JUDGMENT : N.Kotiswar Singh, J. Heard Mr. Z Hussain, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. H. Gupta, learned Central Government Counsel appearing for respondent No.1; Mr. J. Payeng, learned Special Counsel, F.T. appearing for respondent Nos. 2 & 5; Mr. A.I. Ali, learned Standing Counsel, ECI appearing for respondent No.3 and Ms. U. Das, learned Additional Senior Government Advocate, Assam for respondent No.4. 2. In this petition the petitioner has challenged the order dated 22.09.2017 passed by the Foreigners Tribunal No.5th, Morigaon, Assam, in Case No. F.T. (C) 179/2016 (New Number) F.T.(C) 2051/2012 (Old Number), IM(D)T Case No.441/2000 dt.29.12.2000] by which the petitioner was declared a foreigner who had illegally entered into Assam from the specified territory on or after 25.03.1971. 3. On receipt of a reference of the Superintendent of Police (Border), Morigaon against the petitioner (O.P. No.1), his wife (O.P. No.2) and their three children, notice was issued to the petitioner and his family. After receiving notice, the petitioner along with his wife duly appeared before the learned Tribunal and filed their written statements. 4. On the basis of the exhibited documents, the learned Tribunal declared the petitioner as a foreigner but declared the petitioner’s wife (O.P. No.2) and her 3 (three) children as Indians vide its order dated 22.09.2017 and as such, we may not make any reference to them except for the petitioner. 5. In support of his contention, the petitioner submitted as many as 10 documents which were exhibited as Exts.A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, M and N respectively and also adduced evidence by examining himself and one Mofidul Islam as D.W.3, his neighbour, to corroborate the evidence of the petitioner as well as his wife. 6. As regards the aforesaid exhibits, the same had also been mentioned in the opinion dated 22.09.2017 passed by the learned Tribunal, which are as follows: (i) Exhibit (A) is a certified voter list of 1975 of Vill-Bhajakaiti Pathar containing the names of Abdul Hekim, Jainal Uddin and Sarban Nessa, which is produced as the voter list of O.P. No.1 and O.P. No.2 (ii) Exhibit-(B) is a certified voter list of 1997 of Vill-Barchapari containing the names of Jainal Abdin, Sarbanu and Majibur which is produced as the voter list of O.P. No.1 and O.P No.2. (iii) Exhibit-(C) is a certified voter list of 2005 of Vill- Barchapari containing the names of O.P. No.1, O.P. No.2 and O.P. No.3. (iv) Exhibit-(D) is a certified voter list of 2016 of Vill-Barchapari containing the names of O.P. No.1, O.P. No.2 and O.P. No.3. (v) Exhibit-(E) is a computer copy of Jamabandhi which is produced as the Jamabandhi of O.P. No.2 in Sl. No.22 but, the name is found struck off. So, this documents is not accepted as the Jamabandhi of O.P. No.1. (vi) Exhibit-(F) is a certificate issued by the Gaon Burah of Vill-Barchapari certifying the O.P. as the resident of the said village. But, the contents of the document are not proved by the Gaon Burah. So, it is not accepted. (vii) Exhibit-(G) is a certified voter list of 1965 of Vill- Bhajakhaiti Pather containing the name of Sadar Uddin whom the O.P. has named as his father. (viii) Exhibit-(H) is a certified voter list of 1970 containing the name of Sadar Uddin whom the O.P. has named as his father. (ix) Exhibit-(M) is a certified voter list of 1989 of Vill-Barchapari containing the names of A. Hekim, Khudeja, Jainal Abdin and Sarban Nessa which is produced as the voter list of O.P. No.1 and O.P. No.2. (x) Exhibit-(N) is a certified voter list of 2016 of Vill-Barchapari containing the names of Jainal Abdin, Sarbanu, Majibukar Rahman, Rumena Khatun, Matibur Rahman and Rafiqul Islam which is produced as the voter list of O.P.’s family.” 7. From the above, it is seen that one document i.e. Exhibit-E, a computer copy of Jamabandi which, however, was rejected by the Tribunal on the ground that name of the O.P. No.1 (the petitioner herein) which was recorded in the Serial No.22 thereof was found to be struck off and as such, the learned Tribunal held that it cannot be accepted as the Jamabandi of the petitioner. After rejection of the said document, the Tribunal proceeded to examine the plea of the petitioner. SUBMISSION OF THE PETITIONER : 8. Though the petitioner had stated in his deposition that the name of his father is Sadar Uddin and the name of his mother is Sahiran Nessa, the learned Tribunal could not find any link between the petitioner and his aforesaid named parents. SUBMISSION OF THE PETITIONER : 8. Though the petitioner had stated in his deposition that the name of his father is Sadar Uddin and the name of his mother is Sahiran Nessa, the learned Tribunal could not find any link between the petitioner and his aforesaid named parents. The reasons for doing so have been given by the Tribunal in its opinion as follows: (i) Firstly, it was observed by the learned Tribunal that the petitioner had stated in his deposition on 31.05.2017 that he was 65 years old. If that is so, his year of birth would be 1952 and accordingly, he ought to have got his voting right in the year 1973. Further, as per the deposition of the petitioner, his father was alive till 1997. Accordingly, it was observed by the Tribunal that the name of the petitioner along with his father ought to have been included in the voters lists of 1978, 1979, 1983, 1985, 1991 and 1996 respectively. However, the said voters lists were not produced. Thus, the learned Tribunal held that the petitioner had failed to establish the link with his projected father. It has been further observed by the Tribunal that though the petitioner had produced the Exhibit-G & H i.e. the voters lists of 1965 & 1970 respectively, containing the name of Sadar Uddin as a resident of Bhajakhaiti Pather, whom the petitioner claims to be his father, yet these two documents are not the documents of his own father. (ii) Secondly, the learned Tribunal also observed that the petitioner himself had stated that he was born in Bhajakhaiti Gaon but in the voters lists of 1965 and 1970 relied upon by the petitioner as the documents of his father, learned Tribunal then observed that his father’s name is found in the voters lists of Vill-Bhajakhaiti Pather. Since, it is on record that Bhajakhaiti Gaon and Bhajakhaiti Pather are two different villages, if the petitioner was born in Bhajakhaiti Gaon, the name of the petitioner’s father could not have appeared in the voters list of Bhajakhaiti Pather. (iii) Thirdly, the Tribunal also observed that his neighbour, who was examined as D.W.3, in his deposition had stated that the petitioner was born in Bhajakhaiti Pather, though the petitioner himself had stated that the petitioner was born in Bhajakhaiti Gaon. Thus, clearly there is a contradiction. 9. (iii) Thirdly, the Tribunal also observed that his neighbour, who was examined as D.W.3, in his deposition had stated that the petitioner was born in Bhajakhaiti Pather, though the petitioner himself had stated that the petitioner was born in Bhajakhaiti Gaon. Thus, clearly there is a contradiction. 9. In view of the above 3 reasons, the Tribunal opined that the petitioner had failed to establish his link with his projected father and mother and declared the petitioner a foreigner of 25.03.1971 stream. 10. As regards the aforesaid observations and conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal, Mr. Z. Hussain, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the rejection of the copy of the Jamabandi document, relied upon by the petitioner, merely on the ground that the name of the petitioner was struck off from the said document cannot be said to be proper. According to him, striking off the name of the petitioner from the Jamabandi may be because he had sold his share of land and as such, in revenue receits the name of a person who transfers his share of the land by way of sale or gift deed cannot be retained and his name will be shown as struck off. Mr. Z. Hussain further submits that once the name is recorded in the Jamabandi whether it was in the form of struck off or not it does not matter. What does matter is that the name of the petitioner was entered in the Jamabandi at one point of time as a legal heir of Sodu Sheikh, whom the petitioner claims to be his father. Thus, the learned Tribunal had made an error by rejecting the relevant document to show his linkage with his father and as such, the opinion of the Tribunal can be set aside on this ground only. 11. Coming to the other two grounds whereby the learned Tribunal held that the petitioner had failed to prove his linkage with his projected father, it has been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner’s father Sadar Uddin was also known as Sodu Sheikh, which is clearly evident from the records. It has been submitted by Mr. Hussain that in the voters list of 1965 the name of the father was shown as Sadarudin, son of Bedu Sheikh, resident of village-Bhajakhaity Pather. It has been submitted by Mr. Hussain that in the voters list of 1965 the name of the father was shown as Sadarudin, son of Bedu Sheikh, resident of village-Bhajakhaity Pather. Similarly, in the 1970 voters list, the name of the petitioner’s father was also shown as Sadarudin, son of Bedu Sheikh. In the 1975 Electoral list, the name of the petitioner’s father was again shown as Sadaruddin and Sadar and the petitioner’s brother A. Hakim was shown to be son of Sadar. Therefore, the aforesaid voters lists clearly indicate that the names Sadaruddin and Sadar refer to the one and the same person. Subsequently, in the Electoral Rolls of 1989 and 2005, the name of the petitioner’s father was recorded as Sodu Sheikh against the name of the petitioner and his brother A. Hakim. Therefore, the fact that Sadu Sheikh and Sadarudin are one and the same person stands established. 12. Similarly, learned counsel for the petitioner has also drawn attention of this Court to the Jamabandi where the name of the petitioner’s father has been recorded as Sodu Sheikh, son of Bedu Sheikh which corresponds to the entry of voters lists of 1965 and 1970. As such, there cannot be any doubt that Sodu Sheikh and Sadarudin are the names of one and the same person, who is the father of the petitioner. As such, learned Tribunal has made an error in appreciating the evidences. 13. As regards the alleged discrepancies in the names of the villages of the petitioner in his deposition and other records are concerned, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that Bhajakhaity Gaon and Bhajakhaity Pather both are sharing same boundaries and as such, though Bhajakhaity Gaon and Bhajakhaity Pather are two different villages but there can be confusion at the time of making deposition as they are adjacent villages as mentioned above and as such, this minor discrepancy ought to have been ignored by the Tribunal. However, the Tribunal over-emphasised this discrepancy by rejecting the claim of the petitioner that he was born in Bhajakhaity Pather, though he had mistakenly stated so in his deposition that he was born in Bhajakhaity Gaon. The fact that he was born in Bhajakhaity Pather has been testified by his neighbour D.W.3, who had clearly stated that the petitioner was born in Bhajakhaity Pather. The fact that he was born in Bhajakhaity Pather has been testified by his neighbour D.W.3, who had clearly stated that the petitioner was born in Bhajakhaity Pather. Accordingly, it has been submitted that the opinion rendered by the Tribunal suffers from material inconsistency and deserves interference. 14. In support of his submission, Mr. Z. Hussain, learned counsel for the petitioner, referred to the following decisions : (i) Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on para Nos.6 and 9 of the decision of this Court in Abdul Khalique (Md.) vs. Union of India and Ors., 2013 (1) GLT 941. Para Nos.6 and 9 of the aforesaid order in Abdul Kahlique (Md) (supra) reads as follows, “(6) It has been contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that it is evident from the deposition of witness Nos.1, 2 and 3 as well as Exhibit ’ka’, voter’s list that Abdul Wahab was the grandfather of the appellant, who was a voter in respect of Samaguri Legislative Assembly Constituency, whose name appeared in the voter list pertaining to the year 1965, and hence, according to the learned counsel, the tribunal ought not to have opine that the petitioner is not an Indian, more so when the positive statement of the appellant and his witnesses have not been challenged by the State by way of cross examination.” (9) The appellant in his deposition, in categorical term, has stated that his grandfather’s name is Abdul Wahab whose name appears in the voter’s list of the year 1965 pertaining to Samaguri legislative Assembly constituency. The witness Nos.2 and 3, namely, the Gaonbura and the villagers of Dijubasti village has p roved the said voter’s list, which is marked as Exhibit ’ka’. Witness No.3 has also stated that Abdul Wahab is the grandfather of the appellant. Such statements of witnesses have not been challenged by the State by way of cross examination. Witness No.2, the Gaonbura of Dijulibasti however, has stated that though the name of one Abdul Wahab appears in the voter’s list of 1965 pertaining to Samaguri Legislative Assembly Constituency, he, however, does not know who is Abdul Wahab and whether he is the grandfather of the appellant. Witness No.2, the Gaonbura of Dijulibasti however, has stated that though the name of one Abdul Wahab appears in the voter’s list of 1965 pertaining to Samaguri Legislative Assembly Constituency, he, however, does not know who is Abdul Wahab and whether he is the grandfather of the appellant. Witness Nos.1 and 3 having categorically stated that Abdul Wahab is the grandfather of the appellant, such evidence of witness No.2 would demolish the case of the appellant as revealed from the evidence adduced by him, more so, when there was no cross examination of any of the witnesses examined.” 15. In Abdul Khalique (supra), it has been mentioned that if the positive statement made by the petitioner was not challenged by the State in course of cross-examination, no doubt could have been cast. Accordingly, no doubt can be raised in striking off the name of the petitioner from the Jamabandi and merely striking off the name from the Jamabandi does not render the said evidence irrelevant. ‘16. Referring to para-14 of the decision in Jaswant Singh vs. Gurdev Singh & Ors., (2012) 1 SCC 425 , learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the certified copy of the public document is an evidence without requiring it to prove the same by adducing oral evidence in support of such document. Para No.14 of the aforesaid decision in Jaswant Singh (supra) reads as follows, “14. We have already noted that the appellant Jaswant Singh has not challenged the genuineness of certified copy in any manner. Although the record of the Court has been proved to be burnt in a fire in the Judicial Record Room., Hoshiarpur on 16-6-1998, but the certified copy of the compromise (Ext.D-3), which is the part of the decree was obtained from the record room on 24-8-1998 and the decree, Ext. D-4 was got issued on 12-9-1984. In those circumstances, there is no reason to doubt the authenticity of compromise (Ext.D-3). Even otherwise, as rightly observed by the courts below, the appellant Jaswant Singh had not filed any other substitute of the document, Ext.D-3, on the basis of which the decree (Ext.D-4) had been said to be passed. D-4 was got issued on 12-9-1984. In those circumstances, there is no reason to doubt the authenticity of compromise (Ext.D-3). Even otherwise, as rightly observed by the courts below, the appellant Jaswant Singh had not filed any other substitute of the document, Ext.D-3, on the basis of which the decree (Ext.D-4) had been said to be passed. As stated earlier, in view of the fact that the decree dated 8-12-1972 clearly says that the suit is partly decreed in favour of the plaintiff as per the terms of the compromise placed on file, there can be no other way to interpret the decree except in terms and conditions of the compromise (Ext.D-3).” 17. Learned counsel for the petitioner accordingly, submits that in the present case, the Jamanbandi copy i.e. the Exhibit-E ought not have been rejected by the learned Tribunal in the manner which otherwise conclusively shows the linkage between the petitioner and his father and it is immaterial that whether the petitioner is the actual owner of the said property or not. 18. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on para-20 of R.E. Venkatachala Gounder vs. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami & V.P. Temple & Ors , (2003) 8 SCC 752 wherein it has been clearly mentioned that the objection to any document to the admissibility of evidence should be taken only when it is tendered and not in the subsequent stage. It has been submitted that in the present case, what is seen is that though there was no objection to any of the documents when tendered, the learned Tribunal found faults with some of the documents which is not permissible. Para 20 of R.E. Venkatachala Gounder (supra) reads as follows, 20. The learned counsel for the defendant-respondent has relied on The Roman Catholic Mission Vs. The State of Madras & Anr. in support of his submission that a document not admissible in evidence, though brought on record, has to be excluded from consideration. We do not have any dispute with the proposition of law so laid down in the abovesaid case. However, the present one is a case which calls for the correct position of law being made precise. Ordinarily an objection to the admissibility of evidence should be taken when it is tendered and not subsequently. We do not have any dispute with the proposition of law so laid down in the abovesaid case. However, the present one is a case which calls for the correct position of law being made precise. Ordinarily an objection to the admissibility of evidence should be taken when it is tendered and not subsequently. The objections as to admissibility of documents in evidence may be classified into two classes:- (i) an objection that the document which is sought to be proved is itself inadmissible in evidence; and (ii) where the objection does not dispute the admissibility of the document in evidence but is directed towards the mode of proof alleging the same to be irregular or insufficient. In the first case, merely because a document has been marked as 'an exhibit', an objection as to its admissibility is not excluded and is available to be raised even at a later stage or even in appeal or revision. In the latter case, the objection should be taken before the evidence is tendered and once the document has been admitted in evidence and marked as an exhibit, the objection that it should not have been admitted in evidence or that the mode adopted for proving the document is irregular cannot be allowed to be raised at any stage subsequent to the marking of the document as an exhibit. The later proposition is a rule of fair play. The crucial test is whether an objection, if taken at the appropriate point of time, would have enabled the party tendering the evidence to cure the defect and resort to such mode of proof as would be regular. The omission to object becomes fatal because by his failure the party entitled to object allows the party tendering the evidence to act on an assumption that the opposite party is not serious about the mode of proof. The omission to object becomes fatal because by his failure the party entitled to object allows the party tendering the evidence to act on an assumption that the opposite party is not serious about the mode of proof. On the other hand, a prompt objection does not prejudice the party tendering the evidence, for two reasons: firstly, it enables the Court to apply its mind and pronounce its decision on the question of admissibility then and there; and secondly, in the event of finding of the Court on the mode of proof sought to be adopted going against the party tendering the evidence, the opportunity of seeking indulgence of the Court for permitting a regular mode or method of proof and thereby removing the objection raised by the opposite party, is available to the party leading the evidence. Such practice and procedure is fair to both the parties. Out of the two types of objections, referred to hereinabove, in the later case, failure to raise a prompt and timely objection amounts to waiver of the necessity for insisting on formal proof of a document, the document itself which is sought to be proved being admissible in evidence. In the first case, acquiescence would be no bar to raising the objection in superior Court. 19. Learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to para 46 of Mahesh Dattatray Thirthkar vs. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 11 SCC 141 wherein it has been mentioned that minor discrepancies and inconsistency ought to be ignored specially when the burden of proof is by way of preponderance of probability. Para 46 of Mahesh Dattatray Thirthkar (supra) reads as follows, 46. Coming to the findings of the High Court regarding the inconsistency and infirmity in the testimony of the witnesses produced by the appellant for examination, it is emphasized that the burden of proof in civil cases is that of "balance of probability" and not that of "beyond reasonable doubt". Thus minor inconsistencies in evidence are not relevant in civil cases in considering the question of discharge of this burden. This principle has been reiterated by this Court in a number of decisions namely Sarjudas V. State of Gujarat ( AIR 2000 SC 403 ) and State of Rajasthan v. Netrapal & Ors. ( (2007) 4 SCC 45 )” 20. Thus minor inconsistencies in evidence are not relevant in civil cases in considering the question of discharge of this burden. This principle has been reiterated by this Court in a number of decisions namely Sarjudas V. State of Gujarat ( AIR 2000 SC 403 ) and State of Rajasthan v. Netrapal & Ors. ( (2007) 4 SCC 45 )” 20. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that no proper enquiry was held before the reference was made. In fact, the authorities never visited the petitioner or his family to ascertain about the citizenship and nor asked for any documents which were readily available with them and the Inquiry Report which has been brought on record was held behind the back of petitioner and accordingly, it has been submitted that since no proper enquiry was held, the reference is bad in law so is the opinion of the learned Tribunal. SUBMISSION BY THE STATE : 21. Mr. J. Payeng, learned Special Counsel, Foreigners Tribunal, in rebuttal, has submitted that perusal of the written statement would clearly show that though the petitioner referred to certain voters lists, nowhere he has given his details of the date of birth, place of birth, name of his parents, their place of birth and citizenship which are required as observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sarbananda Sonowal Vs. Union of Indian & Anr. reported in (2005) 5 SCC 665 . Relevant portion of the aforesaid decision in Sarbananda Sonowal (supra), is extracted hereinbelow:- “26. There is good and sound reason for placing the burden of proof upon the person concerned who asserts to be a citizen of a particular country. In order to establish one's citizenship, normally he may be required to give evidence of (i) his date of birth (ii) place of birth (iii) name of his parents (iv) their place of birth and citizenship. Sometimes the place of birth of his grandparents may also be relevant like under Section 6-A(1)(d) of the Citizenship Act. All these facts would necessarily be within the personal knowledge of the person concerned and not of the authorities of the State. After he has given evidence on these points, the State authorities can verify the facts and can then lead evidence in rebuttal, if necessary. All these facts would necessarily be within the personal knowledge of the person concerned and not of the authorities of the State. After he has given evidence on these points, the State authorities can verify the facts and can then lead evidence in rebuttal, if necessary. If the State authorities dispute the claim of citizenship by a person and assert that he is a foreigner, it will not only be difficult but almost impossible for them to first lead evidence on the aforesaid points. This is in accordance with the underlying policy of Section 106 of the Evidence Act which says that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.” 22. It has been accordingly submitted that, as the pleadings being devoid of material particulars, cannot be relied upon. Apart from that Mr. Payeng has submitted that there have been material inconsistencies in the evidence adduced by the petitioner as regards the name of the petitioner's father as well as the age and also the place of birth of the petitioner, as discussed above. He submits that it is on record that the aforesaid two villages, namely, Bhajakhaity Pather and Bhajakhaity Gaon are different, yet the petitioner could not name the village of his birth correctly. Further, it has been also submitted that the crucial document i.e. the Jamabandi of which the petitioner has placed much reliance was exhibited not by him but by a third person, a stranger, though a neighbour. Normally it is the petitioner who should adduce documents and evidences himself on which he places reliance and cannot be adduced by any other witness. Further, it has been also submitted that the petitioner has miserably failed to establish the link between himself and his projected father. 23. In this regard, Mr. Payeng has submitted that from his own evidence of the petitioner as well as the deposition of DW-3 recorded in 2017 it was claimed that that the petitioner's father died about 20 years ago, in which event, he would have been alive till about 1997. If the petitioner's father had been alive till 1997, there is no reason why the petitioner has not submitted any voters' list which shows the petitioner's father as an elector. 24. Mr. If the petitioner's father had been alive till 1997, there is no reason why the petitioner has not submitted any voters' list which shows the petitioner's father as an elector. 24. Mr. Payeng, learned counsel for the State submitted that the evidence of DW-3 is not at all reliable for the reason that he is not a resident of either of the Bhajakhaity Pather village or Bhajakhaity Gaon but a resident of Barchapari. 25. Under the circumstances, Mr. Payeng wonders how the DW3 would know when the petitioner was born or about his particulars. In fact, in the cross-examination of the said DW3, it came out very clearly that he did not know when Jainal married. He also did not know the name of Jainal's mother. He also did not know when his mother expired. Thus, DW-3 does not appear to know the particulars of the petitioner, he is supposed to know as a neighbour. According to Mr. Payeng, in the cross-examination of DW3, his credibility has been clearly demolished. Further, it has been also submitted that the Jamabandi copy clearly mentions that by an order passed on 09.02.1975 by the SDC certain changes were made. But nothing has been brought on record by the petitioner of any such changes. 26. Mr. Payeng submits that it has been also admitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that striking of a name from the entries in the Jamabandi would arise on the death of a person or when the same is sold out. If the striking of the name occurred sometimes in 1975, it would show that the petitioner's father would have died before 1975. On the other hand, as per the oral testimony, the petitioner had stated that his father died about 20 years ago when he made the statement in 2017. Thus, there is clear discrepancy. 27. It has been further submitted that in the aforesaid Jamabandi, the land is shown to be located in village Tatikata Pather, which is neither in Bhajakhaity Gaon or in Bhajakhaity Pather nor in Barchapari, any of the three villages of which the petitioner was referring to. Thus, the land is located in a different location of which the petitioner has no relation which clearly indicates that the land does not belong to him, and in fact, the land belongs to somebody else and not to the projected father. 28. Mr. Thus, the land is located in a different location of which the petitioner has no relation which clearly indicates that the land does not belong to him, and in fact, the land belongs to somebody else and not to the projected father. 28. Mr. Payeng accordingly has submitted that since the name of the petitioner was found struck of from the Jamabandi, the said document can be of no assistance to him as he cannot be said to be the owner of any land which he was claiming to be. 29. Mr. Payeng also submitted that assuming that the petitioner's father and mother had survived up to 1997, their names ought to have been included in the voters list up to 1997. However, the petitioner has not submitted any voters list except the 1966 and 1970, whereby the names of his parents are shown along with the petitioner. Therefore, absence of the names of the petitioner’s father and mother as electors in the voters' list other than 1966 and 1970 would clearly throw a doubt on the identity of the projected parents of the petitioner. 30. Mr. Payeng also has submitted that all the submissions advanced before the Tribunal or before this Court should be based on the pleadings. The pleadings however do not mention any of the submissions so advanced. The silence of the petitioner on the issues which have been raised before this Court is deliberate to enable the petitioner to improve upon his case at the time of hearing as otherwise there was no difficulty on the part of the petitioner to state all these facts in the written statement. 31. Thus, it has been submitted by Mr. Payeng, learned counsel for the State that no clear and conclusive proof linking the petitioner with his parents had been adduced by the petitioner and as such, it cannot be said that the petitioner is the son of the projected father. 32. Mr. Payeng, learned counsel for the State submits that merely executing the certified copy of the Jamabandi will not serve any purpose unless the correctness of the entries made in the Jamabandi are proved in accordance with law. 33. Mr. Payeng submits that it has been held by this Court in Monowara Bewa @ Manora Bewa Vs. Union of India & Ors. 33. Mr. Payeng submits that it has been held by this Court in Monowara Bewa @ Manora Bewa Vs. Union of India & Ors. [WP(C) No.2634/2016, disposed of on 28.02.2017] that entries in the copy of the Jamabandi are prepared after fiscal inquiries and the entry in the copy of Jamabandi has to be examined on the probative value of the contents of the documents which require corroboration with other documentary evidences. 34. It has been further submitted that in the present case, no documentary evidence had been adduced to corroborate any of the entries made in the Jamabandi except for oral evidence and as such, it cannot be said that the entry in the copy of Jamabandi is admissible in law. 35. Mr. Payeng, learned counsel for the State relying on the decision of this Court in the State of Assam & Anr. Vs. Ohab Ali, [WP(C) No. 2641/2017, disposed of on 29.05.2018], has submitted that the petitioner has to prove his case by adducing credible, relevant, admissible evidence and only when he has discharged that burden, the question of rebuttal of evidence by the State would arise. In the present case, it has been submitted that no such evidence has been adduced by the petitioner which would require rebuttal by the State Government. 36. Relying on the aforesaid decision, Mr. Payeng also submits that the burden is always on the proceedee under Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, 1946 and it never shifts to the State and as such, the onus is entirely on the petitioner to discharge the said burden of proof. Accordingly, it has been submitted that the opinion rendered by the Tribunal does not warrant any interference by this Court and as such the petition is liable to be rejected. REPLY BY THE PETITIONER : 37. Mr. Hussain, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that much significance may not be attached to the alleged discrepancy as regards the time of death of the petitioner's father as mentioned in the oral testimony. The petitioner is an illiterate villager who would testify about certain incident by way of approximation and he does not have exact knowledge of the specific dates and time and accordingly, the statement of the petitioner that his father died about 20 years before will be mere approximation and cannot be literally taken. The petitioner is an illiterate villager who would testify about certain incident by way of approximation and he does not have exact knowledge of the specific dates and time and accordingly, the statement of the petitioner that his father died about 20 years before will be mere approximation and cannot be literally taken. The fact remains that it is on record that the petitioner's father when it was last recorded was about 70 years in the 1970 voters list and as such, being an old, non-reflection of the name of the petitioner or petitioner's father independently as electors in the subsequent voters list cannot cast any doubt on their existence to prove the fact that Sodu Sheikh was his father. 38. It has been also submitted that in spite of the discrepancy in the oral evidence, the documentary evidences are clear about the relationship of the petitioner with his father and also about his possession of certain land at the relevant time through the Jamabandi. These are all documentary evidences which would clearly indicate the link of the petitioner with his projected father. Accordingly, it has been submitted that there are many documentary evidences from which it can be said that the petitioner has been able to establish that the petitioner is a citizen of this country. 39. However, before we examine the rival contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, we would like to examine the reasons given by the learned Tribunal in coming to the conclusion that the petitioner is a foreigner of post 25.03.1971 stream. 40. The learned Tribunal held that though the petitioner stated in his deposition that the name of his father is Sadar Uddin and the name of his mother is Sahiran Nessa, yet, the learned Tribunal did not find any link between the petitioner and the aforesaid projected parents. For the following reasons as given in the opinion, “1) The O.P. No-1 said in his deposition on 31/05/2017 that he is 65 years old. If that be so, the year of birth of O.P. No-1 is 1952 and as such he should have got his first voting right in 1973. On the other hand, on the basis of the version of the O.P. No-1 it is found that his father was alive till 1997. If that be so, the year of birth of O.P. No-1 is 1952 and as such he should have got his first voting right in 1973. On the other hand, on the basis of the version of the O.P. No-1 it is found that his father was alive till 1997. As such his name should have enlisted as voters together with his father in the voter lists of 1978, 1979, 1983, 1985, 1991 and in 1996. But, the O.P. No-1 has failed to produce any such voter list having his name been enlisted together with his father Sadar Uddin. Consequently, the O.P. has failed to establish his link with his projected father named Sadar Uddin. Although, the O.P. has produced the Ext-(G) and Ext-(E) i.e. the voter lists of 1965 and 1970 respectively containing the name of Sadar Uddin of Vill-Bhajakhaiti Pather whom the O.P. has projected as his father. Yet, this two documents are not the document of his own father. 2) The O.P. No-1 has said himself that he was born in Vill-Bhajakhaiti Gaon. But, the voter list of 1965 and 1970 produced as the documents of the father of O.P. No-1 is found to be the voter lists of Vill-Bhajakhaiti Pather. It is well known to the Tribunal that, Bhajakhaiti Gaon and Bhajakhaiti Pather are two different revenue village. If the O.P. No-1 was born in Vill-Bhajakhaiti Gaon how can his father name be there in voter list of Vill-Bhajakhaiti Pather. 3) Although, the D.W.-3 has said in deposition that the O.P. No-1 was born in Vill-Bhajakhaiti Pather, yet, his statement is falls as because the O.P. himself had said in deposition that, he was born in Vill-Bhajakhaiti Gaon.” 41. Further, the learned Tribunal held that since the petitioner stated in his deposition on 31.05.2017 that he is 65 years old in which event, the year of birth of the petitioner will be 1952 and as such he would have got his voting right in 1973. Since the petitioner stated that his father was alive till 1997, his name could have been enlisted along with his father in the voters list of 1978, 1979, 1983, 1985, 1991 and in 1996 but the petitioner failed to produce any voters list along with his father. Thus, it was held that the O.P. (petitioner) failed to establish his linkage with the said projected father. 42. Thus, it was held that the O.P. (petitioner) failed to establish his linkage with the said projected father. 42. We are unable to agree to the aforesaid proposition for the reason that no single document could be picked up to show that the aforesaid document in itself is sufficient to establish the linkage between the proceedee and the projected parents. That has to be assessed in conjunction with other evide nces adduced by the proceedee. 43. In our view, though the petitioner could have produced more Electoral Rolls showing his name along with his father that could have strengthened his case. Nevertheless, merely because he did not produce any Electoral Roll showing his name and the name of the projected father together in the same Electoral Roll cannot be the reason to reject the claim of the petitioner. Further, the observation by the Tribunal that voters lists of 1965 and 1970 are not documents of his own father is not correct. We fail to understand how the learned Tribunal could have come to the conclusion that the voters lists of 1965 and 1970 respectively containing the names of Sadaruddin of village Bhajakhaity Pather who the petitioner has projected as his father are not the documents of his own father. The aforesaid conclusion arrived at by the learned Tribunal appears to be contrary to the record. In the voters lists of 1965 and 1970, the name of Sadarudin, son of Bedu Shek, who the petitioner claims to be his father appears in respect of Bhajakhaity Pather under Lahorighat Police Station with Moirabari Mouza under the then 84 No. Lahorighat Legislative Assembly Constituency. Similarly, the name of the father appears in the voters list of 1970. 44. In the voters list of 1975, though it is in respect of 83 Dhing Legislative Assembly Constituency which is perhaps due to change of delimination, the name of the Village, Mouza, police Station remained same i.e. Bhajakhaity Pather, Moirabari Mouza and Lahorighat Police Station respectively. The name of the petitioner appeared as “Jainal Uddin” in the Electoral Roll of 1975 in respect of same village Bhajakhaity Pather in which the name of the petitioner’s father appeared as “Sadaruddin”. The name of the petitioner appeared as “Jainal Uddin” in the Electoral Roll of 1975 in respect of same village Bhajakhaity Pather in which the name of the petitioner’s father appeared as “Sadaruddin”. Therefore, the electoral rolls of 1965 and 1970 could not have been rejected merely on the ground that the petitioner did not file other voters list of 1978, 1979, 1983, 1985, 1991 and 1996 along with his father. 45. Learned Tribunal also appeared to have laid great emphasis on the difference in the name of Village Bhajakhaity Gaon and Bhajakhaity Pather, which are stated to be different villages. Learned Tribunal held that if the petitioner was from Village Bhajakhaity Gaon, how can his father’s name be there in the voters list of Bhajakhatity Pather. 46. We have noted the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that though Bhajakhaity Gaon and Bhajakhaity Pather are stated to be two different villages, these are contiguous villages and the villagers sometimes use it interchangeably. It is not the case that these two villages are located in two different locations in different districts far away from each other. If these villages are contiguous and if the petitioner claims that he was born in Bhajakhaity Gaon, and as per the voters list, house is shown in Bhajakhaity Pather, it cannot be said to be an impossibility being contiguous villages. 47. It may be noted that in the electoral roll of 1975, the name of the petitioner is shown as a resident of village Bhajakhaity Pather under Lahorighat Police Station and Moirabari Mouza. Similarly, the name of the petitioner’s projected father Sadaruddin, a resident of village Bhajakhaity Pather was shown in the Electoral Rolls of 1965 and 1970 respectively. It appears from the records that the revenue name of the village is Bhajakhaity Pather and it is also known as Bhajakhaity Gaon. It is not the case of anybody that these are differently located villages. It would be possible to use it interchangeably. In fact, DW3 who is a neighbour to the petitioner stated that the petitioner was born in Bhajakhaity Pather and later on he came to Borchapari village. From the above, it appears that the people had been using Bhajakhaity Pather with Bhajakhaity Gaon interchangeably. 48. It would be possible to use it interchangeably. In fact, DW3 who is a neighbour to the petitioner stated that the petitioner was born in Bhajakhaity Pather and later on he came to Borchapari village. From the above, it appears that the people had been using Bhajakhaity Pather with Bhajakhaity Gaon interchangeably. 48. Thus, merely because of the failure to appropriately explain the difference between Bhajakhaity Pather and Bhajakhaity Gaon which are contiguous villages, all the documents relied on by the petitioner in which the name of his projected father appears in Bhajakhaity Pather cannot be ignored. 49. Accordingly, we are of the view that the learned Tribunal is required to re-examine the issue by taking into consideration the explanation offered by the petitioner about the discrepancy and pass a fresh opinion as regards the citizenship status of the petitioner. 50. Under the circumstances, we remand the matter to the Foreigners Tribunal-5th, Morigaon, Assam for re-consideration and for passing a fresh opinion by properly appreciating the evidences on record in the light of the observations and discussions made above. 51. Accordingly, the present petition is allowed by setting aside the impugned opinion dated 22.09.2017 passed by the learned Foreigners Tribunal 5th, Morigaon, Assam in Case No.F.T.(C) 179/2016 (New Number) [F.T.(C) 2051/2022 (Old Number), IM(D)T Case No.441/2000 dt.29.12.2000] as regards the citizenship status of the petitioner. 52. Petitioner will appear before the learned Foreigners Tribunal-5th, Morigaon within a period of 1(one) month from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. The learned Tribunal after hearing the petitioner and after re-appreciation of evidences on record will pass a fresh opinion as regards the citizenship status of the petitioner. 53. Petitioner will continue to remain on bail on similar terms and conditions as directed by this Court vide order dated 20.11.2017 till a fresh opinion is rendered by the learned Foreigners Tribunal-5, Morigaon, Assam as regards the citizenship status of the petitioner, Md. Jainul Uddin @ Jainal Abdin. 54. The present petition is, accordingly, disposed of. 55. LCR be remitted forthwith to the concerned Foreigners Tribunal.