ORDER : 1. This Revision has been preferred against the order dated 18.11.2022 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Durg, District in Criminal Appeal No.100/2022, whereby the preliminary objection raised by the Applicants herein, who are Father-in-law, brother-in-law (devar) and mother-in-law respectively of the Non-Applicant/Complainant regarding non-maintainability of the Petition filed by the Non-Applicant under Section 12 of the Act of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (for short ‘the Act of 2005’) has been dismissed. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the Non-Applicant had filed an application under Section 12 of ‘the Act of 2005’ before the JMFC, Durg seeking direction to return her stridhan along with suitable compensation. It is alleged that Applicant No.2 is having 100% permanent disability of blindness and a copy of the disability certificate has also been annexed in support of this Revision and the Applicants are facing trial under Section 498-A IPC, which is pending before the Court of JMFC, Durg. It is further alleged that the Applicants are living separately and earlier, a compromise took place between the parties during the counseling, therefore, no good case is made out against the Applicants and the preliminary objection raised by them against the Petition filed by the Non-Applicant under Section 12 of the Act of 2005 has wrongly been rejected by the Court below. Hence this Revision. 3. Ms. Singh, learned Counsel for the Applicants submits that the impugned order is not sustainable as the Applicants are living separately and they have not caused any type of domestic violence towards the Non-Applicant. She further submits that in order to create a pressure, the Non-Applicant had filed the said Petition and further considering that Applicant No.2-Nishant Acharya (devar) is having 100% permanent disability of blindness, the order impugned may be set aside and the Revision may be allowed. 4. Heard learned Counsel for the Applicants and also perused the documents annexed with the Revision carefully. 5. The Act of 2005 was enacted to provide for more effective protection of the rights of women guaranteed under the Constitution who are victims of violence of any kind occurring within the family and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto and filing of a Petition under Section 498-A IPC and registering of an offence thereunder is not a bar to file a subsequent or separate application under Section 12 of the Act of 2005. It is explicit under Section 5 of the said Act that the police officers, service providers and Magistrate shall inform the aggrieved person of her right to file a complaint under Section 498-A IPC. Further, there is no limitation in the Code or in the provision of the Act for filing an application and the said issue has been no longer res integra and the Supreme Court in the matter of Kamatchi vs. Lakshmi Narayanan reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 446 held that the High Court was in error in observing that the application under Section 12 of the Act of 2005 ought to have been filed within a period of one year of the alleged acts of domestic violence and the relevant para-21 is quoted below for ready reference:- “21. Let us now consider the applicability of these principles to cases under the Act. The provisions of the Act contemplate filing of an application under Section 12 to initiate the proceedings before the concerned Magistrate. After hearing both sides and after taking into account the material on record, the Magistrate may pass an appropriate order under Section 12 of the Act. It is only the breach of such order which constitutes an offence as is clear from Section 31 of the Act. Thus, if there be any offence committed in terms of the provisions of the Act, the limitation prescribed under Section 468 of the Code will apply from the date of commission of such offence. By the time an application is preferred under Section 12 of the Act, there is no offence committed in terms of the provisions of the Act and as such there would never be a starting point for limitation from the date of application under Section 12 of the Act. Such a starting point for limitation would arise only and only after there is a breach of an order passed under Section 12 of the Act.” 6. Similarly, in the matter of Krishna Bhattacharjee vs. Sarathi Choudhury and Another reported in (2016) 2 SCC 705 , the law has been clarified at para-29, which reads as under :- “29. Having appreciated the concept of stridhan, we shall now proceed to deal with the meaning of “continuing cause of action”. Similarly, in the matter of Krishna Bhattacharjee vs. Sarathi Choudhury and Another reported in (2016) 2 SCC 705 , the law has been clarified at para-29, which reads as under :- “29. Having appreciated the concept of stridhan, we shall now proceed to deal with the meaning of “continuing cause of action”. In Raja Bhadur Singh v. Provident Fund Inspector [ (1984) 4 SCC 222 ] the Court while dealing with the continuous offence opined that the expression “continuing offence” is not defined in the Code but that is because the expressions which do not have a fixed connotation or a static import are difficult to define. The Court referred to the earlier decision in State of Bihar v. Deokaran Nenshi [ (1972) 2 SCC 890 and reproduced a passage from the same which is to the following effect:- 10…..’5. A continuing offence is one which is susceptible of continuance and is distinguishable from the one which is committed once and for all. It is one of those offences which arises out of a failure to obey or comply with a rule or its requirement and which involves a penalty, the liability for which continues until the rule or its requirement is obeyed or complied with. On every occasion that such disobedience or non-compliance occurs and reoccurs, there is the offence committed. The distinction between the two kinds of offences is between an act or omission which constitutes an offence once and for all and an act or omission which continues, and therefore, constitutes a fresh offence every time or occasion on which it continues. In the case of a continuing offence, there is thus the ingredient of continuance of the offence which is absent in the case of an offence which takes place when an act or omission is committed once and for all.” 7. Taking into consideration the aforesaid principles and the pleadings made by the Applicants as also the plea of Non-Applicant for return on stridhan and certain other reliefs, this Court thinks that at this juncture, there is no need to go into the merits of the case. 8. Accordingly, the Revision stands disposed of. 9. Taking into consideration the aforesaid principles and the pleadings made by the Applicants as also the plea of Non-Applicant for return on stridhan and certain other reliefs, this Court thinks that at this juncture, there is no need to go into the merits of the case. 8. Accordingly, the Revision stands disposed of. 9. It is made clear that any observation made hereinabove is only to the extent of deciding the maintainability of the Petition filed by the Non-Applicant under Section 12 of the Act of 2005 and it does not affect the merits of the case in any way and the concerned Court shall decide the case on its own merits.