JUDGMENT : RAJENDRA M. SAREEN, J. 1. This Appeal is filed by the appellant – Gujarat Pollution Control Board under Section 378(4) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 against the judgment and order dated 07.01.2008 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jamnagar in Criminal Case No.3328 of 2004 acquitting the respondent – original accused from the offence punishable under sections 21(1)(2) and 31(A) of the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981. (hereinafter shall be referred to as the “Air Act” for short). 2. The case of the prosecution is as under :- 2.1. The complainant is serving as an law officer Gujarat Pollution Control Board (hereinafter referred to as “the Board”), a Board duly constituted under section 4 of the Air Act and he has authorized prosecute respondent No.1 by the Board. 2.2. The complainant is a public servant and in his capacity, he filed Criminal Complaint being Criminal Case No.3328 of 2004 in the court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jamnagar against the respondent No.1 accused for breach of Section 21(1)(2) and 31(A) of the Air Act, which is punishable under section 27 of the Air Act. It is alleged in the complaint that the respondent accused has started industrial plant in Air Pollution Control Area without obtaining prior consent and not fixed Chimney and has not complied with the Declaration issued by the Board on 15/1/2004 and thereby committed the alleged offence. 2.3. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate initially issued process to the respondent No.1 accused and thereafter respondent accused appeared before the learned Judicial Magistrate and denied all the charges levelled against him. 2.4. Thereafter, after hearing both the parties, and evaluating the evidence on record, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jamnagar by order dated 7/1/2008 was pleased to acquit the respondent No.1 accused for breach of Section 21(1)(2) and 31(A) of the Air Act. 2.5. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgement and order of acquittal dated 7/1/2008 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jamnagar in Criminal Case No.3328 of 2004, the appellant – original complainant has preferred the present appeal. 3. Mr.Rituraj Meena, learned advocate for the appellant Board has vehemently argued that the court below has committed a grave error in not believing the deposition of the witnesses examined by the prosecution and evidence adduced by the prosecution. 3.1. 3. Mr.Rituraj Meena, learned advocate for the appellant Board has vehemently argued that the court below has committed a grave error in not believing the deposition of the witnesses examined by the prosecution and evidence adduced by the prosecution. 3.1. Mr.Rituraj Meena, learned advocate for the appellant Board has further submitted that the court below has erred in acquitting the respondent – accused from the charges levelled against him. 3.2. Mr.Rituraj Meena, learned advocate for the appellant Board has further submitted that prosecution has proved that the respondents have committed offence under section 21(1)(2) and 31(A) of the Air Act. 3.3. Mr.Rituraj Meena, learned advocate for the appellant Board has further submitted that trial court has acquitted the respondent accused merely on some minor contradictions and omissions in the evidence of the witnesses. 3.4. Mr.Rituraj Meena, learned advocate for the appellant Board has further submitted that the trial court has erred in not believing the evidence of the complainant who had no reason to implicate the accused falsely in the case. 3.5. Mr.Rituraj Meena, learned advocate for the appellant Board has further submitted that the offence punishable under section 21(1)(2) and 31(A) of the Air Act, is made out, however, the same is not believed by the court below. 3.6. Mr.Rituraj Meena, learned advocate for the appellant Board has further submitted that the prosecution witnesses have supported the case of the prosecution, however, the trial court erroneously not believed their evidence and acquitted the accused. 3.7. Mr.Rituraj Meena, learned advocate for the appellant Board has further submitted that trial court has erroneously held that the prosecution has failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. Making above submissions, he has requested to allow the present appeal. 4. Mr.Mrugen Purohit, learned advocate for the contesting respondent No.1 - original accused has submitted that that there is hardly any substance in the submissions of learned advocate for the appellant. There is no admissible evidence on record connecting the accused with the commission of the offence. There are material contradictions and omissions in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses. The prosecution has not proved the case beyond reasonable doubt. Since there was no evidence, no error or illegality has been committed by the trial court in acquitting the respondent accused. Making above submissions, he has requested to dismiss the present appeal. 5. There are material contradictions and omissions in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses. The prosecution has not proved the case beyond reasonable doubt. Since there was no evidence, no error or illegality has been committed by the trial court in acquitting the respondent accused. Making above submissions, he has requested to dismiss the present appeal. 5. Heard the learned advocates for the respective parties and gone through the impugned judgement and order of the trial court as well as the entire material on record. 6. Before adverting to the facts of the case, it would be worthwhile to refer to the scope in Acquittal Appeals. It is well settled by is catena of decisions that an appellate Court has full Power to review, re-appreciate and consider the Evidence upon which the Order of Acquittal is founded. However, the Appellate Court must bear in mind that in case of Acquittal, there is prejudice in favour of the Accused, firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the Fundamental Principle of Criminal Jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of Law. Secondly, the Accused having secured his Acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. 7. On perusal of the record it appears that from the deposition of the witness who inspected the brick-ciln, it is clear that the manufacturing of the bricks was not continued but the work of transportation of raw material was continued. From the deposition of other witnesses, it is clear that in the inspection, there were only officers of the Board and there was no independent witness as panch or witness. Even during the inspection, accused was not present but one Narshibhai Panchasara was present, who according to the case of the complainant, was employee of the accused. As stated above, accused Keshavjibhai was not present and Keshavjibhai was present and he signed the writing wherein it is written that the accused Keshavjibhai is owner of the brick kiln and on that basis the complainant assumed that the accused is the owner of the brick kiln. Even the aforesaid writing alleged to have been signed by Narshibhai, was not written by Narshibhai but the same was written by the officer of the Board namely Kishorbhai Malavya. Even the aforesaid writing alleged to have been signed by Narshibhai, was not written by Narshibhai but the same was written by the officer of the Board namely Kishorbhai Malavya. The witness of the Board has admitted that no investigation has been done as to who is owner of the brick kiln, Narshibhai or Keshavjibhai. The complainant has not produced on record any document or evidence from the office of the Talati-cum-Mantri or Collector, as to the ownership of the brick kiln. From the evidence of the witness of the complainant it is doubtful as to who was owner of the brick kiln. 7.1. Further clerk of the Collector Office, Jamnagar namely Shailendra Madhukar Thakor is examined as PW No.3 at Ex.46. He has admitted in his cross examination that he has not visited the brick kiln, which alleged to have been run in the government waste land on the bank of Kankavati river. Thus, this witness has no personal knowledge. 7.2. Even the Talati-cum-Mantri in his deposition has also admitted that at the time of inspection, there was no activity of manufacturing bricks and the place was open. It is also admitted that no notice for encroachment on the Panchayat land has been issued to the accused and there is no mention of encroachment in the village form No.7/12. He has also admitted that when they visited the place, there was no the brick kiln. He also admitted that no case for encroachment has been filed against the accused. As per the Talati, at the time of inspection, the place was open and there was no brick kiln. All the proceedings are of 21/5/2007 whereas inspection has been done on 25/4/2004 i.e. after three years. It has not come on record that at the time of inspection what was the position at the place. After issuance of the notice on 15/1/2004 no proceedings was initiated by the office of the Collector upto 21/5/2007. The proceedings are initiated after service of summons to the witness. Notice Ex.25 has been issued to the Collector Office for cancellation of the lease, but no evidence has been produced on record for cancellation of the lease. During the trial and after service of summons to the witnesses, it is tried to show that the accused is running brick kiln, but the same is not proved. Notice Ex.25 has been issued to the Collector Office for cancellation of the lease, but no evidence has been produced on record for cancellation of the lease. During the trial and after service of summons to the witnesses, it is tried to show that the accused is running brick kiln, but the same is not proved. Thus, the prosecution has failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. No error or illegality has been committed by the trial court while acquitting the accused. 7.3. It may be noted that as per the settled legal position, when two views are possible, the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial Court should not be interfered with by the Appellate Court unless for the special reasons. A beneficial reference of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan versus Ram Niwas reported in (2010) 15 SCC 463 be made in this regard. In the said case, it has been observed as under:- “6. This Court has held in Kalyan v. State of U.P., (2001) 9 SCC 632 : “8. The settled position of law on the powers to be exercised by the High Court in an appeal against an order of acquittal is that though the High Court has full powers to review the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is passed, it is equally well settled that the presumption of innocence of the accused persons, as envisaged under the criminal jurisprudence prevalent in our country is further reinforced by his acquittal by the trial court. Normally the views of the trial court, as to the credibility of the witnesses, must be given proper weight and consideration because the trial court is supposed to have watched the demeanour and conduct of the witness and is in a better position to appreciate their testimony. The High Court should be slow in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by the trial court. In Kali Ram V. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1973) 2 SCC 808 , this Court observed that the golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal case is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The Court further observed: "27. It is no doubt true that wrongful acquittals are undesirable and shake the confidence of the people in the judicial system, much worse, however, is the wrongful conviction of an innocent person. The consequences of the conviction of an innocent person are far more serious and its reverberations cannot but be felt in a civilised society. Suppose an innocent person is convicted of the offence of murder and is hanged, nothing further can undo the mischief for the wrong resulting from the unmerited conviction is irretrievable. To take another instance, if an innocent person is sent to jail and undergoes the sentence, the scars left by the miscarriage of justice cannot be erased by any subsequent act of expiration. Not many persons undergoing the pangs of wrongful conviction are fortunate like Dreyfus to have an Emile Zola to champion their cause and succeed in getting the verdict of guilt annulled. All this highlights the importance of ensuring, as far as possible, that there should be no wrongful conviction of an innocent person. Some risk of the conviction of the innocent, of course, is always there in any system of the administration of criminal justice Such a risk can be minimised but not ruled out altogether It may in this connection be apposite to refer to the following observations of Sir Carleton Alien quoted on page 157 of "The Proof of Guilt" by Glanville Williams, second edition: "I dare say some sentimentalists would assent to the proposition that it is better that a thousand, or even a million, guilty persons should escape than that one innocent person should suffer; but no responsible and practical person would accept such a view. For it is obvious that if our ratio is extended indefinitely, there comes a point when the whole system of justice has broken down and society is in a state of chaos." 28. For it is obvious that if our ratio is extended indefinitely, there comes a point when the whole system of justice has broken down and society is in a state of chaos." 28. The fact that there has to be clear evidence of the guilt of the accused and that in the absence of that it is not possible to record a finding of his guilt was stressed by this Court in the case of Shivaji Sahebrao, (1973) 2 SCC 793 , as is clear from the following observations: "Certainly it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely, may be guilty before a court, can be convicted and the mental distinction between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures from sure considerations." “9. The High Court while dealing with the appeals against the order of acquittal must keep in mind the following propositions laid down by this Court, namely, (i) the slowness of the appellate court to disturb a finding of fact; (ii) the non-interference with the order of acquittal where it is indeed only a case of taking a view different from the one taken by the High Court." 8. In Arulvelu and another versus State reported in (2009) 10 Supreme Court Cases 206, the Supreme Court after discussing the earlier judgments, observed in para No. 36 as under: “36. Careful scrutiny of all these judgments lead to the definite conclusion that the appellate court should be very slow in setting aside a judgment of acquittal particularly in a case where two views are possible. The trial court judgment can not be set aside because the appellate court's view is more probable. The appellate court would not be justified in setting aside the trial court judgment unless it arrives at a clear finding on marshaling the entire evidence on record that the judgment of the trial court is either perverse or wholly unsustainable in law.” 8. In that view of the matter, the Criminal Appeal being devoid of merits is dismissed.