JUDGMENT : I.A. No.431 of 2021 This Interlocutory Application has been filed for condoning the delay of 206 days in preferring the present appeal. However, vide stamp report dated 22.01.2021 it has been reported that the appeal actually is not time barred in view of the order dated 23.03.2020 and 06.05.2020 passed in suo motu Writ (Civil) No.03 of 2020 by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. 2. In that view of the matter, no order is required to be passed in this Interlocutory Application as the appeal is to be taken to have been filed within time. 3. I.A. No.431 of 2021 stands disposed of accordingly. L.P.A. No.35 of 2021 4. The instant appeal, preferred under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent, is directed against the order/judgment dated 26.05.2020 passed by learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(C) No.142 of 2009 whereby and whereunder the order dated 13.05.1998 passed in S.A.R. Case No. 164/1996-97 by which the restoration application preferred by the respondent No. 5/appellant has been allowed and the land in question having an area of 1.5 Kathas has been ordered to be restored in favour of respondent No. 5 and the order dated 29.11.05 passed in S.A.R. Appeal No. 110-R-15/1998-99 by which the appeal preferred by the original writ petitioner against the order dated 13.05.1998 has been dismissed as also the order dated 20.10.2008 passed in S.A.R. Revision No. 91/2005 by which the revision application preferred by the petitioner has been rejected, have been quashed and set aside. 5. Brief facts of the case as per the pleadings made in the writ proceeding, which are required to be enumerated herein, read as under :- It is the case of the writ petitioner that in the year 1936 the grandfather of respondent No. 5 had surrendered the land in question to the landlord. The landlord had executed a Hukumnama in the name of father of the writ petitioner, namely, Sri Govind Sahu, for an area of 1.5 Kathas. The father of the original writ petitioner used to pay Chowkidari and other rents to the landlord and had constructed a house over the land in question consisting of two pucca rooms and a boundary wall. The father of the original writ petitioner used to pay Chowkidari and other rents to the landlord and had constructed a house over the land in question consisting of two pucca rooms and a boundary wall. The land in question was initially recorded in the name of Lenga Munda and Soma Munda, both sons of late Munda Munda, in the record of rights and thereafter both the recorded tenants made a family partition and the disputed land came in possession of Lenga Munda who had three sons, namely, Bhadar Munda, Sadhan Munda and Sukra Munda. The land was subsequently transferred in favour of the then landlord in the year 1936. The respondent No. 5 had filed an application under Section 71A of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act (hereinafter referred to as the CNT Act) being S.A.R. Case No. 164/1996-97 for restoration of an area of 20 Kathas in Plot No. 299, Khata No. 59, situated at Tiril Road, Kokar, P.S. Sadar, District Ranchi. The Respondent No.4, vide order dated 13.05.1998, had passed an order directing for restoration of the land in question in favour of Respondent No. 5. The original writ petitioner preferred an appeal before Respondent No. 3 being S.A.R. Case Appeal No. 110-R-15/1998-99 which however was dismissed on 29.11.2005 against which the original writ petitioner had preferred revision application before the respondent No. 2 being S.A.R. Revision No. 91/2005 which also was dismissed vide order dated 20.10.2008. The writ petitioner, being aggrieved with the orders passed by the revenue authorities, preferred a writ petition being W.P.(C) No.142 of 2009 for seeking a direction for quashing of the orders dated 13.05.1998, 29.11.2005 and 20.10.2008 passed in S.A.R. Case No. 164/1996-97, S.A.R. Case Appeal No. 110-R-15/1998-99 and S.A.R. Revision No. 91/2005 respectively taking the ground that the land has been transferred without seeking permission from the Deputy Commissioner as required under Section 46 of the CNT Act. Counter affidavit was filed on behalf of Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 taking the ground inter alia therein that the original writ petitioner claimed the title over the land in question by virtue of Sada Istafanama and Sada Hukumnama which appeared to be doubtful as there were over writings in the said documents and they were forged and fabricated. Counter affidavit was filed on behalf of Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 taking the ground inter alia therein that the original writ petitioner claimed the title over the land in question by virtue of Sada Istafanama and Sada Hukumnama which appeared to be doubtful as there were over writings in the said documents and they were forged and fabricated. The Respondent No. 5, being the main contesting respondent, has also filed a counter affidavit in which it has been stated that the disputed land comprising of an area of 1.5 Kathas of Khata No. 59, Plot No. 299 of Village Kokar, P.S. Sadar, District Ranchi is recorded in the name of Lenga Munda and Soma Munda, both sons of Munda Munda. After the death of Munda Munda, Lenga Munda and Soma Munda had amicably partitioned the land and the disputed land came in the share of Lenga Munda who had three sons namely, Bhadar Munda, Sadhan Munda and Sukra Munda. The disputed land subsequently came in the share of Sukra Munda who was the grandfather of respondent No. 5/appellant. The Respondent No. 5/appellant had also submitted various documents in support of his case including Khatiyan, rent receipts of the Jamindari, etc. Rejoinder affidavit was filed by the writ petitioner to the counter affidavit filed by the respondent No. 5/appellant in which it has been stated that the ancestors of the writ petitioners are residing in the plot in question since 1940 on the basis of the Sada Hukumnama issued by the then landlord Thakur Mahendra Nath Sahdeo in favour of Shiv Govind Saw. It has further been stated that the restoration application was filed by respondent No. 5/appellant after more than 50 years. The Learned Single Judge has considered the rival submissions made on behalf of the parties and taking into consideration the fact that the application for restoration under Section 71A of the CNT Act since has been filed after lapse of 50 years, which has been considered to be beyond the reasonable period, and as such, the orders passed by the revenue authorities dated 13.05.1998, 16.11.2005 and 20.10.2008 passed in S.A.R. Case No. 164/1996-97, S.A.R. Case Appeal No. 110-R-15/1998-99 and S.A.R. Revision No. 91/2005 respectively have been quashed and set aside against which the present Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred. 6. Mr. 6. Mr. Anil Kumar Sinha, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, has submitted referring to the provision of Section 71A of the CNT Act wherein the Act itself provides that the application for restoration of land which is required to be filed under Section 71A of the CNT Act, can be filed at any time and, therefore, the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge that the application for restoration of land filed under Section 71A of the CNT Act is beyond the reasonable period, cannot be considered to be a good ground for showing interference with the order passed by the revenue authorities. It has further been submitted that only on this ground the learned Single Judge since has not considered the relevant provisions as contained under Section 71A of the CNT Act, wherein there is no period prescribed to file application for restoration of land, is fit to be quashed and set aside. 7. While on the other hand, Mr. Rakesh Kr. Shahi, learned A.C. to S.C.(L&C)-I appearing for respondent State of Jharkhand, has submitted that although the provision as contained under Section 71A of the CNT Act does not provide any period of limitation for filing application under Section 71A but that has been clarified by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgment rendered in Situ Sahu & Others v. The State of Jharkhand and Others, [ (2004) 8 SCC 340 ] and as such, the learned Single Judge, after taking into consideration the aforesaid position of law, is correct in interfering with the order passed by the revenue authorities since the application for restoration of land under Section 71A of the CNT Act was filed after lapse of more than 50 years. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the documents available on record as also the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order. 9. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the documents available on record as also the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order. 9. The issue fell for consideration, as per the argument advanced on behalf of the learned counsel for the appellant, is that since the provision of Section 71A of the CNT Act does not contain any period of limitation, therefore, interference shown by the learned Single Judge in the impugned orders passed by the revenue authorities dated 13.05.1998, 29.11.2005 and 20.10.2008 passed in S.A.R. Case No. 164/1996-97, S.A.R. Case Appeal No. 110-R-15/1998-99 and S.A.R. Revision No. 91/2005 respectively is absolutely incorrect and as such, the order passed by the learned Single Judge suffers from patent illegality. 10. This Court, in order to answer the aforesaid issue, deems it fit and proper to refer certain undisputed facts, as would appear from the material available on record. The writ petitioner came in the possession of the land by virtue of Sada Hukumnama of the year 1936. He claims possession over the land in question since 1936 but after lapse of about more than 50 years, an application was filed by Respondent No.5/appellant under Section 71A of the CNT Act for restoration of the land. The Special Officer, Schedule Area Regulation passed an order on 13.05.1998 in S.A.R. Case No. 164/1996-97 directing for restoration of land in favour of the Respondent No.5/appellant. The order dated 13.05.1998 passed in S.A.R. Case No. 164/1996-97 was affirmed in appeal as also in the revision by the revisional authority vide orders dated 16.11.2005 and 20.10.2008 respectively. The writ petitioner preferred writ petition being W.P.(C) No.142 of 2009 on the ground that the revenue authorities failed to consider that the application which was filed by the Respondent No.5/appellant under Section 71A of the CNT Act, was filed after lapse of more than 50 years, therefore, the said application ought to have been dismissed but without taking into consideration the aforesaid aspect of the matter, the revenue authorities have passed the orders for restoration of the land and, therefore, the impugned orders passed by the revenue authorities are not sustainable in the eyes of law. The learned Single Judge, after appreciating the issue of filing of application for restoration of land under Section 71A of the CNT Act, has interfered with the orders passed by the revenue authorities, taking into consideration the fact that the application for restoration of land cannot be allowed to be filed after inordinate delay. The Respondent No.5/appellant, in whose favour the revenue authorities have passed orders for restoration of the land, being aggrieved with the order passed by the learned Single Judge, has preferred the instant intra-court appeal taking the ground that since under the provision of Section 71A of the CNT Act, there is no stipulation of prescribing the time period for filing such application, therefore, even though the application was filed beyond the period of 50 years, the same cannot be said to be improper but learned Single Judge, without appreciating this aspect of the matter, has interfered with the impugned orders, therefore, the same is not sustainable. 11. This Court, therefore, requires to consider the provisions of Section 71A of the CNT Act before answering the rival submissions agitated on behalf of the parties. For ready reference, the provision of Section 71A is being referred as under :- “71A. Power to restore possession to member of the Scheduled Tribes over land unlawfully transferred. 11. This Court, therefore, requires to consider the provisions of Section 71A of the CNT Act before answering the rival submissions agitated on behalf of the parties. For ready reference, the provision of Section 71A is being referred as under :- “71A. Power to restore possession to member of the Scheduled Tribes over land unlawfully transferred. - If at any time, it comes to the notice of the Deputy Commissioner that transfer of land belonging to a Raiyat or a Mundari Khunt-Kattidar or a Bhuinhari who is a member of the Scheduled Tribes has taken place in contravention of Section 46 or Section 48 or Section 240] or any other provisions of this Act or by any fraudulent method, including decrees obtained in suit by fraud and collusion] he may, after giving reasonable opportunity to the transferee, who is proposed to be evicted, to show cause and after making necessary inquiry in the matter, evict the transferee from such land without payment of compensation and restore it to the transferor or his heir, or, in case the transferor or his heir is not available or is not willing to agree to such restoration, re-settle it with another Raiyat belonging to Scheduled Tribes according to the village custom for the disposal of an abandoned holding : Provided that if the transferee has, within 30 years from the date of transfer, constructed any building or structure on such holding or portion thereof, the Deputy Commissioner shall, if the transferor is not willing to pay the value of the same, order the transferee to remove the same within a period of six months from the date of the order, or within such extended time not exceeding two years from the date of the order as the Deputy Commissioner may allow, failing which the Deputy Commissioner may get such building or structure removed : Provided further that where the Deputy Commissioner is satisfied that the transferee has constructed a substantial structure or building on such holding or portion thereof before coming into force of the Bihar Scheduled Areas Regulation, 1969, he may, notwithstanding any other provisions of the Act, validate such transfer where the transferee either makes available to the transferor an alternative holding or portion thereof as the case may be, of the equivalent value of the vicinity or pays adequate compensation to be determined by the Commissioner for rehabilitation of the transferor: Provided also that if after an inquiry the Deputy Commissioner is satisfied that the transferee has acquired a title by adverse possession and that the transferred land should be restored or re-settled, he shall require the transferor or his heir or another Raiyat, as the case may be, to deposit with the Deputy Commissioner such sum of money as may be determined by the Deputy Commissioner having regard to the amount for which the land was transferred or the market value of the land, as the case may be and the amount of any compensation for improvements effected to the land which the Deputy Commissioner may deem fair and equitable.” It is evident from the provision of Section 71A that the said provision contains “at any time, when it comes to the notice” the land pertaining to the Schedule Area, if transferred in favour of non-tribal without permission of Deputy Commissioner, will be restored in favour of the tribal. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has given much emphasis upon the word “at any time when it comes to the notice” questioning the order passed by the revenue authorities. 12. The provision of Section 71A of the CNT Act fell for consideration before the Hon'ble Apex Court in Situ Sahu & Ors. v. The State of Jharkhand and Others (Supra) wherein it has been decided by discussing the implication of the word “if at any time” and after discussing the aforesaid provision of law, the Hon'ble Apex Court was of the view that “if at any time” even though has been referred under the provision of Section 71A of the CNT Act, does not mean that such application for restoration of land can be filed even after lapse of reasonable period, as would appear from paragraphs 11 and 14 of the aforesaid judgment, which read as hereunder:- “11. We are, therefore, of the view that the use of the words “at any time” in Section 71-A is evidence of the legislative intent to give sufficient flexibility to the Deputy Commissioner to implement the socio-economic policy of the Act viz. to prevent inroads upon the rights of the ignorant, illiterate and backward citizens. Thus, where the Deputy Commissioner chooses to exercise his power under Section 71-A it would be futile to contend that the period of limitation under the Limitation Act has expired. The period of limitation under the Limitation Act is intended to bar suits brought in civil courts where the party himself chooses to exercise his right of seeking restoration of immovable property. But, where, for socio-economic reasons, the party may not even be aware of his own rights, the legislature has stepped in by making an officer of the State responsible for doing social justice by clothing him with sufficient power. However, even such power cannot be exercised after an unreasonably long time during which third-party interests might have come into effect. Thus, the test is not whether the period of limitation prescribed in the Act of 1963 had expired, but whether the power under Section 71-A was sought to be exercised after unreasonable delay. 14. We shall now examine the last argument of Shri Narasimha that the transfer was fraudulent. Even on this, we are afraid that the appellants are entitled to succeed. 14. We shall now examine the last argument of Shri Narasimha that the transfer was fraudulent. Even on this, we are afraid that the appellants are entitled to succeed. We need not go into the details of the transaction for we may even assume that the transfer was fraudulent. Even then, as held in Ibrahimpatnam [ (2003) 7 SCC 667 ] the power under Section 71-A could have been exercised only within a reasonable time. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the present appeal, we are not satisfied that the Special Officer exercised his powers under Section 71-A within a reasonable period of time. The lapse of 40 years is certainly not a reasonable time for exercise of power, even if it is not hedged in by a period of limitation. We derive support to our view from the observations made by this Court in Jai Mangal Oraon case [ (2000) 5 SCC 141 ] which was also a case which arose under the very same provision of law. There this Court took the view that Section 46(4)(a), which envisaged a prior sanction of the Deputy Commissioner before effecting the transfer in any of the modes stated therein, was introduced only in the year 1947 (with effect from 5-1-1948) and no such provision existed during the relevant point of time when the surrender was made in that case (15-1-1942). Obviously, therefore, no such provision existed in 1938, and the same reasoning applies.” 13. This Court, after discussing the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Situ Sahu & Ors. v. The State of Jharkhand and Others (Supra) and after going through the factual aspect as also the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge, has found therefrom that the writ petitioners were in possession of the land in question since the year 1936 and learned counsel for the appellant/Respondent No.5 has not disputed that aspect of the matter since only point agitated in assailing the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge is reference of the word as contained under the provision of Section 71A of the CNT Act, i.e., “at any time” but the said provision has been clarified by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment referred hereinabove. 14. 14. Therefore, the learned Single Judge, after taking into consideration the fact that the application has been filed under Section 71A of the CNT Act after lapse of more than 50 years, has come to the conclusion that the orders impugned require interference. Accordingly, the learned Single Judge, on the basis of such inordinate delay in the filing the application under Section 71A of the CNT Act by the Respondent No.5/appellant, has interfered with the impugned orders, which according to our considered view, cannot be said to suffer from an error. 15. In the result, the instant appeal fails and is dismissed.