ORDER : 1. This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is filed by the petitioner seeking direction to quash and set aside an order dated 04.09.2021 passed by the Development Commissioner, which in turn had confirmed order dated 20.12.2018 passed by the District Development Office, Aravalli, by which in exercise of powers under Section 59 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993 (for short “the Act”) the petitioner who held the office of Sapanch was removed. 2. Learned advocate Mr. Rajesh O. Gidiya appearing for the petitioner submitted that though the FIR has been registered against the petitioner by invoking the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act however, as a matter of fact, the petitioner has been made a scapegoat. It is submitted that as there was a dispute between two villagers with regard to the eve-teasing of one lady, the petitioner had acted as a mediator to get the matter settled and it is in regard of this settlement that the amount was received as a part of settlement when the trap was carried out. It is submitted that the receipt of money during the trap has nothing to do with the allegations made in the FIR pertaining to passing of resolution to excavate and deepen the village pond. 2.1. Learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that in the facts of the case, the action would not attract a question of moral turpitude against the petitioner and therefore, the orders passed by the authority deserve to be quashed and set aside. Learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that the authorities have not taken into consideration all the relevant aspects especially has not at all considered the issues raised by the petitioner before such authorities concerning the nature of evidence. It is submitted that though the reference is made to the recording pertaining to the subject matter of bribe, such recording was not at all examined either by the District Development Officer or the Development commissioner and therefore, any finding by these authorities based on it are merely on surmises and therefore, orders of both the authorities deserve to be set aside. 2.2. 2.2. Learned advocate has thereafter, referred to the decision of this Court in case of Ramanbhai Santubhai Raut v/s. State of Gujarat, reported in 2021 LawSuit (Guj) 2160, submitting that in an identical facts of the case where the allegations pertain to the offence of corruption, there the Court had interfered and set aside the order of suspension of that petitioner. Learned advocate emphasizes that the facts of the case are quite similar and in fact even after the investigation pursuant to the FIR, period of two years has lapse, still no charge-sheet has been filed. Therefore, it is submitted that the Investigating Agency has not been able to garner sufficient evidence to charge-sheet the petitioner and therefore, this aspect is relevant which was not considered by the authorities. 2.3. Learned advocate has thereafter drawn attention of this Court to other judgments of this Court in case of Aatulbhai Tapubhai Nakum v/s. State of Gujarat and others, reported in2016(2)GLR 1007, unreported judgment in case of Anakbhai Chhanabhai Sankhat v/s. State of Gujarat in Special Civil Application No.12134 of 2020 and unreported judgment in case of Bhavansinh Bhupatsinh Mori v/s. Additional Development Commissioner and Another, in Special Civil Application No.14582 of 2021. By drawing attention of this Court, it is submitted that merely registration of an FIR is not sufficient to attract the clause of moral turpitude so as to invoke provisions of Section 59 of the Act.3] As against this, learned advocate Mr. Manish Patel appearing for the respondent-authorities submitted that the allegations made in the FIR are clear and make out the offence at prima-facie stage and hence, the offence has been registered and in the allegations ade, the role is also attributed which would attract the offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act. Learned advocate has submitted that the nature of role attributed to the petitioner clearly attracts the requirement of Section 59 of the Act and therefore, no fault can be found in exercising the powers under Section 59 of the Act to remove the petitioner from the post of Sarpanch. Learned advocate has submitted that the nature of role attributed to the petitioner clearly attracts the requirement of Section 59 of the Act and therefore, no fault can be found in exercising the powers under Section 59 of the Act to remove the petitioner from the post of Sarpanch. Learned advocate has also submitted that the arguments made pertaining to the settlement aspect between two villagers in an eve-teasing case appears to be an afterthought and at best can be treated as an defence which the petitioner will have to be established by leading the evidence however, when the FIR is registered and the petitioner is arrested for a particular period, the provisions of Section 59 of the Act would be automatically attracted. 4. Learned Assistant Government Pleader supported the decision of two authorities and submitted that both the authorities have consistently given a finding of fact regarding the role attributed to the petitioner which undoubtedly is amounting to offence under the Provisions of Corruption Act. Learned AGP also has relied upon the decision of this Court in case of Niraj Kaushikchandra Desai v/s. State of Gujarat, reported in 2006 SCC OnLine 6627, drawing attention of this Court to paras-20 and 21 to indicate that where an accused is caught red handed in the trap of ACB itself, prima-facie sufficient justification of suspension in exercise of powers under Section 59 of the Act. Learned AGP has submitted that the judgment relied upon by the petitioner in case of Ramanbhai Shantubhai Raut (Supra), is completely on different facts, where this Court has pointed out that the decision taken by the authorities was on an erroneous facts as in that case, the authorities have passed the order by holding that the petitioner in that case was caught red handed in the trap of ACB, whereas in fact that was not the case as the one who was caught red handed was a co-accused and not the petitioner in that case and therefore, only the Court had interfered in the suspension of the Sarpanch in that case. 5. The Court has heard learned advocates for the parties and perused the documents placed on record. The petitioner was an elected member of Sayra Gram Panchayat and was also elected as a Sarpanch of the very Gram Panchayat. 5. The Court has heard learned advocates for the parties and perused the documents placed on record. The petitioner was an elected member of Sayra Gram Panchayat and was also elected as a Sarpanch of the very Gram Panchayat. It appears that an FIR being I-C.R. No.05 of 2018 came to be registered with ACB Police Station, Modasa for offence under Sections 7 and 13(A) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. In the FIR, which is at Annexure-A, the allegation was made by the complainant against the petitioner that in the waste land of the village, the proposal was to dig a village pond under the scheme of the State Government for which the complaint had approached the petitioner in his capacity as a Sarpanch for passing a proper resolution with consent of all the members and for that purpose, the petitioner had demanded an amount of Rs.60,000/- which was thereafter settled at Rs.40,000/-. It is in this connection, as the complainant was not willing to pay the amount of bribe, an offence came to be registered and in connection with the offence, the verbal exchange between the petitioner and the complainant was recorded. It appears from the record that on the basis of such complaint, the ACB had led the trap and the petitioner appears to be have been caught red handed in the trap. Pursuant to the FIR and the trap being successful, the petitioner was arrested on 20.09.2018 and was sent to the custody. The petitioner remained in custody till the petitioner was enlarged on bail on 26.09.2018. Pursuant to this, the petitioner was served with show-cause notice dated 03.11.2018, initiating the proceedings under Section 59(1) of the Act. After affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, the District Development Officer passed an order dated 20.12.2018, by which the petitioner was ordered to be suspended from the post of Sarpanch. It appears that aggrieved by the order of the District Development Officer, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Development Commissioner and the Development Commissioner by taking into consideration the grounds raised by the petitioner and the record, confirmed the order of the District Development Officer, observing as under:- “It appears that a complaint with Aravalli Police Station, C.R. No–05/2018 dated 20/09/2018, has been filed against the appellant under section–7, 13(A) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (Amendment Act of 2018). In this regard, following the principles of natural justice, the respondent has given dates of 12/10/2018 and 19/11/2018 to the plaintiff for defence. It is clear from the records that the appellant demanded the bribe of Rs.20,000/- from the complainant for passing a resolution in the Gram Panchayat for making a pond on the land to store water and utilise it for agricultural works, but the complainant was not willing to give the said bribe amount to him and he was caught red-handed while accepting the bribe of Rs.20,000/- in the presence of the pancha during the A.C.B. trap on 20/09/2018. As per the provision under section – 59 of the Gujarat Panchayat Act, 1993, the District development Officer has authority to suspend from office the Sarpanch or the Upa-Sarpanch of a village panchayat against whom any criminal proceedings in respect of an offence involving moral turpitude have been instituted. As per the provision of the said section of the said Act, the offence instituted against the Sarpanch or the Upa-Sarpanch shall be regarding moral turpitude. The Hon'ble Gujarat High Court has passed various judgments regarding the merits of the offence involving the moral turpitude. In this regard, considering the above details to ascertain the offence of moral turpitude, as the appellant in this case demanded Rs.40000/- from the complainant Mr. Natwarlal Revabhai Patel for passing a resolution of the Panchayat to make a pond on the waste land, a complaint under section – 7, 13(A) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 was lodged on 20/09/2018 and therefore, the appellant has been taken into judicial custody i.e. detained in the jail from 20/09/2018 to 26/09/2018. Therefore, it can be considered an act which is derogatory to the reputed post of the Sarpanch. In this regard, it is the work of the court of law to decide whether he is guilty or innocent in the offence and whether the complaint is true or false. An offence with C.R. No– 5/2018 dated 20/09/2018 has been registered against the appellant under sections–7, 13(A) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (Amendment Act of 2018) by the Modasa A.C.B. police. This fact is based on the record. In this manner, the respondent District Development Officer, Aravalli has suspended the appellant from the post of the Sarpanch of the Sayara Gram Panchayat as per section – 59(1) of the Gujarat Panchayat Act, 1993.” 6. This fact is based on the record. In this manner, the respondent District Development Officer, Aravalli has suspended the appellant from the post of the Sarpanch of the Sayara Gram Panchayat as per section – 59(1) of the Gujarat Panchayat Act, 1993.” 6. Both the authorities have given finding of fact on the basis of record available and therefore, there is no case made out for any interference with the decision of both the authorities. 6.1. Insofar as the decision relied upon by the petitioner in case of Ramanbhai Shantubhai Raut (Supra), undoubtedly the Court had examined the issue where the Sarpanch was suspended in view of him involved in the offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act like the present case and had also considered the issue regarding the period for which the petitioner therein had been arrested and enlarged on bail. However, when the Court had interfered with the decision therein, the Court had two aspects which had weighed with the Court and that is the fact the petitioner therein was not caught red handed in the trap led by ACB and the authorities before passing the order of suspension had taken into consideration an erroneous fact that the petitioner therein was caught red handed accepting the bribe amount of bribe. The other aspect which the Court has considered was with regard to the audiotapes which were referred to by the District Development Officer as well as Commissioner which was for the first time in the order, but was not part of the proceedings and was not made available to the petitioner therein considering the aforesaid facts, the Court had interfered. 6.2. However, this decision can be distinguished on facts as in the present case, the petitioner from the beginning was made aware of the material against him when the show-cause notice was issued and that it is a matter of record that the petitioner was caught red handed accepting the bribe which is clear from the allegations made in the FIR as well as panchnama. 7. The decision of this Court in case of Aatulbhai Tapubhai Nakum (Supra) was also completely on different facts where the offence against the petitioner therein was under the provisions of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. 7. The decision of this Court in case of Aatulbhai Tapubhai Nakum (Supra) was also completely on different facts where the offence against the petitioner therein was under the provisions of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. The Court had taken into consideration the facts particularly where the petitioner therein was subjected to prosecution under the Atrocities Act because he had objected to the illegal activities of the complaint which was under the provisions of the Pollution Control Act and therefore, the petitioner therein was victimized by filing of the FIR. 8. The other decision relied upon by the petitioner in case of Anakbhai Chhanabhai Sankhat (Supra), the Court has proceeded to hold that offence involved would not constitute an offence of moral turpitude. Moreover, the Court had taken into consideration the compromise which was arrived at between the petitioner there and the complainant therein. 9. The decision of this Court in case of Niraj Kaushikchandra Desai (Supra), in para-16, the Court has laid down four parameters which would bring an action on the part of Sapranch as an act of moral turpitude. Para-16 reads as under:- “16. This aspect has also been referred to in the judgment of the High Court (Coram: D.A.Mehta,J) reported in 2009 (0) GLHEL-HC 221759 in case of Aswinbhai Somabhai Kachhia Patel v. State of Gujarat. The High Court while considering this very issue of “suspension” of Sarpanch on the ground of moral turpitude and exercise of powers under Section 59 of the Act, has discussed and interpreted the provisions of Section 59 of the Act. The condition as provided in Section 59 of the Act for exercise of powers of suspension is that; (i) In case of a Sarpanch against whom a criminal proceedings instituted for the offence involving moral turpitude have been instituted. (ii) In case of a Sarpanch who has been detained in a prison during trial for any offence. (iii) In case of a Sarpanch, who is undergoing such a sentence of imprisonment as would not disqualify him from continuing as a member of the Panchayat under Section 30 (iv) In case of a Sarpanch, who has been detained under any law relating to preventive detention for the time being in force. (iii) In case of a Sarpanch, who is undergoing such a sentence of imprisonment as would not disqualify him from continuing as a member of the Panchayat under Section 30 (iv) In case of a Sarpanch, who has been detained under any law relating to preventive detention for the time being in force. These conditions which have been referred to are to be read disjunctively and independent of each other, meaning thereby, in a given case, one or more conditions may be attracted simultaneously. However, for the purpose of determining whether the condition is fulfilled or not, it has to be considered whether the Sarpanch, who is elected could be suspended on fulfillment of these conditions. In the facts of the case, the Respondent No.6 has been caught red-handed, for which the offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act has been registered, was taken in custody and thereafter has been released on bail. Therefore, these conditions are fully attracted and the institution of criminal proceedings in respect of having involved in moral turpitude is sufficient.” [10] After observing in para-16, this Court has proceeded to hold in paras-20 and 21 which read as under:- “20. Therefore, the allegations for corruption in the facts of the case would constitute a moral turpitude has to be considered. There may not be any rigid or inflexible rule. However, the fact that the ACB case is registered, the competent authority while considering this aspect of suspension has to consider all such relevant facts. 21. Again it may be added that there has to be some prima facie case made out and mere allegation or the vague allegations itself would be a ground for exercise of such power of suspension. In the facts of the case, Respondent No.6 has been caught red-handed in the trap by the ACB itself prima facie suggest for a justification for the suspension in exercise of statutory power under Section 59 of the Act.” [11] In view of the aforesaid reasonings, the Court finds no reasons to interfere with the decision of both the authorities and hence, the petition deserves to be dismissed. The petition stands dismissed.