JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Mr. M. A. Sheikh, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Applicants and Mr. M.H. Rajbarbhuiya and Mr. A. Mannaf, the learned counsels appearing for the Respondents. 2. All the above applications are the applications under Section 5 for condonation of delay in filing the application seeking setting aside of the abatement as well as for substitution of the legal representatives. 3. The Interlocutory Application being I.A(Civil) No. 1308/2021 is an application for condonation of delay of 3063 days in filing the application for setting aside the abatement of appeal in respect to Appellant No.1. The ground assigned in the said application is that the Applicants’ father filed the connected Second Appeal alongwith others and he was conducting the case and the applicants even after the death of their father were not aware of the case but subsequently when the surviving respondents declared in public in August, 2019 that there was a case in the High Court filed by their father and others which the Respondents won, then the applicants approached the Appellant No. 3(b) and enquired from him whether he had any knowledge of filing of a case by their father against the Respondents and then the Appellant No. 3(b) replied in the positive and also said that the Applicants’ father has filed the case in the High Court alongwith him and other appellants and then the Applicants said to the Appellant No. 3(a) that they had come to know from the Respondents that they won the said case. The original Appellant No.1 as per the said application expired on 01.02.2013. 4. To the said application, the Opposite Party No. 7 filed an Affidavit-in-Opposition objecting to the condonation of delay of 3063 days. A perusal of the said Affidavit-in-Opposition shows that the statements made in the application for condonation of delay is not at all believable as the source of the information of the applicants regarding the appeal filed by their father was Appellant Nos. 3(b) and 3(a). But there was no step taken by the said Co-Appellant Nos. 3(b) and 3(a) for setting aside the abatement of the appeal. It was further mentioned that the applicants herein as per the age mentioned in the application are all above 50 years (nearing 60 years of age) and it was not believable that they had no knowledge about their father filing an appeal. 3(b) and 3(a) for setting aside the abatement of the appeal. It was further mentioned that the applicants herein as per the age mentioned in the application are all above 50 years (nearing 60 years of age) and it was not believable that they had no knowledge about their father filing an appeal. Further to that, it was also mentioned that in the said application they have named one Kashem Ali who is the Respondent No.1 but the said person had died on 18.01.2021 as well as the Respondent No.6, one Saban Ali who also died on 05.12.2018. These persons were co-villagers and as such the applicants have due knowledge about the death of the persons. It was also mentioned that the appeal in question was filed in the year 2010 against a dead person whose name is Azimudin Sk. who died much prior to filing of the appeal and the subject matter of the suit being joint property of the Respondents, the appeal filed in the year 2010 against the dead man i.e. the Respondent No.7 is not at all sustainable in law. On the basis of the same, it was stated in the said Affidavit-in-Opposition that the version of the applicants cannot at all be accepted. 5. The Interlocutory Application i.e. I.A.(Civil) No.511/2022 is an application for condonation of delay of 3040 days in filing the application for setting aside the abatement in respect to the Appellant No.2(a) who expired on 19.08.2011. A perusal of the said application shows that the applicants herein who are the legal representatives of the original Appellant No.2(a) had stated that their father filed the connected Second Appeal alongwith others and their father was conducting the case and the applicants even after the death of their father were not aware of the case. But, subsequently, when the surviving respondents declared in public in the last week of August 2019, that there was a case in the High Court filed by Bodiyot Jamal (original Appellant No.2(a)) and others was won by them, then the applicants approached the Appellant No.3(b) and enquired from him whether he had any knowledge about filing of the case by their father against the Respondent. Then the Appellant No.3(b) replied in positive and also said that Bodiyot Jamal i.e. the Appellant No.2 filed the case in the High Court alongwith him and other appellants and then the applicants said to Appellant No.3(a) that they have come to know from the Respondents that they won the said case. It was further stated that after hearing the same, the Appellant No.3(b) immediately contacted Mr. M. A. Sheikh, Advocate for the appellants and enquired from him about the status of the case and then the Advocate told him that the case was pending. However, the Appellant No.3(b) informed the learned counsel that the surviving Respondents had announced in public that they won the case. Thereafter, the Advocate went through the records and came to learn that vide an order dated 07.04.2017, the case was closed. The certified copy of the said order dated 07.04.2017 was taken out on 04.09.2019. It is under such circumstances that there has been a delay of 3040 days in filing the application for setting aside the abatement. 6. The Interlocutory Application (Civil) bearing No.531/2022 is another application filed on behalf of the applicants for condonation of delay of Appellant No.2(a). The difference between I.A.(Civil) No.511/2022 with I.A. (Civil) No.531/2022 is while in I.A.(Civil) No.511/2022 the condonation of delay sought for was 3040 days in filing the application for substitution of the legal representatives of Appellant No.2(a) while in I.A.(Civil) No.531/2022 the condonation of delay sought for was 2980 days in filing the application for setting aside the abatement in respect to the Appellant No.2(a). 7. The Interlocutory Application i.e. I.A.(Civil) No.540/2022 is an application for condonation of delay of 2203 days for setting aside the abatement of the Appellant No.3(a) who expired on 02.12.2013. The said application is filed by the applicants who are the legal representatives of Shahar Ali (the Appellant No.3(a)). The ground mentioned in the instant application is a replica of the I.A. (C) No.511/2022 filed by the other applicants and for the sake of brevity, this Court is not repeating the same. 8. The Interlocutory Application i.e. I.A.(Civil) No.546/2022 is an application for condonation of delay of 2143 days in filing the application for setting aside the abatement in respect to the Appellant No.3(a). 8. The Interlocutory Application i.e. I.A.(Civil) No.546/2022 is an application for condonation of delay of 2143 days in filing the application for setting aside the abatement in respect to the Appellant No.3(a). The contents and grounds of the instant application sought for is a replica of the I.A.(Civil) No.531/2022 and for the sake of brevity, this Court is not repeating the same. 9. The Interlocutory Application i.e. I.A.(Civil) No.554/2022 is also a condonation of delay for 2203 days in filing the application for substitution of the legal representatives of the deceased Appellant No.1. The contents of the said application is the replica of I.A.(Civil) No.1308/2021. 10. Before determining the said applications, it is relevant to take note of some other facts and circumstances which would be relevant for the determination of the said applications. It appears on record that this Court on 11.08.2010 admitted the connected Second Appeal for hearing on a substantial question of law and issued notice upon the Respondents. On 23.11.2010, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of all other Respondents except Respondent No.7 informed the Court that the Respondent No.7 had already expired and in that regard this Court vide an order dated 23.11.2010 directed that the Appellants to take steps for substitution of the legal representatives of the Respondent No.7. 11. I have also perused the Office Note in respect to the connected Regular Second Appeal wherein vide the Office Note dated 07.01.2011 and 28.08.2012, it has been duly reflected that the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has not taken steps for substitution of the legal representatives of the Respondent No.7. The orders passed by the Lawazima Court dated 30.08.2012, 07.09.2012 and 10.09.2012 also shows that the Appellants did not take any steps for substitution of the legal representatives of the Respondent No.7. On 07.04.2017 when the connected Second Appeal came up before this Court, this Court by taking into consideration that the Respondent No.7 had died and from the Office Note dated 07.01.2011, 28.08.2012, 07.09.2012, 30.08.2012 and 10.09.2012 it appeared that there was no substitution application filed, closed the connected Second Appeal on the ground that the Second Appeal had abated. However, liberty was given to the Appellants to take steps for substitution and then only the matter was directed to be listed. 12. However, liberty was given to the Appellants to take steps for substitution and then only the matter was directed to be listed. 12. It further appears from the record that till now no application has been filed for substitution of the legal representatives of the Respondent No.7. In the meantime, it further appears that the Appellant No.1, Appellant No.2(a) and Appellant No.3(a) had expired for which the above noted applications have been filed for condonation of delay. A perusal of all the application shows that in each of the application a stand has been taken by the legal representatives of the Appellant No.1, Appellant No.2(a) and Appellant No.3(a) that their father was looking after the case and the applicants concerned had no knowledge about the said cases. The stand therefore taken by the applicants in the instant applications were that the Appellant No.1, Appellant No.2(a) and Appellant No.3(a) were pursuing the litigation in the connected Second Appeal. It further appears from the record that Appellant No.3(b) had also the knowledge about the connected Second Appeal as would be apparent from perusal of paragraph No.3 of all the applications. It also appears that Appellant No.3(b) knew who was their counsel, who was appearing on behalf of the appellants as could be seen in the averments in applications to the effect that the Appellant No.3(b) contacted Mr. M.A. Sheikh, Advocate. 13. Now, in this circumstances, the question therefore arises as to whether the grounds assigned for condonation of delay comes within the ambit of sufficient cause and whether the delay is preferring the applications is to be condoned. 14. For determination of the above question, it is required to look into the object behind the concept of Limitation. The Limitation Act, 1963 is founded on public policy. Its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and forgery, to quicken diligence and prevent oppression. By the said Act, it seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been adjudicated unexplainably and have for the lapse of time become stale. In Paragraph No.605 of Volume 28 of the Halsbury’s Laws of England, the policy of the Limitation Acts in England have been stated. The same is quoted hereinbelow. “605. By the said Act, it seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been adjudicated unexplainably and have for the lapse of time become stale. In Paragraph No.605 of Volume 28 of the Halsbury’s Laws of England, the policy of the Limitation Acts in England have been stated. The same is quoted hereinbelow. “605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.- The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitation, namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence.” 15. The law as laid down by the various judgments of the Supreme Court have categorically held that an unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party’s own inaction, negligence or laches. 16. Therefore, law on the issue of Limitation can be summarized to the effect that where a case has been presented beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain to the Court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the Court within the limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have acted not diligently or remain inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. The settled law also stipulates that no Court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by the various legal pronouncements in regard to the condonation of delay. In case, there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the Court on time, condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation to statutory provisions and it tantamount to showing utter disregard to the Legislature. 17. In case, there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the Court on time, condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation to statutory provisions and it tantamount to showing utter disregard to the Legislature. 17. Another aspect of the matter which also is required to be taken into consideration for the purpose of condonation of delay that merely because sufficient cause has been made out in the facts of the given case, there is no right of the applicant to have the delay condoned. This was held by the Supreme Court in the case of Ramlal Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. Reported in AIR 1962 SC 361 , Paragraph 12 of the said judgment is quoted hereinbelow. “12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant. It cannot justify an enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle during all the time available to it. In this connection we may point out that considerations of bona fides or due diligence are always material and relevant when the Court is dealing with applications made under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In dealing with such applications the Court is called upon to consider the effect of the combined provisions of Sections 5 and 14. In this connection we may point out that considerations of bona fides or due diligence are always material and relevant when the Court is dealing with applications made under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In dealing with such applications the Court is called upon to consider the effect of the combined provisions of Sections 5 and 14. Therefore, in our opinion, considerations which have been expressly made material and relevant by the provisions of Section 14 cannot to the same extent and in the same manner be invoked in dealing with applications which fall to be decided only under Section 5 without reference to Section 14.” 18. A reading of the above quoted paragraph of the judgment of the Supreme Court would show that it was held that even the proof of sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. If the sufficient cause is not proved, nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning the delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that the diligence of a party or its bona fide may fall for consideration. The Supreme Court however, put a caution to the scope of the enquiry by observing that while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown, the scope of the enquiry would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant. In a recent judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra Vs. Borse Bros. In a recent judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra Vs. Borse Bros. Engineers and Contractors (P) Ltd reported in (2021) 6 SCC 460 , the Supreme Court after taking into consideration the various judgments including the judgment of Supreme Court rendered in the case of Ramlal (supra) observed that in a case where a party has acted bona fide and not in a negligent manner, the delay could be condoned in the discretion of the Court however bearing in mind that other side of the picture is that the Opposite Party may have acquired both in equity and justice which would may now be lost by the first party’s inaction, negligence or laches. 19. The law above mentioned summarized would show that in order to be successful in an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 seeking condonation of delay, the applicant is required to show two things. First is that, there was a sufficient cause which means adequate and enough reason which had prevented the applicant to approach this Court within a period of limitation. Secondly, even after showing sufficient cause, an obligation is cast upon the Court whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. For exercise of such discretion, it would require the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at that stage, the diligence of the party or its bona fides fall for consideration. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on its part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground for condoning the delay. 20. In the backdrop of the above, if this Court take into consideration, the statements made in the applications for condonation of delay, it would be seen that the reasons assigned for which had prevented the applicants, who were the legal representatives of the Appellant No.1, Appellant No.2(a) and Appellant No.3(a) respectively are varied inasmuch as in each of the applications it has been mentioned that the Appellant No.1, Appellant No.2(a) and Appellant No.3(a) were taking steps in respect to the appeal in question and the applicants who were the legal representatives of the said appellants had no knowledge about the appeal. It is further relevant to take note of that the Appellant No.3(b) as per the version of the applicants knew about the filing of the appeal as well as the pendency of the appeal. But there was no steps taken by the Appellant No.3(b) or even by the Appellant No.2(b) and Appellant No.3(c)(i) for bringing on record the legal representatives of the Appellant No.1, Appellant No.2(a) as well as Appellant No.3(a). There is also non-explanation as to why the Appellant No.3(b) who had the knowledge about the pendency of the appeal as well as also the death of the Appellant No.1, Appellant No.2(a) and Appellant No.3(a) who were near relatives of the Appellant No.3(b) had not taken any steps for substitution of the legal representatives. Consequently, this Court does not find any sufficient cause for condoning the delay in all the applications filed by the applicants. 21. It is also noteworthy to mention that not only the applicants have not shown any sufficient cause but also their conduct also suffers from negligence, want of bona fide as well as have not acted diligently. The act of the Appellant No.3(b) not to take any steps in spite of having knowledge about the pendency of the appeal in spite of the Appellant No.1, Appellant No.2(a) and Appellant No.3(a) having expired makes it abundantly clear that the conduct of the applicants suffers from negligence, want of bona fide as well as want of diligence. Merely stating that they did not know that such application is required to be filed cannot be a justified ground for condoning the delay of 3063, 3040 and 2203 days. 22. Another aspect of the matter which also needs to be taken into consideration is that on 23.11.2010, the learned counsel of the appellants who is also the present learned counsel of the applicants was informed that the Respondent No.7 had expired. There was no steps taken by the appellants as would be apparent from a perusal of Office Note dated 07.01.2011 and 28.08.2012 and the orders being passed by the Lawazima Court on 30.08.2012, 07.09.2012 and 10.09.2012. It is under such circumstances that this Court vide an order dated 07.04.2017 had observed that the Second Appeal had abated and accordingly closed the same. Till date, no steps have been taken for substitution of the legal representatives of the Respondent No.7. It is under such circumstances that this Court vide an order dated 07.04.2017 had observed that the Second Appeal had abated and accordingly closed the same. Till date, no steps have been taken for substitution of the legal representatives of the Respondent No.7. The filing of the Interlocutory Application i.e. I.A. (Civil) No.545/2022 on 17.03.2021 also shows the negligence on the part of the applicants to take steps in respect to the instant matter. 23. Consequently, this Court therefore, finds no sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the applications filed herein and also finds that the applicants herein as well as the Appellant No.2(b), Appellant No.3(b) and Appellant No.3(c) (i) being negligent and the actions being not bona fide dismisses all the Interlocutory Applications filed for condonation of delay. However, in the facts of the present case, no costs are imposed.