JUDGMENT : The petitioner has filed this writ petition seeking to quash Exts. P4, P11, P14 and P16 demand notices and consequential orders passed by the Secretary of the Thiruvalla Municipality and the Finance Standing Committee directing him to pay the property tax; to declare that Section 234(2) of the Kerala Municipality Act, 1994 (substituted by the Kerala Municipality (Amendment) Act, 1999 and omitted later by the Kerala Municipality (Amendment) Act, 2009 as unconstitutional and void; to issue a writ of mandamus restraining respondents 1 to 3 from assessing or collecting property tax without authority of law in respect of the petitioner's building constructed vide permit No. BP No. 69/0405 comprised in resurvey No. 205/32 of Thiruvalla Municipality and located in ward No. 13 of the Thiruvalla Municipality; and a further writ of mandamus commanding respondents 1 to 3 to refund an amount of Rs.10,79,339 collected from the petitioner vide Ext. P5 series together with interest at the rate of 12%. 2. The material facts for the disposal of the writ petition are as follows : The petitioner is the co-owner of a commercial building having an extent of about 26,000 sq. feet located within the limits of the Thiruvalla Municipality, respondent No.1. He individually owns about 16,200 sq. feet out of the aforesaid total area. Earlier, the Secretary of the Municipality, the third respondent, issued several notices demanding payment of an amount of Rs.10,79,339 as property tax for a period of 4 years, as is evident from Ext. P5 series. 3. According to the petitioner, he remitted the said tax; however, the exorbitant and illegal demand was challenged by him by filing W.P.(C) Nos. 31173 of 2008 and 17758 of 2009 before this Court. The said writ petitions were disposed of by this Court as per Ext. P6 common judgment directing the Standing Committee for Finance, Thiruvalla Municipality, respondent No.2, to consider the appeals to be filed by the petitioner before them. Pursuant to the same, Exts.P7 and P12 appeals were filed. However, the second respondent, by a single line order, disposed of the said appeals as per Ext. P14 decision dated 24.01.2012, is the contention advanced by the petitioner. 4. It is also the case of the petitioner that as per Ext. P16, the annual property tax now fixed in respect of the portion of the property owned by the petitioner is Rs.2,51,064/. P14 decision dated 24.01.2012, is the contention advanced by the petitioner. 4. It is also the case of the petitioner that as per Ext. P16, the annual property tax now fixed in respect of the portion of the property owned by the petitioner is Rs.2,51,064/. The legal contentions advanced by the petitioner is that the respondents are legally bound to fix the property tax based on the annual value of building and such annual value is dependent on the actual rent received/receivable as per Sections 233 and 234 of the Act, 1994 as amended by the Act, 14 of 1999. It is further submitted that as per Ext. P8 deed, the petitioner rented out the entire portion of the building owned by him and the annual rent as on today is only Rs.4,83,000/-. But, while issuing Exts.P14 and P16, Ext. P8 lease deed executed by the petitioner with the tenant was not even considered. 5. It is further pointed out that as per Section 236 of the Act, 1994 (later omitted by the Kerala Municipality (Amendment) Act, 2009, taxes have to be uniform for similarly placed buildings. Whereas, Exts.P9 and P10 information and photographs would show that similarly placed buildings were assessed at much lower rates. It is further contended that Section 234(2) of the Act, 1994 stipulates that the property tax shall be assessed in the prescribed manner on the basis of the annual value of any buildings and the lands adjacent to it and that as per Section 234(4) of Act, 1994, the Government is mandated to make rules regarding the person by whom and the intervals at which the annual value of buildings, the deduction or addition in the tax to be made etc,, is to be determined and the procedure for the realisation of tax amount. Whereas, since no rules were framed in accordance with the stipulations, the entire procedure adopted by respondents 1 to 3 is unconstitutional, arbitrary and illegal. It is further contended that Section 234(2) of the Act, 1994 confers unguided and arbitrary power to impose tax on citizens without any proper guidelines or principles for imposition of tax and as such, the same is also unconstitutional and arbitrary. 6. The Thiruvalla Municipality, Standing Committee for Finance, and the Secretary of the Thiruvalla Municipality, respondent Nos. It is further contended that Section 234(2) of the Act, 1994 confers unguided and arbitrary power to impose tax on citizens without any proper guidelines or principles for imposition of tax and as such, the same is also unconstitutional and arbitrary. 6. The Thiruvalla Municipality, Standing Committee for Finance, and the Secretary of the Thiruvalla Municipality, respondent Nos. 1 to 3 respectively, have filed a joint counter affidavit refuting the allegations and the claims and demands raised by the petitioner and inter alia it is contended that the building in question bearing Nos. 279(5), (6), (7), (9), (10), (11) and (12) are situated in the heart of the city and it faces the Main Central Road (MC Road) and ThiruvallaKozhencherry road. Adjacent to the building, there are KSRTC bus stand, private bus stand, Government Offices and public sector banks, apart from the other textiles and jewellery shops. 7. It is also pointed out that even though the building was constructed on the basis of building permit No. BP69/0405 issued by the Secretary, the said building was an unauthorised construction. As per Ext. P1 interim order dated 25.11.2008 passed by this Court in W.P.(C) No. 31173 of 2008, the Secretary of the Municipality was directed to issue occupancy certificate and make regular assessment, of the building. In respect of the assessment already made by resorting to Section 242, the petitioner was directed to avail the appellate remedy. 8. The sum and substance of the contention advanced by the learned Standing Counsel is that the directions contained in Ext. P6 common judgment is binding upon the petitioner as well as the Municipality. That apart, as per the interim order, unauthorised construction was regularised by giving numbers 279(1) and 279(2) and Ext. P2 notice was issued fixing an annual tax of Rs.4,16,392/. It is also contended that as the tax demanded as per Ext. P2 notice was not remitted, Ext. P4 demand notice was issued. In Exhibit P5 series of demand notices, the total amount of tax would come to Rs.11,00,399/and the computation made by the petitioner at Rs.10,79,339/ was not correct. 9. It is further submitted that Ext. P16 was issued to the petitioner as per the decision of the Finance Standing Committee dated 24.01.2012 and a special notice dated 13.10.2009 was issued to the petitioner in respect of building Nos. 9. It is further submitted that Ext. P16 was issued to the petitioner as per the decision of the Finance Standing Committee dated 24.01.2012 and a special notice dated 13.10.2009 was issued to the petitioner in respect of building Nos. 279(1) to 279(12) except 279(8) and other buildings belonging to the petitioner and one Ansari. Thereafter, they submitted a petition dated 20.10.2009 before the then Secretary of the Municipality requesting for a further reduction of tax. The then Secretary, after personal hearing, has reduced the tax and refixed the same. However, the petitioner filed an appeal before the Standing Committee and the Standing Committee visited the building for redetermining the tax ultimately leading to Ext. P16 impugned order. 10. The case of the Municipality is that the tax has to be determined by way of computing the expected annual rental value. So much so, there was no justification for contending that the tax fixed is highly untenable. That apart, it is contended that if the occupancy certificate was issued to a new building, tax for the same has to be determined even if the building was lying vacant. For the purpose of fixation of tax of a building, several relevant inputs, such as the area where the building was situated, its plinth area, category of the building, availability of road facility, materials used for construction, air conditioning etc. have to be taken into account. In regard to the description of tax assessment of one Deepa Tower in Ext. P9, it is stated that the said building was constructed as per the building permit No. BP99/9495 with tax liability that commenced from the second half of the year 19981999. The said building was demolished and reconstructed on 19.05.2008 as per building permit No. BP815/0304 and tax of the said building was assessed from the first half of the assessment year 20082009. The plinth area of the said building would come to 5857 sq. meter and the tax was fixed at Rs. 8,34,743/. 11. It is pointed out that the petitioner has produced the photograph of the new Deepa Tower building (Ext. P10(c) and the tax assessed for the old building (Ext. P9/2). So also, it is submitted that the tax imposed for Basota Hotel constructed as per building permit, BP No. 554 in the year 20052006, and tax was assessed for the same at Rs.96,275/. P10(c) and the tax assessed for the old building (Ext. P9/2). So also, it is submitted that the tax imposed for Basota Hotel constructed as per building permit, BP No. 554 in the year 20052006, and tax was assessed for the same at Rs.96,275/. It is also stated that the building bearing Nos. 279(5), (6), (7), (9), (10), (11) and (12) belonging to the petitioner were having a total plinth area of 210.307 sq. meters and tax was assessed at Rs.2,51,064/, which would mean that the tax for the building belonging to the petitioner was assessed at Rs.119.38 per sq. meters, whereas the tax assessed against Deepa Tower is at Rs. 142.86 per sq. meters. 12. It is also submitted that tax was assessed not on the basis of the actual annual rent received, but on the basis of the annual rental that was expected to be received in normal circumstances and therefore, the contention that no rent was received for the building that was not rented out and fresh tax should not be levied, is highly unsustainable. It is also submitted that once the construction of a building is complete, tax has to be levied and therefore, the contention of the petitioner that Exts. P14 and P15 are illegal, is highly untenable in law. It is also pointed out that there is a clear cut procedure prescribed under Section 234 of the Act, 1994 as to the manner in which the tax is to be assessed and therefore, the contention advanced by the petitioner that since no rule was made to implement the provisions of Section 234 of Act, 1994, the tax could not have been levied, cannot be sustained under law. 13. It is further contended that from the order of the Finance Standing Committee, the remedy of the petitioner was to prefer a revision before the Tribunal for Local Self Government Institutions. However, the petitioner has approached this Court without availing the statutory remedy and therefore, the writ petition is to be dismissed on that sole ground. 14. The 4th respondent i.e., the state of Kerala, has filed a counter affidavit basically contending that the tax demanded by the Municipality is in accordance with law, especially as per Article 265 of the Constitution of India. 14. The 4th respondent i.e., the state of Kerala, has filed a counter affidavit basically contending that the tax demanded by the Municipality is in accordance with law, especially as per Article 265 of the Constitution of India. The sum and substance of the contention advanced is that the power exercised by the legislature by incorporating Section 214 in the Act, 1994 is in accordance with law. The petitioner has filed separate reply affidavits to the counter affidavit of respondents 1 to 3, and 4 respectively reiterating the stand adopted in the writ petition. 15. I have heard Sri. Jacob P. Alex for the petitioner, Sri. S. Subash Chand for the Thiruvalla Municipality and Smt. K.R Deepa, learned Special Government Pleader appearing for the State, and perused the pleadings and materials on record. 16. The paramount question involved in this writ petition revolves around Section 234 of Act, 1999, which was deleted by Act 30 of 2009 with effect from, 07.10.2009, and it reads thus: “234. Method of assessment of property tax.— (1) Every building shall be assessed together with its site and other adjacent premises occupied as an appurtenance thereto unless the owner of the building is a different person from the owner of such site or premises. {(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) or any other law for the time being in force, for the purpose of assessing the property tax, it shall be assessed in the prescribed manner on the basis of the annual value of any buildings and lands adjacent to it, the importance of area where the building is situated, type of the building construction, method of use, plinth area, reasonable annual maintenance cost etc. and the tax shall be determined for the said building and land at the rate fixed by the Council under sub-section(3) of Section 233: Provided that from the property tax assessed in such manner, property tax shall be fixed by allowing the deduction at the rate of ten per cent to buildings above ten years and upto twenty years old, twenty per cent to buildings above twenty years and upto fifty years old and twenty-five percent to buildings above fifty years old, (3) In the case of a building given for the use of another person upon rent or on such other condition by the owner, the property tax shall be assessed by adding with it an amount equal to twenty-five per cent of the assessed tax under sub-section (2). (4). The Government may make rules regarding the person by whom and the intervals at which the annual value of buildings, the deduction or addition in the tax to be made etc,, is to be determined and the procedure for the realisation of tax amount.] 17. The thrust of the contention is that no rule was introduced by the State Government to implement the provisions of Section 234 of the Act, 1994 during the period in question and therefore, the contention that the assessment made by the authority purely on the basis of the provisions of the Act, cannot be sustained under law. That apart, it is contended that the Kerala Municipality (Property Tax and Service Tax and Surcharge) Rules 2011 has been brought into force only after Section 234 was deleted, and therefore the tax assessed by the authority without the Rules for enforcement of the provisions of the Act, cannot be sustained under law. 18. It is further pointed out that from 2009 onwards, a new provision has come into force to assess the building for property tax as per the plinth area of the building. Therefore, it is the case of the petitioner that the building in question is to be assessed for property tax on the basis of the plinth area of the buildings in question. Therefore, it is the case of the petitioner that the building in question is to be assessed for property tax on the basis of the plinth area of the buildings in question. All these contentions are raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the basis that in Section 234(2) of Act, 1994, it is specified that the property tax shall be assessed in the “prescribed manner” on the basis of the annual value of any buildings and lands adjacent to it etc. The thrust of the contention is that since the phraseology 'prescribed manner' is employed in Section 234(2) of the Act, 1994, taking into account Section 2 (30) of Act, 1994, without framing a rule, the provisions of Section 234 cannot be implemented. 19. On the other hand, the learned Standing Counsel for the Municipality as well as the learned Special Government Pleader submitted that as per Section 234 of Act, 1994, a clear power is conferred on the authority under the Act, 1994 as to the manner in which a building is to be assessed and going through the entire provisions of Section 234 of Act, 1994, it is evident that a clear cut procedure is prescribed in order to assess, determine and levy the property tax. 20. Therefore, according to the learned Standing Counsel for the Municipality and the learned Senior Government Pleader, merely because rule is not framed by the State Government to implement the provisions of Section 234 of Act, 1994, that will not take away the power conferred on the authority to assess, determine and levy the property tax as per the procedure prescribed under Section 234 of Act, 1994. 21. Taking into account the rival submissions made across the Bar, I am of the considered opinion that insofar as the assessment of the property tax is concerned, during the period in question, a clear cut procedure is prescribed under Section 234 of Act, 1994. Section 234(1) of Act, 1994 makes it clear that every buildings shall be assessed together with its site and other adjacent premises occupied as an appurtenance thereto, unless the owner of the building is a different person from the owner of such site or premises. 22. Section 234(1) of Act, 1994 makes it clear that every buildings shall be assessed together with its site and other adjacent premises occupied as an appurtenance thereto, unless the owner of the building is a different person from the owner of such site or premises. 22. Sub-Section (2) of Section 234 makes it clear that notwithstanding anything contained in the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 or any other law for the time being in force, for the purpose of assessing the property tax, it shall be assessed in the prescribed manner on the basis of the annual value of any buildings and lands adjacent to it, the importance of area where the building is situated, type of the building construction, method of use, plinth area, reasonable annual maintenance cost etc. and the tax shall be determined for the said building and land at the rate fixed by the Council under Sub-Section(3) of Section 233. 23. On an analysis of Sub-Section (2) of Section 234, it is clear that definite parameters are fixed in order to assess the building and determine the tax, and to fix the rate in terms of the power exercised by the Municipal Council under Sub-Section (3) of Section 233. There is no case for the petitioner that the Municipal Council has not fixed the property tax in accordance with the parameters prescribed under Section 233 of Act 1994 as it existed then, which reads thus: “233, Description and classes of property tax,— (1) Where a Council of a Municipality by a resolution determines to levy property tax, such tax shall unless, exempted by or under this Act or any other law, be levied on all buildings and lands within the municipal area. (2) The property tax under sub-section (1) may comprise of a tax for general purposes and a service tax and the service tax may comprise of - (i) a water and drainage tax to provide for expenses connected with the construction, maintenance, repair, extension or improvement of water or drainage work heretofore provided or hereafter to be provided. (2) The property tax under sub-section (1) may comprise of a tax for general purposes and a service tax and the service tax may comprise of - (i) a water and drainage tax to provide for expenses connected with the construction, maintenance, repair, extension or improvement of water or drainage work heretofore provided or hereafter to be provided. (ii) a lighting tax to provide for expenses connected with the lighting of the municipal area by gas, electricity or any other means; (iii) a sanitary tax to provide for expenses connected with the general sanitation of the municipal area and the removal of rubbish, filth and carcasses of animals from the private premises. (3) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, these taxes shall be levied at such percentage of the annual value of buildings or lands which are occupied by or adjacent and appurtenant to buildings or both as may be fixed by the Council: Provided that the aggregate of the percentage so fixed shall not be less than [six percent] and more than twenty per cent in the case of a Town Panchayat, [nine percent] and twenty five per cent in the case of a Municipal Council and [twelve percent] and twenty five per cent in case of Municipal Corporation of the annual value of all buildings, or lands, which are occupied by or adjacent and appurtenant to buildings or both and that the different components of tax shall not be less than the following minimum rates namely: Minimum rates Town Panchayat Municipal Council Municipal Corporation (i) Tax for General Purposes [4%] 5% [6%] (ii) Lighting tax [1%] 2% 2% (iii) Drainage tax 2% (iv) Water tax 1% (v) Sanitary tax 1% [2%] [2%] Provided further that where water tax and drainage tax are levied, the Council shall declare what proportion of tax is levied in respect of water works and the remainder shall be deemed to be levied in respect of drainage works and the proportion so declared shall also be specified in the notification under section 232. [(4)The Municipal Council shall in the case of land used exclusively for agricultural purposes and which is more than one hectare in extent, levy, these taxes on its annual value, excluding one hectare therefrom, at such percentage as may be fixed by it. Provided that such percentage shall not exceed the maximum, if any, fixed by Government. [(4)The Municipal Council shall in the case of land used exclusively for agricultural purposes and which is more than one hectare in extent, levy, these taxes on its annual value, excluding one hectare therefrom, at such percentage as may be fixed by it. Provided that such percentage shall not exceed the maximum, if any, fixed by Government. Explanation.— For the purpose of this section the annual value of land shall be deemed to be the total annual rent which can be reasonably be expected if it is leased out from year to year.] [(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (3) and Sub-Section (4) the minimum property tax to be given for a half year shall be twenty five rupees in the case of a Town Panchayat or a Municipal Council and fifty rupees in the case of a Municipal Corporation.] 24. It is important to note that proviso to Section 233 (2) further makes it clear that the property tax assessed “in such manner” means; can only be the manner provided under Section 233(1) and (2) and the property tax shall be fixed by allowing the deduction at the rate of ten per cent to the buildings above ten years and up to twenty years old, twenty per cent to buildings above twenty years and up to fifty years old and twentyfive percent to buildings above fifty years old. Which means, the fixation has to be made taking into account all the component figures contained under Sections 233 and 234 of the Act, 1994 and the limit of tax fixed by the Council. 25. Sub-Section (3) of Section 234 of Act, 1994 clearly specifies that in the case of a building given for the use of another person upon rent or on such other condition by the owner, the property tax shall be assessed by adding with it an amount equal to twenty-five per cent of the assessed tax under Sub-Section (2). It is true, Sub-Section (4) enables the Government to make the rules regarding the person by whom and the intervals at which the annual value of buildings, the deduction or addition in the tax to be made etc. is to be determined and the procedure for the realisation of tax amount. 26. It is true, Sub-Section (4) enables the Government to make the rules regarding the person by whom and the intervals at which the annual value of buildings, the deduction or addition in the tax to be made etc. is to be determined and the procedure for the realisation of tax amount. 26. On a reading of Sub-Section (4) of Section 234 of Act, 1994, it is clear from the phraseology employed “may”, that the Government is thereby granted the liberty to make the Rules in order to fix intervals at which the annual value of buildings, the deduction or addition in the tax to be made, determined etc. and for the realisation of tax amount. No doubt, as per the Act, 1994, the Secretary of the Municipality, an officer of the Government and the Chief Executive Officer of the Municipality is to discharge the functions under the Act, and the Rules framed thereunder in accordance with law, by virtue of the powers conferred on him under Section 48 of the Act, 1994. 27. In my considered opinion, irrespective of the failure of the Government for framing the Rules, Municipal Council is vested with powers to determine the property tax; and needless to say, if the tax is fixed by employing the power of the authority conferred under the Act, 1994, the Secretary or the delegatee can recover the tax in the manner prescribed under law. The issue with respect to the implementation of the provisions of a statute without a rule is no more res integra. 28. In Orissa State (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Board v. Orient paper Mills [ (2003) 10 SCC 421 ], the Apex Court had occasion to consider the question by which the provisions of a parent statute empowered the State Government to declare an area as air pollution control area and as to whether without introduction of a rule, the power could be exercised by the State Government after considering the phraseology employed 'if any prescribed' and it is held as follows: “13. Thus, in case manner is not prescribed under the rules, there is no obligation or requirement to follow any, except whatever the provision itself provides viz. Thus, in case manner is not prescribed under the rules, there is no obligation or requirement to follow any, except whatever the provision itself provides viz. Section 19 in the instant case which is also complete in itself even without any manner being prescribed as indicated shortly before to read the provision omitting this part “in such manner as may be prescribed”. Merely by absence of rules, the State would not be divested of its powers to notify in the Official Gazette any area declaring it to be an air pollution control area. In case, however, the rules have been framed prescribing the manner, undoubtedly, the declaration must be in accordance with such rules. 14. On the proposition indicated above, a decision reported in T. Cajee v. U. Jormanik Siem [ AIR 1961 SC 276 ] would be relevant. The matter pertained to removal of Seim from the office, namely, the Chief Headman of the area in the District Council governed by Schedule VI of the Constitution. The High Court took the view that the District Council could act only by making a law with the assent of the Governor. So far as the appointment and removal from the office of a Seim is concerned, provision contained in para 3(1)(g) of the Schedule was referred to, which empowered the District Council to make laws in respect of the appointment and succession of office of Chiefs Headmen. The High Court took the view that in absence of framing of such a law, there would be no power of appointment of a Chief or Seim nor for his removal either. This apex Court negated the view taken by the High Court observing that: (AIR p. 281, para 10) “[I]t seems to us that the High Court has read far more into para 3(1)(g) than is justified by its language. Para 3(1) is in fact something like a legislative list and enumerates the subjects on which the District Council is competent to make laws. Para 3(1) is in fact something like a legislative list and enumerates the subjects on which the District Council is competent to make laws. … But it does not follow from this that the appointment or removal of a Chief is a legislative act or that no appointment or removal can be made without there being first a law to that effect.” This Court found that para 2(4) relating to administration of an autonomous district, vested in the District Council such powers and further observed as under: (AIR p. 281, para 10) “The Constitution could not have intended that all administration in the autonomous districts should come to a stop till the Governor made regulations under para 19(1)(b) or till District Council passed laws under para 3(1)(g). … Doubtless when regulations are made … the administrative authorities would be bound to follow the regulations so made or the laws so passed.” 15. It is thus clear from the decision referred to in the preceding paragraph that the power which vests in an authority would not cease to exist simply for the reason that the rules have not been framed or the manner of exercise of the power has not been prescribed. So far as Section 54 of the Act is concerned, it only enumerates the subjects on which the State Government is entitled to frame rules.” 29. Therefore, it can be seen that once a manner is prescribed as to how tax is to be assessed, determined, fixed, and recovered, undoubtedly the authority is vested with powers to do so and recover the tax in accordance with the provisions of the Act, 1994. That is to say, merely because rules were not framed, that will not, in any manner, curtail the power of the authority under the Act, 1994 to recover the tax so fixed. This I say because, till such time Section 234 of Act, 1994 was omitted on and with effect from 07.10.2009, the procedure that had to be followed by every Municipality and the Municipal Corporation within the State is the procedure prescribed thereunder. Which means, if the argument advanced by the petitioner is accepted, none of the Municipality and the Municipal Corporations within the State could have assessed, determined, fixed, levied and recovered the tax for a period of 5 years from 2004 to 2009. 30. Which means, if the argument advanced by the petitioner is accepted, none of the Municipality and the Municipal Corporations within the State could have assessed, determined, fixed, levied and recovered the tax for a period of 5 years from 2004 to 2009. 30. Again this question was considered by the Apex Court in Surinder Singh v. Central Government and Others [ (1986) 4 SCC 667 ], wherein it was held at paragraph 6 thus: 6. The High Court has held that the disposal of property forming part of the compensation pool was “subject” to the rules framed as contemplated by Sections 8 and 40 of the Act and since no rules had been framed by the Central Government with regard to the disposal of the urban agricultural property forming part of the compensation pool, the authority constituted under the Act had no jurisdiction to dispose of urban agricultural property by auction-sale. Unless rules were framed as contemplated by the Act, according to the High Court the Central Government had no authority in law to issue executive directions for the sale and disposal of urban agricultural property. This view was taken, placing reliance on an earlier decision of a Division Bench of that court in Bishan Singh v. Central Government. [(1961) 63 Punj LR 75] The Division Bench in Bishan case [(1961) 63 Punj LR 75] took the view that since the disposal of the compensation pool property was subject to the rules that may be made, and as no rules had been framed, the Central Government had no authority in law to issue administrative directions providing for the transfer of the urban agricultural land by auction-sale. In our opinion the view taken by the High Court is incorrect. Where a statute confers powers on an authority to do certain acts or exercise power in respect of certain matters, subject to rules, the exercise of power conferred by the statute does not depend on the existence of rules unless the statute expressly provides for the same. In other words framing of the rules is not condition precedent to the exercise of the power expressly and unconditionally conferred by the statute. The expression “subject to the rules” only means, in accordance with the rules, if any. If rules are framed, the powers so conferred on authority could be exercised in accordance with these rules. In other words framing of the rules is not condition precedent to the exercise of the power expressly and unconditionally conferred by the statute. The expression “subject to the rules” only means, in accordance with the rules, if any. If rules are framed, the powers so conferred on authority could be exercised in accordance with these rules. But if no rules are framed there is no void and the authority is not precluded from exercising the power conferred by the statute. In T. Cajee v. U. Jormanik Siem [ AIR 1961 SC 276 : (1961) 1 SCR 750 ] the Supreme Court reversed the order of the High Court whereby the order of District Council removing Siem, was quashed by the High Court on the ground that the District Council had not framed any rules for the exercise of its powers as contemplated by para 3(1)(g) of 6th Schedule to the Constitution. The High Court had taken the view that until a law as contemplated by para 3(1)(g) was made there could be no question of exercise of power of appointment of a Chief or Siem or removal either. Setting aside the order of the High Court, a Constitution Bench of this Court held that the administration of the district including the appointment or removal of Siem could not come to a stop till regulations under para 3(1)(g) were framed. The view taken by the High Court that there could be no appointment or removal by the District Council without framing of the regulation was set aside. Similar view was taken by this Court in B.N. Nagarajan v. State of Mysore [ AIR 1966 SC 1942 : (1966) 3 SCR 682 : (1967) 1 Lab LJ 698] and Mysore State Road Transport Corpn. v. Gopinath [ AIR 1968 SC 464 : (1968) 1 SCR 767 : (1968) 2 Lab LJ 144] In U.P. State Electricity Board v. City Board, Mussoorie [ (1985) 2 SCC 16 : AIR 1985 SC 883 : (1985) 2 SCR 815 ] validity of fixation of Grid Tarrif was under challenge. Section 46 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 provide that tariff known as the Grid Tariff shall be fixed from time to time in accordance with any regulations made in that behalf. Section 79 of the Act conferred power on the Electricity Board to frame regulations. Section 46 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 provide that tariff known as the Grid Tariff shall be fixed from time to time in accordance with any regulations made in that behalf. Section 79 of the Act conferred power on the Electricity Board to frame regulations. The contention that Grid Tariff as contemplated by Section 46 of the Electricity (Supply) Act could not be fixed in the absence of any regulations laying down for fixation of tariff, and that the notification fixing tariff in the absence of such Regulations was illegal, was rejected and this Court observed: (SCC pp. 20-21, para 7) “It is true that Section 79(h) of the Act authorises the Electricity Board to make regulations laying down the principles governing the fixing of Grid Tariffs. But Section 46(1) of the Act does not say that no Grid Tariff can be fixed until such regulations are made. It only provides that the Grid Tariff shall be in accordance with any regulations made is this behalf. That means that if there were any regulations, the Grid Tariff should be fixed in accordance with such regulations and nothing more. We are of the view that the framing of regulations under Section 79(h) of the Act cannot be a condition precedent for fixing the Grid Tariff.” 31. In State of Orissa v. Radheyshyam Meher, (1995) 1 SCC 652 ], the Apex Court had occasion to consider the question as to whether in the absence of any rule or regulation to the contrary, can the power of the State be abridged on the basis of an individual interest of certain trader, even to the extent of restricting the State's capacity to advance larger public good. Merely because a rule was not brought forth by the State, that will not detain to implement the provisions of the Act. 32. In U.P. State Electricity Board v. City Board, Mussoorie, (1985) 2 SCC 16 , the Apex Court considered the very same issue in regard to the fixation of grid tariff, wherein a contention was raised that it was not open to the Electricity Board to issue the impugned notifications without framing any regulations and it was held thus at paragraph 7 that “we are of the view that the framing of regulation under Section 79(h) of the Act cannot be a condition precedent for fixing the Grid Tariff”. Again in paragraph 9, it was held as follows: “9. As observed by the Division Bench of the High Court, there is ample guidance available in the various provisions of the Act and that the rates fixed are subject to the control of the State Government....” 33. Therefore, on an analysis of the facts and figures and the law applicable, and applying the principles laid down by the Apex Court, I have no doubt in my mind to say that even without the introduction of a rule, when there was a procedure prescribed under the provisions of the Act, the authority was vested with ample powers to assess, determine, fix and levy tax. 34. Above all, the purpose of framing of rules can only be seen as, to implement the purpose and objective of the provisions of the parent statute. It is well settled in law that before the rule can have the effect of a statutory provision, two conditions must be fulfilled, namely (i) it must conform to the provisions of the statute under which it is framed; (ii) it must also come within the scope and purview of the rule making power of the authority framing the rule. It is well settled in law that when a delegated power is given for making a rule, the delegatee shall trace out the object of the enactment and to frame the Rules to satisfy the requirements of the provisions of the parent statute. 35. The provisions of the parent statute, which in this case Section 234 of the Act, 1994, is a legislative function declaring legislative policy and laying down the manner by which the tax is to be assessed, determined and levied. Therefore, if at all a rule was not made during the period between 2004 and 2009, (the period during which Sections 233 and 234 were in prevalence), it could have been only to satisfy the need and requirements of Section 234 and not overlook the same. Which thus means, the rule making power conferred on the Government cannot be by overlooking the provisions of Section 234 declared by the legislative assembly of the State Government and if at all any Rule was made to implement the provisions of Section 234 of Act, 1994, that can never overlook the procedure contemplated under Section 234 of the Act, 1994. 36. 36. This question was considered by the Apex Court in MCD v. Birla Cotton Spg. & Wvg. Mills [ AIR 1968 SC 1232 ] and it is held as follows at paragraph 13 thus: “13 … Thus, where the law passed by the legislature declares the legislative policy and lays down the standard which is enacted into a rule of law, it can leave the task of subordinate legislation which by its very nature is ancillary to the statute to subordinate bodies, i. e., the making of rules, regulations or bye-laws. The subordinate authority must do so within the frame-work of the law which makes the delegation, and such subordinate legislation has to be consistent with the law under which it is made and cannot go beyond the limits of the policy and standard laid down in the law. Provided the legislative policy is enunciated with sufficient clearness or a standard is laid down, the courts should not interfere with the discretion that undoubtedly rests with the legislature itself in determining the extent of delegation necessary in a particular case.” 37. In the said judgment of the Apex Court, it was also held that the legislature must retain in its own hands the essential legislative function and what can be delegated is the task of subordinate legislation necessary for implementing the purpose and objects of the Act and where the legislative policy is enunciated with sufficient clearness or a standard is laid down, the courts should not interfere; and what guidance should be given and to what extent and whether guidance has been given in a particular case at all depends on a consideration of the provisions of the particular Act with which the court has to deal including its Preamble. 38. Analysing these legal aspects, it could be seen that the legal position is very well settled and it is established that when the parent statute prescribes a clear cut function enabling the statutory authority to proceed without the introduction of any rule, the statutory authority is at liberty to follow the procedure prescribed under the parent statute and exercise the powers conferred on it under the law. 39. 39. Therefore, considering those aspects, I do not think, merely because in the definition clause of Act, 1994, the term 'prescribed' is defined to mean 'prescribed under Rule', that cannot interfere with the absolute power conferred on the authority under Section 234 of the Act, 1994. 40. To put it otherwise, the definition clause is not powerful enough to take away the rights conferred on an authority as per the provisions of the parent statute and it can only be treated as a tool or aid to support any rules made. Therefore, the definition given to the term 'prescribed' has to be read down to mean that if and when the Rules are introduced and the procedure is prescribed under the Rules to implement the purpose and object of the provisions of the parent statute, it may be followed. However, in the case on hand, there was no rule at all; but that by itself will not detain an authority to exercise the powers conferred on them by the statute. Moreover, the taxing provision of the statute has to be treated differently from the other provisions, because the very survival of the Municipality is largely dependent on the property tax collected. So also, if the contention of the petitioner is accepted, it would have a cascading effect throughout the State adversely affecting the very functioning of the Municipal Corporations and the Municipalities. 41. That being the legal position, I do not think, the petitioner has made out any case to interfere with the procedure adopted by the Municipal authority to assess, determine, fix, levy and recover the tax. The learned Standing Counsel for the Municipality Sri. Subash Chand has raised a contention that, since against Ext. P14 impugned order of the Standing Committee, the petitioner had a remedy to approach the Tribunal for Local Self Government Institutions, the writ petition is not maintainable. However, from the materials on record, I find that when the writ petition was admitted to the files of this Court in the year 2012, an interim order of stay of recovery of tax was granted by this Court and the same is still in force. Moreover, in view of the special limitation of 30 days prescribed under the Tribunal Rules, a revision at this distance of time cannot be maintained under law. 42. Moreover, in view of the special limitation of 30 days prescribed under the Tribunal Rules, a revision at this distance of time cannot be maintained under law. 42. According to the petitioner, the entire tax is paid for the year 20042009, even though the Municipality disputes the same. However, it is admitted by the petitioner that tax between the period 2009 and 2016 is not paid by him, consequent to the stay granted by this Court. 43. The learned counsel for the petitioner Sri. Jacob P. Alex has also raised a contention that Ext. P14 order passed by the Standing Committee is without taking into account the contentions raised by the petitioner in the appeal memorandum. 44. I have gone through Ext. P14 and find that as per decision No. 14 dated 24.01.2012, just in one sentence, the Finance Committee has concluded that the tax assessed is in accordance with the determination, on the basis of which, the Secretary has issued Ext. P16 order dated 19.09.2012. 45. Considering the above aspect, I am of the view that the Finance Standing Committee has not considered the contentions raised by the petitioner with respect to the manner in which the tax was assessed by the primary authority, though explanations are offered in the counter affidavit filed in the writ petition on hand. In that view of the matter, interference is required to Ext. P14 order passed by the Standing Committee, being violative of the principles of natural justice and arbitrary. Accordingly, I quash Ext. P14 order of the Finance Standing Committee bearing No. 14 dated 24.01.2012, and consequently direct the Finance Standing Committee of the Municipality to reconsider the issue with respect to the parameters employed, for assessing the building and determination made, to fix and levy the tax. 46. However, since in the reply affidavit filed by the petitioner, it is submitted that the entire tax for the period in question was paid by the petitioner as levied by the authority and the same is disputed by the Municipality, it is for the authority to find out as to whether the entire tax assessed was paid by the petitioner for the disputed period. Even though the constitutional validity of Section 234 of Act, 1994 is questioned in the writ petition, the learned counsel for the petitioner has not addressed any arguments on the same. 47. Even though the constitutional validity of Section 234 of Act, 1994 is questioned in the writ petition, the learned counsel for the petitioner has not addressed any arguments on the same. 47. Though the learned Standing Counsel for the Municipality submitted that the constitutionality was challenged by the petitioner only to maintain the writ petition in view of the statutory provision for preferring a revision before the Tribunal for Local Self Government Institution, I do not propose to enter into a finding on the same, in view of my observation made above with respect to the limitation. 48. Upshot of the discussion of law and facts made above, is that the issue raised by the petitioner with respect to the power of the Municipal authority to assess, fix and levy the property tax for want of rules, is negatived, and the reliefs sought for accordingly are declined. However, in view of the quashing of Ext. P14 order of the Finance Standing Committee, the writ petition is allowed in part and the Finance Standing Committee, the second respondent, is directed to reconsider Ext. P12 appeal filed by the petitioner in accordance with law, after providing an opportunity of hearing and participation to the petitioner at the earliest and at any rate within two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this Judgment also taking note of the observations made above.