JUDGMENT : SHAJI P. CHALY, J. 1. This writ petition is filed by the petitioner society seeking a direction to quash Ext.P1, P1(a) and P6(a) demand notices/intimation issued by the Secretary of the Payyannur Municipality, the first respondent, directing the petitioner to pay property tax from 01.10.1998 in accordance with the decision taken by the Finance Standing Committee; for a declaration that the Secretary of the Municipality has no power to enhance/refix and demand property tax which was once assessed, concluded and demanded by the competent Municipal Council and received from the petitioner; and to further declare that Ext.P1 and P1(a) are barred by law of limitation prescribed under Section 539 of the Kerala Municipality Act, 1994 (Act, 1994 for short). 2. Brief material facts for the disposal of the writ petition are as follows: The petitioner was paying half yearly property tax as assessed by the competent Municipal Council of the second respondent Municipality against an auditorium building bearing door No. PMC/XXIII/483A. According to the petitioner, it purchased the building in the year 2010 and till such time tax was being paid by the owner of the property and from 2010 onwards, the petitioner was paying tax at the rate assessed under Chapter XIV of the Act, 1994. 3. It is further submitted that abruptly, the Secretary of the Municipality issued Ext.P1 notice and P1(a) special notice informing the petitioner that the tax was enhanced to Rs. 17,640/- on the basis of a vigilance report dated 06.10.2012 and insisted it to pay the same retrospectively for a period of 15 years. 4. The contention put forth by the petitioner is that only the Municipal Council is vested with powers to assess, or enhance, or re-fix, or impose the property tax. However, it is evident from Ext.P1 and P1(a) notices that the first respondent enhanced and re-fixed the property tax which was once assessed by the competent Municipal Council. Therefore, according to the petitioner, the demand raised as per Ext.P1(a) special notice itself is bad. It is also contended that tax once assessed and concluded by the Council and received on the basis of the demand cannot be revised unilaterally by the Secretary of the Municipality. Therefore, according to the petitioner, the demand raised as per Ext.P1(a) special notice itself is bad. It is also contended that tax once assessed and concluded by the Council and received on the basis of the demand cannot be revised unilaterally by the Secretary of the Municipality. Therefore, the sum and substance of the contention is that the amount required to be paid as per Ext.P1 notice and Ext.P1(a) special notice will not come under the terminology ‘property tax’ as the same is not assessed by the Council under Chapter XIV of the Act, 1994. 5. That apart, it is pointed out that the demand is enhanced from Rs. 1,422/- to Rs. 17,640/- and that too after 15 years. Therefore, according to the petitioner, any demand beyond the period of three years is bad under Section 539 of the Act, 1994. 6. The Secretary and the Municipality have filed a joint counter affidavit refuting the allegations and the claims and demands raised by the petitioner. 7. The basic contention advanced is that the writ petition is not maintainable, since there is an alternative remedy available to the petitioner by filing a revision before the Tribunal for Local Self Government Institutions. That apart, it is submitted that the Secretary has not enhanced the tax in an arbitrary manner; but notice was issued enhancing the tax, since the Vigilance and Anti Corruption Department conducted an inspection and found that the tax levied on the building is less and accordingly, directed to reconsider the same taking into account the renovation done in the auditorium. Accordingly, it is submitted that the demand was raised under special circumstances and therefore, the limitation prescribed under Section 539 of Act, 1994 would not come into play, and the contentions advanced by the petitioner in that regard cannot be sustained under law. 8. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner Sri M.V. Amaresan and the learned counsel for the Municipality Sri. M. Sasindran and perused the pleadings and material on record. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned Standing Counsel for the Municipality have addressed their arguments in accordance with the contentions deliberated above. 10. 8. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner Sri M.V. Amaresan and the learned counsel for the Municipality Sri. M. Sasindran and perused the pleadings and material on record. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned Standing Counsel for the Municipality have addressed their arguments in accordance with the contentions deliberated above. 10. The issue revolves around the revision of property tax made by the Secretary of the Municipality from the year 1998 onwards as per Ext.P1 notice dated 28.02.2013 and Ext.P1(a) special notice raising demand for property tax dated nil. 11. On a reading of the said notice, it is quite clear and evident that the tax is demanded for the building in question from October, 1998 in the year 2013. Even though the petitioner has submitted an appeal before the Finance Standing Committee, the same was dismissed as per Ext.P6(a) order dated 22.09.2014 stating that the property tax revised is reasonable and fair. 12. The first question emerges for consideration is whether the Secretary of the Municipality is vested with powers to revise the property tax. The issue with respect to the imposition of property tax is guided by Chapter XIV of Act, 1994. As per Section 230 of the Act, 1994, the Municipality alone is vested with the power to levy property tax among other taxes and definitely not with the Secretary. 13. Section 231, as it stood prior to the amendment with effect from 07.10.2009, deals with resolution of council deciding to levy tax. Sub-Section (1) thereto specifies that any resolution of a Council determining to levy a tax shall specify the rate at which and the date from which any such tax shall be levied. 13. Section 231, as it stood prior to the amendment with effect from 07.10.2009, deals with resolution of council deciding to levy tax. Sub-Section (1) thereto specifies that any resolution of a Council determining to levy a tax shall specify the rate at which and the date from which any such tax shall be levied. Sub-Section (2) further shows that before passing a resolution imposing a tax for the first time or increasing the rate of an existing tax, the Municipality shall publish a notice in the Gazette, at least in one newspaper published in the language of the locality having wide circulation in the Municipality, on the notice board of the office of the Municipality and in such other places within the municipal area as may be specified by the Council and in any other manner as it may determine, of its intention, fix a reasonable period not being less than one month for submission of objections, and consider the objection if any, received within the period specified. 14. Therefore, on a conjoint reading of Sections 230(1) and 231(1) and 231(2), it is unequivocal that in order to revise a tax, a clear cut procedure is prescribed; however on a perusal of Ext.P1 notice, and Ext.P1(a) special demand notice, I find that the Secretary has decided to revise the tax on the basis of some instruction given by the Vigilance and Anti Corruption Bureau. It is also evident from Ext.P1 that except the letter of the Vigilance (D) Department (Thiruvananthapuram) bearing No. 9887/D1/2012/Vigilance dated 06.10.2012, no other aspects were considered by the Secretary of the Municipality before revising the tax. In the circumstances it can be seen that the Secretary has usurped the power of the Council to enhance the property tax with retrospective effect. Merely because vigilance has issued some direction, that would not confer any power on the Secretary to take up the role of the Municipal council and enhance the property tax. I also could not locate any provision under the Act, 1994 conferring power on the Council to delegate its powers to the Secretary. To put it short, on the directions issued by the Vigilance, there is no enabling power on the Secretary to overlook and transgress the powers conferred on an elected authority by the legislature under the Act, 1994. I also could not locate any provision under the Act, 1994 conferring power on the Council to delegate its powers to the Secretary. To put it short, on the directions issued by the Vigilance, there is no enabling power on the Secretary to overlook and transgress the powers conferred on an elected authority by the legislature under the Act, 1994. Therefore, on an appreciation of the facts and law discussed above, I have no hesitation to hold that the Secretary was not vested with any power to revise the existing property tax and raise a demand for the same, for the basic reason that only the Municipal Council is vested with powers to impose or revise the property tax and therefore, the demand is arbitrary and illegal liable to be interfered. 15. That apart, Section 539 of the Act, 1994 deals with limitation for recovery of dues. Sub-Section (1) thereto clearly states that no distraint shall be made, no suit shall be instituted and no prosecution shall be commenced in respect of any sum due to a Municipality under the Act after the expiration of a period of three years from the date on which distraint might first have been made, suit might first have been instituted, or prosecution might first have been commenced, as the case may be, in respect of such sum. 16. It is true, as per the proviso thereto, in the case of assessments made under Section 282 of Act, 1994, the said period of three years shall be computed from the date on which distraint might have been made, suit instituted, or prosecution commenced, after the assessment under the said Section shall have been made. 17. 16. It is true, as per the proviso thereto, in the case of assessments made under Section 282 of Act, 1994, the said period of three years shall be computed from the date on which distraint might have been made, suit instituted, or prosecution commenced, after the assessment under the said Section shall have been made. 17. Section 282 of Act, 1994, which deals with the power to assess in case of escape from assessment, specifies that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Act or the rules made thereunder, where for any reason a person liable to pay any tax or fees leviable under that Chapter has escaped assessment in any half-year, the Secretary may at any time within four years from the date on which such person should have been assessed, serve on him a notice assessing the tax or fee due and demanding payment thereof within fifteen days from the date of such service and thereupon, the provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder shall, so far as may be, apply as if the assessment was made in the half-year to which the tax or fee relates. 18. However, this is a case where there is no escape from the assessment of the property tax, but it is a question of revision of property tax. As I have pointed out above, in order to revise the property tax, only the Council is vested with powers. Therefore, the power exercised by the Secretary by issuing Ext.P1 and P1(a) notices cannot be said to be any action taken under Section 282 of the Act, 1994. In fact, sub-section (2) of Section 539 prescribes the manner in which the barred amounts are to be recovered, which clearly states that where any amount due to the Municipality has been barred by limitation under sub-section (1) due to the default of not taking steps at the appropriate time, and it is found in a lawful enquiry that it was lost due to the default of any officer or officers, the amount so lost to the Municipality shall be realised with twelve percent interest thereon from such officer or officers. 19. Taking into account the above factual and legal circumstances, I have no hesitation to hold that Exts.P1 and P1(a) notices are issued without any jurisdiction and authority. 19. Taking into account the above factual and legal circumstances, I have no hesitation to hold that Exts.P1 and P1(a) notices are issued without any jurisdiction and authority. It is also barred by limitation prescribed under Section 539 of the Act, 1994. Consequently, the order passed by the Finance Standing Committee at Ext.P6(a) decision dated 22.09.2014 also cannot be sustained under law. Accordingly, Exts.P1, P1(a) and P6 are quashed. 20. The Writ Petition is allowed.