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2022 DIGILAW 607 (ALL)

Dinesh Singh Sarthi v. State of U. P.

2022-04-22

AJIT KUMAR

body2022
JUDGMENT : Ajit Kumar, J. Heard Sri Ashok Khare, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Narendra Kumar Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Amit Sexena, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Balwant Singh, learned counsel for the respondents. 2. The petitioner, who claims to be a member of general body of the society is aggrieved against the order of the Assistant Registrar, Society dated 10th March, 2022, whereby he has rejected the objection of the present petitioner against the list of members of general body and finalized 251 members electoral college for the purposes to hold election of the Committee of Management of the society nominating District Inspector of Sanskrit Schools of Gorakhpur Division, Gorakhpur as an Election Officer. 3. It transpires from the record that earlier petitioner had approached this Court vide Writ - C No. 29150 of 2019 against the order dated 1st July, 2015 passed under Section 25(2) of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as 'Act, 1860') directing District Inspector of Schools, Gorakhpur to hold elections of the society. 4. The main argument advanced in the said case was that District Inspector of Schools wholly illegally further delegated the power to the associate District Inspector of Schools to conduct elections inasmuch as the elections that were held, were not in consonance with the scheme of the bye-laws. 5. The Contesting respondents in the said writ petition agreed for a fresh election to be held and, accordingly, direction was issued to the Assistant Registrar, Societies, Gorakhpur to ensure that fresh elections of the Committee of Management of the Societies were held under Section 25(2) of the Act, 1860 in accordance with bye-laws of the society. The operative portion of the order of this Court dated 18th September, 2019 is reproduced hereunder : ''With consent of parties, the orders dated. 6.7.2019 passed by the Assistant Registrar, Firms, Societies and Chits, Gorakhpur, the elections proceedings dated 11.6.2017 and 20.6.2019 are quashed and the matter is remitted to the Assistant Registrar, Firms, Societies and Chits, Gorakhpur to execute the following directions: 1. The respondent No. 2, Assistant Registrar, Firms, Societies and Chits, Gorakhpur shall ensure that the fresh elections to the society are conducted under Section 25(2) of the Societies Registration Act as per the Bye-laws of the society. 2. The respondent No. 2, Assistant Registrar, Firms, Societies and Chits, Gorakhpur shall ensure that the fresh elections to the society are conducted under Section 25(2) of the Societies Registration Act as per the Bye-laws of the society. 2. The elections shall be conducted within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. The writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated above.'' 6. It appears that after the aforesaid order was passed, the Deputy Registrar, Societies proceeded to issue notice dated 8th February, 2021 to both the petitioner and respondent No. 2 to deposit requisite expenses to be incurred in holding elections. The list of general body members was forwarded by the respondent No. 3 to the Assistant Registrar, Societies on 22nd January, 2021 for necessary approval and follow up action to hold election under Section 25(2) of the Act, 1860. This gave an opportunity this time to the petitioner to file his objections which he did file on 25th April, 2021 and claimed 108 members to be only the valid members and, therefore, prayed that rest of the members be held to be illegally enrolled. This is how the matter under Section 4-B of the Act, 1860 came to be adjudicated upon by the Assistant Registrar, Societies by the order impugned. 7. The main argument advanced herein this petition by learned Senior Advocate is that those members who had participated in the election held in the year 2004 should be taken to be only the valid members to form the electoral college because 52 members who were subsequently enrolled and were not the members in the year 2004 were wholly illegally inducted as members. 8. It is argued that the Committee of Management that was elected on 11th June, 2017 was ultimately held to be invalid and cancelled by this Court under its order dated 18th September, 2019, therefore, the list that was got registered for the year 2019-20 on 6th July, 2019 would be taken to be invalid and therefore, meeting convened by such Committee of Management on 28th July, 2019 would stand void. It is argued that depositing enrollment fee on 1st August, 2019 shows that the 86 members were got fraudulently enrolled. 9. It is argued that depositing enrollment fee on 1st August, 2019 shows that the 86 members were got fraudulently enrolled. 9. It is in the above background, therefore, it is argued that Assistant Registrar, Societies was not justified in applying de facto doctrine in upholding memberships of 86 members on the ground that their membership fee was accepted as per the scheme of bye-laws prior as the election of the Committee of Management then in power having been quashed. 10. Per contra, it is argued by Sri Amit Saxena, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner that the petitioner could have grievance to the extent of his membership and he being not the Committee of Management, could not have set up grievance regarding others inasmuch as he argued that the order passed by the Assistant Registrar, Societies is a reasoned and speaking order in which he has dealt with various aspects of the matter of determination of the membership and is, therefore, fully justified in upholding the membership of 251 members submitted by the contesting respondents. He further submits that de facto doctrine has been correctly applied and thus prayed that the petition deserves to be dismissed. 11. Learned Standing Counsel would defend the order for the reasons assigned therein. 12. Rival submissions fall for consideration : 13. The elections that were earlier held by the associate District Inspector of Schools dated 11th June, 2017 and so the consequential order dated 26th February, 2019 were basically questioned on the ground that the District Inspector of Schools could not have sub-delegated the power once he was directed by the Assistant Registrar, Societies to hold the elections and this is how the writ petition came to be allowed on 18th February, 2019 with a direction to the Assistant Registrar, Societies, Gorakhpur to conduct the elections as per the scheme of bye-laws under Section 25(2) of the Act, 1860. It, therefore, clearly transpires that insofar as the previous election is concerned there was no dispute of the membership, it only cropped up when a list of 251 members was forwarded by the contesting respondent No. 3 in response to the notice of Assistant Registrar, Societies on 8th November, 2019 in which only expenditure to be incurred was required to be deposited. The Assistant Registrar, Societies proceeded to issue fresh notice on 8th January, 2021 directing the parties to produce their original documents so as to determine electoral college under Section 4-B of the Act, 1860. The objection taken before the Deputy Registrar, Societies by the present petitioner was that after verifying from the original records membership of 54 old members and 86 new members be held invalid and only the living members of 108 list of members that was there in 2004 election, be taken to be as consisting a valid electoral college. He has raised objection to the membership of 54 members on the ground that there was forged meeting held on 1st October, 2006 as there was nothing available on records to demonstrate as to whether any receipt was issued against the membership fee taken from each such member nor, membership fee was deposited in the account. Regarding 86 members the plea taken is that their membership was accepted on 1st August, 2019 only by a Committee of Management which was there in office and since very election pursuant to which the Committee continued in office came to be set aside by this Court on 18th September, 2019 it will be taken that those 86 members were enrolled by an illegally elected Committee of Management and so their membership was also liable to be cancelled. 14. I find that Assistant Registrar, Societies has discussed the issue of 54 members whose membership was finalized by the Assistant Registrar, Societies vide order dated 1st September, 2015 which came to be challenged before this Court vide Writ- C No. 43837 of 2015 and the Court had repelled the argument questioning the membership of those 54 members earlier enrolled by erstwhile Committee of Management in the year 2006 and, therefore, the Court held that ''the induction of 54 members cannot be faulted especially as it has not been shown anywhere nor argued that in past the members of both the committees acted separately or distinctly''. 15. Thus, the Court declined to interfere with the order of Assistant Registrar, Societies and the petition was dismissed. 15. Thus, the Court declined to interfere with the order of Assistant Registrar, Societies and the petition was dismissed. The said judgment was unsuccessfully appealed against and it found favour with the findings of learned Single Judge by observing thus : ''The issue as to whether the 54 members were validly inducted and whether the second appellant presided over or did not participate in the meeting in which they are said to have been enrolled are clearly disputed questions of fact. The Assistant Registrar, it may be noted while finalizing the composition of the general body of a society, is exercising only a summary jurisdiction and it is always open to a person aggrieved to question the same in appropriate proceedings instituted either before the Civil Court or by invocation of the provisions of Section 25 of the 1860 Act. The Assistant Registrar while proceeding to negative the claim of the subsequent elections has in our opinion correctly proceeded to direct the holding of fresh elections, the results of which shall be open to question by the rival factions by either invoking the jurisdiction of the Civil Court or by challenging the same in appropriate proceedings under the 1860 Act.'' 16. Having gone through the judgment of learned Single Judge and that of the Special Appellate Bench, in my considered view the controversy with regard to the 54 members enrolled in the year 2006 did not remain open to challenge any further except in proceedings to be drawn either under Section 25(1) of the Act, 1860 or through a common law remedy of instituting the suit. 17. The order of Assistant Registrar, Societies on the question of membership of those very 54 members having been held to be genuine members once stood upheld by a Coordinate Bench and then by Division Bench of this Court even while exercising power under Section 4-B of the Act, 1860, the Assistant Registrar, Societies cannot reopen the controversy to return a finding qua membership contrary to what has already been held by such an authority previously and affirmed by this Court. Section 25 as referred to in the order of Division Bench (supra) would be referable to Section 25(1) of the Act, 1860, where the question of membership can be raised while reference is being adjudicated upon. 18. Section 25 as referred to in the order of Division Bench (supra) would be referable to Section 25(1) of the Act, 1860, where the question of membership can be raised while reference is being adjudicated upon. 18. Under the circumstances, therefore, I do not find any fault in the findings returned by the Assistant Registrar, Societies relating to 54 members. 19. Now I come to the second argument that Assistant Registrar, Societies wrongly applied de facto doctrine in upholding membership of 86 new members whose fee was deposited on 1st August, 2019 prior to the order of this Court dated 18th September, 2019, whereby the elections were set aside. 20. In support of his argument learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of Division Bench of this Court in the case of Committee of Management Gangadin Ram Kumar Inter College v. Deputy Director of Education, Vth Region and others, 2006(4) ADJ 381 (All) (DB). Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon paragraphs 22 and 23 of the judgment that run as under: ''22. learned Counsel for the appellant has further placed reliance on Division Bench judgment of this Court in Mohd. Iqbal v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, (1992) 2 UPLBEC 1558. In the aforesaid case two members were nominated by the State Government in the Board exercising power under proviso to Section 9 of the U.P. Municipality Act, 1916 by notification dated 2.8.1991. These two nominated members participated in the proceedings of no-confidence held on 12.8.1991 which was brought against the President of the Municipal Board Mohd. Iqbal. The President filed writ petition challenging the proceedings dated 12.8.1991 and participation of aforesaid two nominated members. Two nominated members who were earlier nominated vide notification dated 19.4.1990 also challenged the notification dated 12.8.1991. The Division Bench relying on an earlier judgment of the Division Bench held that the power of nomination given to the State Government was without providing any definite guide lines, thus the nomination dated 12.8.1991 was of no legal consequence. Thus, the notification nominating the two members was held to be illegal. It was contended before the Division Bench that their participation in the proceedings dated 12.8.1991 is saved by de facto doctrine because on the date when they participated in the proceedings the nomination was subsisting. Thus, the notification nominating the two members was held to be illegal. It was contended before the Division Bench that their participation in the proceedings dated 12.8.1991 is saved by de facto doctrine because on the date when they participated in the proceedings the nomination was subsisting. The writ petition was filed even before the proceedings dated 12.8.1991 could take place seeking the interim relief restraining the nominated members to participate in the election. The Court did not grant any interim order staying the participation but only directed that their participation shall be subject to result of the writ petition. The Division Bench in the aforesaid case repelled the argument of saving the said proceedings dated 12.8.1991 on de facto doctrine. Following was observed in paragraphs 7 and 8: 7... If the result of no-confidence motion proceeding is subjected to the decision of a writ petition and if the right to hold office is directly questioned as it has been done in the cases on hand, then de facto doctrine could not protect the illegal participation of respondent Nos. 4 and 5 and voting right exercised by them in the ab-initio void no-confidence motion proceeding. 8... The Supreme Court lint the case of Gokaraju Rangaraju (supra) clearly enunciated that a judgment delivered by a Judge cannot be questioned in a collateral proceeding like appeal or revision but his right to hold office of a Judge can be questioned directly. The right to hold office of a member by respondent Nos. 4 and 5 under the notification dated 2.8.1991 has not been challenged by the petitioner in the instant cases in a collateral proceeding but directly. Therefore, reliance placed by Sri Ravi Kiran Jain on the case of Gokaraju Rangaraju (supra) is misplaced. 23. In the above case the Division Bench did not accept the submission based on de facto doctrine for saving of actions of illegally nominated members principally on the ground that the nomination of two members was directly under challenge in the writ petition. The Division Bench applied the judgment of the Apex Court in Gokaraju Rangaraju (supra). The above case does not help the appellant in any manner rather support the view which we have taken in the present case. No benefit can be taken by the appellant of de facto doctrine.'' 21. The Division Bench applied the judgment of the Apex Court in Gokaraju Rangaraju (supra). The above case does not help the appellant in any manner rather support the view which we have taken in the present case. No benefit can be taken by the appellant of de facto doctrine.'' 21. Upon a bare reading of aforesaid paragraphs I find that there was already writ petition filed before the Court in which the nomination of 2 members was already under challenge and their participation in the voting was directed to be subject to the result of the writ petition. 22. This is a case quite distinguishable on facts. Here in this case there was no such rider operating in the writ petition being Writ - C No. 29150 of 2019 which ultimately came to be allowed on 18th September, 2019. It is on the score of their being already a rider provided in the said case that Division Bench held that de facto doctrine would not be attracted to save the participation and consequential casting of votes by two nominated members. 23. It is a settled law that when the occupation of an office is under challenge and the interim order is passed by the Court that the no policy decision would be taken by such party in office nor, would its conduct resulting in finality to any proceeding then this doctrine would not apply. Even otherwise the Court is of the view that if the officer whose title is ultimately held to be defective then any act by him by which he would build up a personal right or claim or privilege or emolument by reason of his being in office, the doctrine would not be attracted (Cooley' Constitutional Limitations 8th Edition (2) 1355). 24. Here is a case where certain members have come to be enrolled and so no individual rights by any office bearer of Committee in office is sought to be invoked or built up for any personal gain rather it is the members who have the right to participate in an election and cast their respective votes so it is more prejudicing their right than the office bearers who by adopting resolution enrolled members to the general body of the society. By no stretch of imagination if Committee of Management is functioning and adopting resolution, it can be attributable to any personal gain of a particular office bearer individually or collectively by the Committee of Management. 25. It is one who applies for membership his application is taken into consideration and then the Committee or Society adopts the resolution as the case may be. For any Committee of Management that is in office, this is a routine and general exercise of power which cannot be questioned only on this score that subsequently such Committee of Management got ousted by virtue of its election being held to be invalid. 26. Coming to the de facto doctrine, the literal meaning of this would be 'in fact'. The doctrine of de facto is based on sound principle of public policy and is aimed at removing any kind of insecurity and confusion amongst the people whose rights would get prejudiced in the event the orders passed or actions taken by a person who in fact occupied the office, is held to be void on account of his occupation of office subsequently being held to be illegal. 27. It is rightly said that doctrine is borne of necessity and to arrest mischief if there exists office in law and an authority occupies it by virtue of its appointment or election or nomination. Such a person or body is clothed with insignia of the office and exercises powers and functions as such and the authority to exercise such power is upheld by virtue of de facto doctrine. 28. Public policy is a matter of faith and trust that individual's repose in a system which has been created for their benefits. In case of Gokaraju Rangaraju v. State of Andra Pradesh and Achanti Sreenivasa Rao and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1981) 3 SCC 132 , it was held vide paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10 and 17 thus: ''7. In Scadding v. Lorant [1851] 3 HLC 418, the question arose whether a rate for the relief of the poor was rendered invalid by the circumstance that some of the vestry men who made it were vestry men de facto and not de jure. In Scadding v. Lorant [1851] 3 HLC 418, the question arose whether a rate for the relief of the poor was rendered invalid by the circumstance that some of the vestry men who made it were vestry men de facto and not de jure. The Lord Chancellor observed as follows : With regard to the competency of the vestry men, who were vestry men de facto, but not vestry men de jure, to make the rate, your Lordships will see at once the importance of that objection, when you consider how many public officers and persons there are who were charged with very important duties, and whose title to the office on the part of the public cannot be ascertained at the time. You will at once see to what it would lead if the validity of their acts, when in such office, depended upon the propriety of their election. It might tend, if doubts were cast upon them, to consequences of the most destructive kind. It would create uncertainty with respect to the obedience to public officers and it might also lead to persons, instead of resorting to ordinary legal remedies to set right anything done by the officers, taking the law into their own hands. 8. Some interesting observations were made by the Court of Appeal in England in Re James (An Insolvent) [1977] 2 W.L.R. 1. Though the learned Judges constituting the Court of Appeal differed on the principal question that arose before them namely whether ''the High Court of Rhodesia'' was a British Court, there did not appear to be any difference of opinion on the question of the effect of the invalidity of the appointment of a judge on the judgments pronounced by him. Lord Denning M. R., characteristically, said : He sits in the seat of a judge. He wears the robes of a judge. He holds the office of a judge. May be he was not validly appointed. But, still, he holds the office. It is the office that matters, not the incumbent... So long as the man holds the office and exercises it duly and in accordance with law, his orders are not a nullity. If they are erroneous they may be upset on appeal. But, if not, erroneous they should be upheld''. But, still, he holds the office. It is the office that matters, not the incumbent... So long as the man holds the office and exercises it duly and in accordance with law, his orders are not a nullity. If they are erroneous they may be upset on appeal. But, if not, erroneous they should be upheld''. Lord Denning then proceeded to refer to the State of Connecticut v. Carroll decided by the Supreme Court of Connecticut, Re Aldridge decided by the Court of Appeal in New Zealand and Norton v. Shelby County decided by the United States Supreme Court. Observations made in the last case were extracted and they were : Where an office exists under the law, it matters not how the appointment of the incumbent is made, so far as the validity of his acts are concerned. It is enough that he is clothed with the insignia of the office, and exercises its powers and functions.... The official acts of such persons are recognised as valid on grounds of public policy, and for the protection of those having official business to transact. 9. Scarman, L.J., who differed from Lord Denning on the question whether the High Court of Rhodesia was a British Court appeared to approve the view of Lord Denning, M. R. in regard to the de facto doctrine. He said : He (Lord Denning) invokes the doctrine of recognition of the de facto judge, and the doctrine of implied mandate or necessity. I agree with much of the thinking that lies behind his judgment. I do think that in an appropriate case our Courts will recognise the validity of judicial acts, even though they be the acts of a judge not lawfully appointed or derive their authority from an unlawful Government. But it is a fallacy to conclude that, because in certain circumstances our Courts would recognise as valid the judicial acts of an unlawful Court or a de facto judge, therefore, the Court thus recognised is a British Court. 10. The de facto doctrine has received judicial recognition in the United States of America also. In State v. Gardner (Cases on Constitutional Law by Mc. Gonvey and Howard Third Edition 102) the question arose whether the offer of a bribe to a City Commissioner whose appointment was unconstitutional was an offence. 10. The de facto doctrine has received judicial recognition in the United States of America also. In State v. Gardner (Cases on Constitutional Law by Mc. Gonvey and Howard Third Edition 102) the question arose whether the offer of a bribe to a City Commissioner whose appointment was unconstitutional was an offence. Bradbury, J. said: We think that principle of public policy, declared by the English Courts three centuries ago, which gave validity to the official acts of persons who intruded themselves into an office to which they had not been legally appointed, is as applicable to the conditions now presented as they were to the conditions that then confronted the English Judiciary. We are not required to find a name by which officers are to be known, who have acted under a statute that has subsequently been declared unconstitutional, though we think such officers might aptly be called de facto officers. 17. A judge, de facto, therefore, is one who is not a mere intruder or usurper but one who holds office, under colour of lawful authority, though his appointment is defective and may later be found to be defective. Whatever be the defect of his title to the office, judgments pronounced by him and acts done by him when he was clothed with the powers and functions of the office, albeit unlawfully, have the same efficacy as judgments pronounced and acts done by a Judge de jure. Such is the de facto doctrine, born of necessity and public a policy, to prevent needless confusion and endless mischief. There is yet another rule also based on public policy. The defective appointment of a de facto judge may be questioned directly in a proceeding to which he be a party but it cannot be permitted to be questioned in a litigation between two private litigants, a litigation which is of no concern or consequence to the judge except as a judge. Two litigants litigating their private titles cannot be permitted to bring in issue and litigate upon the title of a judge to his office. Otherwise so soon as a judge pronounces a judgment a litigation may be commenced for a declaration that the judgment is void because the judge is no judge. A judge's title to his office cannot be brought into jeopardy in that fashion. Hence the rule against collateral attack on validity of judicial appointments. Otherwise so soon as a judge pronounces a judgment a litigation may be commenced for a declaration that the judgment is void because the judge is no judge. A judge's title to his office cannot be brought into jeopardy in that fashion. Hence the rule against collateral attack on validity of judicial appointments. To question a judge's appointment in an appeal against his judgment is, of course, such a collateral attack.'' 29. In the case of Committee of Management Dayanand Arya Kanya Degree College, Moradabad and others v. Director of Higher Education, Allahabad and others, (1998) 4 SCC 104 , the Court upheld the acceptance of voluntarily resignation of a teacher by the Committee of Management which was de facto in office. vide paragraph 3 of the judgment the Court held that the Committee of Management that was continuing in office by virtue of interim order of the High Court, it would be taken to be a de facto and de jure as well. 30. Following the above judgment, a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Mehandi Hasan and others v. State of U.P. and others, 2014(3) ADJ 437 (DB), had an occasion to deal with the situation where Committee of Management continued to enjoy office by virtue of stay order passed by this Court even though subsequently the election was held to be invalid. In that case the Committee of Management which was continued by virtue of an interim order it issued an advertisement. The petitioners, who had applied against the advertisement and their selection was held but the same was questioned on the ground that their appointment was void ab initio as at that time the Committee was only on the strength of interim order. vide paragraphs 15 and 16 of the judgment, the Court held thus: ''15. The principles of de facto and de jure have been explained by the Supreme Court in the case of Committee of Management, Dayanand Arya Kanya Degree College, Moradabad and others v. Director of Higher Education, Allahabad and others, (1998) 4 SCC 104 . In the said case one Dr. Manju Saraswat was a Principal of Dayanand Arya Kanya Degree College. She tendered her resignation from the post, which was accepted by the managing committee. In the said case one Dr. Manju Saraswat was a Principal of Dayanand Arya Kanya Degree College. She tendered her resignation from the post, which was accepted by the managing committee. The dispute arose whether the committee of management had power to accept the resignation as on the date when the committee of management had accepted the resignation, it was in the office by virtue of interim order passed by the High Court in a writ proceeding in favour of the committee of management. The resignation was not accepted by the Vice Chancellor on the ground that the authorized controller was appointed in the Institution and he had not accepted the resignation but it was accepted by the committee of management, which was continuing on the strength of the interim order. The High Court had also taken the same view. The Supreme Court took the view that as the committee of management was working in the Institution on the strength of interim order, its decision is saved by de facto and de jure both. The similar view was taken by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Committee of Management Gangadin Ram Kumar Inter College, Ramgarh Barwan, District Jaunpur v. Deputy Director of Education, Vth Region, Varanasi and others, 2006(4) ADJ 381 (DB). 16. After careful consideration of the matter, we are of the view that the appointment of writ petitioners are saved by the de facto doctrine. Accordingly, the impugned order of the learned Single Judge so far as it relates to the petitioners in Dr. Mehandi Hasan and another v. The State of U.P. and others, 2007(4) ADJ 664 , is set aside and a direction is issued upon the respondents for the payment of salary of the writ petitioners. Accordingly, special appeal is disposed of.'' 31. Applying the above principle of de facto doctrine in the present case, I find that the present case stands on a much better footing than those cases discussed above. Here is a case where Committee of Management had stood elected and was continuing in office. 32. In my considered view unless and until election to any office or post is held bad, such elected office bearer or board of Management or Committee, to whatever name it is called, enjoy the office both de jure and de facto. Here is a case where Committee of Management had stood elected and was continuing in office. 32. In my considered view unless and until election to any office or post is held bad, such elected office bearer or board of Management or Committee, to whatever name it is called, enjoy the office both de jure and de facto. A mere challenge to an office in absence of any order of interim stay or rider making continuance subject by express words, would not mean that such persons, board of Management or Committee illegally continued and so exercise of power would stand served by the de facto doctrine. No one would be entitled to any personal benefit for having occupied his office as such if such occupation is held bad. 33. In this case writ petition was filed challenging the election and no interim order was passed. While it is true that the elections were ultimately set aside but neither any plea was taken in the writ petition nor, any direction was issued that whatever the powers had been exercised by the Committee of Management in office by virtue of its election, would get rendered void or cancelled on account of election being set aside. 34. As a matter of fact from the bare reading of the aforesaid order of the High Court, I do not find that any plea regarding membership was ever raised. 35. Thus, Committee of Management that had validly continued until the elections were set aside, its conduct of proceeding including resolution adopted by it, shall stand saved by virtue of de facto doctrine. 36. In view of the above, therefore, I do not find any good ground to interfere with the order passed by the Assistant Registrar, Societies. Liberty rests with the petitioner to apply for common law remedy. 37. This petition lacks merit and is, accordingly, dismissed with no order as to cost. 38. Consigned to records.