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2022 DIGILAW 602 (GAU)

Mihir Kumar Biswas, S/o Late Sudhir Kumar Biswas v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Represented By Its Chairman, R. S. Butala, 3079/3, Sadiq Nagar, J. B. Tito Marg, New Delhi

2022-06-09

MICHAEL ZOTHANKHUMA

body2022
JUDGMENT : Heard Mr. P.K. Roychoudhury, learned Counsel for the petitioner as well as Mr. N. Deka, learned counsel for all the respondents. 2. The petitioner who was working as a Deputy Manager (Training & Development) in the Indian Oil Corporation (IOC) has challenged the penalties of removal from service inflicted upon him, in pursuance to two disciplinary proceedings initiated against him. The joint appeal filed by the petitioner against the two penalties of removal from service imposed upon him, have been rejected. The Review petition filed by the petitioner not having been decided by the respondents, the writ petition has been filed. 3. Mr. P.K. Roychoudhury, learned Senior counsel for the petitioner submits that the first charge-sheet dated 17.06.2011 issued to the petitioner, was to the effect that the petitioner had collected money from various persons in the IOC for investment in a non-banking financial company (Unipay VISAREV) with assured returns, by acting as a local agent for the non-banking financial company. The second charge in the charge-sheet dated 17.06.2011 was that the petitioner was in possession of assets disproportionate to his known source of income. 4. The petitioner’s counsel submits that with respect to the charge of the petitioner owning assets disproportionate to the known source of income, the CBI had registered Special Case No.R.C.9(A)11-GWH. However, the CBI thereafter submitted a Final Report dated 10.06.2011, wherein it recommended closure of the case, as it came to a finding that “it may not be right to hold that the assets found in the possession of the accused were disproportionate to his known source of income”. The CBI Final Report dated 10.06.2011 was accepted by the Special Judge, CBI, Assam, vide it’s order dated 31.07.2012. He further submits that there are witnesses who have stated that there was no pressure to make any investment by the petitioner, in the non-banking financial institution and as the petitioner did not engage in any trade or business, the petitioner could not have been given the penalty of removal from service. 5. He further submits that there are witnesses who have stated that there was no pressure to make any investment by the petitioner, in the non-banking financial institution and as the petitioner did not engage in any trade or business, the petitioner could not have been given the penalty of removal from service. 5. With regard to the second charge-sheet dated 24.02.2012, by which the petitioner has been charged with abusing his official position, by creating 25 vendor codes online in SAP at his own discretion, without supporting documents and approval of the competent authority for personal gain and on the charge of manipulating the PAN number of Shri Rajib Sarma, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that there was no abuse of the petitioner’s official position while creating the 25 vendor codes online, as the same had been done by him on the request of other officials, who did not know now to create vendor codes by themselves. 6. The petitioner’s counsel submits that the Disciplinary Authority has awarded the same penalty of removal in respect of the second Disciplinary Proceedings, as has been given in respect of the first Disciplinary Proceeding without application of mind. He submits that in terms of Rule 29 of the Conduct, Discipline & Appeal Rules, 1980, hereinafter referred to “1980 Rules”, applicable to the officers of the IOC, one or more of the penalties provided in the said Rule 29 can be imposed on an employee for misconduct committed by him, and different penalties may be imposed for different acts, omission or misconduct, whether covered by one or different charge-sheets. He submits that as the acts of misconduct provided in the two charge-sheets are different, different penalties should have been imposed upon the petitioner. He also submits that the punishment imposed upon the petitioner is disproportionate to the offences, keeping in view that there was no financial loss caused to the IOC. He also submits that as the disciplinary proceedings did not find the petitioner guilty of having disproportionate assets and as no bribe had been taken by the petitioner, the penalty of removal imposed upon the petitioner should be modified. Accordingly, the petitioner’s counsel prays that the matter may be remanded back to the Disciplinary Authority, to enable him to re-consider imposing a lesser penalty than the penalty of removal. Accordingly, the petitioner’s counsel prays that the matter may be remanded back to the Disciplinary Authority, to enable him to re-consider imposing a lesser penalty than the penalty of removal. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Naresh Chandra Bhardwaj vs. Bank of India & Others, reported in (2019) 15 SCC 786 and in the case of S. Muthu Kumaran vs. Union of India & Others, reported in (2017) 4 SCC 609 . 7. Mr. N. Deka, learned counsel for the IOC, on the other hand submits that the petitioner was collecting money from the homes of the other officers of the IOC on behalf of the non-banking financial company for personal gain, as is evident from the evidence of witnesses recorded in the disciplinary proceedings. The same goes to show that the petitioner was doing trade and business for a non-banking financial institution. Further, the collection of money in itself was an offence. He also submits that though the charge of disproportionate assets could not be proved, the fact that the first charge was proved justified the penalty of removal imposed upon the petitioner. In respect of the second charge-sheet, he submits that the fact that the petitioner had created vendor codes online without valid documents and had manipulated the PAN number of one Sri Rajib Sarma goes to show that the offences committed by the petitioner were serious in nature. He submits that as there is no procedural irregularity in the disciplinary proceedings and as the punishment of removal does not bar the petitioner from receiving any pensionary benefits, as the said punishment is less harsh than the punishment of dismissal from service, this Court should uphold the decision taken by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority. 8. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties. 9. As can be seen from the documents on record, though witnesses WT-1, WT-2 and WT-3 stated that they made payments to the petitioner in the office premises, without any pressure by the petitioner to make investments to reap the benefits of extremely high returns, the statement of WT-10 is to the effect that the petitioner had been collecting money from her home for investment in a non-banking financial company (Unipay VISAREV). Further, the petitioner used to advocate the scheme in the office and enticed many investors. WT-11 has in her statement also stated that payments were made to the petitioner in cash in his residence. Various witnesses have also stated that they made payments to the petitioner for investment. However, the charge of possession of assets disproportionate to the known source of income was not proved against the petitioner. As the Disciplinary Authority found the petitioner to be collecting cash as well as cheque and engaging in trade and business for personal gain, without obtaining the required permission from the competent authorities, the Disciplinary Authority imposed the penalty of removal from service, vide the impugned order dated 09.01.2013, in respect of the first charge-sheet dated 17.06.2011. 10. The second charge-sheet dated 24.02.2012 was to the effect that the petitioner had created 25 vendor codes online in SAP, without supporting documents and approval of the competent authority for personal gain. He had also manipulated the PAN number of one Rajib Sarma for creating vendor code for another firm in his name as M/s Raj Enterprise. The two charges in the second charge-sheet dated 24.02.2012 have been found to be proved against the petitioner. The only challenge to the above charges by the petitioner is that he made the vendor codes, as the other officials in the IOC did not know how to make them. 11. This Court on considering the pleadings and the submissions made by the counsels finds that there is no procedural irregularity committed by the respondents, while holding the two disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. The findings on facts recorded by the Enquiry Officer are all supported by evidence. Further, there is no ground for this Court to interfere in the findings of fact made by the Disciplinary Authority. 12. In the case of Lalit Popli vs. Canara Bank reported in (2003) 3 SCC 583 , the Apex Court has held that while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court does not act as an Appellate Authority. Its jurisdiction is circumscribed by limits of judicial review to correct errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice. Its jurisdiction is circumscribed by limits of judicial review to correct errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice. In the present case, the petitioner has been charged with collection of money within the premises of the IOC and engaging in trade and business, without taking permission from the competent authority. Rule 7 of the 1980 Rules deals with misconduct and Rule 7(3), 7(15) and 7(21), which pertains to the first charge-sheet dated 17.06.2011, are as follows : “7(3) Possession of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to the known sources of income by the employee or on his behalf by another person, which the employee cannot satisfactorily account for. 7(15) Collection without the permission of the Competent Authority of any money within the premises of the Corporation except as sanctioned by any law of the land for the time being in force or Rules of the Corporation. 7(21) Engaging in any trade or business without taking permission of the Competent Authority”. 13. As stated earlier, the collection of money by the petitioner and engaging in trade or business without taking permission of the Competent Authority had been proved in the disciplinary proceeding relating to the first charge-sheet dated 17.06.2011. 14. The charge of the petitioner abusing his official position by creating 25 vendor codes online, without supporting documents for personal gain and manipulating the PAN number of one Sri Rajib Sarma, pertaining to the second charge-sheet dated 24.02.2012 is relatable to Rule 7(5) and 7(30) of the 1980 Rules, which are reproduced below : “7(5) Acting in a manner prejudicial to the interests of the Corporation. 7(30) Commission of any act subversive of discipline or of good behaviour ”. 15. Rule 29 of the 1980 Rules is the provision for minor and major penalties, which can be imposed by the Disciplinary Authority and it says that one or more of the following penalties may be imposed on an employee for misconduct committed by him, and different penalties may be imposed for different acts or omission of misconduct, whether covered by one or different charge-sheets. Rule 29 thereafter lists out the various minor penalties and major penalties. Rule 29(12) provides for removal from service. 16. Rule 29 thereafter lists out the various minor penalties and major penalties. Rule 29(12) provides for removal from service. 16. The petitioner having been found guilty in the second disciplinary proceeding in relation to the second charge-sheet dated 24.02.2012, the petitioner was imposed with the penalty of removal of service, vide the impugned order dated 09.01.2013. This Court is of the view that just because the petitioner has been found guilty on all the charges, except for the charge of having assets disproportionate to his known source of income in two disciplinary proceedings, on the basis of different charges framed against the petitioner in the two different charge-sheets, the same does not require the respondents to impose different penalties. A reading of the provision of “Penalties” as provided in Rule 29 of the 1980 Rules, does not bar the respondents from imposing the same penalty of “removal from service” in respect of different acts of misconduct, covered by different charge-sheets. The extract of Rule 29 is reproduced below : “29. Penalties One or more of the following penalties may be imposed on an employee for misconduct committed by him, and different penalties may be imposed for different acts or omission of misconduct, whether covered by one or different Charge Sheets. Minor Penalties 1. Censure 2. Fine upto Rs.50,000 3. Withholding of increments of pay without cumulative effect 4. Withholding of promotion for a specified term upto 6 (six) months 5. Reduction of pay upto 3 (three) lower stages in time scale for one year without cumulative effect. Major Penalties 6 Withholding of increments of pay with cumulative effect 7 Reduction to a lower stage(s) in time scale with cumulative effect. 8 Recovery from pay or such other amount as may be due to him of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the Corporation by negligence or breach of orders or the acts of omission and commission 9. Withholding of promotion for a specified term of more than 6 (six) month 10. Reduction to a lower grade 11. Compulsory retirement 12. Removal from service 13. Dismissal” Further, in the case of Naresh Chandra Bhardwaj (supra), the Apex Court has held that when the charge(s) of misconduct is proved, the quantum of punishment to be imposed in a particular case is essentially the domain of the departmental authorities. 17. Reduction to a lower grade 11. Compulsory retirement 12. Removal from service 13. Dismissal” Further, in the case of Naresh Chandra Bhardwaj (supra), the Apex Court has held that when the charge(s) of misconduct is proved, the quantum of punishment to be imposed in a particular case is essentially the domain of the departmental authorities. 17. The only question to be decided now is with regard to the prayer of the petitioner’s counsel to remand the case back to the Disciplinary Authority to take a decision, as to whether a lesser penalty can be imposed upon the petitioner, as the penalty of removal is disproportionate to the offence. In the case of Naresh Chandra Bhardwaj (supra), the Apex Court has held that limited judicial review is available for interfering with the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority, i.e., only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the Court. Even in such a case, when the punishment is set aside as shockingly disproportionate to the nature of charge framed against the delinquent employee, the appropriate course of action is to remit the matter back to the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority with a direction to pass appropriate order of penalty. The Court by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the penalty in such a case. The only exception to the principle would be in those cases, where the co-delinquent is awarded lesser punishment even when the charges of misconduct was identical or the co-delinquent was foisted with more serious charges. 18. In the case of S. Muthu Kumaran (supra), the Apex Court had modified the penalty of dismissal from service into that of discharge, by keeping in view the fact that the delinquent officer therein did not have any blemish in his long service record. As such, to enable the said person to get the benefits of gratuity and other attendant benefits for the service rendered by him, the penalty imposed was modified 19. In the case of V. Ramana vs. A.P. SRT C & Others, reported in (2005) 7 SCC 338 , the Apex Court has held that unless the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the Court, there is no scope for interference. 20. In the case of V. Ramana vs. A.P. SRT C & Others, reported in (2005) 7 SCC 338 , the Apex Court has held that unless the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the Court, there is no scope for interference. 20. In the present case, the petitioner has been found to be engaging in trade or business and collection of money without permission of the competent authority. The petitioner has also been found to have created vendor codes without the approval of the competent authority for personal gain and manipulated the PAN number of one Shri Rajib Sarma. It is settled law that the Disciplinary Authority is the sole judge of facts and there is nothing to show that the findings of Enquiry Officer are wholly perverse or legally untenable. Further, the petitioner will be able to receive retirement benefits as applicable to him, due to the petitioner being imposed with the penalties of removal imposed upon him in both the disciplinary proceedings. On considering the above facts, this Court does not find that the punishments/penalties imposed upon the petitioner, on the basis of the two disciplinary proceedings, to be shockingly disproportionate and neither does it shock the conscience of this Court. Accordingly this Court does not find any ground to exercise it’s discretion in the present case. 21. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed.