JUDGMENT : 1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel. 2. The present petition has been filed challenging the order dated 14.11.2018 whereby the fair price shop license of the petitioner has been cancelled as well as the order dated 14.02.2020 whereby the appeal preferred against the cancellation order was rejected. 3. The facts, in brief, are that the petitioner was a fair price shop license holder having a shop situate at Tahsil Mahmoodabad District Sitapur. It is stated that on the basis of an inspection carried out by the 'Minority Welfare Officer', Sitapur on 06.04.2017, an opinion was formed that the petitioner was not running the shop properly and certain discrepancies were found in the said inspection carried out by the Minority Welfare Officer, Sitapur. Based upon the said, the petitioner was issued with a show cause notice calling upon the petitioner to show cause as to why the steps may not be taken for cancellation of the license. The petitioner submitted his defense on 15.09.2017 and subsequently thereto, an order came to be passed on 29.01.2018 cancelling the fair price shop license of the petitioner. The said order was challenged in an appeal which resulted in the remand order and the matter was remanded for decision afresh. After the remand, a fresh order was passed on 14.11.2018 cancelling the fair price shop license and an appeal preferred against the said order came to be dismissed on 14.02.2020. The said orders are under challenge in the present writ petition. 4. The counsel for the petitioner argues that the supply, sale and distribution of the essential commodities in the State of U.P. is governed under the provisions of the various Control Orders and in the present case, the same would be governed by the Uttar Pradesh Essential Commodities (Regulation of Sale and Distribution Control) Order 2016 issued by the State Government in exercise of the power under section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act read with notification of the Government of India. He argues that under the said Control Order of 2016, 'Designated Authority' is defined under section 2(l) and reads as under: "2(l) 'Designated Authority' means any officer not below the rank of Supply Inspector of the Food and Civil Supplies Department in the State but for rural Areas it also includes Assistant Development Officer (Panchayat) or any officer authorized by the State Government." 5. He argues that in terms of the Control Order various obligations have been cast upon the license holder in respect of distribution and sale of the essential commodities. It also empowers the State Government to prescribe for the procedure to be followed by the 'designated authority' in the event of default by the licensing authority, for that he places reliance on Clause No.8(6) of the Control Order. He also placed reliance on Clause 12 of the Control Order 2016 to argue that the power of search and seizure is conferred upon the Commissioner, the food officer, the competent authority and designated officer within the jurisdiction on which they exercise their powers. Clause 12 of the Control Order is quoted as under : 12. Power of search and seizure -(1) The Commissioner, the food officer, the competent authority and designated officer may within his jurisdiction with such assistance if any, as he thinks fit – 6. In the backdrop of the said, he argues that the very initiation of the proceedings against the petitioner is contrary to the mandate of Clause 12 of the Control Order 2016 inasmuch as the inspection was carried out by the 'Minority Welfare Officer' who is not a designated officer as defined under Clause 2(l) of the Control Order 2016. He further argues that the Minority Welfare Officer is neither a designated officer nor he has been delegated any powers traceable to Clause 12 of the Control Order as also that there is no power of sub-delegation available upon the designated officer under the scheme of the Control Order or the Essential Commodities Act. He argues that it is well settled that the powers conferred upon a particular authority can be exercised only by the said authority and can be delegated only if there is specific power of sub-delegation conferred upon the said authority (Delegatees non protest delegare). He argues that it is well settled that the powers conferred upon a particular authority can be exercised only by the said authority and can be delegated only if there is specific power of sub-delegation conferred upon the said authority (Delegatees non protest delegare). He places reliance on the judgment in the cases of State of Bombay vs. Shiva Balak; AIR 1965 SC 661 , NGEF vs. Chandra (2005) 8 SCC 219 and the judgement dated 07.05.2019 of this court in Writ -C No. 12696 of 2009 (Mohammad Suaif and another vs. State of U.P. and others). 7. He further argues that even otherwise the order passed against the petitioner is bad in law inasmuch as in the defense the petitioner had relied upon various affidavits given in support of the petitioner which have been disbelieved on the grounds which are wholly arbitrary. To buttress his submissions, he argues that in the order, it is recorded that the affidavits filed in support of the defense of the petitioner are not worthy of credence because they are not affixed with photographs. He further argues that in respect of the some of the affidavits, the prescribed authority has formed an opinion that the same appear to have been obtained by misrepresentation from the deponents, which has neither any legal basis nor any factual basis. Thus, the said order is clearly a result of an arbitrary exercise of the power and deserves to be set aside. He lastly argues that in terms of the Government Order issued, it is specified that after a reply is submitted, the same should be got inquired into by an officer who is higher in rank than the officer who issued show cause notice, which has not been done in the present case. In the light of the said submissions, he argues that the writ petition deserves to be allowed. 8. The Additional Chief Standing Counsel, on the other hand, justifies the orders on the ground that various allegations were levelled against the petitioner, which after due process have been found to be correct and thus no interference is called for. He further argues that the argument with regard to non-availability of the authority/jurisdiction were neither raised in the defense nor in the appeal, as such, the petitioner cannot be permitted to raise the said argument at this stage. He further argues that the argument with regard to non-availability of the authority/jurisdiction were neither raised in the defense nor in the appeal, as such, the petitioner cannot be permitted to raise the said argument at this stage. To conclude his submissions, he argues that the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 9. I have considered the arguments raised at the bar and perused the records. 10. Considering the objection of the learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel that the plea/defense regarding lack of jurisdiction was neither raised before the prescribed authority nor before the appellate authority and has been raised for the first time before this court. It is well settled that the plea which goes to the root of lack of substantive jurisdiction can be raised at any stage of the proceedings, thus, I reject the preliminary objection raised by the Additional Chief Standing Counsel. 11. As regards the first argument, a specific averment has been made in the writ petition in para no. 9 with regard to lack of jurisdiction by the inspecting authority to which no reply has been given in the counter affidavit. A perusal of the Control Order specifically Clause 12 clearly provides that the power of search and seizure can be exercised only by the officer specified therein namely the Commissioner, food officer, the competent authority and the designated officer within his jurisdiction. The power of search is an expropriatory power and has to be interpreted strictly inasmuch as it is an exception to the fundamental right of carrying business and thus has to be interpreted strictly. A plain reading of Clause 12 read with section 2(l) makes it clear that the Minority Welfare Officer is neither a person specified in Clause 12 nor a designated officer and thus the inspection carried out by him was without any authority of law. 12. It has been argued by the State that the inspection was carried out under the oral direction of the District Magistrate, however, no provision exists either under the Act or the Control Order empowering the District Magistrate to delegate his powers. 12. It has been argued by the State that the inspection was carried out under the oral direction of the District Magistrate, however, no provision exists either under the Act or the Control Order empowering the District Magistrate to delegate his powers. The law with regard to delegation of power is very well settled, a power can be delegated only if permissible and up to that extent and without there being such power, the powers conferred upon the authority cannot be delegated (Delegatees non protest delegare) as laid down in the cases of State of Bombay vs. Shiva Balak; AIR 1965 SC 661 , NGEF vs. Chandra (2005) 8 SCC 219 and the judgement dated 07.05.2019 of this court in Writ -C No. 12696 of 2009 (Mohammad Suaif and another vs. State of U.P. and others). Thus, on the first ground itself, I am inclined to hold that the proceedings initiated by an inspection of 'Minority Welfare Officer' which culminated in the impugned order are clearly unsustainable. 13. Considering the second submission that the prescribed authority has erred in disbelieving the affidavits, the counsel for the petitioner places reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of Balram Das vs. State of U.P. decided on 11.04.2022 in Writ-C No.20446 of 2017, wherein this court has held that in the event the prescribed authority disbelieves any evidence given in support of the defense, he should call for a better evidence/explanation in that regard from the person concerned. In the present case, the reasons prescribed for disbelieving the affidavits that photographs were not affixed, clearly cannot be termed as a proper exercise of the power by the prescribed authority. In any event, if the prescribed authority had reasons to disbelieve the said affidavits, he ought to have called for better affidavits which has not been done, as is clear from the records. Thus, on that ground also, the orders are unsustainable and are liable to be set aside. 14. I am not going into the third question in view of the first two questions being decided in favour of the petitioner. For the reasons recorded above, the writ petition deserves to be allowed. The orders dated 14.11.2018 and 14.02.2020 are set aside. 15. The writ petition stands allowed.