JUDGMENT : P.B. Suresh Kumar, J. 1. The pivotal question that arises for consideration in these matters revolves around the right of the petitioners in the writ petitions from which the appeals have arisen to claim absorption as Assistant Professor in the regular establishment of Sree Sankaracharya University of Sanskrit (the University), a University established in accordance with the provisions contained in the Sree Sankaracharya University of Sanskrit Act, 1994 (the Act). 2. Before dealing with the said question, it is necessary to give an outline of the relevant facts as also a brief narrative of the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties on either side. 3. W.A.Nos.96 of 2022 and 352 of 2022 are directed against the judgment in W.P.(C) No.3363 of 2018, of which W.A.No.96 of 2022 is by the University and its Vice Chancellor and W.A.No.352 of 2022 is by the petitioner therein. W.A.No.98 of 2022 is directed against the judgment in W.P.(C) No.29677 of 2016. The appellants therein are the University and its Registrar. W.A.Nos.206 of 2022 and 325 of 2022 are directed against the judgment in W.P.(C) No.15257 of 2021, of which W.A.No.325 of 2022 is by the University, its Vice Chancellor and its Regional Director and W.A.No.206 of 2022 is by the petitioner therein. 4. The parties are referred to in this judgment for convenience, as they appear in the writ petitions from which the writ appeals arise. Documents are referred to in this judgment, unless otherwise mentioned, as they appear in W.P. (C) No.15257 of 2021. 5. The petitioner in W.P.(C) No.3363 of 2018 even though was appointed in the University on 01.01.1996 as a Lecturer in Malayalam, the said appointment was cancelled by the University pursuant to a decision of this court that the University was incompetent to make such an appointment. Later, the petitioner was engaged as Guest Lecturer in the University on contract basis from 09.12.1997 to 30.11.1998 and later from 22.01.1999 onwards continuously till the date of institution of the writ petition, except during vacations. In between, the post of Lecturer in the regular establishment of the University was re-designated as Assistant Professor. Later, the petitioner was engaged as Guest Lecturer in the University on contract basis from 09.12.1997 to 30.11.1998 and later from 22.01.1999 onwards continuously till the date of institution of the writ petition, except during vacations. In between, the post of Lecturer in the regular establishment of the University was re-designated as Assistant Professor. It is stated by the petitioner that his engagements on contract basis as Guest Lecturer were always after a due process of selection and that regular appointments were not being made in the University since required number of posts of Lecturer corresponding to the workload of the University were not sanctioned by the Government. It is also stated by the petitioner that even though several Guest Lecturers like the petitioner were similarly engaged on contract basis, they were absorbed in the regular establishment by the University as Assistant Professors in due course on their own and also based on the directions issued by this court, but the said benefit had not been extended to the petitioner on the pretext that there is dearth of vacancy in the concerned department. At last, in terms of Ext.P12 order in W.P.(C) No.3363 of 2018, the request of the petitioner for absorption was rejected by the Syndicate of the University. The writ petition aforesaid has been filed in the above background seeking a writ of mandamus directing the University to absorb the petitioner in the regular establishment as Assistant Professor in Malayalam. The case set out by the petitioner in the writ petition in essence is that he holds the requisite qualification for appointment as Assistant Professor; that he was engaged on contract basis after a due process of selection and that insofar as large number of similarly placed persons have been absorbed in the regular establishment of the University, he is entitled to the same treatment. 6. The petitioner in W.P.(C) No.29677 of 2016 is also a person similarly placed like the petitioner in W.P.(C) No.3363 of 2018. After the cancellation of her appointment as Guest Lecturer in Malayalam, she was engaged on contract basis as Lecturer initially for the period from 14.07.1997 to 30.10.1998 and later for the period from 12.07.2000 to 15.05.2002 and thereafter from 24.06.2005 onwards continuously till the date of institution of the writ petition, except during vacations. After the cancellation of her appointment as Guest Lecturer in Malayalam, she was engaged on contract basis as Lecturer initially for the period from 14.07.1997 to 30.10.1998 and later for the period from 12.07.2000 to 15.05.2002 and thereafter from 24.06.2005 onwards continuously till the date of institution of the writ petition, except during vacations. Ext.P27 in the said writ petition is the order in terms of which the request of the petitioner for absorption in the regular establishment of the University was rejected by the Syndicate of the University. Further, the petitioner seeks directions to the University to absorb her as Assistant Professor in Malayalam. 7. The petitioner in W.P.(C) No.15257 of 2021 is a person who is engaged as Guest Lecturer in History on contract basis initially from 10.06.1997 to 30.11.1998 and later continuously from 11.10.2002 onwards till the date of institution of the writ petition except during vacations. As in the case of the earlier writ petitions, the case set out by the petitioner in this writ petition is also that even though several Lecturers who were engaged on contract basis as Guest Lecturers have been absorbed in the regular establishment, his claim for similar treatment was turned down by the Syndicate of the University in terms of Ext.P20 order in the said writ petition, stating that he has no right to claim absorption in the regular establishment. The writ petition was instituted seeking, among others, a declaration that the petitioner is entitled to be absorbed in the regular establishment of the University as Assistant Professor. 8. W.P.(C) Nos.3363 of 2018 and 29677 of 2016 were taken up and disposed of together by the learned Single Judge directing the University to reconsider its decision after making a request to the Government for increasing the number of sanctioned posts, taking the view that in spite of there being sufficient workload in the University, it is resorting only to contract appointments without taking appropriate steps to increase the number of sanctioned posts so as to get the work done at a reduced cost and that the said practice cannot be permitted to be continued. The learned single judge has placed reliance on the decisions of the Apex Court in State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 and Nihal Singh v. State of Punjab, (2013) 14 SCC 65 for issuing the direction aforesaid. The learned single judge has placed reliance on the decisions of the Apex Court in State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 and Nihal Singh v. State of Punjab, (2013) 14 SCC 65 for issuing the direction aforesaid. The learned Single Judge has also found that the petitioners are entitled to all benefits of service as given to other incumbents in the regular establishment and directed that they shall be disbursed pay and allowances as has been paid to the incumbents in the regular establishment with arrears for a period of three years. Reliance was placed by the learned Single Judge on the decision of the Apex Court in State of Punjab v. Jagjith Singh, (2017) 1 SCC 148 for issuing the said direction. It was also directed by the learned Single Judge that the services of the petitioners shall not be dispensed with unless and until the process of filling up of regular vacancies are initiated and completed. W.P.(C) No.15257 of 2021 was disposed of later by the learned Judge directing the University to take a call on regularisation of the service of the petitioner, after making a request to the Government for increasing the number of the sanctioned posts. The other reliefs granted to the petitioners in the earlier writ petitions were, however, not granted to the petitioner in this case. As noted, the University as also the petitioners in W.P.(C) No.3363 of 2018 and W.P.(C) No.15257 of 2021 are aggrieved by the decision of the learned Single Judge. 9. The essence of the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioners in the writ petitions was that insofar as the petitioners have been engaged after a due process of selection as Guest Lecturers in the University and since they have been working for more than ten years, in the light of the decision of the Apex Court in Umadevi (3), they are entitled to be absorbed in the regular establishment. It was their submission that in the light of the decision of the Apex Court in Nihal Singh, insufficiency in the number of sanctioned posts cannot be a reason for not absorbing the petitioners in the regular establishment of the University. It was their submission that in the light of the decision of the Apex Court in Nihal Singh, insufficiency in the number of sanctioned posts cannot be a reason for not absorbing the petitioners in the regular establishment of the University. It was pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioners that since large number of similarly placed persons have already been absorbed in the regular establishment of the University, they are also entitled to a similar treatment. The learned counsel placed reliance on various decisions of the Apex Court and this court which upheld the claims of similarly placed persons, in support of their arguments. We are not referring to the said judgments for the present as we propose to deal with them a short while later. 10. Per contra, the essence of the submissions made by the learned Standing Counsel for the University was that the petitioners who were engaged as Guest Lecturers on contract basis for definite periods, do not have any right whatsoever to claim absorption in the regular establishment. The selection processes, on the basis of which the petitioners were engaged as Guest Lecturers, were exclusively intended for the selection of candidates to be engaged on contract basis and the same cannot be equated with the selection process of a regular selection. The learned Standing Counsel has taken us elaborately through the decision of the Apex Court in Umadevi (3) and the decisions of the Apex Court which followed, clarified, distinguished as also deviated from the principles laid down in Umadevi (3). The attempt of the learned Standing Counsel while making the said endeavour was to bring home the point that the decision of the Apex Court in Umadevi (3) being one rendered by a Constitution Bench, the principles therein will have to be followed in preference to the decisions which are inconsistent with the same. With reference to the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioners that they are entitled to be absorbed in the regular establishment of the University in the light of the direction in Umadevi (3), it was pointed out by the learned Standing Counsel that the petitioners have not completed ten years service as on the date of the judgment. With reference to the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioners that they are entitled to be absorbed in the regular establishment of the University in the light of the direction in Umadevi (3), it was pointed out by the learned Standing Counsel that the petitioners have not completed ten years service as on the date of the judgment. The learned Standing Counsel has also placed for our consideration the various decisions of the Apex Court dealing with the scope of contract employment as also the decisions dealing with the question as to whether contract employees are entitled to claim pay and allowances at par with regular employees. We propose to deal with the same elaborately in the course of our discussion. Even while making the aforesaid submissions forcefully, the learned Standing Counsel for the University did not deny the fact that a few similarly placed Guest Lecturers have been absorbed into the regular establishment. It was pointed out by the Standing Counsel that some of them have been absorbed based on the directions issued by the State Government, some based on directions issued by this Court and some by the University on their own, taking a cue from the said directions. 11. Apart from the learned counsel for the parties, learned Senior Counsel Smt. V.P. Seemandini, who is instructed to appear for the petitioner in W.P.(C) No.4274 of 2022 which was listed along with these appeals, had also made elaborate submissions in the matter, even though we indicated to her that we will not be dealing with the writ petition on merits, as the decision in the above appeals will have a bearing on the decision in the said writ petition also. 12. Before reverting to the question, it is also necessary to note that the petitioners are persons who have entered into contracts with the University for every spell of their engagement. In service jurisprudence, the appointments are made by an employer with different nomenclature/ characteristics. Appointments are made both on permanent and temporary basis against a permanent post or a temporary post. Appointments can also be made on ad hoc basis on permanent or temporary posts. The common feature of temporary or permanent or ad hoc appointments is that those appointments are made against posts which are either permanent or temporary. On the contrary, for contractual appointment, there is no requirement of existence of any post. Appointments can also be made on ad hoc basis on permanent or temporary posts. The common feature of temporary or permanent or ad hoc appointments is that those appointments are made against posts which are either permanent or temporary. On the contrary, for contractual appointment, there is no requirement of existence of any post. The contractual appointment is not normally made against the posts. Further, they are also not normally made on a pay scale [See K. Anbazhagan v. Registrar General, High Court of Madras, (2018) 9 SCC 293 ]. It is long settled that contract appointees are estopped from claiming any right other than what is provided for in the contracts. The contracts to which the petitioners are parties do not confer on the petitioners any right to claim absorption in the regular establishment of the University. The petitioners do not deny the said position. Even while admitting all that, the attempt of the petitioners is to make out a case of absorption in the regular establishment of the University in the light of the decision of the Apex Court in Umadevi (3) and also on the basis that since similarly placed persons have been absorbed in the regular establishment, they are entitled to equal treatment. 13. Let us now revert to the question. Public employment has to be as set down by the Constitution and the laws made thereunder. The scheme of our Constitution envisages employment by the State and its instrumentalities on the basis of a procedure established in that behalf. Equality of opportunity is the hallmark, and the Constitution has provided also for affirmative action to ensure that unequals are not treated as equals. The State and its instrumentalities are not precluded from engaging workers on contract basis. However, a regular process of recruitment has to be resorted to, when regular vacancies in a post are required to be filled up. These are the introductory statements made by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Umadevi (3). The State and its instrumentalities are not precluded from engaging workers on contract basis. However, a regular process of recruitment has to be resorted to, when regular vacancies in a post are required to be filled up. These are the introductory statements made by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Umadevi (3). In the said case, it was held that adherence to the rule of equality in public employment is the basic feature of our Constitution and since the rule of law is the core of our Constitution, a court would be disabled from passing an order upholding a violation of Article 14 or in ordering the overlooking of the need to comply with the requirements of Article 14 read with Article 16 of the Constitution. In other words, unless the appointment is made in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among the qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee. It has been clarified that in the case of contractual appointment, the appointment terminates at the end of the contract and contract appointees cannot claim to be made permanent on the expiry of their term of appointment, even if he/she is permitted to continue beyond the term on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made following a due process of selection as envisaged by the relevant rules. Paragraph 43 of the judgment in Umadevi (3) dealing with the said aspect reads thus : “43. Thus, it is clear that adherence to the rule of equality in public employment is a basic feature of our Constitution and since the rule of law is the core of our Constitution, a court would certainly be disabled from passing an order upholding a violation of Article 14 or in ordering the overlooking of the need to comply with the requirements of Article 14 read with Article 16 of the Constitution. Therefore, consistent with the scheme for public employment, this Court while laying down the law, has necessarily to hold that unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee. Therefore, consistent with the scheme for public employment, this Court while laying down the law, has necessarily to hold that unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee. If it is a contractual appointment, the appointment comes to an end at the end of the contract, if it were an engagement or appointment on daily wages or casual basis, the same would come to an end when it is discontinued. Similarly, a temporary employee could not claim to be made permanent on the expiry of his term of appointment. It has also to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent, merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by the relevant rules. It is not open to the court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right. The High Courts acting under Article 226 of the Constitution, should not ordinarily issue directions for absorption, regularisation, or permanent continuance unless the recruitment itself was made regularly and in terms of the constitutional scheme. Merely because an employee had continued under cover of an order of the court, which we have described as “litigious employment” in the earlier part of the judgment, he would not be entitled to any right to be absorbed or made permanent in the service. In fact, in such cases, the High Court may not be justified in issuing interim directions, since, after all, if ultimately the employee approaching it is found entitled to relief, it may be possible for it to mould the relief in such a manner that ultimately no prejudice will be caused to him, whereas an interim direction to continue his employment would hold up the regular procedure for selection or impose on the State the burden of paying an employee who is really not required. The courts must be careful in ensuring that they do not interfere unduly with the economic arrangement of its affairs by the State or its instrumentalities or lend themselves the instruments to facilitate the bypassing of the constitutional and statutory mandates.” As explicit from the extracted passage, it was also clarified in the said case that High Courts acting under Article 226 of the Constitution should not ordinarily issue directions for absorption, regularisation, or permanent continuance of employees engaged on temporary basis unless the recruitment itself was made regularly and in terms of the constitutional scheme. It was observed that while directing appointments, temporary or casual to be regularised or made permanent, the courts are swayed by the fact that the person concerned has worked for sometime and in some cases for considerable length of time, and it must not be forgotten that it is not as if the person who accepts the engagement either temporary or casual, is not aware of the nature of his employment and that he accepts the employment with open eyes. Such a person shall not be permitted to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointments. Paragraph 45 of the judgment in Umadevi (3) dealing with the said aspect reads thus : “45. While directing that appointments, temporary or casual, be regularised or made permanent, the courts are swayed by the fact that the person concerned has worked for some time and in some cases for a considerable length of time. It is not as if the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature, is not aware of the nature of his employment. He accepts the employment with open eyes. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain—not at arm's length—since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible. But on that ground alone, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible. If the court were to void a contractual employment of this nature on the ground that the parties were not having equal bargaining power, that too would not enable the court to grant any relief to that employee. A total embargo on such casual or temporary employment is not possible, given the exigencies of administration and if imposed, would only mean that some people who at least get employment temporarily, contractually or casually, would not be getting even that employment when securing of such employment brings at least some succour to them. After all, innumerable citizens of our vast country are in search of employment and one is not compelled to accept a casual or temporary employment if one is not inclined to go in for such an employment. It is in that context that one has to proceed on the basis that the employment was accepted fully knowing the nature of it and the consequences flowing from it. In other words, even while accepting the employment, the person concerned knows the nature of his employment. It is not an appointment to a post in the real sense of the term. The claim acquired by him in the post in which he is temporarily employed or the interest in that post cannot be considered to be of such a magnitude as to enable the giving up of the procedure established, for making regular appointments to available posts in the services of the State. The claim acquired by him in the post in which he is temporarily employed or the interest in that post cannot be considered to be of such a magnitude as to enable the giving up of the procedure established, for making regular appointments to available posts in the services of the State. The argument that since one has been working for some time in the post, it will not be just to discontinue him, even though he was aware of the nature of the employment when he first took it up, is not one that would enable the jettisoning of the procedure established by law for public employment and would have to fail when tested on the touchstone of constitutionality and equality of opportunity enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution.” The Apex Court has also repelled the argument that the doctrine of legitimate expectation enables such temporary employees to claim permanence in the regular establishment. Paragraphs 46 and 47 of the judgment in Umadevi (3) dealing with the said aspect read thus : “46. Learned Senior Counsel for some of the respondents argued that on the basis of the doctrine of legitimate expectation, the employees, especially of the Commercial Taxes Department, should be directed to be regularised since the decisions in Dharwad [ (1990) 2 SCC 396 : 1990 SCC (L&S) 274 : (1990) 12 ATC 902 : (1990) 1 SCR 544 ], Piara Singh [ (1992) 4 SCC 118 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 825 : (1992) 21 ATC 403 : (1992) 3 SCR 826 ], Jacob [Jacob M. Puthuparambil v. Kerala Water Authority, (1991) 1 SCC 28 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 25 : (1991) 15 ATC 697] and Gujarat Agricultural University [Gujarat Agricultural University v. Rathod Labhu Bechar, (2001) 3 SCC 574 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 613] and the like, have given rise to an expectation in them that their services would also be regularised. The doctrine can be invoked if the decisions of the administrative authority affect the person by depriving him of some benefit or advantage which either (i) he had in the past been permitted by the decision-maker to enjoy and which he can legitimately expect to be permitted to continue to do until there have been communicated to him some rational grounds for withdrawing it on which he has been given an opportunity to comment; or (ii) he has received assurance from the decision-maker that they will not be withdrawn without giving him first an opportunity of advancing reasons for contending that they should not be withdrawn. [See Lord Diplock in Council for Civil Services Union v. Minister of Civil Service [ 1985 AC 374 : (1984) 3 All ER 935 : (1984) 3 WLR 1174 (HL)], National Buildings Construction Corpn. v. S. Raghunathan [ (1998) 7 SCC 66 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 1770] and Chanchal Goyal (Dr.) v. State of Rajasthan [ (2003) 3 SCC 485 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 322].] There is no case that any assurance was given by the Government or the department concerned while making the appointment on daily wages that the status conferred on him will not be withdrawn until some rational reason comes into existence for withdrawing it. The very engagement was against the constitutional scheme. Though, the Commissioner of the Commercial Taxes Department sought to get the appointments made permanent, there is no case that at the time of appointment any promise was held out. No such promise could also have been held out in view of the circulars and directives issued by the Government after Dharwad decision [ (1990) 2 SCC 396 : 1990 SCC (L&S) 274 : (1990) 12 ATC 902 : (1990) 1 SCR 544 ]. Though, there is a case that the State had made regularisations in the past of similarly situated employees, the fact remains that such regularisations were done only pursuant to judicial directions, either of the Administrative Tribunal or of the High Court and in some cases by this Court. Moreover, the invocation of the doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot enable the employees to claim that they must be made permanent or they must be regularised in the service though they had not been selected in terms of the rules for appointment. Moreover, the invocation of the doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot enable the employees to claim that they must be made permanent or they must be regularised in the service though they had not been selected in terms of the rules for appointment. The fact that in certain cases the court had directed regularisation of the employees involved in those cases cannot be made use of to found a claim based on legitimate expectation. The argument if accepted would also run counter to the constitutional mandate. The argument in that behalf has therefore to be rejected. 47. When a person enters a temporary employment or gets engagement as a contractual or casual worker and the engagement is not based on a proper selection as recognised by the relevant rules or procedure, he is aware of the consequences of the appointment being temporary, casual or contractual in nature. Such a person cannot invoke the theory of legitimate expectation for being confirmed in the post when an appointment to the post could be made only by following a proper procedure for selection and in cases concerned, in consultation with the Public Service Commission. Therefore, the theory of legitimate expectation cannot be successfully advanced by temporary, contractual or casual employees. It cannot also be held that the State has held out any promise while engaging these persons either to continue them where they are or to make them permanent. The State cannot constitutionally make such a promise. It is also obvious that the theory cannot be invoked to seek a positive relief of being made permanent in the post.” In the context of the High Courts issuing directions in exercise of the power under Article 226 directing the State and its instrumentalities to absorb temporary employees in permanent service or to allow their continuance, it has been held in the said case that in order to issue a mandamus, it must be shown that the statute imposes a legal duty on the authority and that the aggrieved party had a legal right under the statute or rule to enforce it and that this position continues. Therefore, a mandamus cannot be issued in favour of the employees directing the State and its instrumentalities to make them permanent since the employees cannot show that they have an enforceable legal right to be permanently absorbed or that the State has a legal duty to make them permanent. Therefore, a mandamus cannot be issued in favour of the employees directing the State and its instrumentalities to make them permanent since the employees cannot show that they have an enforceable legal right to be permanently absorbed or that the State has a legal duty to make them permanent. Paragraph 52 of the judgment in Umadevi (3) dealing with the said aspect reads thus : “52. Normally, what is sought for by such temporary employees when they approach the court, is the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the employer, the State or its instrumentalities, to absorb them in permanent service or to allow them to continue. In this context, the question arises whether a mandamus could be issued in favour of such persons. At this juncture, it will be proper to refer to the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Rai Shivendra Bahadur (Dr.) v. Governing Body of the Nalanda College [1962 Supp (2) SCR 144 : AIR 1962 SC 1210 ]. That case arose out of a refusal to promote the writ petitioner therein as the Principal of a college. This Court held that in order that a mandamus may issue to compel the authorities to do something, it must be shown that the statute imposes a legal duty on the authority and the aggrieved party had a legal right under the statute or rule to enforce it. This classical position continues and a mandamus could not be issued in favour of the employees directing the Government to make them permanent since the employees cannot show that they have an enforceable legal right to be permanently absorbed or that the State has a legal duty to make them permanent.” In Umadevi (3), the Apex Court has also held that if the appointment itself is in infraction of the rules or in violation of the provisions of the Constitution, the illegality cannot be regularised and ratification/regularisation is possible only of an act which is within the power and province of the authority, but there has been some non-compliance with the procedure or manner which does not go to the root of the appointment. Paragraphs 15 and 16 of the said judgment read thus : “15. Even at the threshold, it is necessary to keep in mind the distinction between regularisation and conferment of permanence in service jurisprudence. Paragraphs 15 and 16 of the said judgment read thus : “15. Even at the threshold, it is necessary to keep in mind the distinction between regularisation and conferment of permanence in service jurisprudence. In State of Mysore v. S.V. Narayanappa [ (1967) 1 SCR 128 : AIR 1967 SC 1071 ] this Court stated that it was a misconception to consider that regularisation meant permanence. In R.N. Nanjundappa v. T. Thimmiah [ (1972) 1 SCC 409 : (1972) 2 SCR 799 ] this Court dealt with an argument that regularisation would mean conferring the quality of permanence on the appointment. This Court stated : (SCC pp. 416-17, para 26) “Counsel on behalf of the respondent contended that regularisation would mean conferring the quality of permanence on the appointment whereas counsel on behalf of the State contended that regularisation did not mean permanence but that it was a case of regularisation of the rules under Article 309. Both the contentions are fallacious. If the appointment itself is in infraction of the rules or if it is in violation of the provisions of the Constitution illegality cannot be regularised. Ratification or regularisation is possible of an act which is within the power and province of the authority but there has been some non-compliance with procedure or manner which does not go to the root of the appointment. Regularisation cannot be said to be a mode of recruitment. To accede to such a proposition would be to introduce a new head of appointment in defiance of rules or it may have the effect of setting at naught the rules.” 16. In B.N. Nagarajan v. State of Karnataka [ (1979) 4 SCC 507 : 1980 SCC (L&S) 4 : (1979) 3 SCR 937 ] this Court clearly held that the words “regular” or “regularisation” do not connote permanence and cannot be construed so as to convey an idea of the nature of tenure of appointments. They are terms calculated to condone any procedural irregularities and are meant to cure only such defects as are attributable to methodology followed in making the appointments. This Court emphasised that when rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution are in force, no regularisation is permissible in exercise of the executive powers of the Government under Article 162 of the Constitution in contravention of the rules. This Court emphasised that when rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution are in force, no regularisation is permissible in exercise of the executive powers of the Government under Article 162 of the Constitution in contravention of the rules. These decisions and the principles recognised therein have not been dissented to by this Court and on principle, we see no reason not to accept the proposition as enunciated in the above decisions. We have, therefore, to keep this distinction in mind and proceed on the basis that only something that is irregular for want of compliance with one of the elements in the process of selection which does not go to the root of the process, can be regularised and that it alone can be regularised and granting permanence of employment is a totally different concept and cannot be equated with regularisation.” As evident from the extracted passage, the words “regular” or “regularisation” do not connote permanence and cannot be construed so as to convey an idea of the nature of tenure of appointments. They are terms calculated to condone any procedural irregularities and are meant to cure only such defects as are attributable to methodology followed in making the appointments. The Apex Court has also held that when rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution are in force, no regularisation is permissible in exercise of the executive powers of the Government under Article 162 of the Constitution in contravention of the rules. In other words, only something that is irregular for want of compliance with one or other of the elements in the process of selection which does not go to the root of the process, can be regularised and it alone can be regularised and granting permanence of employment is totally a different concept and cannot be equated with regularisation. 14. In other words, only something that is irregular for want of compliance with one or other of the elements in the process of selection which does not go to the root of the process, can be regularised and it alone can be regularised and granting permanence of employment is totally a different concept and cannot be equated with regularisation. 14. True, in paragraph 53 of the judgment in Umadevi (3), the Apex Court has observed that there may be cases where irregular appointments, not illegal appointments, as explained in paragraphs 15 and 16 therein of duly qualified persons in duly sanctioned vacant posts might have been made and the employees have continued to work for ten years or more but without the intervention of orders of the courts or of the tribunals, the question of regularisation of service of such employees may have to be considered on merits in the light of the principles settled and permitted the State and its instrumentalities to take steps to regularise as a one time measure the services of such irregularly appointed persons. Paragraph 53 of the judgment in Umadevi (3) reads thus : “53. One aspect needs to be clarified. There may be cases where irregular appointments (not illegal appointments) as explained in S.V. Narayanappa, R.N. Nanjundappa and B.N. Nagarajan and referred to in para 15 above, of duly qualified persons in duly sanctioned vacant posts might have been made and the employees have continued to work for ten years or more but without the intervention of orders of the courts or of tribunals. The question of regularisation of the services of such employees may have to be considered on merits in the light of the principles settled by this Court in the cases abovereferred to and in the light of this judgment. In that context, the Union of India, the State Governments and their instrumentalities should take steps to regularise as a one-time measure, the services of such irregularly appointed, who have worked for ten years or more in duly sanctioned posts but not under cover of orders of the courts or of tribunals and should further ensure that regular recruitments are undertaken to fill those vacant sanctioned posts that require to be filled up, in cases where temporary employees or daily wagers are being now employed. The process must be set in motion within six months from this date. The process must be set in motion within six months from this date. We also clarify that regularisation, if any already made, but not sub judice, need not be reopened based on this judgment, but there should be no further bypassing of the constitutional requirement and regularising or making permanent, those not duly appointed as per the constitutional scheme.” As is evident from the extracted passage, it was directed that the process aforesaid must be set in motion within six months from the date of the judgment. It was also clarified in the said paragraph that if regularisation if any, already made, but not sub judice, need not be reopened based on this judgment and that there should be no further bypassing of the constitutional requirement and regularising or making permanent those not duly appointed as per the constitutional scheme. 15. Later, in State of Karnataka v. M.L. Kesari, (2010) 9 SCC 247 , the Apex Court explained that in the light of the judgment in Umadevi (3), it was obligatory for the States and their instrumentalities to undertake a one-time exercise to prepare a list of all casual, daily-wage or ad hoc employees who have been working against sanctioned posts as on the date the judgment for more than ten years without the intervention of courts and tribunals, subject them to a process verification as to whether they are working against vacant posts and possess the requisite qualification for the post and regularise them in their services, if they conform to the requirements contained in paragraph 53 of the judgment. It was also clarified by the Apex Court in the said case that if the State or its instrumentalities do not comply with the said direction, the employees who were entitled to be considered for regularisation in terms of the judgment will not lose their right to be considered for regularisation. Paragraphs 7 to 11 of the said decision of the Apex Court read thus : “7. It is evident from the above that there is an exception to the general principles against “regularisation” enunciated in Umadevi (3) (3) [ (2006) 4 SCC 1 ], if the following conditions are fulfilled: (i) The employee concerned should have worked for 10 years or more in duly sanctioned post without the benefit or protection of the interim order of any court or tribunal. In other words, the State Government or its instrumentality should have employed the employee and continued him in service voluntarily and continuously for more than ten years. (ii) The appointment of such employee should not be illegal, even if irregular. Where the appointments are not made or continued against sanctioned posts or where the persons appointed do not possess the prescribed minimum qualifications, the appointments will be considered to be illegal. But where the person employed possessed the prescribed qualifications and was working against sanctioned posts, but had been selected without undergoing the process of open competitive selection, such appointments are considered to be irregular. 8. Umadevi (3) (3) [ (2006) 4 SCC 1 ] casts a duty upon the Government or instrumentality concerned, to take steps to regularise the services of those irregularly appointed employees who had served for more than ten years without the benefit or protection of any interim orders of courts or tribunals, as a one-time measure. Umadevi (3) (3) [ (2006) 4 SCC 1 ] directed that such one-time measure must be set in motion within six months from the date of its decision (rendered on 10-4-2006). 9. The term “one-time measure” has to be understood in its proper perspective. This would normally mean that after the decision in Umadevi (3) (3) [ (2006) 4 SCC 1 ], each department or each instrumentality should undertake a onetime exercise and prepare a list of all casual, daily-wage or ad hoc employees who have been working for more than ten years without the intervention of courts and tribunals and subject them to a process verification as to whether they are working against vacant posts and possess the requisite qualification for the post and if so, regularise their services. 10. At the end of six months from the date of decision in Umadevi (3), cases of several daily-wage/ad hoc/casual employees were still pending before courts. Consequently, several departments and instrumentalities did not commence the one-time regularisation process. On the other hand, some government departments or instrumentalities undertook the one-time exercise excluding several employees from consideration either on the ground that their cases were pending in courts or due to sheer oversight. Consequently, several departments and instrumentalities did not commence the one-time regularisation process. On the other hand, some government departments or instrumentalities undertook the one-time exercise excluding several employees from consideration either on the ground that their cases were pending in courts or due to sheer oversight. In such circumstances, the employees who were entitled to be considered in terms of para 53 of the decision in Umadevi (3), will not lose their right to be considered for regularisation, merely because the one-time exercise was completed without considering their cases, or because the six-month period mentioned in para 53 of Umadevi (3) has expired. The onetime exercise should consider all daily-wage/ad hoc/casual employees who had put in 10 years of continuous service as on 10-4-2006 without availing the protection of any interim orders of courts or tribunals. If any employer had held the onetime exercise in terms of para 53 of Umadevi (3), but did not consider the cases of some employees who were entitled to the benefit of para 53 of Umadevi (3), the employer concerned should consider their cases also, as a continuation of the onetime exercise. The one-time exercise will be concluded only when all the employees who are entitled to be considered in terms of para 53 of Umadevi (3), are so considered. 11. The object behind the said direction in para 53 of Umadevi (3) is twofold. First is to ensure that those who have put in more than ten years of continuous service without the protection of any interim orders of courts or tribunals, before the date of decision in Umadevi (3) was rendered, are considered for regularisation in view of their long service. Second is to ensure that the departments/instrumentalities do not perpetuate the practice of employing persons on dailywage/ ad hoc/casual basis for long periods and then periodically regularise them on the ground that they have served for more than ten years, thereby defeating the constitutional or statutory provisions relating to recruitment and appointment. The true effect of the direction is that all persons who have worked for more than ten years as on 10-4-2006 [the date of decision in Umadevi (3)] without the protection of any interim order of any court or tribunal, in vacant posts, possessing the requisite qualification, are entitled to be considered for regularisation. The true effect of the direction is that all persons who have worked for more than ten years as on 10-4-2006 [the date of decision in Umadevi (3)] without the protection of any interim order of any court or tribunal, in vacant posts, possessing the requisite qualification, are entitled to be considered for regularisation. The fact that the employer has not undertaken such exercise of regularisation within six months of the decision in Umadevi (3) or that such exercise was undertaken only in regard to a limited few, will not disentitle such employees, the right to be considered for regularisation in terms of the above directions in Umadevi (3) as a one-time measure.” (underline supplied) In the light of the decision of the Apex Court in M.L. Kesari, there cannot be any doubt to the position that only those who had worked in vacant posts for more than ten years as on the date of judgment viz, 10.04.2006 without the protection of any interim order of any court or tribunal possessing the requisite qualification, are entitled to be considered for regularisation. The said position has been reiterated by the Apex Court in University of Delhi v. Delhi University Contract Employees Union and Others, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 256. Paragraphs 15 to 17 of the judgment in the said case read thus : “15. The decision in Narendra Kumar Tiwari has to be understood in the backdrop of the facts of that case. 16. The contract employees in the present case cannot, therefore, claim the relief of regularization in terms of paragraph 53 of the decision in Umadevi (3)1. The rejection of their petition by the single Judge of the High Court was quite correct and there was no occasion for the Division Bench to interfere in the matter. 17. It is true that, as on the day when the judgment in Umadevi (3) was delivered by this Court, the contract employees had put in just about 3 to 4 years of service. But, as of now, most of them have completed more than 10 years of service on contract basis. Though the benefit of regularization cannot be granted, a window of opportunity must be given to them to compete with the available talent through public advertisement. But, as of now, most of them have completed more than 10 years of service on contract basis. Though the benefit of regularization cannot be granted, a window of opportunity must be given to them to compete with the available talent through public advertisement. A separate and exclusive test meant only for the contract employees will not be an answer as that would confine the zone of consideration to contract employees themselves. The modality suggested by the University, on the other hand, will give them adequate chance and benefit to appear in the ensuing selection.” (underline supplied) The Apex Court however, clarified in the said case that a window of opportunity must be given to them to compete with the available talent through public advertisement and extended to them a few benefits for the said purpose including age relaxation. 16. It is thus indubitably clear from the directions issued by the Apex Court in Umadevi (3) and as has been further clarified and explained in M.L. Kesari and University of Delhi that in order to claim the benefit of regularisation in terms of paragraph 53 of the judgment in Umadevi (3), the employee concerned should have worked for ten years or more as on the date of the judgment in Umadevi (3) in a duly sanctioned post without the benefit or protection of the interim order of any court or tribunal; that he should possess the requisite qualification for holding the office and that his appointment should not have been illegal, even if irregular. As noted, even though it is disputed between the parties whether the petitioners possess the qualification required for regular appointment as Assistant Professor, there is no dispute to the fact that none of them had worked continuously for ten years as on the date of judgment in Umadevi (3), even if the breaks in service during vacation are ignored. Similarly, there is no dispute to the fact that none of them have been working against any sanctioned post. Again, there is no dispute to the fact that even though the petitioners have been subjected to processes of selection before their engagement as Guest Lecturer on contract basis, the same were only selection processes carried on by the University exclusively for engaging persons on contract basis. Again, there is no dispute to the fact that even though the petitioners have been subjected to processes of selection before their engagement as Guest Lecturer on contract basis, the same were only selection processes carried on by the University exclusively for engaging persons on contract basis. The said selection process, as rightly pointed out by the learned Standing Counsel for the University, cannot be equated with a selection process in compliance with the constitutional scheme, for all those who are desirous of seeking opportunity for employment might not have participated in the said selection processes, for the same being only for engagement as Guest Lecturers for short duration and that too, for a lesser pay. 17. Of course, the petitioners would argue that the fact that they were not working against sanctioned posts and the fact that there are no sanctioned posts sufficient to accommodate them on regular basis even now in the University shall not be an impediment for granting them the reliefs sought for in the writ petitions in the light of the decision of the Apex Court in Nihal Singh. We are unable to accept this argument. Nihal Singh was a case which dealt with the claim of persons appointed as Special Police Officers in the State of Punjab for absorption in the regular establishment. They were recruited for providing security to banks on an arrangement that they would be paid remuneration on daily-wage basis by the banks concerned. The claim of the parties involved therein for absorption in the regular establishment was turned down on the ground that their appointments were purely temporary; that they have been recruited only for providing security services to banks; that they were being remunerated by the banks and that their engagement was not against any sanctioned posts. The Apex Court found that they were appointed in accordance with the provisions contained in the Police Act applicable to the State and the appointments cannot, therefore, be said to be illegal or irregular in any manner. The Apex Court found that they were appointed in accordance with the provisions contained in the Police Act applicable to the State and the appointments cannot, therefore, be said to be illegal or irregular in any manner. It was also found by the Apex Court that since master and servant relationship exists only between the State Government and officers so recruited, merely for the reason that emoluments payable to the officers were being disbursed by the banks and sufficient number of vacancies have not been created for accommodating them in regular establishment, are no reasons to refuse to absorb them in the regular establishment. It is in the said context, the Apex Court held that the fact that sufficient number of sanctioned posts are not available to accommodate them in the regular establishment cannot be a reason to decline them the relief of absorption and that they have to be accommodated after creating sufficient number of posts. The judgment in Nihal Singh, according to us, cannot have any application to the facts of the case on hand inasmuch as the petitioners are not persons who were subjected to any process of selection for regular recruitment. 18. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, we have no doubt in our minds that the petitioners are not entitled to absorption in the regular establishment of the University as Assistant Professors in terms of the direction issued by the Apex Court in paragraph 53 of the judgment in Umadevi (3). Now let us deal with the various judgments of the Apex Court relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioners to bring home the point that the petitioners are entitled to be absorbed in the regular establishment of the University in terms of the direction in the said judgments. 19. Amarendra Kumar Mohapatra v. State of Orissa, (2014) 4 SCC 583 , is the first among the cases that has been relied on. The issue considered in the said case was as to whether the legislation brought in by the State Government for absorption of certain number of graduate engineers whose services were utilised by the State Government on a consolidated stipend is valid in the light of the decision of the Apex Court in Umadevi (3). The issue considered in the said case was as to whether the legislation brought in by the State Government for absorption of certain number of graduate engineers whose services were utilised by the State Government on a consolidated stipend is valid in the light of the decision of the Apex Court in Umadevi (3). The Apex Court held in Amarendra Kumar Mohapatra that the parties involved are persons who were entitled to regularisation in terms of paragraph 53 of the judgment in Umadevi (3) even in the absence of such a legislation. Paragraphs 37 and 38 of the judgment in Amarendra Kumar Mohapatra read thus : “37. Dr Dhavan, learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the appellants in some of these appeals argued, and in our opinion rightly so, that both the aspects referred to above bear considerable significance to the case at hand. He submitted that regularisations granted by the State or its instrumentalities given in regard to appointments that were strictly speaking (sic not) illegal had not been upset by this Court in Umadevi (3) (3) case [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3) (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753]. That being so, the impugned enactment by which the appointment of the appellant Stipendiary Engineers were regularised as Assistant Engineers must also be treated to have been saved from the rigour of the view taken in Umadevi (3) (3) case [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3) (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753]. There is merit in that contention. The decision in Umadevi (3) (3) case [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3) (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] stated the true legal position on the subject but having regard to the fact that several earlier decisions of this Court had sanctioned regularisation of those not regularly appointed, this Court was of the view that upsetting such regularisations would not only unsettle what stood settled but also gravely prejudice those who are benefited from such orders of regularisation. There is no gainsaying that most of such persons who entered the public service initially without going through any open competitive selection process would have lost by passage of time their prospects of entering public service by legal course even if vacancies were available for such appointments. There is no gainsaying that most of such persons who entered the public service initially without going through any open competitive selection process would have lost by passage of time their prospects of entering public service by legal course even if vacancies were available for such appointments. In some of the decisions the continuance of employees on ad hoc, temporary or daily-wage basis for an indefinite period was seen by this Court also to be a violation of the fundamental right to life apart from being discriminatory. Considering the magnitude of the problem that would arise if all such appointments were to be unsettled, this Court in Umadevi (3) (3) case [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3) (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] left such regularisation alone and declared that in the future such orders of appointments dehors rules would not qualify for the grant of regularisation in public employment. 38. Equally important is the fact that even after declaring the true legal position on the subject and even after deprecating the practice of appointing people by means other than legitimate, this Court felt that those who had served for ten years or so may be put to extreme hardship if they were to be discharged from service and, therefore, directed the formulation of a scheme for their regularisation. This was no doubt a one-time measure, but so long as the appointment sought to be regularised was not illegal, the scheme envisaged by para 53 of the decision (supra) extracted above permitted the State to regularise such employees. Dr Dhavan argued that the appellant Stipendiary Engineers had, by the time the decision in Umadevi (3) (3) case [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3) (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] was pronounced, qualified for the benefit of a scheme of regularisation having put in ten years as ad hoc Assistant Engineers and fifteen years if their tenure was to be counted from the date of their employment as Stipendiary Engineers. He contended that even in the absence of a Validation Act, Stipendiary Engineers appointed on ad hoc basis as Assistant Engineers, who had worked for nearly ten years to the full satisfaction of the State Government would have been entitled to regularisation of their services in terms of any such scheme.” The decision in Amarendra Kumar Mohapatra is one that follows the decision of the Apex Court in Umadevi (3) and the same does not in any manner help the petitioners to sustain the relief sought for by them in the writ petitions. 20. The next decision in line is the decision in Amarkant Rai v. State of Bihar, (2015) 8 SCC 265 . It is a case where a daily-wage employee of a University was declined the benefit of regularisation despite having completed 10 years service as on the date of the judgment of the Apex Court in Umadevi (3), on the ground that his initial recruitment was illegal. The Apex Court directed regularisation of the employee having regard to the fact that he served the University for more than 29 years. This is a judgment rendered by a two Judge Bench of the Apex Court and it appeared to us as a judgment deviating from the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench in Umadevi (3) inasmuch as his appointment cannot be regarded as an irregular one in terms of the direction contained in paragraph 53 of the judgment in Umadevi (3). 21. The next is the decision of the Apex Court in Surendra Kumar v. Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority, (2015) 14 SCC 382 . The appellants in the said case were persons engaged as Assistant Manager (Civil) by Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority on contract basis. Their appointments were not against sanctioned posts, nevertheless, they were regularised on 06.08.2010. Later, they claimed retrospective regularisation from the date of occurrence of vacancies. Although their claim was allowed by the concerned tribunal, the decision therein was reversed by the High Court in the light of the decision of the Apex Court in Umadevi (3). The High Court also, in terms of its decision, quashed the regularisation order issued by the competent authority being one not in accordance with the directions issued in the said case. The High Court also, in terms of its decision, quashed the regularisation order issued by the competent authority being one not in accordance with the directions issued in the said case. The Apex Court held that the appellants being employees engaged on contract basis right from 1994 and since there already exists a policy decision to regularise them, it cannot be said that the regularisation of the appellants was contrary to the directions issued by the Apex Court in Umadevi (3). Consequently, the decision of the High Court to the extent it interfered with the decision of the employer to regularise them was held to be bad. Insofar as there is already a decision by the employer to regularise the appellants long prior to the decision of the Apex Court in Umadevi (3), the decision in Surendra Kumar can only be understood as one following the decision in Umadevi (3). 22. The next is the decision of the Apex Court in State of Jammu and Kashmir v. District Bar Association, Bandipora, (2017) 3 SCC 410 . This was a case where, in a public interest litigation, a Division Bench of the High Court directed the State Government to absorb the daily-wage employees engaged in the High Court and the District Judiciary in the State after creating sufficient posts for their absorption in the regular establishment mainly on the ground that the Government has not created required number of posts for the State Judiciary. Later, for non-compliance of the said direction, proceedings have been initiated against the State Government. The said proceedings were challenged before the Apex Court on the ground that the direction issued by the High Court was inconsistent with the decision of the Apex Court in Umadevi (3). Although it was observed by the Apex Court in the said case that the decision in Umadevi (3) is not an authority for the proposition that the executive or the legislature cannot frame a scheme for regularisation, having found that the impugned directions to regularise the service of the daily-wage employees including those engaged in the year 2015 were not consistent with the directions in Umadevi (3), the Apex Court directed the matter to be reconsidered by the High Court. The judgment in State of Jammu and Kashmir cannot be said to be one which has distinguished the decision in Umadevi (3) in any manner, merely on account of the observation referred to above. Even otherwise, the said judgment does not in any manner help the petitioners in sustaining the relief sought for in the writ petitions. 23. In Narendra Kumar Tiwari v. State of Jharkhand, (2018) 8 SCC 238 , a two Judge bench of the Apex Court having taken the view that the direction contained in paragraph 53 of the judgment in Umadevi (3), if interpreted strictly then no irregularly appointed employee can ever be regularised in the State of Jharkhand which was established only with effect from 15.11.2000 and therefore, directed that the benefit of the Regularisation Rules of 2015 shall be given to the appellants therein, if they have completed ten years of service on the date of promulgation of the Regularisation Rules. It is seen that it has been clarified by the Apex Court subsequently in University of Delhi that Narendra Kumar Tiwari is one to be understood contextually in the backdrop of the facts of that case and reiterated the position that only those who have 10 years of service as on the judgment of the Apex Court in Umadevi (3) are entitled to the benefit of the directions contained in paragraph 53 therein. The decision of the Apex Court in Narendra Kumar Tiwari also, in the circumstances, does not improve the case of the petitioners in any manner. 24. The last among the decisions of the Apex Court cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners is the decision in Rajnish Kumar Mishra v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2019) 17 SCC 648. This is a case where certain employees who were appointed on ad-hoc basis during 1999-2001 in the District Judiciary in the State of Uttar Pradesh were ordered to be absorbed in the regular establishment on 09.11.2012. Later, the said order was revoked and proceedings were issued for recovery of the pay and emoluments received in the meanwhile. The order revoking the order of regularisation was affirmed by the High Court in a proceedings under Article 226 and it is the said decision of the High Court that was under challenge before the Apex Court. Later, the said order was revoked and proceedings were issued for recovery of the pay and emoluments received in the meanwhile. The order revoking the order of regularisation was affirmed by the High Court in a proceedings under Article 226 and it is the said decision of the High Court that was under challenge before the Apex Court. It is seen that the Apex Court reversed the decision of the High Court and restored the decision to direct regularisation of the employees in the light of the directions contained in paragraph 53 of the judgment in Umadevi (3) having regard to the fact that certain similarly placed persons were ordered to be absorbed in the regular establishment by the Apex Court in earlier proceedings. Rajnish Kumar Mishra is a case dealt with by a Three Judge Bench of the Apex Court, and going by the facts disclosed in the judgment, the same is inconsistent with the judgment of the Constitution Bench in Umadevi (3) inasmuch as none of the parties therein who are stated to have been engaged on ad-hoc basis during 1999-2001 had worked for ten years as on the date of the judgment in Umadevi (3). 25. As indicated, the decisions of the Apex Court in Amarkant Rai, State of Jammu and Kashmir, Narendra Kumar Tiwari and Rajinish Kumar Mishra though struck a different note on the legal aspects dealt with in Umadevi (3), they being decisions rendered by benches of lesser strength, we are obliged under law to follow the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Umadevi (3). In other words, the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners based on the said decisions of the Apex Court are only to be rejected. 26. In the course of the arguments, the learned counsel for the petitioners have brought to our notice a few orders passed by the Sree Sankaracharya University, in terms of which, a few persons similarly placed like the petitioners have been absorbed in the regular establishment. Among them, four have been absorbed in the regular establishment by the University pursuant to the directions issued by this Court and the rest have been absorbed by the University. Persons who were absorbed in the regular establishment by the University are Dr. G. Reghu Kumar, Dr. R. Geetha Devi, Dr. K.P. Vijayalekshmi and Dr. R. Sharmila. Among them, four have been absorbed in the regular establishment by the University pursuant to the directions issued by this Court and the rest have been absorbed by the University. Persons who were absorbed in the regular establishment by the University are Dr. G. Reghu Kumar, Dr. R. Geetha Devi, Dr. K.P. Vijayalekshmi and Dr. R. Sharmila. They were absorbed in terms of the orders passed by the University on 01.03.2011, 20.04.2011, 23.06.2011 and 22.08.2019 respectively. The orders of absorption are part of the records. Earlier, in terms of the judgment of this Court in O.P.No.9613 of 1998, one Dr. R.S. Sheeja was absorbed in the regular establishment by the University on 03.02.2006. Even though the orders issued in the case of Dr. G. Reghu Kumar and Dr. R. Geetha Devi were set at naught by this Court at the instance of third parties, the said decision was reversed by the Division Bench in terms of the judgment in W.A.Nos.1449 and 1475 of 2013. It is seen that following the decision of this Court in W.A.No.1449 and 1475 of 2013, a learned Single Judge of this Court directed the University to absorb one Dr. Tony K. Raphel and one Dr. P.I. Devaraj also into the regular establishment. It is based on the aforesaid orders and the decisions of this Court, the learned counsel for the petitioners vehemently contended that the petitioners are entitled to similar treatment. 27. The fact that the persons named in the preceding paragraph are persons engaged on contract basis by the University as in the case of the petitioners in this batch of cases, is not disputed by the University. All of them have been absorbed in the regular establishment by the University after the decision of the Apex Court in Umadevi (3). As in the case of the petitioners, none of them had been working against sanctioned posts for ten years as on the date of the judgment in Umadevi (3). Since they do not fall under the category of persons directed to be regularised in terms of paragraph 53 of the judgment, the decisions taken by the University absorbing them in the regular establishment are illegal and against the ratio in Umadevi (3). Since they do not fall under the category of persons directed to be regularised in terms of paragraph 53 of the judgment, the decisions taken by the University absorbing them in the regular establishment are illegal and against the ratio in Umadevi (3). It is now settled that a writ of mandamus can be issued by the High Court only when there exists a legal right in the writ petitioners and a corresponding legal obligation upon the State. Only because an illegality has been committed, the same cannot be directed to be perpetuated, for it is trite that there is no equality in illegality [See Sushanta Tagore v. Union of India, (2005) 3 SCC 16 , U.P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd. v. Sant Raj Singh, (2006) 9 SCC 82 , State v. Sashi Balasubramanian, (2006) 13 SCC 252 and State of Orissa v. Prasana Kumar Sahoo, (2007) 15 SCC 129 ]. The claim of the petitioners for equal treatment based on the orders of the University, in the circumstances, is only to be rejected. 28. Let us now deal with the judgments of this Court, on the basis of which the University was directed to absorb similarly placed persons. First among the judgments is the judgment rendered by this Court in O.P.No.9613 of 1998 in terms of which Dr. R.S. Sheeja was directed to be absorbed in the regular establishment. The said judgment is part of the records. A perusal of the judgment indicates that it is on the basis that she was once selected and appointed as Lecturer which however stood cancelled due to reasons not attributable to her that she was directed to be absorbed in the regular establishment. The judgment is one rendered long prior to judgment in Umadevi (3). Two among the petitioners in this batch are also similarly placed. The judgment is one that runs counter to the ratio in Umadevi (3). The petitioners cannot claim the benefit of the same after the decision in Umadevi (3). 29. As noted, the orders issued in the case of Dr. G. Reghu Kumar and Dr. R. Geetha Devi were though set at naught initially by a learned Single Judge of this court in a writ petition challenging the same, the said decision was subsequently reversed by the Division Bench in terms of the judgment in W.A.Nos.1449 and 1475 of 2013. As noted, the orders issued in the case of Dr. G. Reghu Kumar and Dr. R. Geetha Devi were though set at naught initially by a learned Single Judge of this court in a writ petition challenging the same, the said decision was subsequently reversed by the Division Bench in terms of the judgment in W.A.Nos.1449 and 1475 of 2013. A perusal of the judgment in the said cases would show that the learned Judges of the Division Bench were proceeding as if the parties are entitled to the regularisation benefit contained in paragraph 53 of the judgment in Umadevi (3) even though they have not met the ten years requisite as on 10.06.2004, the date of the judgment. The last sentence in paragraph 53 gathers specific reference in the given context. The said sentence reads thus : “We also clarify that regularisation, if any already made, but not sub judice, need not be reopened based on this judgment, but there should be no further bypassing of the constitutional requirement and regularising or making permanent, those not duly appointed as per the constitutional scheme.” Therefore, the requirement of ten years continuous service has to be fulfilled as on the date of the judgment in Umadevi (3). Further, the said aspect has been reiterated, clarified and explained in M.L. Kesari and University of Delhi. Hence the view taken by this Court in W.A.Nos.1449 and 1475 of 2013 being against the dictum in Umadevi (3), we are unable to agree with the same. We are conscious of the fact that since the judgment in the said cases is also one rendered by a Division Bench of this Court, normally, we ought to have made a reference to a Larger Bench for adjudication. We are not adopting the said course since the view taken is directly in conflict with the view expressed by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the binding judgment in Umadevi (3) and also in the subsequent judgments in M.L. Kesari and University of Delhi. 30. Coming to the decision of the learned Single Judge in W.P(C) Nos.9281 and 8625 of 2012, in terms of which the University was directed to absorb Dr.Tony K.Raphel and Dr. P.I. Devaraj, as noted, it is a judgment rendered placing reliance on the judgment in W.A.Nos.1449 and 1475 of 2013. 30. Coming to the decision of the learned Single Judge in W.P(C) Nos.9281 and 8625 of 2012, in terms of which the University was directed to absorb Dr.Tony K.Raphel and Dr. P.I. Devaraj, as noted, it is a judgment rendered placing reliance on the judgment in W.A.Nos.1449 and 1475 of 2013. As it is found that the judgment in the latter cases mentioned herein-above lack any precedential value, the judgments rendered by the learned Single Judge cannot be made use of by the petitioners to sustain the relief claimed by them in the writ petitions. 31. Going by the provisions contained in the Act, it is obligatory on the part of the Syndicate of the University to institute with prior approval of the State Government Professorships, Readerships, Lectureships and such other teaching and research posts required by the University. It is not disputed that appointment of teachers and other academic staff in Universities is to be made in accordance with the Regulations issued by the University Grants Commission from time to time, in terms of the provisions contained in the University Grants Commission Act (the UGC Act). The applicable Regulations of the University Grants Commission (the UGC Regulations) make it obligatory for the University to fix the number of full-time and part-time teaching posts keeping in view the total institutional work load. The UGC Regulations on Minimum Qualifications for Appointment of Teachers and other Academic Staff in Universities and Colleges and Measures for the Maintenance of Standards in Higher Education, 2018 (the 2018 Regulations) although enables the Universities to appoint teachers on contract basis, the said course could be aptly resorted to only when the student teacher ratio does not satisfy the laid down norms and when it is inevitably necessary to fill up vacancies arising owing to attributable reasons such as maternity leave, child care leave etc. The said Regulations provide that in any case, the number of such appointments should not exceed 10% of the total number of faculty positions in the University and that fixed emoluments paid to such contract teachers should not be less than the monthly gross salary of regularly appointed Assistant Professors. The said Regulations provide that in any case, the number of such appointments should not exceed 10% of the total number of faculty positions in the University and that fixed emoluments paid to such contract teachers should not be less than the monthly gross salary of regularly appointed Assistant Professors. In other words, the scheme of the statutes governing the field is that the University is duty bound to institute teaching posts keeping in view of the total institutional work load with the prior approval of the State Government and the University has to discharge its teaching functions making use of the teachers appointed on regular basis. To put it otherwise, the University, under normal circumstances, is not expected to meet its teaching functions by resorting to contract employment. As noted, there is also a restriction that at any rate, contract appointees shall not exceed 10% of total number of faculty positions in the University. Of course, the aforesaid restriction is only one introduced in the 2018 Regulations. But, even before 2018, the scheme of the statutes aforesaid was that contract appointments shall be resorted to only in exceptionally exceptional situations. 32. The materials on record indicate that sufficient number of teaching posts required for the University considering its work load, have never been created. Instead, for the last several years, the University has been resorting to contract appointments for discharging its teaching obligations. The materials also disclose that there are teachers in the University who are working for over 15 years on contract basis as Guest Lecturers and some of them have even crossed the age of superannuation. The petitioner in W.P.(C) No.3363 of 2018 is one such contract appointee. On a query from the court as to the reason for not creating appropriate number of teaching posts in the University, the answer given by the Standing Counsel was that for creation of sufficient number of posts, prior sanction of the Government is required and although several requests have been made to the Government, sanction has not been accorded due to non-availability of resources. It was also pointed out on a query from the court that it is in public interest that the University is conducting various courses by engaging teachers on contract basis and that if this practice is stopped once and for all, the public will suffer. It was also pointed out on a query from the court that it is in public interest that the University is conducting various courses by engaging teachers on contract basis and that if this practice is stopped once and for all, the public will suffer. It was also conceded by the learned Standing Counsel that the contract appointees are not being paid wages at par with the gross salary of the regularly appointed teachers as insisted by the UGC Regulations even after the 2018 Regulations. To say the least, the state of affairs in the University is in dire straits. Since the University is extracting work from the teachers at a far lesser cost, as has been observed by the learned Single Judge, it is exploitation of the human resources, that too, by an instrumentality of the State. A university is not expected to function in this manner and permitting the same would be against the scheme of the UGC Act and the Regulations made thereunder. The petitioners in this case are victims of the said exploitation. Needless to say, this practice shall be stopped by the University forthwith. 33. As noted, in terms of the judgment in W.P.(C) Nos.3363 of 2018 and 29677 of 2016, the learned Single Judge has directed the University to disburse to the petitioners therein salary as is drawn by the regular incumbents, along with arrears for the last three years. The learned Standing Counsel for the University raised several arguments to assail the said direction. The main argument was that employees appointed on contract basis are not entitled to the pay scale as that of the regular employees. The decisions of the Apex Court in Apangshu Mohan Lodh v. State of Tripura, (2004) 1 SCC 119 and Uttar Pradesh Land Development Corporation v. Mohd. Khursheed Anwar, (2010) 7 SCC 739 were relied on, in support of the said contention. The decisions of the Apex Court in Apangshu Mohan Lodh v. State of Tripura, (2004) 1 SCC 119 and Uttar Pradesh Land Development Corporation v. Mohd. Khursheed Anwar, (2010) 7 SCC 739 were relied on, in support of the said contention. The learned Standing Counsel also relied on the decisions of the Apex Court in State of Punjab v. Jagjit Singh, (2017) 1 SCC 148 and Manish Gupta v. Jan Bhagidari Samiti, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 485, to contend that the principle of equal pay for equal work cannot be pressed into service in a case of this nature in the absence of any pleading in these writ petitions that the duties and responsibilities of the Guest Lecturers and the regularly appointed teachers are one and the same. As noticed, the writ petitions were not instituted for pay and allowances at par with the pay and allowances disbursed to the regularly appointed teachers. Instead, the writ petitions were instituted seeking directions to the University to absorb the petitioners into the regular establishment. The direction to pay salary and emoluments as applicable to regular teachers was issued by the learned Single Judge as an interim measure, as it was found that it was obligatory for the University in the facts of the present case to absorb the petitioners into the regular establishment of the University, after obtaining necessary orders from the Government pertaining to enhancing the sanctioned strength of teachers. As has been found by us that the petitioners are not entitled to absorption in the regular establishment, it is unnecessary to delve deep into the correctness of the said direction. As far as the petitioners in W.P.(C) Nos.3363 of 2018, 29677 of 2016 and 15257 of 2021 are concerned, they have been engaged on contract basis as Guest Lecturers by the University right from 09.12.1997, 14.7.1997 and 10.6.1997 respectively. As it is found that the services of the petitioners were being exploited by the University for several years, even while we hold that prior to the 2018 Regulations, in the absence of a clear finding that they were discharging the same function as that of the regular Assistant Professors, the petitioners were not entitled to remuneration at par with that of the regular Assistant Professors in the University, we are of the view that they are entitled to be compensated. In the light of the UGC Regulations, according to us, they shall be paid, by way of compensation, emoluments equal to the gross salary of regularly appointed Assistant Professors for the services rendered by them for a period of three years prior to the termination of their service less the emoluments already received by them for the said periods. 34. It has come out in the course of the arguments that the petitioner in W.P.(C) No.3363 of 2018 has already attained the age of superannuation and the petitioner in W.P. (C) No.15257 of 2021 is one the verge of the same. As far as the petitioner in W.P.(C) No.29677 of 2016 is concerned, she is in her early 50s. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner in the said case has made an alternative prayer at the conclusion of the hearing that in the event this Court is not inclined to absorb the said petitioner into the regular establishment of the University, she may be given appropriate relief so as to enable her to participate in the next regular selection, if at all a regular selection is resorted to by the University. In the light of the decision of the Apex Court in University of Delhi, we are of the view that having regard to the peculiar facts of this case, she can certainly be given age relaxation so as to enable her to participate in the forthcoming regular selection, if any, in the University for appointment as Assistant Professor in Malayalam. In the light of the discussion aforesaid, the impugned judgments are set aside and the writ petitions are disposed of directing the University to disburse to the petitioners emoluments equal to the gross salary of regularly appointed Assistant Professors for the services rendered by them, for a period of three years prior to the termination of their service less the emoluments already received by them for the said periods. It is also directed that the petitioner in W.P. (C) No.29677 of 2016 shall be given age relaxation so as to enable her to participate in the next regular selection in the University for appointment as Assistant Professor in Malayalam. There will also be a direction in public interest that the University shall not hereafter resort to contract appointments otherwise than in accordance with the 2018 Regulations. There will also be a direction in public interest that the University shall not hereafter resort to contract appointments otherwise than in accordance with the 2018 Regulations. It is however, made clear that the University would be free to make appropriate adjustments in their courses forthwith, so as to ensure compliance of the 2018 Regulations.