced any evidence and erroneously case was closed. When the Collector again issued direction for looking to the records of case decided against tribal persons it came to the knowledge of committing illegality by the Sub-Divisional Officer (R). For starting period of limitation date of knowledge of order is important. Period of limitation will start from the date of knowledge. 27. When the Collector again issued direction for looking to the records of case decided against tribal persons it came to the knowledge of committing illegality by the Sub-Divisional Officer (R). For starting period of limitation date of knowledge of order is important. Period of limitation will start from the date of knowledge. 27. In case of Ranveer Singh (deceased by L.Rs) vs. State of MP, reported in AIR 2011 MP 27 , it was held that period of limitation would start from the date of knowledge of any illegality committed by authority. In case at hand, as the Additional Collector was not having jurisdiction to grant permission to transfer land situated in scheduled area owned by tribe to non-tribe, the order granting permission was per se illegal. The Commissioner registered suo motu revision after getting knowledge of the illegal order. Hence, in the given facts of case, submission of learned Counsel that exercise of suo motu revisional jurisdiction by the Commissioner beyond a reasonable period is arbitrary exercise of powers, is without any merit. 28. Judgment in the case of Joint Collector Ranga Reddy District & Another Vs. D. Narsing Rao & Ors, reported in (2015) 3 SCC 695 , relied upon by learned Counsel for appellant in support of his submission with respect to limitation, is not applicable to the facts of present case. In that case, the issue for consideration before Hon'ble Supreme Court was as to whether suo motu revisional power to correct khasra entries in revenue records can be exercised after long lapse of time. In that case, revenue records of the year 1954-55 was sought to be corrected in the year 2004. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, considering that jurisdiction of revision was exercised after five decades, has held that even when exercise of revisional power did not prescribe any period of limitation, the exercise of revisional power under Section 166B of the A.P. (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act) beyond a reasonable period is not permissible. 29. The Collector issued a direction to again look into cases of transfer of land by aboriginal tribes to non-tribal persons and the proceedings decided against tribals. It is an order/direction to Revenue authorities for all transfers of land by tribal in the district and not with regard to specific case. 29. The Collector issued a direction to again look into cases of transfer of land by aboriginal tribes to non-tribal persons and the proceedings decided against tribals. It is an order/direction to Revenue authorities for all transfers of land by tribal in the district and not with regard to specific case. Another fact which is also important in the present case to be taken note of is that the Sub- Divisional Officer upon receiving information as provided under Section 170-B (1) of the Code, 1959 initiated proceeding and in that proceeding Sub-Divisional Officer, after recording that purchaser failed to examine any witness to prove that transaction was bonafide, closed the proceedings without passing any consequential order in terms of Section 170-B (3) of the Code, 1959. In the aforementioned facts of the case, purchaser himself failed to prove the transaction of sale as bonafide in the proceeding that was started immediately after coming into force of provisions under Section 170-B of the Act, 1959 on his application/information. Additional Collector vide order dated 29.06.1999 took note of the period from date of sale deed and date of order of SDO, and not the proceedings of SDO closing the case contrary to law. In proceeding drawn, seller of land (tribal) was proceeded ex-parte, purchaser of land (petitioner) also failed to produce any evidence in support of bonafide transaction. Additional Collector allowed the appeal only on the ground of limitation, which was erroneous in the aforesaid discussion. 30. In the aforementioned facts of the case and in light of the decisions discussed above, first ground raised by learned counsel for appellant that there was delay in initiation of proceeding is not sustainable. 31. On merits of the case, perusal of first order of Sub-Divisional Officer (R) dated 20.06.1982 would show that statement was submitted by purchaser of the land from aboriginal tribe. Aboriginal tribe was proceeded ex-parte and the purchaser did not place any material and evidence showing that transaction was bonafide, Sub-Divisional Officer (R) recorded that in absence of any evidence, it cannot be said that transfer of land is bonafide or not, and closed the proceedings by dismissing the case. 32. Aboriginal tribe was proceeded ex-parte and the purchaser did not place any material and evidence showing that transaction was bonafide, Sub-Divisional Officer (R) recorded that in absence of any evidence, it cannot be said that transfer of land is bonafide or not, and closed the proceedings by dismissing the case. 32. Based on direction issued by the Collector, Bastar to review all the cases, which were decided against tribal, Additional Collector, Kanker, District Bastar (at that relevant point of time) initiated suo-motu proceeding in the year 1993-94 and after hearing the parties therein held that transfer was not bonafide and passed order for reversion of land under Section 170-B (3) of the Code, 1959. 33. Order of Collector dated 18.10.1993 was put to challenge by purchaser in a revision before the Commissioner, Bastar, Division – Jagdalpur. The Commissioner vide order dated 22.08.1996 allowed the revision and remanded back the case to Sub-Divisional Officer (R) for deciding it afresh after giving opportunity of hearing to all the parties. Sub-Divisional Officer (R) vide order dated 29.07.1998 held that transfer of land in favour of purchaser was not bonafide and ordered for reversion of land to aboriginal tribe. 34. The order of Sub-Divisional Officer (R) was again put to challenge before the Additional Collector, Jagdalpur, District – Bastar in appeal. The Additional Collector considering the grounds raised in appeal allowed the appeal vide order dated 30.06.1999 in favour of purchaser/petitioner. The order of Collector was put to challenge in a revision before Commissioner. 35. In revision petition preferred against the order of Collector, the Commissioner recorded in detail that in the report of Sub- Divisional Officer (R) dated 25.04.1967 permission was recommended for sale of only 7.85 acres of land in favour of Chaitram but 8.30 acres of land was transferred. The land was transferred in the name of Lachhinder and not in the name of Chaitram in whose favour permission for transfer of land was granted. The sale deed was executed through interference of police. Consequently held the order passed by the Sub-Divisional (R) dated 29.07.1998 to be correct. 36. Learned Single Judge in its order upon appreciation of records and submission observed as under:- “5. Land admeasuring 8.30 acres was recorded in favour of ab original tribe Pilu. Pilu made an application under Section 165 (6) of the Code to sell the land, before the Collector on 23-1-1967. 36. Learned Single Judge in its order upon appreciation of records and submission observed as under:- “5. Land admeasuring 8.30 acres was recorded in favour of ab original tribe Pilu. Pilu made an application under Section 165 (6) of the Code to sell the land, before the Collector on 23-1-1967. The Sub Divisional Officer submitted its report to the Collector on 17-4-1967 which the Collector approved on 25-4-1967 permitting sale to Chaitram, but no separate order was passed by the Additional Collector, however, the Sub Divisional Officer on 28-4-1967 held that permission has been granted to Lachhinder. Application under Section 170-B of the Code filed by Pilu was rejected on 20-9-1982 which was reversed by the Collector and the order of the Collector was set aside by the Commissioner and the matter was remanded to the Sub Divisional Officer. The Sub Divisional Officer by order dated 29-7-1998 reverted the land in favour of LRs of Pilu, but that order was reversed by the Additional Collector by order dated 29-6- 1999 and the order dated 29-6-1999 was challenged in revision before the Commissioner, Bastar Division, Jagdalpur, but this time, the Commissioner allowed the revision and restored the order of the Sub Divisional Officer (Revenue). The Commissioner has held that permission to sale was made in favour of Chaitram, S/o Lachhinder Koshta, whereas the sale deed has been registered in favour of Lachhinder. Report of the Sub Divisional Officer dated 17-4-1967 would show that the Collector has approved and granted permission to sell the land to Chaitram, S/o Lachhinder, but the Collector did not issue any order separately and the Sub Divisional Officer by its order dated 28-4-1967 held that permission was granted to Pilu to sell the land in favour of Chaitram whereas, the Collector has granted permission on 25-4-1967 for selling the land in favour of Chaitram, S/o Lachhinder Koshta. When the Additional Collector has not issued any order, on what basis, the Sub Divisional Officer issued such order is not clear from the record. The application was made by Pilu for sale of land of 7.85 acres, whereas the recommendation was made by the Sub Divisional Officer for sale of 8.30 acres of land for a consideration of Rs.1,500/- only. Again there is no basis as to for what reason the area of land has been increased from 7.85 acres to 8.30 acres. The application was made by Pilu for sale of land of 7.85 acres, whereas the recommendation was made by the Sub Divisional Officer for sale of 8.30 acres of land for a consideration of Rs.1,500/- only. Again there is no basis as to for what reason the area of land has been increased from 7.85 acres to 8.30 acres. This has also impressed the Commissioner to hold that the sale is not bona fide. In sum and substance, the Commissioner was not satisfied with the order of the Additional Collector setting aside the order of the Sub Divisional Officer reverting the land and ultimately set aside the order of the Additional Collector. I do not find any illegality in the order of the Commissioner holding the transaction not to be bona fide and upholding the order of the Sub Divisional Officer reverting the land in favour of LRs of Pilu and I do not consider it a fit case to exercise the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, as such, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 6. So far as exercise of suo motu revisional jurisdiction is concerned, parties are in litigation since 1982 and have contested the case on merits. It is not the case where the Collector has reversed the order of the Sub Divisional Officer only on the ground of delay in exercising suo motu revisional jurisdiction. Therefore, merely because there is delay in taking-up the matter under suo motu revisional jurisdiction, as the land of ab original tribe admeasuring 8.30 acres was sold only by paying a consideration amount of Rs.1,500/-, I do not find any ground to interfere. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. However, the petitioners shall pay a cost of 5,000/- to the private respondents.” 37. Taking into consideration the above discussed facts we do not find any good ground to interfere with the impugned order passed by the learned writ Court. 38. Accordingly, the writ appeal being devoid of substance is liable to be and it is hereby dismissed.