ORDER : The applicant herein is SEW Infrastructure Limited (SEW), a company incorporated under the laws of India and having its registered office at Begumpet, Hyderabad; the respondent No.1 is the Ethiopian Roadways Authority (ERA), an entity of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia; the respondent No.2 is the Bank of Abyssinia (BOA) and the respondent No.3 is the State Bank of India (SBI). Background facts: 2. In the bidding process floated by ERA, a contract for construction of roads under Mombassa ? Nairobi ? Addis Ababa Corridor Phase III Project: Hawassa ? Ageremarian Section, Lot 1 : Hawassa ? Chuko in Ethiopia was awarded to SEW and contract agreement dated 30.11.2012 was entered into by the parties. In terms of the contract BOA has issued four Bank Guarantees (BGs) to ERA on the basis counter BGs issued by SBI on behalf of SEW. Out of four BGs, two BGs are Advance Bank Guarantees (ABG), which are encashable on the condition of SEW applying the funds received for the project to purposes, which are outside the scope of the roads project. The other two BGs are Performance Bank Guarantees (PBG), which are encashable upon declaring the contractor/SEW being in default under the contract. 3. Disputes arose between SEW and ERA, as, admittedly, there was delay in execution of the project. SEW claimed that delay is attributable to ERA, as it did not hand over the project sites without obstructions and encumbrances for execution of the road project. The General Conditions of Contract (GCC) provided for mechanism of forming a Dispute Board to which any dispute arising between the parties has to be referred to. It is the case of SEW that as per Clauses 20.4 and 20.5 without referring the dispute to the Dispute Board and without following any conditions of settlement under GCC, ERA unilaterally issued notice of termination dated 20.05.2016, which was served on SEW on 23.05.2016 giving a notice of 14 days for termination of the contract. SEW issued reply dated 30.05.2016 asserting that delay and slow progress of work was due to various reasons attributable to ERA. 4. SEW approached this Court by way of this Arbitration Application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short ?the Act?) seeking to restrain ERA, its agents, officers, employees etc. SEW issued reply dated 30.05.2016 asserting that delay and slow progress of work was due to various reasons attributable to ERA. 4. SEW approached this Court by way of this Arbitration Application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short ?the Act?) seeking to restrain ERA, its agents, officers, employees etc. by way of injunction from invoking two ABGs and two PBGs; to restrain BOA from honouring/encashing ABG and PBG on behalf of SEW; to restrain SBI from honouring/encashing counter BG issued to BOA; to stay operation of all further actions pursuant to the notice of termination dated 20.05.2016 including any coercive steps and encashment of BG issued on behalf of SEW by BOA and SBI. 5. Clause 20.06 of the GCC provides for arbitration, which reads as follows: ?20.6 Arbitration 20.6.1 Any dispute between the Parties arising out of or in connection with the Contract not settled amicably in accordance with GC Clause 20.5 above, and in respect of which the DB?s decision (if any) has not become final and binding, shall be finally settled by arbitration. Arbitration shall be conducted as follows: (a) for contracts with foreign contractors, international arbitration (i) with proceedings administered by the institution designated in the Particular Conditions, and conducted under the rules of arbitration of such institution; or, if so specified in the Particular Conditions, (ii) international arbitration in accordance with the arbitration rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL); or (iii) if neither an arbitration institution or UNCITRAL arbitration rules is specified in the Particular Conditions, with proceedings administered by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), and conducted under the ICC Rules of Arbitration; by one or more arbitrators appointed in accordance with the said arbitration rules. The place of arbitration shall be the neutral location specified in the Particular Conditions, and the arbitration shall be conducted in the language for communications with laws of Employer?s country ?? 6. It is stated by letter dated 22.04.2016, ERA provisionally extended the contract period by 60 days, which was expired on 21.06.2016. SEW made a request for extension of time and without disposing the said application, ERA unilaterally terminated the contract without referring the dispute to the Dispute Board. 7. This Court passed interim order dated 06.06.2016, which reads as under: ?Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Deepak Bhattacharjee for respondent No.3. SEW made a request for extension of time and without disposing the said application, ERA unilaterally terminated the contract without referring the dispute to the Dispute Board. 7. This Court passed interim order dated 06.06.2016, which reads as under: ?Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Deepak Bhattacharjee for respondent No.3. We have perused the letter, dated 20.05.2016, bearing referenceNo.MMS/267/12-2221 and so also the letter, dated 22.04.2015 bearing reference No.AIC/RE/SEW/16/Contr./1146. It is not clear whether Bank guarantee has been encashed by respondent No.1. Learned counsel for respondent No.3 submits that respondent No.3 has not received any communication from respondent Nos.1 and 2. In the circumstances, issue notice to respondent Nos.1 and 2 returnable on 16.06.2016. In addition to Court notice, petitioner is directed to issue personal notice to respondent Nos.1 and 2 including service of notice through e-mail or any other mode and file affidavit of service. Stand over to 16.06.2016. Till 16.06.2016, parties are directed to maintain status quo. It is made clear that this Court has not examined merits of the case.? The interim order was extended from time to time. So far as ERA and BOA are concerned, the interim order dated 06.06.2016 was passed against them ex parte. 8. Initially, the matter was taken up by a Division Bench and later assigned to Single Bench. Vacate Stay petition was filed by BOA in IA.No.2 of 2017 to vacate the interim order dated 06.06.2016. In the meantime, the proceedings in the main dispute which was referred to the Arbitral Tribunal at Paris, France in ICC Case No.23274/PTA were concluded and final award dated 27.07.2021 was passed. Submissions of Mr. S. Niranjan Reddy, learned Senior Counsel for SEW: 9.1. Status quo order dated 06.06.2016 was intimated to ERA vide email dated 10.06.2016. BOA was also intimated about status quo order by personal notice dated 11.06.2016. Despite having knowledge of status quo order, ERA and BOA invoked the subject BGs. BOA made payment under ABG on 20.11.2016 i.e. five months after interim status quo order was passed. Payment under PBG was made on 10.10.2017 by BOA to ERA and they are liable for contempt for deliberately violating the orders of this Court. 9.2. ERA and BOA colluded and illegally encashed BGs in the guise of order dated 16.10.2017 passed by the Federal High Court of Ethiopia. Payment under PBG was made on 10.10.2017 by BOA to ERA and they are liable for contempt for deliberately violating the orders of this Court. 9.2. ERA and BOA colluded and illegally encashed BGs in the guise of order dated 16.10.2017 passed by the Federal High Court of Ethiopia. In fact, the Ethiopian Court was misled by ERA and BOA and status quo order passed by this Court was suppressed. ERA has not even appeared before this Court to answer the claim of SEW. BOA cannot be permitted to act as proxy to ERA and seek to vacate the interim order. A party violating the interim order cannot be heard until it purges itself from contempt. BOA is responsible for the present state of things as BG amounts were paid in violation of orders of this Court. BOA is trying to achieve something indirectly which ERA could not achieve directly. 9.3. Subsisting order under Section 9 of the Act can be continued even after passing of the award as per the judgment of the Supreme Court in ULTRATECH CEMENT LIMITED v. RAJASTHAN RAJYA VIDYUT UTPADAN NIGAM, (2018) 15 SCC 210 . Section 9 orders can be passed post award and pending a challenge against the award as held in I. SUDERSHAN RAO v. EVERSHINE BUILDERS PRIVATE LIMITED, 2012 (6) ALT 343 ; GAIL (INDIA) LTD. v. LATIN RASAYANI PRIVATE LIMITED, 2014 SCC OnLine GUJ 14836; SAPTARISHI HOTELS PVT. LTD. v. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF TOURISM AND HOSPITALITY, 2019 SCC OnLine TS 1765 : (2019) 6 ALT 439 (DB) and MEDIMA LLC v. BALASORE ALLOYS LIMITED, MANU/WB/0540/2021. This Court has jurisdiction to entertain this application as SEW does not have any other remedy in law as per proviso to Section 2(2) of the Act and as amended in 2015. The Court hearing arbitral award under Section 34 of the Act only has the power to suspend operation of the award and has no power to pass further interim directions. Similarly, under the French Code of Civil Procedure, the Court of appeal has no power for passing interim orders similar to orders passed under Section 9 of the Act. 9.4. The arbitral tribunal has erroneously held that invocation of BGs was valid. Such conclusion is contrary to the findings recorded by the arbitral tribunal in paras 223 to 225 of the award dated 27.07.2021. 9.4. The arbitral tribunal has erroneously held that invocation of BGs was valid. Such conclusion is contrary to the findings recorded by the arbitral tribunal in paras 223 to 225 of the award dated 27.07.2021. SEW has made out a case for continuation of status quo order. The Government of Ethiopia ha declared national emergency on 02.11.2021 for a period of six months, which has been recently been revoked. However, the state of unrest continues to exist in Ethiopia in view of the longstanding civil war. 9.5. Interim order has been granted by this Court on 06.06.2016 and hearing of the appeal filed before the appellate tribunal, France is scheduled on 06.06.2023. Hence, the balance of convenience lies in favour of SEW for continuing status quo order. BOA cannot be allowed to take advantage of its own wrong and seek to vacate the interim order. ERA has not appeared before this Court till today to answer the allegations of irretrievable injustice, unjust enrichment and invocation of BGs in violation of order of this Court dated 06.06.20216. Submissions of Mr. Rathan Singh, learned Senior Counsel for BOA: 10.1. The Courts in India or at Hyderabad do not have territorial jurisdiction to entertain this application. No part of cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court. SEW is an Indian contractor. ERA is a State Entity in Ethiopia. BOA/Vacate Petitioner is a bank based in Ethiopia. SBI is a bank based in Hyderabad. The contract was executed in Ethiopia. The project site is in Ethiopia. ABG and PBG were given through BOA. Merely because SBI issued counter BG to BOA, it would not give rise to any cause of action for instituting this arbitration application before this Court. 10.2. SEW has not made out any case for granting injunction to restrain ERA from invoking BG. There is no fraud or irretrievable injury alleged in the arbitration application. BOA was bound to honour the call for invocation of BG. If restraint orders are passed in matters relating to BGs without adhering to settled principles of law, then entire global commercial transactions would collapse. BG is lifeline of commercial transactions. BOA does not have any say in the inter se disputes between SEW and ERA. The reputation and stakes of BOA are involved. In commercial transactions, banks are brought in to assure payment under BGs. 10.3. BG is lifeline of commercial transactions. BOA does not have any say in the inter se disputes between SEW and ERA. The reputation and stakes of BOA are involved. In commercial transactions, banks are brought in to assure payment under BGs. 10.3. The award dated 27.07.2021 has been passed by the Arbitral Tribunal in France. Section 9 petition can be invoked only to pass interim order for protecting assets before, during and after passing arbitration award. In view of award dated 27.07.2021 being passed, this arbitration application has been rendered infructuous. Interim order dated 06.06.20216 passed by this Court can be continued only in the teeth of the findings rendered in the final arbitration award. The dispute between SEW and ERA is not before this Court. The issue in this application is only with regard to invocation of ABG and PBG. The Arbitral Tribunal has already held invocation to be valid as per findings at paras 221, 227 and 228. BG is an independent contract. BOA is not party to the arbitration agreement. The instant dispute relating to bank guarantees is governed by ICC Uniform Rules of Demand Guarantees. The Arbitral Tribunal recognized that money has been paid by BOA to ERA under ABG and PBG. Finding has been given by the Arbitral Tribunal that contract was validly terminated and encashment of BGs was valid. Thus, nothing remains to be decided in this arbitration application. Hence, the pre-award interim order cannot be continue post award. 10.4. Though SEW was awarded certain claims, they did not exercise option of enforcing the award in any of the countries either in India or Ethiopia. An appeal was filed by SEW challenging the award dated 27.07.2021. Only the Courts in France have jurisdiction. When, admittedly, the parties submitted themselves to jurisdiction of Courts in France, the Courts in other countries should refrain to entertain the disputes, as otherwise it would erode the faith in the system and have an adverse impact on the commercial transactions. 10.5. A suit was filed by ERA against BOA and as per order passed by the Ethiopian Court dated 27.07.2021, the BOA had to pay money under ABGs and PBGs to ERA. 10.6. Section 9 petition merges with the final award. This Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 9 of the Act is not a Court of appeal against the award. 10.5. A suit was filed by ERA against BOA and as per order passed by the Ethiopian Court dated 27.07.2021, the BOA had to pay money under ABGs and PBGs to ERA. 10.6. Section 9 petition merges with the final award. This Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 9 of the Act is not a Court of appeal against the award. BOA is alien to the contract between SEW and ERA. The award was passed in favour of SEW for a sum of Rs.11,28,10,946/-. ISSUES: 11. The following issues arise for consideration in this application: i. Whether applicant/SEW has made out a case of fraud, irretrievable injury and special equities so as to seek relief of injunction to restrain invocation of BGs. ii. Whether applicant/SEW has wrongly invoked the jurisdiction of this Court to snatch interim order and whether any cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. iii. Whether the respondent No.1/ERA and respondent No.2/BOA have violated the status quo order dated 06.06.2016 passed by this Court and whether BOA be permitted to seek to vacate the interim order until it purges itself from contempt. iv. Whether status quo order passed by this Court can be continued post-award even when termination of contract and invocation of BGs were held to be valid by the Arbitral Tribunal. 12. It would be appropriate for this Court to first decide issue No.4. If issue No.4 is answered in favour of BOA, then the matter would be rendered infructuous and it may not be necessary for this Court to deal with issues No.1 to 3. 13. The arbitral tribunal, having considered the claims of SEW and counter claims of ERA, framed 17 issues. Issues No.4 and 7, which are relevant for the purpose of this case, are extracted herein: iv. Was Respondent?s termination of the Contract on 20 June 2016 lawful? ? vii. Is the claimant entitled to discharge its liability toward the counter guarantees given by Indian Bank to the Bank of Ethiopia? 14. In para 163 of the final award, the Arbitral Tribunal held that termination notice was valid. In regard to invocation of BGs, the Arbitral Tribunal made the following observations: ?227. ? vii. Is the claimant entitled to discharge its liability toward the counter guarantees given by Indian Bank to the Bank of Ethiopia? 14. In para 163 of the final award, the Arbitral Tribunal held that termination notice was valid. In regard to invocation of BGs, the Arbitral Tribunal made the following observations: ?227. Accordingly, the Tribunal considers that Respondent?s call the Advance Bank Guarantees was lawful and that Claimant?s request for a declaration to this opposite effect, or rather its request for a declaration that it is entitled for discharge of its liability towards Counter Guarantees given by the State Bank of India to the Bank of Abyssinia, is to be denied. Claimant has not suffered any damages from that call, as it has not paid so far, any sums to the State Bank of India. There exists no risk of double-payment, once Claimant is required to reimburse that sum to the State Bank of India, which in all likelihood it will have to do, once the State Bank of India will be honoring the call made upon it by the Bank of Abyssinia for the corresponding amount. In other words, Claimant will not have to reimburse that sum to Respondent, which incidentally had made no claim to that effect, its claim for reimbursement of the Advance Payment having been settled by virtue of the Advance Bank Guarantee. This would be true even if the Tribunal had come to the conclusion that Respondent?s call on the Advance Bank Guarantees was unlawful in the first place, which it was not. 228. In relation to the Performance Bank Guarantees, the situation is not any different, as the Tribunal has found that the Termination was valid, and thus that Claimant was in breach of the Contract, it cannot be held that Respondent unlawfully invoked the BG 3 and BG 4. Claimant?s contention in this regard is therefore incorrect. However, whether the monies cashed by Respondent under these guarantees should be retained by it depends upon the actual quantum, if any, of damages being awarded to Respondent in the counterclaim. This part of the issue, i.e. the monies received by Respondent following the call of these guarantees, will have to be dealt with in the same fashion as Claim No.7 (the retention monies), when it comes to determining Respondent?s counterclaim in Chapter VI below.? 15. This part of the issue, i.e. the monies received by Respondent following the call of these guarantees, will have to be dealt with in the same fashion as Claim No.7 (the retention monies), when it comes to determining Respondent?s counterclaim in Chapter VI below.? 15. In the light of the Arbitral Tribunal holding that termination of contract was valid and call of invocation of ABGs and PBGs was lawful, it needs to be seen whether SEW having suffered such adverse findings is still entitled to seek continuation of interim status quo order dated 06.06.2016 post-award. It needs no emphasis to say that the interim order would merge with the final judgment/award. However, there may be certain situations where interim order would continue if the main judgment is in favour of a party having the benefit of the interim order. 16. For instance, in an application filed for attachment before judgment, the plaintiff would have the benefit of continuation of interim order if the suit is eventually decreed. But the question which arises in this application is whether SEW, which was granted interim status quo order and later faced an adverse order in regard to invocation of BG, is still entitled to seek continuation of interim order. 17. It is contended by Mr. S. Niranjan Reddy, learned senior counsel, that SEW has filed an appeal before the appellate tribunal challenging the award dated 27.07.2021. The Arbitral Tribunal, having held that there was no diversion of monies under ABGs, went on to erroneously hold that call (invocation) of BG was lawful. 18. In the decisions relied upon by the learned senior counsel for SEW above, the Supreme Court in ULTRATECH CEMENT LIMITED?s case (1 supra), held as under: ?7. As to whether the orders passed by the different courts, which culminated in the two orders, extracted hereinabove, dated 13-12-2013 [Mangalam Cement Ltd. v. Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Ltd., 2013 SCC OnLine SC 1333] and 14-3-2014 [Mangalam Cement Ltd. v. Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Ltd., 2014 SCC OnLine SC 1692], would continue even after the passing of the arbitral award, in our considered view, would depend on the nature of the prayer made by the appellant, when the application under Section 9 was filed, before the Court concerned. We have extracted hereinabove the prayer made by the appellant in its Section 9 application. We have extracted hereinabove the prayer made by the appellant in its Section 9 application. A perusal thereof reveals that the interim injunction was sought ??till adjudication of the dispute arises between the parties by appointing the arbitrator by the applicant as per Clause 9 of the agreement dated 15-10-2004 signed by and between the applicant and the respondent, passing of the award by the arbitrator, and also till enforcement of the said award??. It is therefore apparent that the interim prayer made by the appellant under Section 9 of the Act in the very first instance was till the enforcement of the award. It is undoubtedly apparent from a perusal of Section 9 of the Act, extracted above that the enforcement of the award can be effected only under Section 36 of the Act. The aforesaid stage has not yet emerged. The stage presently is of the interregnum, between the passing of the award, and the enforcement of the award under Section 36 of the Act. 8. We are of the view that the prayer made by the appellant clearly included the period, after the pronouncement of the award by the Arbitral Tribunal. In the above view of the matter, it is not possible for us to hold that the proceedings pending before this Court, have been rendered infructuous. In any case, it is now imperative for us to determine whether or not the impugned interim order, should continue till the proceedings under Section 34 of the Act (presently pending before the District Judge) are concluded. We are satisfied in directing that the appellant shall, with effect from the date of the commencement of the arbitral award, pay for the fly ash taken by it from the respondent at the rate of Rs 245 per metric tonne (i.e. in consonance with the arbitral award), till the determination of the proceedings under Section 34 of the Act. We however clarify, that in case, for any reason, the arbitral award is set aside or modified, as prayed for by the respondent Nigam, the appellant would be liable to pay the higher amount, as the respondent would have been able to procure, as disclosed by the auction already held in 2011 (for the period with effect from 2012). We however clarify, that in case, for any reason, the arbitral award is set aside or modified, as prayed for by the respondent Nigam, the appellant would be liable to pay the higher amount, as the respondent would have been able to procure, as disclosed by the auction already held in 2011 (for the period with effect from 2012). Likewise, in case the appellant before this Court succeeds, and is held to be entitled to pay a lesser amount, the payment with effect from 2012 would be regulated by the said determination.? In I. SUDERSHAN RAO?s case (2 supra), the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh held as under: ?7. Thus, the first point to be considered is whether Section 9 of the Act has no application to a situation where the award is passed and consequently the present AOP is not maintainable. Section 9 of the Act provides for grant of interim relief by the Court and the object of this provision is too well known to require any mention here. The opening words of Section 9 read ?a party may, before or during arbitral proceedings or at any time after the making of the arbitral award but before it is enforced in accordance with Section 36, apply to a Court? and the section then sets out various types of interim reliefs which can be sought by a party. It is clear that the words ?at any time after the making of the arbitral award but before it is enforced in accordance with Section 36? clearly show that the interim reliefs stipulated in the said section can be sought even after the passing of the award but before it becomes enforceable. ? ? 20. In our considered view, proviso (a) is only a procedural devise to ensure that an application filed under Section 9 in a petition pending under Section 34 is conveniently disposed of as an application connected to such a petition and also to bring to the notice of the Court, if necessary, about the urgency in the matter and press for even an expeditious disposal of both the matters. Rule 8 or Section 9 of the Act cannot however be construed as laying down that an independent application under Section 9 is not maintainable when a petition under Section 34 is pending. ? ? 27. Rule 8 or Section 9 of the Act cannot however be construed as laying down that an independent application under Section 9 is not maintainable when a petition under Section 34 is pending. ? ? 27. Coming to the argument of Sri Ramakrishna Reddy on the third point, it is true that the arbitral Tribunal refused the relief of specific performance, but its award is under challenge in the application filed by the second respondent under Section 34 of the Act and that has still to be decided. It cannot be presumed at this stage that the award will be confirmed by the trial Court. What should be noted is that whether the refusal of relief of specific performance by the arbitral Tribunal is right has to be decided by the Court. In such a situation, the trial Court cannot be faulted for exercising power under Section 9 to grant temporary injunction to preserve the disputed property till adjudication of the second respondent's petition under Section 34 of the Act No provision or precedential authority has been brought to our notice to hold that just because the arbitral Tribunal refused the relief of specific performance, the Court under Section 9 has no power to pass an order for preservation of the property though of-course that will be subject to the final orders which may be passed by the Court in the petition or application under Section 34 with respect to the award.? In GAIL (INDIA) LTD.?s case (3 supra), the High Court of Gujarat held as under: ?23. This court, respectfully, does not agree with the view adopted by the Bombay High Court in the case of Dirk India Pvt. Ltd. v. Maharashtra State Electricity Generation Company Limited (supra) that the object and purpose of an interim measure after the passing of the arbitral award but before it is enforced is to secure the property, goods or amount for the benefit of the party which seeks enforcement. In the opinion of this court, section 9 of the Act does not draw any distinction between the party who has succeeded in the arbitral proceedings and a party who has failed therein. Under the circumstances, either party would be entitled to approach the court seeking an interim measure under section 9 of the Act. In the opinion of this court, section 9 of the Act does not draw any distinction between the party who has succeeded in the arbitral proceedings and a party who has failed therein. Under the circumstances, either party would be entitled to approach the court seeking an interim measure under section 9 of the Act. The contention that the respondent could not have availed of the benefit under section 9 of the Act as the award already stood enforced, therefore, does not merit acceptance.? In SAPTARISHI HOTELS PVT. LTD.?s case (4 supra), this Court held as under: ?35. The aforestated case law makes it clear that the Court exercising power under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 is not restrained from interfering with the arbitral Award even by way of modification. It can modify the Award, by sustaining it in relation to parts thereof and setting it aside in relation to others, as long as such parts are severable. Therefore, the very foundational premise, which formed the basis for the decisions in DIRK INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED and NUSSLI SWITZERLAND LTD., stands shaken. Once it is accepted that the Court exercising power under Section 34 can modify the Award, if warranted, as per the provisions thereof and in the light of the case law cited supra, the party whose claim was rejected during the arbitral proceedings, as reflected in the final Award, cannot be left remediless (See SUNIL VASUDEVA v. SUNDAR GUPTA) during the pendency of the petition filed by such party under Section 34. It may be necessary for such party to seek interim measures of protection, as contemplated under Section 9. As rightly pointed out by the Gujarat High Court in GAIL (INDIA) LTD., there is no distinction drawn, as per the language of Section 9, between a party who has succeeded in the arbitral proceedings as opposed to a party who has lost and both are equally entitled to invoke the provisions of Section 9, even after passing of the final arbitral Award but before execution thereof. In this context, it may be noted that even if the final Award is a ?nil? Award as in the case on hand, once it is accepted that there is a possibility of the nature of the Award being changed by exercise of jurisdiction by the Court under Section 34, it cannot be ruled out that a ?nil? In this context, it may be noted that even if the final Award is a ?nil? Award as in the case on hand, once it is accepted that there is a possibility of the nature of the Award being changed by exercise of jurisdiction by the Court under Section 34, it cannot be ruled out that a ?nil? Award may transform into an Award favouring one or the other party. Be it noted that in the case on hand, both parties have filed petitions under Section 34 and they are pending consideration. That being so, until the disposal of these pending petitions under Section 34, the appellants cannot be non-suited on the ground that the Award in question is a ?nil? Award, disentitling them from invoking the provisions of Section 9.? In MEDIMA LLC?s case (5 supra), the High Court of Calcutta held as under: ?18. The other point of objection taken by the award-debtor pertains to non-availability of the remedy under Section 9 in a post-award scenario in relation to a foreign award which is enforceable under Part 11 of the Act. Is this argument legally tenable? For the above, the respondent relies on the language of Section 9, the relevant part of which is set out below: ?9. Interim Measures, etc. by Court.-(1) A party may, before or during arbitral proceedings or at any time after the making of the arbitral award but before it is enforced in accordance with Section 36, apply to a court ?? 19. The language ?? and an arbitral award made or to be made?? in section 2(2) read with the proviso makes it clear that Section 9 would apply in a post-award scenario subject to the other conditions of the proviso being satisfied. Second, the perceived gap between Section 9 so far as it mentions enforcement under Section 36 and the enforceability ? recognition under Part II would defeat the very purpose of introduction of the proviso to Section 2(2) if allowed to magnify into a conflict. There is every chance that an award-holder of an arbitration which took place outside India would be rendered remediless if prompt and effective interim measures are not granted to the award-holder in the interregnum in relation to the assets of the award-debtor which are located in India. There is every chance that an award-holder of an arbitration which took place outside India would be rendered remediless if prompt and effective interim measures are not granted to the award-holder in the interregnum in relation to the assets of the award-debtor which are located in India. In other words, if suitable interim measures are not granted to a foreign award-holder and the award is made to pass the tests for enforcement under Part II, the award-holder may be denuded of its rights. The act, together with the amendments, intends to facilitate quick resolution of disputes through alternative means. Hence, asking an award-holder to wait until the award is recognised and enforced is antithetical to the very objective of the Act. The Law Commission in its 246th Report noticed the aforesaid as also the lack of an efficacious remedy in furtherance of the award. 20. It may hence be said, and with good reason, that Section 9 read with the proviso to Section 2(2) would require a purposive construction which would be in line with the intention of the framers for bringing in the proviso by the Amendment Act of 2016. The objective of the amendment was to make the proviso workable, not stultify it by reason of a conflict with Section 9.? 19. Per contra, learned senior counsel for BOA relied on the decisions of the High Court in DIRK INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED v. MAHARASHTRA STATE ELCTRICITY GENERATION COMPANY LIMITED, 2013 SCC OnLine Bom 481 and Supreme Court in HINDUSTAN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY LIMITED v. UNION OF INDIA, (2020) 17 SCC 324 to contend that interim measures under Section 9 of the Act post-award cannot be granted in derogation of the award. Learned senior counsel also relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in KANWAR SINGH SAINI v. HIGH COURT OF DELHI, (2012) 4 SCC 307 and STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA LTD. (SAIL) v. DENIELI CORUS BV, 2019 SCC OnLine Del 8418 to buttress his contention that interim order in the present case has been nullified after award is passed. 20. In DIRK INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED?s case (6 supra), the Bombay High Court held as under: ?13. Two facets of Section 9 merit emphasis. The first relates to the nature of the orders that can be passed under clauses (i) and (ii). ? 20. In DIRK INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED?s case (6 supra), the Bombay High Court held as under: ?13. Two facets of Section 9 merit emphasis. The first relates to the nature of the orders that can be passed under clauses (i) and (ii). ? Clause (ii) contemplates an interim measure of protection for: (a) the preservation, interim custody or sale of any goods which are the subject-matter of the arbitration agreement; (b) securing the amount in dispute in the arbitration; and (c) the detention, preservation or inspection of any property or thing which is the subject-matter of the dispute in arbitration; ? and (e) such other interim measure of protection as may appear to the Court to be just and convenient. The underlying theme of each one of the sub-clauses of clause (ii) is the immediate and proximate nexus between the interim measure of protection and the preservation, protection and securing of the subject-matter of the dispute in the arbitral proceedings. In other words, the orders that are contemplated under clause (ii) are regarded as interim measures of protection intended to protect the claim in arbitration from being frustrated. The interim measure is intended to safeguard the subject-matter of the dispute in the course of the arbitral proceedings. The second facet of Section 9 is the proximate nexus between the orders that are sought and the arbitral proceedings. When an interim measure of protection is sought before or during arbitral proceedings, such a measure is a step in aid to the fruition of the arbitral proceedings. When sought after an arbitral award is made but before it is enforced, the measure of protection is intended to safeguard the fruit of the proceedings until the eventual enforcement of the award. Here again the measure of protection is a step in aid of enforcement. It is intended to ensure that enforcement of the award results in a realisable claim and that the award is not rendered illusory by dealings that would put the subject of the award beyond the pale of enforcement. ... Contextually, therefore, the scheme of Section 9 postulates an application for the grant of an interim measure of protection after the making of an arbitral award and before it is enforced for the benefit of the party which seeks enforcement of the award. ... Contextually, therefore, the scheme of Section 9 postulates an application for the grant of an interim measure of protection after the making of an arbitral award and before it is enforced for the benefit of the party which seeks enforcement of the award. An interim measure of protection within the meaning of Section 9(ii) is intended to protect through the measure, the fruits of a successful conclusion of the arbitral proceedings. A party whose claim has been rejected in the course of the arbitral proceedings cannot obviously have an arbitral award enforced in accordance with Section 36. The object and purpose of an interim measure after the passing of the arbitral award but before it is enforced is to secure the property, goods or amount for the benefit of the party which seeks enforcement. 14. The Court which exercises jurisdiction under Section 34 is not a court of first appeal under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. An appellate court to which recourse is taken against a decree of the trial Court has powers which are co-extensive with those of the trial Court. A party which has failed in its claim before a trial Judge can in appeal seek a judgment of reversal and in consequence, the passing of a decree in terms of the claim in the suit. The court to which an arbitration petition challenging the award under Section 34 lies does not pass an order decreeing the claim. Where an arbitral claim has been rejected by the arbitral tribunal, the court under Section 34 may either dismiss the objection to the arbitral award or in the exercise of its jurisdiction set aside the arbitral award. The setting aside of an arbitral award rejecting a claim does not result in the claim which was rejected by the Arbitrator being decreed as a result of the judgment of the court in a petition under Section 34. To hold that a petition under Section 9 would be maintainable after the passing of an arbitral award at the behest of DIPL whose claim has been rejected would result in a perversion of the object and purpose underlying Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. DIPL's application under Section 9, if allowed, would result in the grant of interim specific performance of a contract in the teeth of the findings recorded in the arbitral award. DIPL's application under Section 9, if allowed, would result in the grant of interim specific performance of a contract in the teeth of the findings recorded in the arbitral award. The interference by the Court at this stage to grant what in essence is a plea for a mandatory order for interim specific performance will negate the sanctity and efficacy of arbitration as a form of alternate disputes redressal. What such a litigating party cannot possibly obtain even upon completion of the proceedings under Section 34, it cannot possibly secure in a petition under Section 9 after the award. The object and purpose of Section 9 is to provide an interim measure that would protect the subject-matter of the arbitral proceedings whether before or during the continuance of the arbitral proceedings and even thereafter upon conclusion of the proceedings until the award is enforced. Once the award has been made and a claim has been rejected as in the present case, even a successful challenge to the award under Section 34 does not result an order decreeing the claim. In this view of the matter, there could be no occasion to take recourse to Section 9. Enforcement for the purpose of Section 36 as a decree of the Court is at the behest of a person who seeks to enforce the award.? In HINDUSTAN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY LIMITED?s case (7 supra), the Supreme Court held as under: ?36. Interpreting Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, 1996, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Dirk (India) (P) Ltd. v. Maharashtra State Power Generation Co. Ltd., 2013 SCC OnLine Bom 481 : (2013) 7 Bom CR 493] held that : (SCC OnLine Bom para 13) ?13. ? The second facet of Section 9 is the proximate nexus between the orders that are sought and the arbitral proceedings. When an interim measure of protection is sought before or during arbitral proceedings, such a measure is a step in aid to the fruition of the arbitral proceedings. When sought after an arbitral award is made but before it is enforced, the measure of protection is intended to safeguard the fruit of the proceedings until the eventual enforcement of the award. Here again the measure of protection is a step in aid of enforcement. When sought after an arbitral award is made but before it is enforced, the measure of protection is intended to safeguard the fruit of the proceedings until the eventual enforcement of the award. Here again the measure of protection is a step in aid of enforcement. It is intended to ensure that enforcement of the award results in a realisable claim and that the award is not rendered illusory by dealings that would put the subject of the award beyond the pale of enforcement.? In KANWAR SINGH SAINI?s case (8 supra), the Supreme Court held as under: ?17. Application under Order 39 Rule 2-A CPC lies only where disobedience/breach of an injunction granted or order complained of was one that is granted by the court under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC, which is naturally to enure during the pendency of the suit. However, once a suit is decreed, the interim order, if any, merges into the final order. No litigant can derive any benefit from mere pendency of case in a court of law, as the interim order always merges in the final order to be passed in the case and if the case is ultimately dismissed, the interim order stands nullified automatically. (Vide A.R. Sircar v. State of U.P. [1993 Supp (2) SCC 734 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 896 : (1993) 24 ATC 832], Shiv Shanker v. U.P.SRTC [1995 Supp (2) SCC 726 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 1018 : (1995) 30 ATC 317 ], Arya Nagar Inter College v. Sree Kumar Tiwary [ (1997) 4 SCC 388 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 967 : AIR 1997 SC 3071 ] , GTC Industries Ltd. v. Union of India [ (1998) 3 SCC 376 : AIR 1998 SC 1566 ] and Jaipur Municipal Corpn. v. C.L. Mishra [ (2005) 8 SCC 423 ].) In STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA LTD. (SAIL)?s case (9 supra), the High Court of Delhi held as under: ?7. We are unable to appreciate this submission of learned senior counsel for the appellant for the reason that as Mr. Dutt has rightly pointed out that should the arbitrator reject the claim petition, this order would automatically become a nullity and should the claim petition be allowed, the said order will hold the field and the interim would merge in the final order.? 21. Dutt has rightly pointed out that should the arbitrator reject the claim petition, this order would automatically become a nullity and should the claim petition be allowed, the said order will hold the field and the interim would merge in the final order.? 21. In ULTRATECH CEMENT LIMITED?s case (1 supra) interim order was passed in favour of the appellant on 31.01.0214 wherein the appellant was allowed to purchase fly ash from the respondent Nigamat Rs.250 per metric tonne. The arbitration award was passed on 18.02.2015 and supplementary award on 17.05.2015. Under the awards, the appellant was allowed to carry away fly ash for another period of five years from 2012 to 2017 at the rate of Rs.245 per metric tonne and the said price was lower than the price determined under Section 9 (Rs.250 per metric tonne) of the Act. The Supreme Court held that the prayer made by the appellant included the period, after the pronouncement of the award by the Arbitral Tribunal and it is not possible to hold that the proceedings pending before the Court have been rendered infructuous. It was specifically observed by the Supreme Court in para 8 that the appellant shall, with effect from the date of commencement of the arbitral award, pay for the fly ash taken by it from the respondent at the rate of Rs.245 per metric tonne (i.e. in consonance with the arbitral award), till the determination of the proceedings under Section 34 of the Act. As the arbitral award was in favour of the appellant it was held that interim order dated 31.01.2014 has not been rendered infructuous. In other words, the interim order was continued as it would be a step-in-aid to the final award/ enforcement of award and not in derogation of the award. 22. The judgment in I. SUDERSHAN RAO?s case (2 supra) is not applicable to the facts of this case. The issue in the said case is not seeking relief of extension of pre-award interim order post-award. In the said case, the claim of specific performance of contract of sale was rejected by award of the Arbitral Tribunal dated 12.01.2008. 22. The judgment in I. SUDERSHAN RAO?s case (2 supra) is not applicable to the facts of this case. The issue in the said case is not seeking relief of extension of pre-award interim order post-award. In the said case, the claim of specific performance of contract of sale was rejected by award of the Arbitral Tribunal dated 12.01.2008. The claimants/appellant filed application under Section 9 of the Act for grant of temporary injunction restraining the respondents from alienating or creating third party interest over the application schedule property, pending disposal of the application under Section 34 of the Act challenging the award. In that context, it was held by a learned Division Bench of this Court that the Court under Section 9 of the Act has power to pass interim order even after the Arbitral Tribunal refused relief of specific performance when Section 34 application is pending. 23. In GAIL (INDIA) LTD.?s case (3 supra), interim orders were passed in favour of the respondent on 28.01.2014 and 29.01.2014 pending arbitration proceedings. The arbitrator passed award on 30.10.2014 dismissing the claim of the respondent. The appellant preferred an appeal challenging interim order passed under Section 9 of the Act. The appellant withdrew the appeal on the ground that it has become infructuous due to passing of the award by the arbitrator in favour of the appellant and thereafter, the respondent moved an application for interim relief pending arbitration application. In para 23 of the judgment, it was held by the Gujarat High Court that either party is entitled to approach the Court seeking an interim measure under Section 9 of the Act even if the party has failed in the arbitral proceedings. 24. The aforesaid view was subscribed by a learned Division Bench of this Court in SAPTARISHI HOTELS PVT. LTD.?s case (4 supra). In the said case final award dated 06.12.2018 was passed by the Arbitral Tribunal rejecting the claim of the appellant and counter claim of the respondent. Both the appellant and the respondent filed applications under Section 34 of the Act challenging the rejection of claims and counter claims respectively and it was held that even if ?nil? award is passed, it does not disentitle the party from invoking the provisions of Section 9 of the Act. Both the appellant and the respondent filed applications under Section 34 of the Act challenging the rejection of claims and counter claims respectively and it was held that even if ?nil? award is passed, it does not disentitle the party from invoking the provisions of Section 9 of the Act. The point involved in the MEDIMA LLC?s case (5 supra) was whether remedy under Section 9 of the Act is available in post-award scenario in relation to a foreign award, which is enforceable under Part II of the Act and it was held that the remedy under Section 9 of the Act is available. 25. The judgments in I. SUDERSHAN RAO?s case (2 supra); GAIL (INDIA) LTD.?s case (3 supra); SAPTARISHI HOTELS PVT. LTD.?s case (4 supra) and MEDIMA LLC?s case (5 supra) are not applicable to the facts of the present case and are of no help to the applicant/SEW herein. In all these four decisions, the application under Section 9 of the Act was filed after award was passed. This Court is not dealing with such issue in this case. The Court is only concerned with continuation of interim order post-award and at the instance of the applicant/SEW, against whom award was passed, more particularly, in regard to relief of invocation of BGs. 26. As rightly contended by Mr. Rathan Singh, learned senior counsel for BOA, the interim measure under Section 9 of the Act post-award should be in consonance of the award and a step in aid of its enforcement cannot be granted in derogation of the award [see HINDUSTAN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY LIMITED?s case (7 supra)]. The applicant/SEW has sought for relief of declaration regarding invocation of BG and as per paras 221, 227 and 228 of the final award by Arbitral Tribunal, it was held that invocation of BG is valid. This Court, exercising jurisdiction under Section 9 of the Act, cannot usurp powers of the appellate tribunal. The applicant/SEW approached this Court seeking interim order under Section 9 of the Act at pre-award stage. 27. The claim of the applicant/SEW was that ERA is seeking to invoke BGs in breach of terms of the contract. It was alleged that there was default on the part of the ERA in handing over the project site free of all encumbrances and obstructions. 27. The claim of the applicant/SEW was that ERA is seeking to invoke BGs in breach of terms of the contract. It was alleged that there was default on the part of the ERA in handing over the project site free of all encumbrances and obstructions. In due course of time, the final award was passed on 27.07.2021 by the Arbitral Tribunal wherein detailed findings have been given. As pointed above, specific issue with regard to invocation of BG was held against the applicant/SEW. Thereafter, the applicant/SEW filed correction application for rectification of the award and thereby declare that ERA is not entitled to retain sums under PBGs and the same came to be dismissed by the order dated 29.10.2021. Thus, the interim status quo order dated 06.06.2016 merged with the final award of the Arbitral Tribunal dated 27.07.2021 and the interim status quo order automatically stood nullified. 28. The contention of Mr. S. Niranjan Reddy, learned senior counsel, that this Court has jurisdiction to continue the interim order post-award, in spite of facing adverse findings regarding invocation of BG, is without any merit. As noted in the above para, this Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 9 of the Act cannot act as an appellate Tribunal. No judicial precedent is brought to the notice of this Court to substantiate that an order under Section 9 of the Act can be continued post-award, even if the party having the benefit of such order, faced adverse decision in the arbitral award. It is relevant to note that during subsistence of the status quo order passed by this Court the BOA paid monies under the ABGs and PBGs to ERA purportedly in compliance of the order dated 16.10.2017 passed by the Federal High Court of Ethiopia. The chances of the applicant/SEW succeeding before the appellate Tribunal and other grounds urged impugning the findings of the Arbitral Tribunal, in the opinion of this Court, cannot fall for consideration in the instant application after award has been passed. 29. In view of the above, this Court does not have jurisdiction to continue the interim order, as the matter has been rendered infructuous, more particularly, in view of the decision of the Arbitral Tribunal that invocation of BGs is valid. Hence, issue No.4 is answered accordingly in favour of the respondent No.2/BOA. Consequently, the issues No.1 to 3 are not necessary to be decided. 30. Hence, issue No.4 is answered accordingly in favour of the respondent No.2/BOA. Consequently, the issues No.1 to 3 are not necessary to be decided. 30. Therefore, the arbitration application is dismissed. The interim order dated 06.06.2016, extended from time to time, shall stand vacated. Miscellaneous Applications, if any, pending in this writ petition shall stand closed. There shall be no order as to costs. 31. It is made clear that this Court has not made any observations on the entitlement of the applicant for interim protection under Section 9 of the Act pending its appeal before the Paris Court of Appeal. An application in IA.No.2 of 2022 is filed by the applicant under Section 151 CPC to hear the BOA only after it purges itself of contempt by rectifying its actions. The applicant cannot be left remediless. The applicant is given liberty to file independent contempt application for the alleged violation of the order dated 06.06.2016 and if it so filed, it is needless to mention that the respondents may put forth its defence by pleading points of limitation, lack of jurisdiction of this Court etc, which were urged by Mr. Rathan Singh in the oral and written submissions.