JUDGMENT : K.S. Mudagal, J. 1. W.P.Nos.35764/2009 and 12515 of 2013 are filed by the workman. W.P.No. 43643/2012 is filed by the management. For the purpose of convenience the parties will be referred to hereafter as 'workman' and 'management'. 2. The management is engaged in running various Educational Institutions. It also runs an Institution called 'Kempegowda Institute of Medical Sciences'. On 29/11/1984 the management appointed the workman as driver in that institution. 3. On 10/2/1990 when workman was driving the Ambulance van of the management, that met with an accident. In the accident he suffered injuries. The management filed complaint against the workman alleging that the accident occurred due to his irresponsibility, dereliction of duties and thereby caused huge damage to the vehicle and in turn to the institution. In the criminal prosecution, he was acquitted. 4. After the accident the workman was not assigned any work. The management claims he was kept under suspension with effect from 24/4/1990. The workman claimed that he was unjustly denied the work from 24/4/1990. The workman filed an application No. 35/1991 under sec. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 ('the Act' for short) claiming full backwages from the date of suspension. The Additional Labour Court allowed the said application on 22/2/1996. The management satisfied the said award. 5. Claiming that he has suffered injuries during the course of employment the workman filed W.C.No. 13/1994 before the Workmen's Compensation Tribunal for compensation. That came to be allowed awarding Rs.1,61,398.00 with interest at 12% P.A. The management challenged the said order before this Court in M.F.A.No. 5491/1999. This Court by order dtd. 20/4/2001 confirmed the award with the direction that the management shall satisfy the award and recover the same from the Insurance Company. 6. The workman raised dispute in Reference No. 84/1996 against the management claiming that the management has unlawfully terminated him from service. In that case, he claimed that the management forced him to drive an Ambulance which was not in good condition which led to the accident. He further claimed that despite that management held a farce domestic enquiry in violation of principles of natural justice on the charge that he was responsible for the accident. He sought for reinstatement and back wages etc. On failure conciliation the matter was referred to the Labour Court, Bengaluru which was numbered as Ref. No. 84/1996. 7. He further claimed that despite that management held a farce domestic enquiry in violation of principles of natural justice on the charge that he was responsible for the accident. He sought for reinstatement and back wages etc. On failure conciliation the matter was referred to the Labour Court, Bengaluru which was numbered as Ref. No. 84/1996. 7. The point of reference in Ref.No. 84/1996 was whether the management was justified in denying the work to the workman with effect from 24/4/1990. In that case though the management was represented through its advocate neither cross-examined the workman's witness nor led its evidence. The II Addl. Labour Court by award dtd. 8/2/2006 allowed that claim petition and directed the management to reinstate the workman to his original post or equivalent post in view of the injuries suffered by him due to the accident. The Labour Court also awarded the continuity of services with other consequential benefits with backwages reserving liberty to the management to deduct whatever amount/wages already paid to the workman. 8. The management filed M.A.No. 6/2006 before the Labour Court for setting aside the ex-parte award dtd. 8/2/2006 in Ref.No. 84/1996. The Labour Court by order dtd. 3/10/2008 dismissed the said application on merits. The management filed W.P.No. 14654/2008 (L-TER) before this Court seeking quashing of the award in Ref.No. 84/1996 and the order in M.A.No. 6/2006. This Court by order dtd. 12/1/2009 dismissed the writ petition confirming the Tribunal's order/award on the ground that the management has already revoked the suspension order in the year 2000 and reinstated the workman. 9. Pending M.A.No. 6/2006 the management initiated second disciplinary enquiry against the workman by issuing charge-sheet dtd. 6/1/2007. The misconduct alleged in the said charge-sheet were as follows: (A) That the workman joined the employment of the management by furnishing fake Transfer Certificate purportedly issued by Govt. High School, Munireddypalya, Bengaluru and that such school did not exist during 1969-70. (B) He remained unauthorizedly absent from duty for 26 days from 4/9/2006 to 29/9/2006. 10. One H.S. Prasad was appointed as Enquiry Officer. The enquiry commenced on 27/2/2007. The Enquiry Officer concluded the enquiry on 13/11/2007. He submitted his report on 18/2/2008 holding that the charges were proved and workman is guilty of violation of Rule Nos.5.1, 5.6, 5.8 and 5.23 of Vokkaligara Sangha Services Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 2001. 11. 10. One H.S. Prasad was appointed as Enquiry Officer. The enquiry commenced on 27/2/2007. The Enquiry Officer concluded the enquiry on 13/11/2007. He submitted his report on 18/2/2008 holding that the charges were proved and workman is guilty of violation of Rule Nos.5.1, 5.6, 5.8 and 5.23 of Vokkaligara Sangha Services Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 2001. 11. The management issued show cause notice to the workman regarding acceptance of the report and imposition of penalty. The workman submitted his reply questioning the DE Report and opposing imposition of penalty. Rejecting such reply the management by order dtd. 3/6/2008 imposed the penalty of compulsory retirement. 12. When the said compulsory retirement order dtd. 3/6/2008 was issued, the proceedings in M.A.No. 6/2006 for setting aside the ex-parte award in Ref.No. 84/1996 was pending. On the very same day the management filed Serial Application No. 3/2008 before the II Addl. Labour Court, Bengaluru under Sec. 33(2)(b) of the Act seeking approval of the said punishment order. 13. On 24/11/2008 the workman filed application under Sec. 33C(1) of the Act before the Deputy Labour Commissioner, Bengaluru Region II in C.R.No. 12/08-09 claiming that the management has not satisfied the award in Ref.No. 84/1996 and sought recovery of Rs.17,69,958.00 under said award. 14. The Commissioner by order dtd. 13/11/2009 rejected the said application on the ground that under the award there is no computation of the amount payable, therefore, the application under Sec. 33C(1) is not maintainable. Challenging that order the workman has preferred W.P.No. 35764/2009. 15. In serial application No. 3/2008 the parties adduced evidence on the fairness of the enquiry. The II Addl. Labour Court by order dtd. 20/9/2010 answered the issue with regard to fairness of enquiry in favour of the management. On recording such finding, Labour Court proceeded with enquiry in Serial Application No. 3/2008 on penalty. Ultimately by order dtd. 1/9/2012 the Labour Court dismissed serial application No. 3/2008. 16. Challenging the order of dismissal of Serial Application No. 3/2008 the management has preferred W.P.No. 43643/2012. Seeking quashing of the findings on the fairness of enquiry the workman preferred W.P.No. 12515/2013. Regarding W.P.Nos.43643/2012 17. The history of the case is already narrated above and this court does not find it necessary to repeat the same here. But one thing is clear that the parties are fighting since 1990 incessantly and very bitterly. Seeking quashing of the findings on the fairness of enquiry the workman preferred W.P.No. 12515/2013. Regarding W.P.Nos.43643/2012 17. The history of the case is already narrated above and this court does not find it necessary to repeat the same here. But one thing is clear that the parties are fighting since 1990 incessantly and very bitterly. The management has imposed punishment of compulsory retirement on the workman on the ground of submission of fake Transfer Certificate to secure the employment and unauthorized absence for 26 days. 18. The workman so far has not raised any dispute challenging the said order. In view of the pendency of M.A.No. 6/2006 the management itself filed application under Sec. 33(2)(b) of the Act for approval of the said order. 19. The Labour Court rejected the serial application on the following grounds: (i) The workman has submitted Leave Application though not in the prescribed form. As he had left for pilgrimage, the telegram of the management to recall him was not served on him. Even otherwise it was not possible for him to cancel his pre-arranged family program and return. (ii) Transfer Certificate was submitted 25 years back. Later the School is renamed as Govt. P.U. College, J.C. Nagar. Therefore the findings of the Enquiry Officer are incorrect. (iii) Date of Birth can be proved by other documents also and not necessarily by the Transfer Certificate. (iv) Since the workman went on questioning the actions of the management and succeeded in them right from 1991 till 2009, the management has invented the case of fake TC / Date of Birth to victimize him. (v) The management has not assigned any reasons to accept the D.E. report. 20. Submissions of Sri S.N.Murthy, learned Senior counsel for advocate on record for management: (i) While dealing with an application under Sec. 33(2)(b) the Labour Court has to see only the prima-facie case and cannot delve deep into the matter. Whenever there is some evidence on record, the findings of the Enquiry officer and the decision of the disciplinary authority cannot be interfered with. (ii) The report of the Principal, Govt. P.U. College, J.C. Nagar dtd. 13/11/2006 and Sri Gangappa Gowda, Secretary/Ex-officio Deputy Director to the effect that the school mentioned in the Transfer Certificate submitted by the workman did not exist at the relevant time and the said Transfer Certificate were issued by public servants. (ii) The report of the Principal, Govt. P.U. College, J.C. Nagar dtd. 13/11/2006 and Sri Gangappa Gowda, Secretary/Ex-officio Deputy Director to the effect that the school mentioned in the Transfer Certificate submitted by the workman did not exist at the relevant time and the said Transfer Certificate were issued by public servants. They are public documents acceptable in evidence. It was for the workman to rebut the said evidence which he failed to do. The Labour Court committed error in rejecting those documents. (iii) Those documents were served on the workman before commencement of the management evidence. Therefore there was sufficient compliance of the principles of the natural justice. (iv) Even if the approval was granted, still the raising of the dispute under Sec. 11A of the Act was open to the workman. When the charge was proved, the plea of victimization does not survive. (v) The Labour Court ought to have considered the antecedents of the workman. The management along with the punishment order sent the Cheque for Rs.1,682.00 to the workman and he has received the same. Therefore there was sufficient compliance of sec. 33(2)(b) of the Act. (vi) Since Ref.No. 84/1996 and M.A.No. 6/2006 were between the individual workman and the management that does not amount to industrial dispute. Therefore the application itself was redundant and was filed only as a precaution. If at all the Labour Court had to reject the application, it should have rejected on that ground. 21. In support of his submissions, he relied on the following judgments: 1. John D'Souza Vs. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation 2019 (18) SCC 47 2. KSRTC Central Offices Vs. Raju M 2020 (III) LLJ 187 (DB-Kar.) 3. B.C.Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India and Ors. 1995 (6) SCC 749 4. Iqbal Basith and Ors. Vs. N.Subbalakshmi and Ors. 2021 (2) SCC 718 5. District Primary School Council Vs. Mritunjoy Das and Ors. 2011 AIR SCW 4579 6. Sciemed Overseas Inc. Vs. BOC India Limited and Ors. 2016 (3) SCC 70 7. State Bank of India and Ors. Vs. Narendra Kumar Pandey 2013 (2) SCC 740 8. Canara Bank Vs. V.K.Awasthy 2005 (6) SCC 321 9. State Bank of Patiala and Ors. Vs. S.K.Sharma 1996 (3) SCC 364 10. M/s Bharat Electronics Ltd. Vs. Labour Court ILR 1996 Kar. 1395 11. Bharat Forge Company Ltd. Vs. A.B.Zodge and Ors. 1996 (4) SCC 374 12. Vs. Narendra Kumar Pandey 2013 (2) SCC 740 8. Canara Bank Vs. V.K.Awasthy 2005 (6) SCC 321 9. State Bank of Patiala and Ors. Vs. S.K.Sharma 1996 (3) SCC 364 10. M/s Bharat Electronics Ltd. Vs. Labour Court ILR 1996 Kar. 1395 11. Bharat Forge Company Ltd. Vs. A.B.Zodge and Ors. 1996 (4) SCC 374 12. Chemicals and Fibres of India Ltd. Vs. D.G.Bhoir 1975 (4) SCC 332 13. New India Motors (P) Ltd. Vs. K.T.Morris AIR 1960 SC 875 14. M/s. BPL Ltd. and Ors. Vs. R.Sudhakar and Ors. AIR 2004 SC 3606 15. VLS Finance Limited Vs. Union of India and Ors. 2013 (6) SCC 278 16. M/s. Bharat Iron Works Vs. Bhagubhai Balubhai Patel and Ors. 1976 (32) FLR 72 17. KSRTC Vs. Ramanna 2001(II) LLJ 1212 (DB-Kar.) 18. Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Ganesh Razak and Anr. 1995 (1) SCC 235 19. State Bank of India Vs. Ramachandra Dubey 2001 LAB.I.C. 79 (SC) 22. Submissions of Sri K. Subba Rao, learned senior counsel for advocate on record for workman: (i) Apparently the findings of the disciplinary authority was the weapon of victimization as the management had lost other litigations for 25 years. After 25 years the management invents the issue of Transfer Certificate. The authors of the documents relied on by the management were not examined. Therefore no value could be attached to those documents moreso when they were disputed. (ii) The charge-sheet itself was defective as it was not accompanied by the documents relied on in support of charges. There was no substantive reliable evidence against the workman. (iii) As per the management's witness himself the wage payable to the workman was Rs.8,904.00whereas the management sent the Cheque only for Rs.1,682.00. Therefore, there was violation of Sec. 33(2)(b) of the Act. Consequently the serial application itself was not maintainable. The Labour Court failed to give a finding on that. (iv) The Labour Court should have held that the enquiry was not fair and proper and petition was not maintainable. (v) Under Sec. 2A of the Act i.e., dismissal etc of an individual workman amounts to deemed industrial dispute. Therefore there is no merit in the contention that the application was redundant. (vi) Having convinced that the management is required to file an application under Sec. 33(2)(b) of the Act the management filed such application and on being unsuccessful backtracks saying that the application was redundant. Therefore there is no merit in the contention that the application was redundant. (vi) Having convinced that the management is required to file an application under Sec. 33(2)(b) of the Act the management filed such application and on being unsuccessful backtracks saying that the application was redundant. The management cannot be permitted to approbate and reprobate simultaneously. 23. In support of his submissions he relied on the following judgments: 1. Petlad Turkey Red Dye Works Co. Ltd. Vs. Dyes and Chemical Workers union and Ors. AIR 1960 SC 1006 2. Sudhir Bhuiya Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. and Anr. AIR 2005 NOC 471 3. Central Bank of India Ltd. Vs. Prakash Chand Jain AIR 1969 SC 983 4. G.V.Aswathanarayana Vs. Central Bank of India, by Chairman, Bombay and Ors. ILR 2003 KAR 3066 5. M/s.Khardah and Co. Ltd. Vs. The Workmen AIR 1964 SC 719 6. L.Michael and Anr. Vs. Johnson Pumps Ltd. AIR 1975 SC 661 7. Colour-Chem Ltd. Vs. A.L.Alaspurkar and Ors. (1998) 3 SCC 192 8. Chandrakumar Madhukar Deshmukh Vs. The Board of Trustees of Port of Bombay and Ors. 1995 LAB.I.C. 1496 9. Strawboard Manufacturing Co. Vs. Gobind AIR 1962 SC 1500 10. Karnataka Agro Industries Corporation Ltd., Bellary Vs. Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Bangalore and Anr. 1984 LAB.I.C. 1358 11. Miss. Sindhu Diwakar Dabholkar Vs. B.N.Dongre and Anr. 1988 LAB.I.C. 291 12. S.Ganapathy and Ors. Vs. Air India and Anr. 1993 LAB. I.C. 1966 13. Dinesh Khare Vs. Industrial Tribunal, Rajasthan, Jaipur and Ors. 1982 LAB.I.C. 517 14. M/s. Podar Mills Ltd. Vs. Bhagwan Singh and Anr. (1974) 3 SCC 157 15. Pandian Roadways Corporation Ltd. Vs. Labour Court and Anr. 2002 (III) LLJ 765 17. Jaipur Zilla Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. Vs. Ram Gopal Sharma and Ors. (2002) 2 SCC 244 18. Syed Yakoob Vs. K.S.Radhakrishnan and Ors. AIR 1964 SC 477 19. M/s. New India Motors (P) Ltd. New Delhi Vs. K.T.Morries AIR 1960 SC 875 20. Dalmia International Limited Vs. Thomas and Anr. (1975) II LLJ 526 Ker 21. P.R.Deshpande Vs. Maruti Balaram Haibatti 1995 Supple (2) SCC 539 22. S.S.Dhanoa Vs. Municipal Corporation, Delhi and Ors.1981 SCR (3) 864 23. The Central Bank of India Ltd. Vs. P.S.Rajagopalan AIR 1964 SC 743 24. Chief Mining Engineer, M/s. East India Coal Co. Ltd. Bararee Colliery Dhanbad Vs. Rameshwar and Ors. 1968 LAB I.C. 197 Regarding Industrial Dispute 24. P.R.Deshpande Vs. Maruti Balaram Haibatti 1995 Supple (2) SCC 539 22. S.S.Dhanoa Vs. Municipal Corporation, Delhi and Ors.1981 SCR (3) 864 23. The Central Bank of India Ltd. Vs. P.S.Rajagopalan AIR 1964 SC 743 24. Chief Mining Engineer, M/s. East India Coal Co. Ltd. Bararee Colliery Dhanbad Vs. Rameshwar and Ors. 1968 LAB I.C. 197 Regarding Industrial Dispute 24. Since the application is one under Sec. 33(2)(b) of the Act, it is necessary to examine the said provision which reads as follows: "33. Conditions of service, etc., to remain unchanged under certain circumstances during pendency of proceedings: (1) During the pendency of any conciliation proceeding before a conciliation officer or a Board or of any proceeding before an arbitrator or a Labour Court or Tribunal or National Tribunal in respect of an industrial dispute, no employer shall: (a) in regard to any matter connected with the dispute, alter, to the prejudice of the workmen concerned in such dispute, the conditions of service applicable to them immediately before the commencement of such proceeding; or (b) for any misconduct connected with the dispute, discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, any workmen concerned in such dispute, save with the express permission in writing of the authority before which the proceeding is pending. (2) During the pendency of any such proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute, the employer may, in accordance with the standing orders applicable to a workman concerned in such dispute [or, where there are no such standing orders, in accordance with the terms of the contract, whether express or implied, between him and the workman]- (a) alter, in regard to any matter not connected with the dispute, the conditions of service applicable to that workman immediately before the commencement of such proceeding; or (b) for any misconduct not connected with the dispute, discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, that workman: Provided that no such workman shall be discharged or dismissed, unless he has been paid wages for one month and an application has been made by the employer to the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer." 25. Thus Sec. 33(1) of the Act bars an employer from altering the service conditions of the workman or punishing him by way of discharge, dismissal or otherwise concerning whom Industrial Dispute is pending. Thus Sec. 33(1) of the Act bars an employer from altering the service conditions of the workman or punishing him by way of discharge, dismissal or otherwise concerning whom Industrial Dispute is pending. Sec. 33(2) permits the employer to pass such order of punishment against such workman subject to payment of one month's wage and approval of the authority before which such industrial dispute is pending. Therefore, the pendency of industrial dispute is a pre-condition to invoke Sec. 33(1) and (2). 26. Relying on the definition of "Industrial Dispute" under Sec. 2(k) of the Act, learned counsel for the management claims that only the dispute between the employer and the collective body of workmen amounts to an industrial dispute. While submitting so, he is oblivious of the provisions of Sec. 2A of the Act. Sec. 2A is incorporated in the Act by way of amending Act, 1965 with effect from 1/12/1965. That confers deemed status of industrial dispute to the case of dismissed workman. 27. In the light of the above, the contention that since the dispute was not an industrial dispute, the application was redundant, deserves no merit. Apart from that as rightly pointed out by Sri Subbarao, learned senior counsel such contention is raised for the first time in this writ petition. This is a clear attempt of improvement in the case. 28. As rightly pointed out by Sri Subbarao, learned senior counsel such conduct amounts to management indulging in approbation and reprobation which is impermissible under law as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in P.R.Deshpande'S case referred to supra. Regarding compliance of Proviso to Sec. 33(2)(b) of I.D.Act. 29. Even pending an Industrial Dispute no doubt the management can proceed to impose punishment of dismissal, discharge, termination etc provided it complies two conditions as required under Sec. 33(2) of the Act. The first condition is that such discharge must be followed by the payment of one month wage. The second condition is that the management has to make an application for approval of such order to the authority before which such industrial dispute is pending. Thus it becomes clear that the dismissal order shall be preceded by the payment of one month wage and that is a precondition for filing application also. 30. In the case on hand, admittedly the management paid an amount of Rs.1,682.00 by way of cheque as one month's wage. Thus it becomes clear that the dismissal order shall be preceded by the payment of one month wage and that is a precondition for filing application also. 30. In the case on hand, admittedly the management paid an amount of Rs.1,682.00 by way of cheque as one month's wage. According to the workman, since 25 years he was paid only Rs.1,682.00and the wages payable to the post of driver at the relevant time was 8,904/-. The management's witness AW.2 in his cross examination unequivocally admitted that as on the date of compulsory retirement of the workman i.e., 3/6/2008 the management was required to pay him wage of Rs.8,904.00 per month. 31. The proviso to Sec. 33(2) speaks of payment of one month's pay. It does not say wage last paid or payable. However, in this case by the time the said order was passed already there was an award of the competent court in Ref.No. 84/1996 directing the management to reinstate the workman in his original post/equivalent post together with continuity of service with all other benefits with full back wages. 32. In para 12 of the said award the Labour Court observed that the management is paying the wage to the workman at Rs.1,300.00 per month instead of wages applicable to a van driver which the workman is actually entitled to. It was further observed that similarly situated drivers were getting more than 7,000/- per month and the management did not explain why the workman was paid Rs.1,300.00 per month instead of wages to which he is entitled to as van driver. It was further held that the management was not justified in denying the wages to the workman in the pay-scales applicable to the post of a van driver and is liable to pay the wages accordingly. That judgment was confirmed by this Court in W.P.No. 14654/2008. 33. Despite such judicial findings and the admission by its own witness, still the management is maintaining that the amount paid at the rate of Rs.1,682.00 was correct, thereby there was compliance of Sec. 33(2). That amounts to circumventing the order of this Court in W.P.No. 14654/2008, therefore cannot be accepted. Thus the application and the dismissal order were not preceded by the cheque of one month's pay payable to the workman. Therefore, the petition itself was not maintainable. Regarding Prima facie case 34. That amounts to circumventing the order of this Court in W.P.No. 14654/2008, therefore cannot be accepted. Thus the application and the dismissal order were not preceded by the cheque of one month's pay payable to the workman. Therefore, the petition itself was not maintainable. Regarding Prima facie case 34. It was contended that in considering an application under Sec. 33(2) the Labour Court is required to examine only the prima facie case, therefore the order of the Labour Court was contrary to Sec. 33(2) and the judgments of the Supreme Court in the cases of John D'Souza, Raju M and B.C.Chaturvedi (cited supra). 35. Since the Petition itself was not maintainable, this Court actually finds that no purpose will be served by considering the point whether there was a prima facie case in proof of the charge. Still the same is being considered by way of abundant caution. 36. The first charge was about submission of the fake Transfer Certificate. To prove that the management produced Ex.M2 letter of the management to the Head Master, Government High School, Munireddypalya, Bengaluru, Ex.M16 alleged inspection report of one Gangappa Gowda, ex-officio Deputy Director Education Department and Ex.M15 the alleged covering letter of Director of Public Instructions to Ex.M16. The correctness of those documents was disputed by the workman. Despite that the authors of those documents were not examined. Therefore, it cannot be said that prima facie those documents were proved. 37. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Petland Turkey Red Dye works Company's case referred to supra held that mere filing of a document itself does not prove any fact unless the author of the document is examined. It was contended that the said documents are the public documents, therefore the workman has to disprove them. 38. The question of disproving a document or a fact arises only if there is any statutory presumption in respect of such documents. To call them as public documents, they are not covered under the definition of the public documents under Sec. 74 of the Indian Evidence Act. Neither they were the acts or records of the soverign authority, official bodies, Tribunals and public officers in discharging their regular official functions. Secondly there is no statutory presumption with regard to the said documents. Therefore, there is no merit in that contention also. Therefore, there was no prima facie proof of charge of submission of fake Transfer Certificate. Neither they were the acts or records of the soverign authority, official bodies, Tribunals and public officers in discharging their regular official functions. Secondly there is no statutory presumption with regard to the said documents. Therefore, there is no merit in that contention also. Therefore, there was no prima facie proof of charge of submission of fake Transfer Certificate. 39. More so as rightly pointed out by the Labour Court such contention was raised after 25 years of submission of the said documents. When they had accepted that document for such a long time, there was heavy burden on management to prove that, that was forged one. Only on proving the forgery the workman was expected to prove that, that was a genuine document. Therefore, the judgments relied on by the management are not helpful to advance their case. 40. So far as the charge of unauthorized absence admittedly the application was submitted, but it was not within the scheduled time. There was some explanation on the part of the workman for that. The application under Sec. 33(2) itself was not maintainable. Further the workman vehemently contended that the disciplinary enquiry as well as the order of punishment were the outcome of victimization. Admittedly, along with the charge sheet, those documents were not furnished to him. 41. Further the history of litigation between the parties narrated above shows that since 1990 the workman is single-handedly fighting against the management. The management dragged him in those proceedings up to this Court unsuccessfully. He was dismissed without paying one month's salary. Even the award in Ref. No. 84/1996 is not complied. The payment of wages in the drivers' pay scale is the subject matter of W.P.No. 35764/2009 and that will be discussed in that case in the later part of this judgment. Under the circumstances, the Labour Court was justified in holding that the order of punishment in question was the outcome of victimization. Therefore, this writ petition does not deserve any merit. 42. In view of the clear facts and circumstances discussed above, this Court does not find it necessary to refer to other judgments relied on by both the parties. Regarding W.P.No. 12515/2013 43. The workman has preferred this writ petition challenging the order of the Labour Court dtd. Therefore, this writ petition does not deserve any merit. 42. In view of the clear facts and circumstances discussed above, this Court does not find it necessary to refer to other judgments relied on by both the parties. Regarding W.P.No. 12515/2013 43. The workman has preferred this writ petition challenging the order of the Labour Court dtd. 20/9/2010 on the issue of fairness of enquiry and on the ground that in serial application No. 3/2008 the question of non-compliance of Sec. 33(2)(b) is not considered. 44. So far as the challenge to the order dtd. 20/9/2010 the writ petition was filed after more than 2 years of passing of the order. After such order, the workman participated in the proceedings before the Labour Court in SA No. 3/2008 and led his further evidence. Therefore that prayer of the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay, laches and acceptance. 45. The second prayer is for issue of writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ/order or direction holding that the respondent has failed to comply with the statutory requirement prescribed under Sec. 33(2)(b) of the Act by paying one month's wages. This Court is at a loss to understand how a writ of mandamus lies for that. Apart from that in view of the finding of this Court in W.P.No. 43643/2012 regarding non compliance of Sec. 33(2)(b) the said question does not survive for consideration in this writ petition. Therefore, the petition is liable to be dismissed. Regarding W.P.No. 35764/2009 46. This petition is filed seeking writ of certiorari for quashing the order Annexure-G whereunder the second respondent has rejected workman's application under Sec. 33C(1) of the Act for recovery of Rs.17,69,958.00. He claimed that as per the award in Ref. No. 84/1996 he was entitled to monthly wages at the rate specified by him in his application the total of which comes to Rs.20,83,040.00. He further claimed that out of that the first respondent management has paid only Rs.3,13,082.00, therefore, an order for recovery of Rs.17,69,958.00 be passed against the first respondent. 47. The second respondent rejected the said application on the ground that under the award in Ref.No. 84/1996 there was no computation of the wages payable, therefore the application under Sec. 33C(1) does not lie. 48. Sec. 33C(1) and (2) which are relevant for the purpose of this case read as follows: "33C. 47. The second respondent rejected the said application on the ground that under the award in Ref.No. 84/1996 there was no computation of the wages payable, therefore the application under Sec. 33C(1) does not lie. 48. Sec. 33C(1) and (2) which are relevant for the purpose of this case read as follows: "33C. Recovery of money due from an employer.-(1) Where any money is due to a workman from an employer under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of [Chapter VA or Chapter VB] the workman himself or any other person authorised by him in writing in this behalf, or, in the case of the death of the workman, his assignee or heirs may, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, make an application to the appropriate Government for the recovery of the money due to him, and if the appropriate Government is satisfied that any money is so due, it shall issue certificate for that amount to the Collector who shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue: Provided that every such application shall be made within one year from the date on which the money became due to the workman from the employer: Provided further that any such application may be entertained after the expiry of the said period of one year, if the appropriate Government is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient cause for not making the application within the said period. (2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government [within a period not exceeding three months]: Provided that where the presiding officer of a Labour Court considers it necessary or expedient so to do, he may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend such period by such further period as he may think fit." 49. The reading of the above provisions makes it clear that when the award specifies a particular amount as due, Sec. 33C(1) applies. The reading of the above provisions makes it clear that when the award specifies a particular amount as due, Sec. 33C(1) applies. Reading of Sec. 33C(2) shows that when the workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money under an award and when there is dispute about computation of such amount, then application lies before the Labour Court under Sec. 33C(2) of the Act. 50. In this case, the award in Ref.No. 84/1996 and the order in W.P.No. 14654/2008 only directed the management to pay the backwages and other service benefits to the workman in the pay-scale of driver and what was paid was not in accordance with the pay scale of the driver. Therefore that required an enquiry, computation/calculation. 51. Under the circumstances, an application under Sec. 33C(1) was not maintainable as held by the second respondent. The remedy of the workman was under Sec. 33C(2) before the Labour Court. In view of the discussion made above, W.P.No. 43643/2012 and W.P.No. 12515/2013 are dismissed. W.P.No. 35764/2009 is dismissed reserving liberty to the workman/petitioner to seek remedy under Sec. 33C(2) of the Act.