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2022 DIGILAW 639 (GAU)

Sulekha Haldar, D/o. Late Khitish Chandra Biswas, W/o. Late Rohit Haldar v. Union of India, Rep. by the Secretary Min. of Home Affairs, Govt. of India

2022-06-15

N.KOTISWAR SINGH, NANI TAGIA

body2022
JUDGMENT : N. Kotiswar Singh, J. Heard Ms. D. Ghosh, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. B. Sharma, learned Central Government Counsel; Mr. G. Sharma, learned Special Counsel, FT; Mr. A.I. Ali, learned Standing Counsel, ECI; Ms. L. Devi, learned Standing Counsel, NRC and Ms. K. Phookan, learned Government Advocate, Assam. 2. In this writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the opinion dated 15.06.2018 passed by the Foreigners Tribunal No.3rd, Morigaon in Case No.FT(D)193/2015 by which the Tribunal held that the petitioner had miserably failed to discharge her burden as envisaged under Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, 1946 and, accordingly, declared her to be an illegal immigrant of post 1971 stream. 3. The case of the petitioner, in brief, is that she is the daughter of one Khitish Ch. Haldar, son of Srinivash Haldar and Sumati Bala Haldar. The petitioner was born in Chakitup in Nagaon district. Later, her father shifted from Chakitup to Morigaon for business purposes and died there and she married to one Rohit Haldar. Thereafter, the petitioner, along with her family, shifted to Ouzari for better livelihood. Presently, the petitioner is settled in Malputa. 4. In support of her claim that the petitioner is an Indian and not a foreigner, she has relied upon the following documents:- (i). Certificate of registration issued in the name of Khitish Ch. Haldar (Ext.A); (ii). Certificate of registration issued in the name of Sumati Bala Haldar (Ext.B); (iii). Voters list of 1997 in which the name of one Samaresh Biswas appears as son of Khitish and one Sumati as the wife of Khitish (Ext.C); (iv) Voters list of 2005 in which the name of the petitioner appears as the wife of Rohit along with his son Pabitra Haldar (Ext.D); (v) Voters list of 2014 in which the name of the petitioner appears as the wife of Lt. Rohit Haldar with her son Pabitra Haldar as well as Dipjyoti Haldar and Prasenjit Haldar (Ext.E); (vi) Certain land documents by which the petitioner sold certain properties on 12.09.2011 (Ext.F); (vii) Jamabandi copy in which her name appears as per mutation order dated 15.09.2012 (Ext.G); (viii) Gaonburah certificate dated 24.09.2014 (Ext.H); (ix) Another Gaonburah certificate issued on 20.03.2014. 5. The Tribunal, however, held that the petitioner had failed to discharge her burden of proof as required under Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, 1946. 6. 5. The Tribunal, however, held that the petitioner had failed to discharge her burden of proof as required under Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, 1946. 6. In order to examine the rationale given by the Tribunal, it may be appropriate to reproduce the reasons assigned in the impugned order, which read as under: “CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE REFERENCE: 4. (i). Ext.A is the certificate of registration issued in the name of Khitish Ch. Haldar who is the father of OP Smti. Sulekha Haldar purportedly obtained on 16.01.1957 from the Election Office, Nagaon. Similarly, Ext.B is also the certificate of registration in the name of Sumoti Halder who is mother of OP Sulekha Haldar issued by the Election Office, Nagaon dated 19.01.1957. It is simply very strange to note as to how migrants from East Pakistan (Bangladesh) have been resorting to making duplicate documents and taking all the privilege of being Indian citizens. I have thoroughly discussed in depth regarding certificate of registration while holding as incharge Member of Foreigners Tribunal No.1, Morigaon in FT(D) Case No.129/2010 (Shri Nibaran Biswas @ Nibaran Mandal) wherein officials of Deputy Commissioner office, Nagaon appeared with record and have recorded their statements that certificates of registration in Nagaon have been issued only since 1962 and Deputy Commissioner is the sole authority to issue citizenship certificate. Be that as it may, since the above two exhibits are not proved as per law more particularly as held by the Apex Court in Life Insurance Company & Anr. Vs. Rampal Sing Bisan reported in (2010) 4 SCC 291 and as such the same cannot be accepted as a genuine document. (ii) The other exhibits, such as, Ext.C and Ext.D voter list of 1997, 2005 in the name of OP with her husband, Ext.E voter list of OP Sulekha Halder along with her children and Ext.F, land sale deed of OP need not be discussed as these are all post 1971 documents. (iii) However, OP Sulekha Halder, D/o. Khitish Ch. Haldar have submitted a HSLC certificate of her purported brother namely Kumaresh Biswas of 1970 as Mark-I (kept on record) who she named during query put by the Tribunal. But this Board Certificate is of no help as the name indicated upon the said certificate is of one Kumaresh Biswas, whereas she has deposed her father name as Khitish Ch. Haldar have submitted a HSLC certificate of her purported brother namely Kumaresh Biswas of 1970 as Mark-I (kept on record) who she named during query put by the Tribunal. But this Board Certificate is of no help as the name indicated upon the said certificate is of one Kumaresh Biswas, whereas she has deposed her father name as Khitish Ch. Haldar and ever in her W/s her father’s name was mentioned as Khitish Ch. Haldar. Therefore, this Kumaresh Biswas is altogether a different person and this Kumaresh Biswas is not her own brother but a good Samaritan who brought her up after her parents early demise if her statements are indeed time. (iv) Similarly, Mark II voter list of 1997 (kept on record) which is submitted as linkage documents during argument also do not aspire the confidence of the Tribunal on the said document because her purported brother’s name is indicated as Kumaresh Biswas though shown as S/o. Khitish. I have come across numerous cases where people got their name registered in the electoral roll showing themselves to be near blood relations of persons where names are already in existence in the electoral rolls. In fact, I still remember inserting of any person’s name in the electoral roll by the census persons, while he was a school going lad just at the whim of an elderly person who directed names of person to be enrolled/enlisted irrespective of any family relationships. 5. In view of the above observation and discussion, OP, namely, Smt. Sulekha Haldar, d/o. Lt. Khitish Haldar, w/o. Ruhit Haldar of village-Malputa, PS. Morigaon in the district of Morigaon (Assam) have therefore miserably failed to discharge her burden of proof as envisaged U/s. 9 of the Foreigners Act, 1946 and therefore in my considered opinion, she is an illegal migrant of post 1971 and accordingly I declare Smt. Sulekha Haldar, d/o. Lt. Khitish Haldar, w/o. Ruhit Haldar a foreigner U/s. 9 of the Foreigners Act, 1946 having entered into India (Assam) after 25.03.1971. And as Smt. Sulekha Haldar, d/o. Lt. Khitish Haldar, w/o. Ruhit Haldar is declared a foreigner, all other blood related immediate relatives of OP Sulekha Haldar are deemed to be foreigners and hence the Superintendent of Police (B), Morigaon is to initiate fresh references against all the immediate family members of OP Smt. Sulekha Haldar.” 7. And as Smt. Sulekha Haldar, d/o. Lt. Khitish Haldar, w/o. Ruhit Haldar is declared a foreigner, all other blood related immediate relatives of OP Sulekha Haldar are deemed to be foreigners and hence the Superintendent of Police (B), Morigaon is to initiate fresh references against all the immediate family members of OP Smt. Sulekha Haldar.” 7. Thus, from the above, it is evident that the Tribunal ignored Exts. A and B, i.e., certificates of registration in the name of her parents purportedly on the basis of certain observations made in FT(D) Case No.192/2010 ( Nibaran Biswas @ Nibaran Mandal) wherein apparently the officials of the Deputy Commissioner, Nagaon had appeared and gave statement that certificates of registration have been issued only since 1962 and the Deputy Commissioner is the sole authority to issue citizenship certificate. The Tribunal further held that since the two exhibits are not proved as per law more particularly as held by the Apex Court in Life Insurance Company and another Vs. Rampal Sing Bisen, reported in (2010) 4 SCC 291, the same cannot be accepted as genuine documents. 8. We are not able to accept the aforesaid conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal to be correct. 9. We have perused the aforesaid two original documents, i.e., certificates of registration in the name of Khitish Ch. Haldar as well as Sumati Bala Haldar, who the petitioner claims to be her parents. These documents have been exhibited and are available on record in the original file requisitioned from the Tribunal. The State has not questioned the authenticity and genuineness of the said two original documents. The said original documents clearly mention that the certificates have been issued on 16.01.1957 and 19.01.1957 by the Election Officer, Nowgong in the name of the parents with their particulars. When the authenticity or genuineness of the documents has not been questioned by the State, we fail to understand how the Tribunal could have ignored these, that too on the basis of certain observation made in another proceeding in which the petitioner was not a party, and as such had no opportunity to contest such stand of the State. Further, these documents are more than 30 years old and there will be a presumption that these documents are genuine unless doubted or questioned by the State in terms of Section 90 of the Evidence Act, 1872. Further, these documents are more than 30 years old and there will be a presumption that these documents are genuine unless doubted or questioned by the State in terms of Section 90 of the Evidence Act, 1872. These documents are in the custody of the petitioner, which ordinarily can be expected to be in her custody as these are related to her parents. 10. In the present case, from the record, it appears that no such question was raised either by the State at the time of filing of the documents or hearing or in course of examination of the said documents by the petitioner. No doubt was also raised that the petitioner had surreptitiously obtained these documents to make a fraudulent claim of citizenship on the basis of these documents. In our view, the aforesaid two certificates of registration issued by the competent authority would be clinching evidences in favour of the petitioner that she being the daughter of Khitish Haldar and Sumati Bala Haldar will be an Indian citizen inasmuch as the said two persons were already registered as citizens of this country as far back as in the year 1957. 11. The question of proof as per the mandate of the Apex Court in Rampal Sing Bisen (supra) will arise when a private document is required to be proved. Even if these certificates are considered to be private documents, the fact remains that these documents are more than 30 years old and if these documents are produced from the custody of the petitioner, who in the particular facts of the case, ordinarily, is expected to be in possession of these documents as these documents certify that her parents were citizens of this country, then these documents can be considered to be genuine ones. Accordingly, this Court would presume the genuineness of the said documents and hold the same to be genuine in the absence of any challenge to the authenticity or otherwise by the State. 12. We also fail to understand what prompted the Tribunal could rely on an opinion which has been personally rendered in a different FT Case without bringing the said matter on record. There is nothing on record to show that the records of FT(D) Case No.129/2010 had been brought on record and, as such, we are unable to understand as to what was decided in the said FT Case. There is nothing on record to show that the records of FT(D) Case No.129/2010 had been brought on record and, as such, we are unable to understand as to what was decided in the said FT Case. Therefore, in the absence of the records being brought on record and made available to the petitioner, we are of the view that any such opinion rendered in a different FT case cannot be used against the petitioner. 13. The Tribunal further held that the voters’ lists of 1997 and 2005 need not be discussed as these are all post 1971 documents. We again fail to understand how such a conclusion could be drawn inasmuch as, even if these documents are post 1971 documents, these may have some relevancy which are sought to be used to corroborate certain facts to show the continuity of relationship or stay in the country. As such, such documents cannot be ignored merely on the ground that these are post 1971 documents. We would like to mention that as far as the voters list of 1997 is concerned, it refers to one Samaresh Biswas, son of Khitish and it also mentions the name of one Sumati, who is the daughter of Khitish. As regards Samaresh Biswas, her brother had clearly mentioned that Samaresh Biswas is one of the brothers of the petitioner staying at Malpota. Thus, if Samaresh Biswas is son of Khitish and if the petitioner is claiming that she is the daughter of Khitish, the said voters list would corroborate the evidence of the petitioner that she has a brother called Samaresh Biswas. To that extent, merely because the voters list of 1997 is a post 1971 document, it cannot be held to be irrelevant, as held by the Tribunal. 14. Coming to the finding of the Tribunal that though the petitioner had submitted an HSLC certificate of 1970 belonging to one Kumaresh Biswas, the original of which is kept on record, the Tribunal held that as the petitioner had deposed in her evidence that the name of her father is Khitish, the said Kumaresh Biswas cannot be said to be her own brother but a good Samaritan, who brought her up after the early demise of her parents. We cannot accept the above conclusion of the Tribunal for the reason that when the petitioner had deposed before the Tribunal that Kumaresh Biswas was her elder brother, no question was raised to doubt the said statement of the petitioner. In fact, during the cross-examination, she stated that after her father had expired and when she was very small, she was brought up by her elder brother Kumaresh Biswas, who also had expired one year ago. No question was asked to the petitioner to shake her testimony that it was her brother Kumaresh Biswas, who had brought her up and also that he had expired one year ago. Therefore, if the petitioner produces the original HSLC certificate belonging to Kumaresh Biswas, there is no reason to doubt her statement more so, when no questions have been asked doubting the same in course of the trial. 15. In any event, how could the petitioner produce an original certificate belonging to another person, unless such a person is closely known or related? Could the relatives of Kumaresh Biswas part with the original certificate to a stranger? The petitioner could not have obtained the original H.S.L.C. certificate unless, the relatives of Kumaresh Biswas trusted the petitioner, which would indicate that they were well acquainted which goes on to corroborate that the petitioner was related to Kumaresh Biswas as claimed by her. 16. As regards the voters list of 1997, though the Tribunal held that it does not inspire confidence of the Tribunal, we are of the view that the said voters list certainly reflects the name of Kumaresh Biswas as the son of Khitish, whom the petitioner claims to be her brother and father respectively. 17. We are also at a loss to understand how the learned Member of the Tribunal can bring his personal opinion while deciding the matter. The Member of the Tribunal observes that he had come across numerous cases where people got their names registered in the electoral roll showing themselves to be near blood relations of persons where their names are already in existence in the electoral rolls. The Member of the Tribunal observes that he had come across numerous cases where people got their names registered in the electoral roll showing themselves to be near blood relations of persons where their names are already in existence in the electoral rolls. The learned Member continues to observe that he still remembers inserting of a person’s name in the electoral roll by the census persons, while he was a school going lad just at the whim of an elderly person who directed names of person to be enrolled/enlisted irrespective of any family relationship. We are afraid, such personal opinion based on personal experience cannot be allowed to influence a judicial decision, which is to be rendered on the basis of appreciation of evidence on record and not by bringing personal opinion and experience of the Member presiding over the matter. Such an opinion/view could not have been brought into the decision-making process for the simple reason that the petitioner was never made known of such prejudicial facts nor was given the opportunity to cross-examination the Member of the Tribunal in order to ascertain the veracity of such an opinion. Such an opinion of the Tribunal was not brought to the notice of the proceedee. Personal opinion of a Judge or Member of a Tribunal ought not to be allowed to influence the decision-making process as it would amount to personal bias, which will vitiate the decision-making process. Neutrality of a Judge or decision making authority will stand compromised if his personal opinion based on personal experience based on certain fact situation is allowed to shape his final decision. While a Judge is entitled to have his views on the rival contentions of the contesting parties or on the question of law, he cannot bring his own views or belief based on his personal experience or certain facts, and make it a part of the decision. That would amount to bringing an extraneous material to shape the decision, which is unknown to the parties, but known only to the Judge. Since, in the present case, such a personal knowledge of the Member of the Tribunal relates to certain alleged malpractices, unless substantiated by evidence or already judicially noticed earlier, cannot be used to shape his decision. Apart from being plainly prejudicial to the parties, it amounts to judicial impropriety. 18. Since, in the present case, such a personal knowledge of the Member of the Tribunal relates to certain alleged malpractices, unless substantiated by evidence or already judicially noticed earlier, cannot be used to shape his decision. Apart from being plainly prejudicial to the parties, it amounts to judicial impropriety. 18. Under the circumstances, we are unable to agree with any of the reasons assigned by the Tribunal in holding that the petitioner had failed to discharge her burden. 19. On the other hand, we are of the view that if the aforesaid two crucial documents, namely, registration certificates issued in the names of Khitish Ch. Haldar and Sumati Bala Haldar are found to be genuine and have not been questioned/doubted by the State, the petitioner can claim to be a citizen of this country by descent. We are of the view that the original document, i.e., HSLC certificate of the year 1970 issued by the Board of Secondary Education, Assam (SEBA) in favour of Kumaresh Biswas having not been questioned would corroborate the statement of the petitioner that the said Kumaresh Biswas, son of Khitish, is the brother of the petitioner. Thus, we are satisfied that the oral evidence of the petitioner stands substantially corroborated by documentary evidences. 20. In a proceeding before the Foreigners Tribunal, the standard of proof required is preponderance of probability. In other words, on the basis of the evidences that are be adduced, the case of the proceedee should be more probable than the one offered by the State. In the present case, what we have seen is that the petitioner has been able to show, on the basis of certain original documents, authenticity or otherwise of which has not been questioned, that in all probability she is the daughter of aforesaid Khitish Ch. Haldar and Sumati Bala Haldar, who were already registered as citizens of this country in the year 1957 itself, supported by the original certificate issued by the SEBA in favour of Kumaresh Biswas who the petitioner claims to be her brother as well as the voters lists referred to above. But, nothing has been brought on record by the State to dispute these claims by shaking her testimony by leading contrary evidence by the State. Thus, we are satisfied that she has been able to prove that she is the daughter of Indian citizens. 21. But, nothing has been brought on record by the State to dispute these claims by shaking her testimony by leading contrary evidence by the State. Thus, we are satisfied that she has been able to prove that she is the daughter of Indian citizens. 21. Under the circumstances, we are of the view that the petitioner has been able to discharge her burden as required under Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, 1946. 22. For the reasons discussed above, we allow this petition by setting aside the impugned order dated 15.06.2018 passed by the Foreigners Tribunal No.3rd, Morigaon in Case No. FT(D) 193/2015. Accordingly, we declare the petitioner to be a citizen of India and not a foreigner. 23. LCR be remitted forthwith to the concerned Tribunal. 24. The writ petition is, accordingly, disposed of.