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2022 DIGILAW 607 (GUJ)

MANHARBEN UDESINGH GOHIL v. NITABEN VIJAYSINGH GOHIL WD/O VIJAYSINGH GOHIL

2022-04-28

ASHOKKUMAR C.JOSHI

body2022
ORDER : 1. By way of this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners have challenged the order dated 15.03.2022 passed by the learned 5th Additional Civil Judge (J.D.), Vadodara, upon framing of issue as under : “(1) Whether the plaint of the plaintiffs is hit by provisions of Order 7 Rule 11 of Civil Procedure Code? (2) What Order?” 2. Learned Counsel Mr. Rushabh H. Shah with learned advocate Mr. Rohan Shah for the petitioners has urged that wherever and whenever there is pure question of law then only, the learned Civil Court can frame the preliminary issue. 2.1. In support of his arguments, learned advocate for the petitioners has placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of NUSLI NEVILLE WADIA v. IVORY PROPERTIES AND OTHERS reported in (2020) 6 Supreme Court Cases 557. 2.2. Learned advocate for the petitioners has also placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Srihari Hanumandas Totala v. Hemant Vithal Kamat reported in 2021 (9) SCC 99 and equivalent citation : 2021 (0) AIJEL-SC 67577 and in the case of Kamgar Swa Sadan Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. v. Vijaykumar Vitthalrao Sarvade reported in 2022 (0) AIJEL-SC 68352. 2.3. Learned advocate for the petitioners has drawn the attention of this Court at Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 2.4. Learned advocate for the petitioners has also drawn the attention of this Court at the grounds, which are narrated in the petition from A to K. 3. Pursuant to the order dated 15.03.2022, wherein the learned Civil Judge has stated and narrated in the order below Exh.1 that on 14.03.2022, learned advocate Mr. B.V. Goswami has remained present before this Court and the learned advocate was heard with regard to the plaint, cause of action and relief claimed. 4. Pursuant to the order dated 15.03.2022, wherein the learned Civil Judge has stated and narrated in the order below Exh.1 that on 14.03.2022, learned advocate Mr. B.V. Goswami has remained present before this Court and the learned advocate was heard with regard to the plaint, cause of action and relief claimed. 4. Learned 5th Additional Civil Judge (J.D.), Vadodara has also observed that pursuant to the averments made in the plaint, cause of action, relief claimed and documents submitted with D-list and keeping in mind provisions of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, The Indian Succession Act, 1925 and The Limitation Act, 1963, the learned Civil Court thought it fit to frame the preliminary issue and the Civil Court has also perused the principles laid down in the case of T. Arivandanam v. T.V. Satyapal & Others reported in AIR 1977 0 (SC) 2421. Upon all such basis, the court has concluded that the preliminary issue with regard to Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure is required to be framed. 5. Learned Counsel has also placed reliance upon the judgments mainly on the issue of limitation Act as well as the issue of res judicata, wherein the judgments are of the Hon’ble Supreme court, it is binding to this court and there is no question for the same, but at the same time, the learned Civil judge has not observed that there is only the question of Limitation Act and there is only question of res judicata. On the contrary, ex facie, the learned Civil Judge has observed that pursuant to the pleadings, there are many factors including the cause of action, The Limitation Act, 1963, Indian Succession Act, 1925 and on all such grounds, prima facie, learned Civil Court has opined that there is requirement of framing of issue under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 6. It is also undisputed fact that the Court has also heard concerned counsel for the suit and also considered the averments made in the plaint. 7. Before traveling to the exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, it would be just and proper to refer land mark decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, in the case of (i) Shalini Shyam Shetty and Another Vs. 7. Before traveling to the exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, it would be just and proper to refer land mark decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, in the case of (i) Shalini Shyam Shetty and Another Vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil, (2010) 8 SCC 329 , wherein, the Court has considered in detail the scope of interference by this Court to hold and observe that Article 227 can be invoked by the High Court Suo motu as a custodian of justice. An improper and a frequent exercise of this power would be counterproductive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality. The power is discretionary and has to be exercised very sparingly on equitable principle. The observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, read as under: “57. Articles 226 and 227 stand on substantially different footing. As noted above, prior to the Constitution, the Chartered High Courts as also the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council could issue prerogative writs in exercise of their original jurisdiction. [See 1986 (suppl.) SCC 401 at page 469)]. 58. However, after the Constitution every High Court has been conferred with the power to issue writs under Article 226 and these are original proceeding. [State of U.P. and others vs. Dr. Vijay Anand Maharaj - AIR 1963 SC 946 , page 951]. 59. The jurisdiction under Article 227 on the other hand is not original nor is it appellate. This jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227 is for both administrative and judicial superintendence. Therefore, the powers conferred under Articles 226 and 227 are separate and distinct and operate in different fields. 60. Another distinction between these two jurisdictions is that under Article 226, High Court normally annuls or quashes an order or proceeding but in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court, apart from annulling the proceeding, can also substitute the impugned order by the order which the inferior tribunal should have made. {See Surya Dev Rai (supra), para 25 page 690 and also the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Ahmad Ishaque and others- [ AIR 1955 SC 233 , para 20 page 243]}. 61. {See Surya Dev Rai (supra), para 25 page 690 and also the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Ahmad Ishaque and others- [ AIR 1955 SC 233 , para 20 page 243]}. 61. Jurisdiction under Article 226 normally is exercised where a party is affected but power under Article 227 can be exercised by the High Court suo motu as a custodian of justice. In fact, the power under Article 226 is exercised in favour of persons or citizens for vindication of their fundamental rights or other statutory rights. Jurisdiction under Article 227 is exercised by the High Court for vindication of its position as the highest judicial authority in the State. In certain cases where there is infringement of fundamental right, the relief under Article 226 of the Constitution can be claimed ex-debito justicia or as a matter of right. But in cases where the High Court exercises its jurisdiction under Article 227, such exercise is entirely discretionary and no person can claim it as a matter of right. From an order of a Single Judge passed under Article 226, a Letters Patent Appeal or an intra Court Appeal is maintainable. But no such appeal is maintainable from an order passed by a Single Judge of a High Court in exercise of power under Article 227. In almost all High Courts, rules have been framed for regulating the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226. No such rule appears to have been framed for exercise of High Court's power under Article 227 possibly to keep such exercise entirely in the domain of the discretion of High Court. 62. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated: (a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of Court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of its power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh (supra) and the principles in Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, `within the bounds of their authority'. (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India & others, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 and therefore abridgement by a Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counter-productive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality. (ii) The Apex Court in a recent decision in Puri Investments v. Young Friends and Co. and Others, MANU/SC/0290/2022 has observed as under: “13. There was no perversity in the order of the Appellate Tribunal on the basis of which the High Court could have interfered. In our view, the High Court tested the legality of the order of the Tribunal through the lens of an appellate body and not as a supervisory Court in adjudicating the application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. This is impermissible. The finding of the High Court that the appellate forum’s decision was perverse and the manner in which such finding was arrived at was itself perverse.” 8.1. The Hon’ble Division Bench of the Apex Court has held at paragraph 13, which is relevant to the present case, that there was no perversity in the order of Appellate Tribunal on the basis of which the High Court could have interfered. In view of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the High Court tested the legality of the order of the Tribunal through the lens of an appellate body and not as a supervisory Court in adjudicating the application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. This is impermissible. The finding of the High Court that the appellate forum’s decision was perverse and the manner in which such finding was arrived at was itself perverse. 9. Upon such premises, when the learned Civil Court has just framed preliminary issue after perusing the pleadings, this Court is of the opinion that at this juncture, this Court, under this supervisory powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot say that there is pure question of law so long as paragraph 3 of the impugned order is concerned. Wherein the cause of action, Indian Succession Act and the Limitation Act is mentioned. Upon such premises, this Court is of the opinion that petitioners are required to submit their case before the learned Civil Court so long as preliminary issue is concerned and if the petitioners fail, in that case, remedy is very well available under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure and therefore, in view of the latest judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Puri Investments (supra), this Court is not inclined to entertain this petition since it is devoid of merits. 10. Without going into the detailed discussion and merits of the case since the learned Trial Court is yet to decide and hear the parties on preliminary issue, the petition is dismissed in limine, with no order as to costs. Further, it is made clear that learned Court below shall decide preliminary issue in accordance with law without being influenced by the order of this Court.