JUDGMENT : N. Kotiswar Singh, J. Heard Mr. J. Ahmed, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Ms. L. Devi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Mr. R.K. Dev Choudhury, learned Assistant Solicitor General of India, for the respondent No.1 as well as appearing as standing counsel, NRC, for respondent No.3; Mr. J. Payeng, learned special counsel, FT, appearing for respondent Nos.5 & 6; Mr. A. Bhuyan, learned standing counsel, ECI, appearing for respondent No.2 and Ms. K. Phukan, learned Junior Government Advocate, Assam, appearing for respondent No.4. 2. In this petition, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 30.10.2017 passed by the Foreigners Tribunal, Barpeta-7th in FT Case No.34/2017 by which the Tribunal held that the petitioner failed to prove himself to be the son of genuine Indian parents by discharging his burden of proof as provided under Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, 1946 and held him to be a foreigner who had entered into Assam on or after 25.03.1971 and is liable to be pushed back to the specified territory. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that after receipt of summons, the petitioner filed his written statement on 25.04.2017 in which the petitioner denied that he is a foreigner. In the said written statement, he had stated that he was born and brought up in village Dakshin Godhani, PS. Tarabri, District-Barpeta and his father’s name is Madhu Sheikh and his mother’s name is Aymon Nessa. 4. He also stated that the names of his parents appeared in the voters lists of 1966 under House No.27, Part No.131 of village Dakshin Godhani under 54 No. Chenga LAC. It has been further stated that their names have appeared in the voters list of 1970 under House No.27, Part No.130 of village Dakshin Godhani under 54 No. Chenga LAC and the petitioner’s name appears in the voters list of 1985 under House No.374, Part No.82 at village Dakshin Godhani under 47 No. Chenga LAC. 5. It has been also stated that the petitioner’s father’s name has been recorded in the Annual Khiraj Patta vide Patta No.112 at Village Uttar Godhani under Baguribari Mouza. 6. It has been also stated that the petitioner’s name was marked as D (Doubtful) voter in the electoral roll of 1997 under House No.269, Part-94 of village Dakshin Godhani under 47 No. Chenga LAC and in the subsequent voters lists. 6. It has been also stated that the petitioner’s name was marked as D (Doubtful) voter in the electoral roll of 1997 under House No.269, Part-94 of village Dakshin Godhani under 47 No. Chenga LAC and in the subsequent voters lists. It has been further stated that a certificate was issued by the Gaonburah of village Dakshin Godhani in favour of the petitioner clearly linking him with his father and also as a permanent resident of village Dakshin Godhani. The petitioner also filed a copy of the Annual Khiraj Patta and the certificate was issued by the Gaonburah. 7. The learned Tribunal after assessment of the evidences on record held that the petitioner has failed to prove that his father is Sadu Sheikh and declared him to be a foreigner of post 1971 stream. The relevant portion of the impugned opinion of the Tribunal reads as follows : “After perusal of both oral and documentary evidence in record it is found that the proceedee projected one Madhu Sheikh @ Sadhu Sheikh and Aymon Nessa to be the father and the mother respectively and amongst others states that the names of his parents are recorded in the voter lists of 1966 and 1970 and his name is recorded in the voter list of 1985 and his father was a holder of Annual Kheraj Patta and claims Madhu Sheikh and Sadhu Sheikh to be same and one person and is the father of the proceedee and claims to be a citizen of India. On the other hand the proceedee described about the names of the father and the mother as Madhu Sheikh and Aimona Nessa when he was inquired about for the discovery of relevant facts by this Tribunal and he is not aware about as to when and where they were born and brought up and during his examination he did not describe about the name of Sadhu Sheikh. On appreciation of documentary evidence it is seen that Ext. ‘A’ and Ext. ‘B’ are the Photostat copies of certified copies of voter list of 1966 and 1970 which are proved in original and in Ext. ‘A’ and Ext. ‘B’ the names of the projected parents have been appeared as Sadu Sheikh and Aymon Nessa Vide Sl. Nos.67 and 68 and 71 and 72, common House No.27 of village Dakhin Godhani under 54 No. Chenga LAC. Ext. ‘A’ and Ext. ‘B’ the names of the projected parents have been appeared as Sadu Sheikh and Aymon Nessa Vide Sl. Nos.67 and 68 and 71 and 72, common House No.27 of village Dakhin Godhani under 54 No. Chenga LAC. Ext. C is the Photostat copy of certified copy of Electoral Roll of 1985 which is proved in original and in Ext. C the proceedee has been described as son of Madhu Seikh vide Sl. No.256 House No.374 of village Dakhin Godhani under 47 No. Chenga LAC and the existence of the proceedee came in to voter list in 1985 when his name was recorded for the first time. Ext. D is the Photostat copy of Annual Kheraj patta which is proved in original as being issued in favour of Madhu Seikh for a particular year but the subsequent developments as to the renewal of the Annual patta was not proved accordingly and it is evident from Ext. D the said Annual patta was issued in favour of Madu Sheik and not Madhu Sheikh as alleged and thus confer no status of a landholder and is also not heritable and transferable. Ext. E is the certificate of local Gaon burah and same has been proved by producing Nur Mohammad Gaonburah as DW2 and DW2 has also described about the name of the father of the proceedee as Madhu Seikh and he could not support of the proceedee with regard to his citizenship right any way. Ext. E(I) is the signature of DW2. Ext. F is the Affidavit of the proceedee as executed before Notary Public, Barpeta and it has no evidentiary value and accordingly discarded by this Tribunal. Thus the proceedee has failed to prove the name of his father as Sadu Sheikh as another name of his father as appeared in Ext. ‘A’ and Ext. ‘B’. The proceedee pleaded about such name as Sadhu Sheikh and this variation of names could be taken up as lightly contrary to the law of pleading.” 8. Assailing the opinion, Mr. Ahmed, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that though the petitioner’s father’s name was recorded in the voters lists of 1966 and 1967 as Sadhu Sheikh, in the subsequent voters list of 1985, it was recorded as Madhu Sheikh, by showing him to be the father of Banes Ali, i.e., the present petitioner. Assailing the opinion, Mr. Ahmed, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that though the petitioner’s father’s name was recorded in the voters lists of 1966 and 1967 as Sadhu Sheikh, in the subsequent voters list of 1985, it was recorded as Madhu Sheikh, by showing him to be the father of Banes Ali, i.e., the present petitioner. The petitioner submits that there is no other person as Banes Ali except himself and, as such, it was a mistake on the part of the election officials by not properly recording the name of his father, Madhu Sheikh, who has been wrongly recorded as Sadhu Sheikh. Accordingly, in the written statement, the name of his father is shown as Sadhu Sheikh as well as Madhu Sheikh. 9. In this regard, the petitioner filed an affidavit on 26.07.2017 to show that Sadhu Sheikh and Madhu Sheikh refers to one and the same person, which was exhibited as Ext.F. It has been contended that, however, the said affidavit was never contested or challenged by the respondents. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Tribunal did not believe that Madhu Sheikh and Sadhu Sheikh are one and the same person because of the difference in the name. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that even otherwise also, the difference in the name of the petitioner’s father, i.e., Madhu Sheikh and Sadhu Sheikh is a minor one and therefore, is not significant and the Tribunal could have ignored such a minor difference. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sirajul Hoque Vs. State of Assam, (2019) 5 SCC 534 and the decision of this Court in Motior Rahman Vs. Union of India and others, 2020 (1) GLT 330. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that other than this minor difference in the name Sadhu Sheikh and Madhu Sheikh, the name of the petitioner’s mother which was shown along with his father is same, namely, Aymon Nessa. Furthermore, the voters lists in which the name of the petitioner appears as the son of Madhu Sheikh is in respect of the same village Dakshin Godhani under 47 No. Chenga LAC. Furthermore, the voters lists in which the name of the petitioner appears as the son of Madhu Sheikh is in respect of the same village Dakshin Godhani under 47 No. Chenga LAC. Accordingly, it has been submitted that since the names Madhu Sheikh and Sadhu Sheikh has reference to the same person, i.e., Aymon Nessa, who is the mother of the petitioner with reference to the same village and, unless the same is doubted or questioned by the State, the said evidence could not have been ignored. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that though the relevant land document, which is in the name of Madhu Sheikh, was exhibited and proved in original as Ex.D (Annual Khiraj Patta), the Tribunal ignored the same on the ground that subsequent developments as to the renewal of the Annual Khiraj Patta had not been proved and as the said land document does not confer any status on the landholder and as the same is not heritable and transferrable, the same could not be taken into consideration. 14. Coming to the Gaonburah certificate, which was exhibited as Ext. E in connection with which the said Gaonburah was examined, who had clearly testified the name of the petitioner’s father as Madhu Sheikh, the Tribunal held that the said document could not prove the citizenship status of the petitioner. 15. As regards the affidavit of the proceedee, which was exhibited as Ext.F, it was also discarded by the Tribunal by holding that it has no evidentiary value. 16. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the aforesaid finding of the Tribunal is neither based on law nor on fact. 17. It has been submitted that merely because there was a minor discrepancy in the name of the petitioner’s father, it cannot be a ground to disbelieve the plea of the petitioner. Similarly, merely because the subsequent developments as to the Annual Khiraj Patta were not shown, it cannot be a ground for ignoring the said vital document. Likewise, since the certificate of the Gaonburah was proved, it could not be ignored by the Tribunal in the manner it has been done. 18. It was submitted that as regards the affidavit, the same also could not be ignored as the same was not contested or questioned by the State. 19. Likewise, since the certificate of the Gaonburah was proved, it could not be ignored by the Tribunal in the manner it has been done. 18. It was submitted that as regards the affidavit, the same also could not be ignored as the same was not contested or questioned by the State. 19. Under the circumstances, it has been submitted that the finding of the Tribunal is not correct. The petitioner contends that he has sufficient documents to prove that he is an Indian. As such, the impugned opinion of the Tribunal is liable to be set aside and on the basis of the documents so adduced, the petitioner may be declared as an Indian, so submits Mr. Ahmed, learned counsel for the petitioner. 20. On the other hand, Mr. Payeng, learned Special Counsel, FT submits that though the petitioner has relied on the voters list of 1966 wherein Sadu Sheikh, son of Tadri and Ayman Nessa are shown, their names do not appear in the subsequent voters list of 1985. Further, the age mentioned in the voters lists of 1966 and 1970 in respect of the aforesaid projected parents do not tally, inasmuch as, in the voters list of 1966, the age of Sadhu Sheikh and Ayman Nessa are shown as 60 and 50 years, respectively whereas their age is shown in the voters list of 1970 as 75 and 74 years, respectively. 21. Mr. Payeng also submits that though the name of Madhu Sheikh is shown as the father of Banes Ali in the voters list of 1985, there is nothing to show that the said Madhu Sheikh who is shown as the father of the petitioner is the said Sadhu Sheikh whose name is shown in the voters lists of 1966 and 1970 as the son of one Dawri and as such it cannot be said that Madhu Sheikh found in the voters list of 1985 is the same person who was shown as Sadhu Sheikh in the voters lists of 1966 and 1970, respectively. 22. Further, in the voters list of 1985, the name of the petitioner is shown for the first time by showing his age as 30 years, which is not believable. Since he had attained majority much earlier, his name ought to have been reflected in the earlier voters lists, at least, in the voters list of 1980. 23. Mr. 22. Further, in the voters list of 1985, the name of the petitioner is shown for the first time by showing his age as 30 years, which is not believable. Since he had attained majority much earlier, his name ought to have been reflected in the earlier voters lists, at least, in the voters list of 1980. 23. Mr. Payeng also submits that nowhere in the written statement, it has been explained by the petitioner as to what had happened to his parents after their names were shown in the voters lists of 1966 and 1970. Neither in his evidence, he has mentioned about the whereabouts of his parents. It has been submitted that under the circumstances, it is highly doubtful that the said Madhu Sheikh, who is shown as the father of the petitioner in the voters list of 1985, is the same person who is shown as Sadhu Sheikh in the voters list of 1970 and, as such, the linkage is not clearly established. 24. Mr. Payeng further submits that the evidence of the Gaonburah would show the incongruity in the age of the proceedee’s father. The Gaonburah stated in his deposition that the father of the proceedee was born about 60 years back at village Godoni when he testified in the year 2017, whereas, in the voters lists of 1966 and 1970, the age of the petitioner’s father is shown to be 60 and 75 years respectively. Thus, in view of the age recorded in 1966 and 1970, it cannot be the same person for, if the father of the petitioner was born 60 years back, then he would have been born sometime in 1957. Thus, it would clearly show that the evidence of the Gaonburah is utterly unreliable. Further, the said Gaonburah had never testified before the Tribunal that Madhu Sheikh and Sadhu Sheikh are the same person, which is the case of the petitioner and the fact that the said Gaonburah did not know the name of the mother of the petitioner would clearly indicate that the said Gaonburah did not know the father of the petitioner personally. 25. Coming to the affidavit, which has been ignored by the Tribunal, Mr. 25. Coming to the affidavit, which has been ignored by the Tribunal, Mr. Payeng, relying on a decision of this Court in Abdul Sheikh Vs Union of India and others [WP(C) No.6871/2016], decided on 29.03.2018, has submitted that a self-serving suo moto affidavit filed by a proceedee to explain the discrepancies in name and age of self, father, etc. is neither evidence nor proof in the eye of law. 26. Mr. Payeng further submits that identity of the father is the most crucial element in matters relating to Foreigners Tribunal. In the present case, except for showing similarity of the village, there is no other similarity. In fact, no evidence has been adduced in detail about the identity of the said Madhu Sheikh whom the petitioner claims to be his father as the same Sadhu Sheikh referred to in the voters lists of 1966 and 1970. Even if it is stated that Madhu Sheikh has died, the petitioner has not shown as to what has happened to the mother of the petitioner and her name ought to have been recorded in the 1985 voters list. Thus, in the absence of proper description of the said Sadhu Sheikh to show that he is indeed the same Madhu Sheikh reflected in the voters lists of 1966 and 1970, it will be too presumptuous to contend that the said Madhu Sheikh is really the Sadhu Sheikh mentioned in the voters lists of 1966 and 1970. 27. Mr. Payeng, referring to the provisions of Section 5 of the Foreigners Act, 1946, further submits that it would be impermissible to make any change in the name of a person. In fact, as mentioned in the said provision, even a change in the spelling is also not permissible. Thus, it has been submitted that consistency in the name of a person is very critical and cannot be altered. Thus, any change in the name, as in the present case, will not only be permissible but also cast doubt on the real identity of the petitioner’s father. 28. Mr. Thus, it has been submitted that consistency in the name of a person is very critical and cannot be altered. Thus, any change in the name, as in the present case, will not only be permissible but also cast doubt on the real identity of the petitioner’s father. 28. Mr. Ahmed, learned counsel for the petitioner, on the other hand, submits that though it may not be permissible to make any change in the name of the person as provided under Section 5 of the Foreigners Act, 1946, in the present case, at the relevant time when the proceeding was initiated, the petitioner was not a foreigner and as such this provision would not be applicable in the present case. It applies in the case of a declared foreigner or who is detected to be a foreigner. Further, Section 2 of the Foreigners Act, 1946 provides that foreigner means a person who is not a citizen of India. In the present case, till the petitioner is declared as a foreigner, it cannot be held that he is not a citizen of India. 29. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits, as mentioned in paragraph 26 of the writ petition that one of the brothers of the petitioner, namely, Kurban Ali had his name recorded in the NRC 1951. However, it has been submitted that the said NRC document was not produced before the Tribunal. Similarly, the name of another brother Danish Ali is also reflected in the NRC document. It has been also submitted that the name of the petitioner was not shown along with his parents in the subsequent voters lists because of the fact that he does not stay with his father but stays separately in a separate house. 30. Mr. Payeng submits that these are new pleas, which cannot be entertained at this stage. Neither any document was filed before the Tribunal nor these pleas were taken up before the Tribunal. Mr. Payeng also submits that in view of the statement of the Gaonburah that the father of the petitioner had died about 30 years ago, it is hard to understand how the name of the petitioner’s father which was originally recorded as Sadhu Sheikh could be changed to Madhu Sheikh by swearing an affidavit which was filed in the year 2017 by one Banesh Ali. These pleas were never taken up when the petitioner filed his written statement on 25.04.2017. 31. Learned counsel for the petitioner on the other hand submits that the petitioner has sufficient documents to prove that Madhu Sheikh is really his father. In this connection, the petitioner has sought to rely on two documents, namely, (i) NRC document in which the name of one Kurban Ali is shown as the son of Madu of village No.137, House No.74 under Barpeta district and (ii) NRC document in the name of one Danesh Ali as the son of Madu under the same village, same house no and same district, respectively. It has been contended that the present petitioner is the brother of said Kurban Ali as well as Danesh Ali, which would conclusively prove that the petitioner’s father is Madu. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that though the said documents were not relied on or filed before the learned Tribunal, the same can be taken cognizance by this Court in exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and accordingly, the Tribunal’s opinion can be interfered with. 32. It has been submitted that the petitioner has clearly mentioned that the petitioner is the brother of the aforesaid two persons in paragraph 26 of the petition, wherein the petitioner explained the family tree including the names of his siblings. The learned counsel for the petitioner also admits that the averments were not made in the written statement filed before the learned Tribunal. However, in view of the decision rendered by this Court in Haidar Ali Vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in 2021 (3) GLT 85, it has been submitted that the petitioner may be given another opportunity to file these documents before the Tribunal in which event, this Court may remand the matter to the Tribunal for a fresh reconsideration. Learned counsel for the petitioner also placed further reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India Vs. Ibrahim Uddin & Anr. reported in (2012) 8 SCC 148 , where the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in paragraph 49, as follows:- “49. Learned counsel for the petitioner also placed further reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India Vs. Ibrahim Uddin & Anr. reported in (2012) 8 SCC 148 , where the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in paragraph 49, as follows:- “49. An application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC is to be considered at the time of hearing of appeal on merits so as to find out whether the documents and/or the evidence sought to be adduced have any relevance/bearing on the issues involved. The admissibility of additional evidence does not depend upon the relevancy to the issue on hand, or on the fact, whether the applicant had an opportunity for adducing such evidence at an earlier stage or not, but it depends upon whether or not the appellate court requires the evidence sought to be adduced to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause. The true test, therefore is, whether the appellate court is able to pronounce judgment on the materials before it without taking into consideration the additional evidence sought to be adduced. Such occasion would arise only if on examining the evidence as it stands the court comes to the conclusion that some inherent lacuna or defect becomes apparent to the court. [Vide Arjan Singh v. Kartar Singh ( AIR 1951 SC 193 ) and Natha Singh v. Financial Commr., Taxation (1976)3 SCC 28 : AIR 1976 SC 1053 )]” 33. Learned counsel for the petitioner also relying on the decision of this Court in Haidar Ali (supra) submits that the petitioner may be allowed to file these additional documents before the Tribunal. As regards the contention of Mr. Payeng that there is a wide discrepancy in the age reflected in the voters’ lists of 1966 and 1970 in respect of the projected parents, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that such variance may not be of any significance if there are other credible evidence. In this regard, the learned counsel for the petitioner has sought to rely on the decision of this Court in WP(C) No.2926/2019 (Talebar Rahman @ Talu Munshi Vs. Union of India & Ors., decided on 22.10.2019), in which it was held that the discrepancy in the age will be of no significance if other parameters in evidence are similar. In this regard, the learned counsel for the petitioner has sought to rely on the decision of this Court in WP(C) No.2926/2019 (Talebar Rahman @ Talu Munshi Vs. Union of India & Ors., decided on 22.10.2019), in which it was held that the discrepancy in the age will be of no significance if other parameters in evidence are similar. Learned counsel for the petitioner relying on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan Vs. T.N. Sahani & Ors. reported in (2001) 10 SCC 619 , contends that filing of additional documents would be permissible as held in paragraph 4 of the said decision, which reads as under:- “4. It may be pointed out that this Court as long back as in 1963 in K. Venkataramiah v. Seetharama Reddy ( AIR 1963 SC 1526 ) pointed out the scope of unamended provision of Order 41 Rule 27(c) that though there might well be cases where even though the court found that it was able to pronounce the judgment on the state of the record as it was, and so, additional evidence could not be required to enable it to pronounce the judgment, it still considered that in the interest of justice something which remained obscure should be filled up so that it could pronounce its judgment in a more satisfactory manner. This is entirely for the court to consider at the time of hearing of the appeal on merits whether looking into the documents which are sought to be filed as additional evidence, need be looked into to pronounce its judgment in a more satisfactory manner. If that be so, it is always open to the court to look into the documents and for that purpose amended provision of Order 41 Rule 27(b) CPC can be invoked. So the application under Order 41 Rule 27 should have been decided along with the appeal. Had the Court found the documents necessary to pronounce the judgment in the appeal in a more satisfactory manner it would have allowed the same; if not, the same would have been dismissed at that stage. But taking a view on the application before hearing of the appeal, in our view, would be inappropriate. Further the reason given for the dismissal of the application is untenable. The order under challenge cannot, therefore, be sustained. It is accordingly set aside. But taking a view on the application before hearing of the appeal, in our view, would be inappropriate. Further the reason given for the dismissal of the application is untenable. The order under challenge cannot, therefore, be sustained. It is accordingly set aside. The application is restored to its file. The High Court will now consider the appeal and the application and decide the matter afresh in accordance with law.” 34. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that since the name of the petitioner appears in the voters’ list of 1985, merely because his name is not reflected in the earlier voters’ list, cannot be a ground to disbelieve that he is a genuine Indian citizen and has relied on a decision of this Court in Junab Ali (Md.) Vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in 2021 (5) GLT 385. In the present case, since the names of the parents had appeared in the voters’ list prior to 1971, it clearly proves that he is an Indian citizen being a descendent of an Indian. 35. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in view of the provision under Section 3(1)(c)(ii) of the Citizenship Act, 1955, since both the parents of the petitioner are Indian citizens and since the petitioner was born before 1987, the petitioner cannot be declared to be a foreigner. 36. In response, Mr. J. Payeng, learned special counsel, FT, has submitted that the proceeding before this Court is in exercise of power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, for issuance of the writ of certiorari to ascertain the validity of an opinion of the Tribunal. This Court does not exercise the power of the Appellate Court, but merely supervisory in nature to examine the validity of the opinion on certain broad principles as to whether the Tribunal had acted without jurisdiction or in access of it or had failed to exercise it or whether it decided the matter without giving opportunity to the parties of being heard in violation of principle of natural justice. Thus, this Court in exercise of power under Article 226 in certiorari jurisdiction cannot really appreciate the evidence adduced in the Tribunal as in the case of appellate court, as also held by this Court in State of Assam & Anr. Vs. Moslem Mondal & Ors. Thus, this Court in exercise of power under Article 226 in certiorari jurisdiction cannot really appreciate the evidence adduced in the Tribunal as in the case of appellate court, as also held by this Court in State of Assam & Anr. Vs. Moslem Mondal & Ors. reported in 2013 (1) GLT 809, where the power of this Court has been succinctly dealt under paragraph 112 of the said case, which reads as follows:- “112. Article 226 of the Constitution confers on the High Court power to issue appropriate writ to any person or authority within its territorial jurisdiction. The Tribunal constituted under the 1946 Act read with the 1964 Order, as noticed above, is required to discharge the quasi-judicial function. The High Court, therefore, has the power under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue writ of certiorari quashing the decision of the Tribunal in an appropriate case. The scope of interference with the Tribunal’s order, in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 226, however, is limited. The writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as and when the inferior Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it or if such Court or Tribunal acts illegally in exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, or when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard or violates the principles of natural justice. The certiorari jurisdiction of the writ Court being supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction, the Court cannot review the findings of facts reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal. There is, however, an exception to the said general proposition, in as much as, the writ of certiorari can be issued and the decision of a Tribunal on a finding of fact can be interfered with, if in recording such a finding the Tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible or has refused to admit admissible evidence or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases such error would amount to an error of law apparent on the face of the record. The other errors of fact, however grave it may be, cannot be corrected by a writ court. The other errors of fact, however grave it may be, cannot be corrected by a writ court. As noticed above, the judicial review of the order passed by the inferior Court or the Tribunal, in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, is limited to correction of errors apparent on the face of the record, which also takes within its fold a case where a statutory authority exercising its discretionary jurisdiction did not take into consideration a relevant fact or renders its decision on wholly irrelevant factors. Hence, the failure of taking into account the relevant facts or consideration of irrelevant factors, which has a bearing on the decision of the inferior court or the Tribunal, can be a ground for interference of the Court or Tribunal’s decision in exercise of the writ jurisdiction by the High Court.” As such, it may not be permissible to appreciate evidence already led before the Tribunal. Further, for the same reason, it may not be permissible to take into consideration any additional documents for the reason that the provisions of Order 43 Rule 17 CPC are applicable in the case of appellate courts, and this Court is not functioning as an appellate court in determining the validity of the opinion of the Tribunal. 37. Further, Mr. Payeng, learned special counsel, FT, submits that as held by this Court in Nilbhan (Musstt.) Vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in 2021 (1) GLT 799 it would be impermissible to bring any new evidence to fill up the lacuna or gap in the evidence. It is only to clarify certain doubts in the evidence already laid and as such the prayer of the petitioner to adduce new evidence would not be permissible. Mr. Payeng further submits that in the present case, apart from appearance of the name of the proceedee in the 1985 voters’ list, there is no other document or evidence to show that he ever existed before 1985 and as regards the similarities, except for the similarity in the name of the village, there is no similarity with the earlier voters’ list of 1985 with the voters’ lists of 1966 and 1970 and there is no relation or link with the aforesaid earlier voters’ list of 1985. 38. Mr. 38. Mr. Payeng further submits that the burden is heavy on a proceedee to discharge that he is an Indian and not a foreigner for the peculiar historical reason obtaining in this part of the country where a large number of people had migrated from the neighbouring country who bear similar resemblance with the people already inhabiting in this country and the Tribunals have been created in Assam which are not found in other jurisdiction of this country. These Tribunals have been created to determine and detect illegal immigrants who have come from the neighbouring country who bear similar resemblance in features, in the language and as such, the proceedee has to prove before the Tribunal that he is not a foreigner but an Indian with sufficient documentary evidences. Mere orally claiming that he is an Indian will not suffice. The same assertion has to be supported by credible documentary evidences. It has been further submitted that in the present case, these documentary evidences are not available except for the voters’ list of 1985 and as such, merely on the basis of the claim of the petitioner that he was born before 1987, he cannot claim that he is an Indian as he has to prove with sufficient credible evidences that he is the son of his parents, who themselves were Indians. Unless he is able to discharge that burden, merely because he was born before 1987, cannot give him the benefit that he is an Indian in terms of the provisions of Section 3(1)(c)(ii) of the Citizenship Act, 1955. 39. Further, Mr. Payeng submits that if the petitioner is claiming the benefit under Section 6A of the Citizenship Act of 1955, certainly he cannot invoke the provisions of Section 3 for the purpose of citizenship, as these two provisions relate to different situations to deal with different categories of persons. Section 6A has been enacted specifically to give certain benefits to immigrants from Bangladesh who entered India before 1971 and in the present case, the petitioner has to prove with credible evidences that he was born before 1971 which is not proved. It has been also submitted that if filing of additional documents which the petitioner is seeking to rely is allowed, there will be no end to litigation. It has been also submitted that if filing of additional documents which the petitioner is seeking to rely is allowed, there will be no end to litigation. He contends that the purpose of creating Tribunal is to bring to a logical conclusion about the claim of citizenship within a time bound period and not to allow him to continue ad infinitum by allowing a proceedee to produce documents at a later point of time. 40. In response to the submission made by Mr. Payeng that this Court is not an appellate court but has limited jurisdiction of certiorari, Mr. J. Ahmed, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that this contention perhaps would not lie for the reason that there is no appellate forum available against any decision rendered by the learned Tribunal, as in the earlier case, where there used to be an appellate forum against which a person could approach the Single Bench of this Court and if felt further aggrieved, could avail the appellate forum in the form of Division Bench of this Court. However, the said higher forum is now no more available and as such this Court being the ultimate forum as far as a proceedee is concerned, in exercise of constitutional power as guaranteed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has ample power and jurisdiction to pass appropriate orders for the ends of justice. 41. Mr. Ahmed further submits that Section 6A(1)(a) defines Assam as territories included in the State of Assam immediately before commencement of the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 1985 and also defines specified territory under sub-clause (c) as territory included in Bangladesh immediately before commencement of the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 1985 and under sub-clause (d), it has been held that a person shall be deemed to be of an Indian origin, if he, or either of his parents or of any of his grandparents was born in undivided India and as such, these provisions of Section 6A would cover persons who are born after 1985 and not before 1985. In the present case, the petitioner admittedly was born before 1985 and as such his citizenship cannot be denied because of the provisions under Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955. 42. Mr. In the present case, the petitioner admittedly was born before 1985 and as such his citizenship cannot be denied because of the provisions under Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955. 42. Mr. J. Ahmed, learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that it has been clearly mentioned under Section 6A(7) of the Citizenship Act, 1955 that nothing in sub-sections (2) to (6) shall apply in relation to any person who, immediately before the commencement of the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 1985, is a citizen of India and accordingly, submits that since the petitioner was already a citizen of India before 1985, the provisions of sub-sections (2) to (6) of Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955 will not apply. 43. Mr. Payeng, however, submits that such a proposition would be absolutely incorrect and submits that if that is accepted, any person who comes before 1985 has to be treated as an Indian which is not contemplated under law. 44. However, before we examine the rival contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, it may be apposite to examine the conclusions and reasons thereof given by the learned Tribunal in the impugned order which is quoted above. 45. Perusal of the aforesaid opinion would show that the learned Tribunal declined to believe the claim of the petitioner that Madhu Sheikh and Aymon Nessa were his parents on the ground that when the petitioner was asked by the learned Tribunal, the petitioner failed to state as to when and where they were born and brought up. 46. In other words, the learned Tribunal felt that since the petitioner did not know when his parents were born and brought up, his claim that the aforesaid persons were his parents, was not established. 47. Further, the learned Tribunal also felt that the existence of the proceedee has been proved only by the Electoral Roll of 1985 when his name appeared for the first time. 48. We do not agree with the aforesaid approach undertaken by the learned Tribunal inasmuch as the failure to mention as to where and how the parents were brought up would not necessarily render such a relationship claimed by the petitioner not being established since other evidences adduced have to be also taken into account before the relationship is ruled out. 49. 49. The learned Tribunal also held that the Annual Khiraj Patta was issued in favour of Madu Sheik and not Madhu Sheikh. Learned Tribunal also held that the said Annual Khiraj Patta was in respect of a particular year and nothing has been mentioned about the subsequent developments as to the renewal of the Annual Patta. Accordingly, the learned Tribunal held that it does not confer any status of land holder nor that it is heritable and transferable. 50. As regards this finding of the learned Tribunal, what is important to note is whether the land was recorded in the name of a person or not. It is not necessary that all the subsequent documents have to be also shown. The Patta on its own though may not be the conclusive proof of the tile of a person, yet it indicates possession of land by the particular person and also the relationship with the person, shown along with the land holder. Thus, if the name of the petitioner is shown as the son of a person, the document can be used to prove the father-son relationship. 51. Though the affidavit filed by the petitioner which was exhibited as Ext. F in itself does not establish any fact, yet, affidavit is nothing but testimony of a person relating to certain aspects and as such, though it may not be a proof of the facts stated in an affidavit, certainly, it partakes the character of oral testimony put down in writing which has to be appreciated in conjunction with other available evidences on record. 52. As regards the observation by the learned Tribunal that there is difference in the name of projected father of the petitioner since it has been shown as Madhu Sheikh in some of the documents, it has been shown as Madu Sheik in some other documents, which the learned Tribunal had held to be of serious nature. We are again not able to agree with the said conclusion as the difference does appear to be a significant discrepancy but rather a minor one. We are again not able to agree with the said conclusion as the difference does appear to be a significant discrepancy but rather a minor one. It is also to be noted that in the said revenue documents, though the name of the father of the petitioner has been shown as “Madu Seikh” which is different from “Madhu Sheikh”, the name of the father of the said Madu Seikh has been shown as Dauri and as such the name of the grandfather of the petitioner appears to be the same and as such, the learned Tribunal ought not to have ignored the said document. 53. Further, we have also noted that the learned Tribunal did not discuss anything about one witness produced by the petitioner who was examined as DW2, namely, Nur Mohammad, aged about 75 years resident of Utter Godoni under Tarabari Police Station. He stated that he knew the proceedee since childhood and that the proceedee was born and brought up at Dakhin Godhani. The said DW2 also stated that the name of the father of the petitioner was Madhu Seikh. However, there was no discussion in the opinion rendered by the learned Tribunal of the aforesaid testimony of the vital witness who knew the proceedee since childhood. 54. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, we are of the view that the opinion rendered by the learned Tribunal cannot be sustained in law and accordingly, it requires to be reconsidered. 55. In view of the above, we do not deem it necessary to consider the rival contentions of the parties as the parties would be at liberty to raise all these contentions before the learned Tribunal when the matter will be taken up again by the learned Tribunal for giving a fresh opinion in this regard with respect to citizenship of the petitioner. 56. As regards the documents which were not filed before the Tribunal, which according to the petitioner are relevant, the petitioner may make an application before the Tribunal and the Tribunal will consider the same if it does not cause any prejudice to the State and decide in accordance with law. 57. 56. As regards the documents which were not filed before the Tribunal, which according to the petitioner are relevant, the petitioner may make an application before the Tribunal and the Tribunal will consider the same if it does not cause any prejudice to the State and decide in accordance with law. 57. For the reasons discussed above, the present petition is allowed by setting aside the impugned order dated 30.10.2017 passed by the learned Foreigners Tribunal, Barpeta 7th in F.T. Case No.34/2017 and the matter is remanded to the learned Tribunal for giving a fresh opinion as regards the citizenship status of the petitioner after hearing the parties. 58. Petitioner will appear before the learned Tribunal within a period of 1 (one) month from today. Petitioner will continue to remain on bail on similar terms and conditions as directed by this Court vide order dated 18.05.2018 till a fresh opinion is rendered by the learned Foreigners Tribunal as regards the citizenship status of the petitioner. 59. The present petition is, accordingly, disposed of. 60. LCR be remitted forthwith to the concerned Foreigners Tribunal.