JUDGMENT : N. Kotiswar Singh, J. Heard Mr. A.R. Sikdar, learned counsel for the petitioner in both the petitions. Also heard Ms. L. Devi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Mr. R.K. Dev Choudhury, learned Assistant Solicitor General of India, for respondent No.1 as well as appearing as standing counsel, NRC, for respondent No.6; Mr. N. Pathak, learned special counsel, FT, appearing for respondent Nos.2 and 5; Mr. A.I. Ali, learned standing counsel, ECI, appearing for respondent No.3 and Ms. U. Das, learned Additional Senior Government Advocate, Assam, appearing for respondent No.4. 2. In these petitions, the petitioners have challenged the common order dated 15.02.2019 passed in F.T. Case Nos.103/2017 [Ref. IM(D)T Case No.11076/98] and 104/2017 [Ref. IM(D)T Case No.11074/98] declaring both of them as foreigners. 3. The proceedees in both the petitions, namely, Sahjahan Ali and Khandakar Abdur Rouf, are stated to be two brothers born to Khandakar, resident of Tedhara, under Baghbar police station in Barpeta district. After the reference was made, notices were issued to the petitioners in both the petitions and they duly received the notice and filed their respective written statements. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, since the petitioners in both the petitions are brothers, they relied on the same set of documents and in fact, the learned Tribunal proceeded to consider the said documents, which are 8(eight) in number and exhibited as Exbts.-A to H as follows:- Exhibit-A: Certified copy of Electoral Roll of 1966 Exhibit-B: Certified copy of Electoral Roll of 1970 Exhibit-C: Certified copy of Electoral Roll of 1997 Exhibit-D: Certified copy of Electoral Roll of 2005 Exhibit-E: Electoral Photo Identity Card Exhibit-F: Jamabandi copy Exhibit-G: Gaonburah Certificate of Tedhara Gaon Exhibit-H: A self sworn affidavit 4. We will first examine the observations and findings of the learned Tribunal. 5. Learned Tribunal by referring to the written statements and the evidences on record noted that the both the petitioners in their written statements had claimed that they were born and brought up at village Tedhara Pathar, PS-Baghbar, District-the then Kamrup, now Barpeta, Assam. Learned Tribunal also noted that both the proceedees had stated that in the year 1997 both their parents, in their nick names i.e. Khandakar Aklas Uddin and Sahera Khatun were shown as voters of Tedhara under 45 No. Baghbar LAC instead of their correct names Akhlaz Uddin and Saheran Nessa. Learned Tribunal also noted that both the proceedees had stated that in the year 1997 both their parents, in their nick names i.e. Khandakar Aklas Uddin and Sahera Khatun were shown as voters of Tedhara under 45 No. Baghbar LAC instead of their correct names Akhlaz Uddin and Saheran Nessa. In the written statements, it was also mentioned that Saheran Nessa and Sahera Khatun are one and the same person. It has been also stated that in the Electoral Photo Identity Card, their mother's name Sahera Khatun has been recorded instead of correct name, Saheran Nessa. 6. Learned Tribunal further observed that both the petitioners had not disclosed their grand-parents' names and also had not mentioned how many brothers and sisters their grand-parents had and how many brothers and sisters their father had. The Tribunal also noted that there is also no mention about the brothers and sisters of both the petitioners. Learned Tribunal also noted that at the time of filing written statements, both the petitioners had not mentioned the date and year of their birth. 7. Learned Tribunal also noted that both the petitioners had examined two witnesses as DW-2 and DW-3 in support of their claim. DW-2 is Saheran Nessa alias Sahera Khatun, wife of Akhlaz Uddin alias Khandakar Akhlaz Uddin, who the petitioners claim to be their mother. DW3 is a Gaonburah. 8. Learned Tribunal also noted that DW-2 stated that the person whose name as Akhlaz Uddin in the voters' lists of 1966 and 1970, is her husband and the name of DW-2 has been recorded as Saheran Nessa, wife of Akhlaz Uddin in the aforesaid voters' lists. DW-2 further stated that in the year 1997 her name along with her husband Akhlaz Uddin and Sahera Khatun respectively had been recorded instead of their correct names i.e. Akhlaz Uddin and Saheran Nessa. The Tribunal also noted that DW-2 claimed that Saheran Nessa and Sahera Khatun are one and the same person and her husband Akhlaz Uddin and Khandakar Akhlaz Uddin are the names of one and the same person. 9. Coming to witness DW-3, Abdus Salam, learned Tribunal noted his statement that he was working as the Gaonburah since 1997 and he had issued both the certificates marked as Exbt.-G to both the petitioners. 9. Coming to witness DW-3, Abdus Salam, learned Tribunal noted his statement that he was working as the Gaonburah since 1997 and he had issued both the certificates marked as Exbt.-G to both the petitioners. DW-3 also stated that he knew both the petitioners since last 30 years and had issued both the certificates as proof of residence on the basis of Population Register of 2017. However, the Tribunal observed that DW-3 did not say on what basis he had issued the certificates. 10. Coming to the voters lists of 1966, 1970, 1997 and 2005, learned Tribunal noted that the voters list of 1966 reflect the names of Akhlaz Uddin and Saheran Nessa as residents of village Tedhara Pathar under 52 No Baghbar LAC. The Tribunal also noted that in the voters list of 1970 (Exbt.-B) the name of Ekhlazuddin appears along with his two wives, namely, Saheran Nessa and Nurjaman Nessa. Coming to Exbts.-C and D, the voters lists of 1997 and 2005, the Tribunal noted that the names of Khandar Eklas Uddin and his wife Sahera Khatun of village Tedhara under 45 No Baghbar LAC had been recorded. The Tribunal also noted that both the proceedees had claimed that Eklasuddin and Khandakar Eklas Uddin are one and the same person and so are Saheran Nessa and Sahera Khatun, which are the names of one and the same person. However, after discussing the evidences as above, learned Tribunal held that the contents of the documents would have to be proved and relevancy established by adducing cogent, reliable and admissible evidence, but there is no corroborating evidence on record that Eklasuddin and Khandakar Eklas Uddin, Saheran Nessa and Sahera Khatun are one and the same person. 11. The learned Tribunal also noted that in the voters list of 1970, Eklasuddin has been shown to have two wives, namely, Saheran Nessa and Nurjaman Nessa. However, both the petitioners and the DW-2 were completely silent regarding the name of Nurjaman Nessa, the other wife of the petitioner's father. 11. The learned Tribunal also noted that in the voters list of 1970, Eklasuddin has been shown to have two wives, namely, Saheran Nessa and Nurjaman Nessa. However, both the petitioners and the DW-2 were completely silent regarding the name of Nurjaman Nessa, the other wife of the petitioner's father. Thereafter, the learned Tribunal observed that if both the petitioners and the DW-2 claimed that Saheran Nessa of 1966 and 1997 are one and the same person i.e. Saheran Nessa, in that case, it is not understood why the name of Nurjaman Nessa was not included in the voters list of 1997 along with Khandakar Eklas Uddin and Sahera Khatun in the subsequent voters' list of 2003. According to the learned Tribunal, this is a legitimate question which gives rise to a genuine suspicion about the truthfulness of the narrative presented by the petitioners as well as the witness DW-2. 12. Coming to the deposition of DW-2, the learned Tribunal observed that DW-2 during cross-examination had stated that her name is Sahera Khatun and in the Exbt.-E the name of Sahera Khatun, wife of Khandakar Eklas Uddin appears. However, it does not show that the names of Sahera Khatun and Saheran Nessa are of the one and same person. 13. Referring to the certified copy of Jamabandi, which was exhibited as Exbt.-F, learned Tribunal observed that the name of Eklasuddin appears as the pattadar. However, as per the remarks in the remarks column, his name was substituted as a pattadar following the order of the Circle Officer dated 19.09.1986. Learned Tribunal went on to observe that under the law of evidence, entries in the copy of Jamabandi are prepared based on the fiscal inquiries and the entry in the Jamabandi has to be examined on the probative value of the contents of the documents which require corroboration by other documentary evidence. 14. Learned Tribunal further observed that the petitioners had not provided any explanation and failed to produce other documentary evidence subsequent to such entries made on fiscal inquiries. Accordingly, the Tribunal held that the entry in the copy of Jamabandi is inadmissible in evidence in absence of other substantial documentary evidences. Accordingly, learned Tribunal held that the same does come to the assistance of the petitioners. 15. Accordingly, the Tribunal held that the entry in the copy of Jamabandi is inadmissible in evidence in absence of other substantial documentary evidences. Accordingly, learned Tribunal held that the same does come to the assistance of the petitioners. 15. Learned Tribunal after examining the voters lists and the documents observed that it appears that only in the voters lists of 1966 and 1970, the names of Eklasuddin and Saheran Nessa appear, but after 1970 in the rest of the documents, the names of Khandakar Eklas Uddin and Sahera Khatun appear and the petitioners claim that the names were wrongly recorded. In this regard, learned Tribunal held that if there had been certain mistakes in the voters lists no reason has been offered as to why their parents had not tried to correct their names by applying to the concerned authority. Accordingly, the learned Tribunal proceeded to hold that mere pleading of material facts in the written statement is not enough. It was also observed that if material facts are disclosed, these would have to be proved by adducing cogent, reliable and admissible evidence. Learned Tribunal, accordingly, observed that there is no corroborating evidence on record to show that Eklasuddin and Khandakar Eklas Uddin are the names of the same and one person and also that Saheran Nessa and Sahera Khatun are also the names of one and the same person. Accordingly, the learned Tribunal held that because of the aforesaid anomalies, the voters lists are doubtful. 16. Coming to the Gaonburah's certificates, issued by Abdus Salam DW3, which was marked as Exbt.-G in both the references, their father's name appeared as Khandakar Eklas Uddin of village Tedhara under Mouza-Mandia, PS-Baghbar, District-Barpeta (Assam), dated 15.12.2016. However, the learned Tribunal observed that the certificates do not show that Eklasuddin whose name appears in the voters list of 1966 and Khandakar Eklas Uddin, whose name appears in the documents, are the names of one and the same person. The learned Tribunal also noted that in the Gaonburah certificates State Emblem is embossed at the top of the certificates and since under Section 11 of the State Emblem of India (Prohibition of Improper Use) Act, 2005 use of the State Emblem is prohibited, the certificates issued by the Gaonburah (Exbt.-G), cannot be accepted as valid admissible evidences. 17. The learned Tribunal also noted that in the Gaonburah certificates State Emblem is embossed at the top of the certificates and since under Section 11 of the State Emblem of India (Prohibition of Improper Use) Act, 2005 use of the State Emblem is prohibited, the certificates issued by the Gaonburah (Exbt.-G), cannot be accepted as valid admissible evidences. 17. Accordingly, on the basis of the reasons as discussed above, the learned Tribunal came to the conclusion that both the petitioners had picked up the voters lists of 1966 and 1970 resembling to voters list of 1997 to prove their respective claims. Learned Tribunal also held that since the voters lists of 1966 and 1970 are doubtful, these cannot be relied upon. It was observed by the learned Tribunal that mere filing of some documents and picking up any names from such documents so as to establish relationship with the person concerned as father or mother, as the case may be, does not amount to proof. 18. Coming to Exbt.-H, affidavits sworn by both the petitioners, the learned Tribunal held that self sworn affidavit is not included in the definition of Evidence Act. It was observed that Section 3 of the Evidence Act provides that facts have to be proved either by oral or documentary evidence. In the absence of documentary evidence, no reliance can be placed on the self sworn affidavit of the petitioners. Accordingly, learned Tribunal held that the petitioners had failed to discharge the mandatory burden to establish that they were not foreigners but Indians and accordingly, declared both the petitioners to be foreigners who had entered India illegally after 25.03.1971. 19. Learned counsel for the petitioners, however, submits that the discrepancies pointed by the Tribunal are minor and not substantial. Further, the said discrepancies had been already explained in the written statements as well as in their affidavits-in-chief by way of affidavits and as such it cannot be said that such difference in the name of their father i.e. Eklasuddin and Khandakar Eklas Uddin as well as the name of their mother i.e. Saheran Nessa and Sahera Khatun had not been explained. Accordingly, it has been submitted that it is not correct to say that the difference in the names of the father i.e. Eklasuddin and Khandakar Eklas Uddin and difference in the name of the mother i.e. Saheran Nessa and Sahera Khatun had not been explained. Accordingly, it has been submitted that it is not correct to say that the difference in the names of the father i.e. Eklasuddin and Khandakar Eklas Uddin and difference in the name of the mother i.e. Saheran Nessa and Sahera Khatun had not been explained. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, unfortunately, the Tribunal had not referred to the explanation offered by the petitioners in the written statements as well as in the evidence-in-chief. 20. Coming to the Gaonburah's certificate, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the Gaonburah had himself appeared before the Tribunal and deposed in support of the certificates issued by him and he also had categorically mentioned that he knew both the petitioners and as such there was no occasion for disbelieving the evidence of the Gaonburah and not to rely on the certificate issued by the Gaonburah. 21. Learned counsel for the petitioners further submits that in view of Regulation 41(2) of the Assam Land Revenue Regulation, 1886, entries in the record of rights shall be presumed to be correct unless contrary is proved. It has been submitted that in the present case, the said Jamabandi reflects the name of the petitioners' father Eklasuddin as well as their mother's name Saheran Nessa and the State had not adduced any evidence to disprove or to prove any fact contrary to the entries in the land records and as such, the learned Tribunal could not have ignored the said entry in the Jamabandi. 22. As regards Exbt.-H, the affidavits sworn by both the petitioners, these clearly explain the discrepancy in the names of their parents and there is no reason why these should not have been accepted. Further, even if the affidavits were not taken into consideration, there are sufficient documentary evidences available on record, which would explain the discrepancy in the names of their parents. 23. Learned counsel for the petitioners has referred to the following decisions in support of his submissions:- (i) Sirajul Hoque Vs. State of Assam & Ors. [ (2019) 5 SCC 534 ] (ii) Haidar Ali Vs. Union of Indian & Ors. [WP(C) No.1818/2019, decided on 30.03.2021] (iii) State of West Bengal Vs. Mir Mohammad Omar & Ors. [ (2000) 8 SCC 382 ] (iv) Sodhi Transport Co. & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors. [ (1986) 2 SCC 486 ] (v) Idrish Ali Vs. [ (2019) 5 SCC 534 ] (ii) Haidar Ali Vs. Union of Indian & Ors. [WP(C) No.1818/2019, decided on 30.03.2021] (iii) State of West Bengal Vs. Mir Mohammad Omar & Ors. [ (2000) 8 SCC 382 ] (iv) Sodhi Transport Co. & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors. [ (1986) 2 SCC 486 ] (v) Idrish Ali Vs. Union of India & Ors. [WP(C) No.4116/2019, decided on 27.02.2020] (vi) Abdul Matali Vs. Union of India & Ors. [2015 (2) GLT 617] (vii) State of Assam & Ors. Vs. Moslem Mondal [2013 (1) GLT 809] 24. Mr. Pathak, learned counsel for the State on the other hand submits that apart from improper use of State Emblem, the witness DW3 has not indicated the basis on which the said entries in the certificate were recorded. In other words, there is no way to verify the correctness of the entries made in the certificates in absence of relevant entry in the office records and the said records were not produced before the Tribunal. Coming to the issue of Jamabandi, learned counsel for the State submits that irrespective of the entry made in the Jamabandi, what is relevant in the present case is the establishment of the linkage of the petitioners with their parents and we are not concerned as to whether any person possesses land or not and since the ownership of the land is not an issue, it may not be necessary to go into the correctness of the entries made in the Jamabandi as provided under Regulation 41(2) of the 1886 Regulation. It is also well-settled that for the purpose of discharging the burden cast under Section 9 of the Foreigners Act what is important is to establish the linkage not by oral evidence but through documentary evidences. 25. Mr. N. Pathak, learned Special Counsel, F.T. submits that the certificates issued by Gaonburah do not at all establish the linkage between the petitioners and their projected parents. In this regard, it has been submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rupjan Begum vs. Union of India (2018) 1 SCC 579 had clarified and emphasised that the certificate issued by the Gram Panchayat Secretary is by no means of a proof of citizenship. Such proof will come only if the link between the claimant and the legacy person is established. Such proof will come only if the link between the claimant and the legacy person is established. Further, such a certificate has to be verified at two stages; firstly, the authenticity of the certificate has to be established; and secondly, the authenticity of the contents, and establishing the authenticity of the contents would require an exhaustive process of verification. In this regard one may refer to paras-15 and 16 which are reproduced herein below:- “15. The certificate issued by the G.P. Secretary merely acknowledges the shifting of residence of a married woman from one village to another. The said certificate by itself and by no means establishes any claim of citizenship of the holder of the certificate. This is made clear in the illustrative list of documents itself by specifying the same to be only a supporting document. The certificate in question only enables its holder to establish a link between the holder and the person from whom legacy is claimed. It has been made clear in the several reports of the learned State Coordinator, NRC, Assam that a claim accompanied by such a certificate, without details of the legacy person, is to be discarded and in the event information as to the legacy person has been furnished, the certificate in question is to be used for the limited purpose of providing a linkage after due enquiry and verification. 16. The certificate issued by the G.P. Secretary, by no means, is proof of citizenship. Such proof will come only if the link between the claimant and the legacy person (who has to be a citizen) is established. The certificate has to be verified at two stages. The first is the authenticity of the certificate itself; and the second is the authenticity of the contents thereof. The latter process of verification is bound to be an exhaustive process in the course of which the source of information of the facts and all other details recorded in the certificate will be ascertained after giving an opportunity to the holder of the certificate. If the document and its contents is to be subjected to a thorough search and probe we do not see why the said certificate should have been interdicted by the High Court, particularly, in the context of the facts surrounding the enumeration and inclusion of the documents mentioned in the illustrative list of documents, as noticed above. If the document and its contents is to be subjected to a thorough search and probe we do not see why the said certificate should have been interdicted by the High Court, particularly, in the context of the facts surrounding the enumeration and inclusion of the documents mentioned in the illustrative list of documents, as noticed above. In fact, the said list of illustrative documents was also laid before this Court in the course of the proceedings held from time to time and this Court was aware of the nature and effect of each of the documents mentioned in the list.” 26. It has been submitted that the aforesaid decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has been relied on in many occasions by this Court in rejecting the claim for the citizenship on the basis of such certificate issued by the Grampanchayat/ Gaonburah. In this regard, learned Special Counsel, F.T. has also referred to the decisions of this Court in (1) Jabeda Begum @ Jabeda Khatun vs. Union of India in WP(C) No.7451/2019 decided on 12.02.2020, (2) Nur Begum vs. Union of India in WP(C) No.1900/2019 decided on 18.02.2020. 27. In the present case, the contents of the certificate cannot be taken to be correct as it was based merely on the population register and the Gaonburah himself had also stated in his deposition that he did not maintain proper records regarding the population register and accordingly, it has been submitted that the aforesaid Gaonburah certificates relied upon by the petitioners cannot be the proof of citizenship and also of linkage with their projected parents. 28. Coming to the evidence of the petitioners' mother Saheran Nessa, whom the petitioners had projected to be their mother, it has been submitted that such an oral evidence would be of no evidentiary value unless the same is corroborated by documentary evidences. In this regard, learned counsel for the State has relied on the decision of this Court in Nur Bengum (supra) and Asia Khatun vs. Union of India [WP(C) No.4020 of 2017] decided on 21.11.2019 wherein it has been very clearly held that any oral evidence without any documentary evidence cannot establish the relationship with the projected parents. Further, it has been submitted that in the present case, there is variation in the name of their mother. Further, it has been submitted that in the present case, there is variation in the name of their mother. In some documents, the name of the petitioners' mother has been shown as Saherann Nessa and in some of the documents, it has been shown as Sahiran Khatun. 29. Coming to the 3rd document i.e. jamabandi which has been relied upon by the petitioners to show their relationship with the projected parents, it has been submitted that such a copy of the jamabandi cannot be said to be conclusive as the names of both the petitioners do not appear in the said jamabandi. Only the names of father and mother of the petitioners and the wife of the second petitioner appeared and that too as a purchasers and not as an inheritors. Therefore, these documents showing certain sale transaction, that too, in the year 2014 does not provide and proof of linkage with their projected parents. It has also been submitted that in the case of Abdul Rouf his title Khandakar did not appear in the document, thus raising a doubt as to whether Abdul Rouf who is shown to be husband of Hamida Khatun is same Abdul Khandakar or not. 30. Accordingly, it has been submitted that the aforesaid 2(two) crucial documents, namely the certificates issued by the Gaonburah and the jamabandi which had been relied upon by the petitioners in both the cases to show the linkage with their projected parents, do not establish their linkage nor the citizenships. It has been also submitted that except these documents, there is no other document which can establish the linkage between the petitioners and their projected parents and as such, it has been submitted on behalf of the State that the opinion rendered by the Tribunal does not suffer from any irregularity and does not warrant interference. 31. On the other hand, Mr. Sikdar, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the aforesaid two documents have been relied on not as the basis of citizenship but as corroborative evidences, primarily to show the residence of their parents in that particular village, namely, Tedhara Pathar. 32. As regards the contention of the State that oral evidence is of no value without documentary evidence, to repel the same, Mr. Sikdar has relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in Anil Sharma and Ors. 32. As regards the contention of the State that oral evidence is of no value without documentary evidence, to repel the same, Mr. Sikdar has relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in Anil Sharma and Ors. vs. State of Jharkhand, (2004) 5 SCC 679 wherein it was held that mere absence of documentary evidence would not dilute the evidentiary value of the oral testimony and in this regard has relied on para -13 of the said judgment, which is reproduced herein below:- “13. Non-production of documents which the appellants claim would have strengthened the claim of absence of PW-5 cannot in any way dilute the evidentiary value of the oral testimony. Even though the witnesses have been cross-examined at length, no material inconsistency has been elicited to discard the evidence of PWs 5 and 6. One of the pleas which was pressed into service is alleged relationship of PWs 5 and 6 with deceased and their criminal antecedents. As rightly noticed by the High Court on the aforesaid basis the evidence which is found truthful and credible otherwise should not be discarded. The Courts have to keep in view that in such matters deep scrutiny is necessary. After having kept these principles in view the Trial Court and the High Court have found that the evidence when carefully analysed on the whole was credible. After deep scrutiny the Courts below have found that there is ring of truth in the evidence of PWs 5 and 6.” 33. In this regard the learned counsel for the petitioners has also relied on para-42(iv) of the decision of this Court in Haidar Ali vs. Union of India and Ors. in WP(C) No.1818/2019 on 30.03.2021, which is reproduced herein below:- “42. On proper analysis of the aforesaid observation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the following aspects emerge: (i) In order to establish one's citizenship, normally he may be required to give evidence of (i) his date of birth (ii) place of birth (iii) name of his parents (iv) their place of birth and citizenship. However, the Supreme Court nowhere states that the aforesaid facts must be proved only by documents. The expression used is “normally he may be required to give evidence”. Thus, it is not mandatory to prove all these to show that he is an Indian citizen. However, the Supreme Court nowhere states that the aforesaid facts must be proved only by documents. The expression used is “normally he may be required to give evidence”. Thus, it is not mandatory to prove all these to show that he is an Indian citizen. These are, however, relevant facts, if one proves, can establish beyond doubt that he is a citizen of this country. Yet, he may be able to prove his citizenship by other evidences as well. (ii) Further, disclosure of facts or information other than the ones mentioned in para 26 does not mean that adverse inference can be drawn. (iii) One may prove one’s citizenship without referring accurately to all the factors mentioned under paragraph 26 of Sonowal II (supra). For example, if the date of birth or the place of birth is not conclusively proved, but if it is conclusively proved that the father of the proceedee is an Indian citizen, the claim of the proceedee cannot be rejected as a foreigner, as it would fly in the face of logic and common sense. (iv) Further, it is nowhere mandated that he must prove all these facts by documentary evidence only. Section 59 of the Evidence Act, 1872 says that all facts, except the contents of document or electronic records, may be proved by oral evidence. There may be cases, where the proceedee is an illiterate, and the birth is not registered with any authority, in which event, it would be impossible to produce any documentary evidence to prove his date of birth and place and other facts accurately and one may rely on oral evidence only. In such case, can a claim be thrown out merely because only oral evidence has been led? (v) Further, after he has given evidence on these points, the State authorities can verify the facts and can then lead evidence in rebuttal, if necessary.” 34. Mr. Sikdar also submits that the petitioners have been successfully able to establish their linkage with Saheran Nessa and the difference of her name i.e. Saheran Nessa and Sahiran Khatun has been explained in the written statements as well as in the evidences adduced. 35. Mr. Sikdar also submits that the petitioners have been successfully able to establish their linkage with Saheran Nessa and the difference of her name i.e. Saheran Nessa and Sahiran Khatun has been explained in the written statements as well as in the evidences adduced. 35. Before we examine the rival contentions of the learned counsel for contesting parties, we would like to examine the correctness of the reasons on the basis of which the learned Tribunal has given the opinion that the petitioners Sahjahan Ali and Kahndakar Abdur Rouf are not an Indians, but foreigners who had entered into India illegally after 25.03.1971. 36. In the impugned order dated 15.02.2019, while the learned Tribunal noted the plea taken by the petitioners in their written statement that in the voters lists of 1997, both his parents' nick names Khandakar Aklas Uddin and Sahera Katun were entered, at village Tedhara under 45 No. Baghbar LAC instead of their correct names Akhlaz Uddin and Saheran Nessa, respectively and that Akhlaz Uddin and Khandakar Aklas Uddin are one and the same person. It was also mentioned in the written statement that the Saheran Nessa and Sahera Khatun are also one and the same person. The learned Tribunal observed that the petitioners had not disclosed the names of the grandparents and also that they have not disclosed how many brothers and sisters of the parental grandfather were there as well as his fathers. 37. In para No.9 of the impugned order, the learned Tribunal made the following observation:- “9. This is all both the O.P.s stated in their written statement but they have not disclosed their grandparent’s name. The O.P. has not mentioned about how many brother and sister(s) of O.P. Parental grandfather were as well as how many brother and sisters of his father’s. There is also not mentioned about the brothers and sister(s) of the O.P. if any. At the time of filing written statement both the O.P.s have not mentioned the date and year of birth. The pleading of O.P’s by no means can be adequate to assert their citizenship right as per Section 9 of the Foreigners Act 1946 as explained by the Supreme Court in paragraph 26 of Sarbananda Sonowal vs. Union of India, reported in (2005) 5 SCC 665 .” 38. The pleading of O.P’s by no means can be adequate to assert their citizenship right as per Section 9 of the Foreigners Act 1946 as explained by the Supreme Court in paragraph 26 of Sarbananda Sonowal vs. Union of India, reported in (2005) 5 SCC 665 .” 38. Thus, in absence of mentioning of the names of the grandparents and other relatives in the written statement filed by the petitioners, the learned Tribunal held that the petitioners have failed to discharge the burden cast under Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, 1946. 39. We are unable to subscribe to the said view taken by the learned Tribunal for the reason that failure to mention of the names of relatives in the written statement does not ipso facto render the claim of the proceedees untenable as the linkage has to be established primarily with the parents or grand-parents as the case may be by adducing evidences. However, if the petitioners were not able to state the names of other relatives, when asked during the cross-examination, then the issue of doubting the credibility of their evidence may arise. However, when no questions were asked to them, as in the present case, no adverse inference could be drawn against them for not mentioning the names of other relatives in their written statements. 40. Petitioners examined their mother Saheran Nessa @ Sahera Khatun as DW2 who corroborated the plea of the petitioners. However, the said evidence of DW2 which corroborates the evidence of the petitioners had not been accepted by the learned Tribunal on the ground that Sahera Khatun and Saheran Nessa are not the one and the same person as her name has been shown differently in different documents including in the Electoral Photo Identity Card, where her name appears as Sahera Khatun, wife of Khandakar Eklas Uddin. The petitioners had claimed their mother’s name is Saheran Nessa as reflected in the voters list of 1966, 1970. 41. As regards this, the petitioners had filed an affidavit which was exhibited as Ext.H in which the discrepancies in the names of the parents were explained. 42. However, the learned Tribunal ignored the same on the ground that it is a self-sworn affidavit which cannot be relied upon. 43. We fail to understand how an affidavit can be ignored merely on the ground that it is self-serving. 42. However, the learned Tribunal ignored the same on the ground that it is a self-sworn affidavit which cannot be relied upon. 43. We fail to understand how an affidavit can be ignored merely on the ground that it is self-serving. Every affidavit filed by a proceedee obviously will be self-serving in the sense that through the affidavit a proceedee would try to explain his/her position and relationship and discrepancies if any. Unless the veracity of the contents of the affidavit is questioned or doubted, the same cannot be ignored merely on the ground that it is self-serving. An affidavit stating certain facts does not amount to a documentary evidence, but pertakes the character of oral evidence put in writing. Thus, if the affidavit is not controverted or challenged, it would amount to an oral evidence unrebutted. Oral evidence, if found consistent, and if not questioned or challenged, cannot be altogether ignored. Thus, affidavit in our view cannot be totally ignored. 44. It may be also mentioned that when DW2, Saheran Nessa @ Sahera Khatun had deposed before the Tribunal as Saheran Nessa @ Shahera Khatun and also explained that she is also known as Shaheran Nessa and Saheran Nessa and these names refer to same and one person, no question was asked in the cross-examination disputing the said claim. Thus, the evidence of DW-2 corroborates the contents of the affidavits filed by the petitioners in crucial aspects. 45. Under the circumstances, we are of the view that rejection of the affidavit which have been amply corroborated by the testimony of the DW2 before the learned Tribunal is not legally sustainable. 46. Learned Tribunal also found fault with the petitioners for not mentioning their stepmother, namely, Nurjaman Nessa, in their testimonies. In the voters list of 1970, the petitioners' father Eklazuddin is shown to have two wives namely, Saheron Nessa and Nurjaman Nessa. It has been stated that the petitioners as well as DW2 remained silent on this and the learned Tribunal observed that this will give rise to a genuine suspicion about the truthfulness of the narrative presented by the petitioners as well as the witness, DW2. 47. It has been stated that the petitioners as well as DW2 remained silent on this and the learned Tribunal observed that this will give rise to a genuine suspicion about the truthfulness of the narrative presented by the petitioners as well as the witness, DW2. 47. However, in our view, the said inference cannot be drawn for the reason that if the petitioners were silent on this aspect, it could be because the petitioners were not asked in the cross-examination as to how the name of Nurjaman Nessa appeared in the voters list of 1970 and what is the relationship of the said Nurjaman Nessa with the petitioners. In absence of any question by the Tribunal as to why the petitioners did not mention the name of Nurjaman Nessa which was shown to be another wife of the father of the petitioner, no adverse inference could have been drawn, as had been done. 48. We are of the opinion that the evidence of DW2 who had testified before the Tribunal that she is the mother of the petitioners, could not have been ignored, more so, when no dispute was raised about the relationship. Merely because a person comes to witness stand and claims that she is the mother of a proceedee may not amount to proof the relationship. Yet, when no question was asked and her testimony not challenged, such an assertion can be accepted as true specially when there are documentary evidences, in the form of voters lists. In the present case, no such question was asked to DW2 to doubt her claim that she is the mother of the proceedees. 49. The evidence of a mother is important and critical which cannot be compared with the evidence of any other person as the mother would have a direct knowledge of the relationship with her off-springs. 50. Be that as it may, since the evidence of said DW2 had remained unchallenged as regards her claim that the proceedees (petitioners herein) were her sons, we are of the view that the said evidence of the DW2 could not have been ignored. 51. As regards the Jamabandi which was exhibited as Ext.F, the same was rejected by the learned Tribunal on the ground that the name of Eklas Uddin was entered by the Circle Officer dated 19.09.1986 which was not taken into consideration. 51. As regards the Jamabandi which was exhibited as Ext.F, the same was rejected by the learned Tribunal on the ground that the name of Eklas Uddin was entered by the Circle Officer dated 19.09.1986 which was not taken into consideration. The learned Tribunal observed that no other documentary evidence had been produced to substantiate the entries made in the Jamabandi and as such, it does not have evidentiary value. 52. We are unable to agree with the said approach taken by the learned Tribunal for the reason that even if the name of the petitioners' father was entered in the year 1986, the name entered in the said document was Eklas Uddin, son of A. Sattar and it can be used to corroborate that it is the same person whose name appears in the voters lists of 1966 and 1970 in the same village Tedhar Pather under Police Station Baghbar, District Barpeta. 53. Thus, it can be used as an evidence to show the continued presence of their father in the said village of Tedhar Pather under Police Station Baghbar, Dist.-Barpeta. The said jamabandi copy in isolation may not throw any light on the linkage of the petitioners with the projected father, but in conjunction with other evidences on record, it may help to establish their plea that they are sons of the projected father Akhlaz Uddin. 54. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, we are unable to agree with the approach and reasoning adopted by the learned Tribunal in rejecting the plea of the petitioners. 55. Accordingly, we are of the opinion that the learned Tribunal will be required to reassess the evidences on record in the light of the observations made above by us and also in accordance with law and pass a fresh opinion as regards the citizenship status of the petitioners after hearing the petitioners. In view of our above conclusion, we deem it not necessary to deal with the rival contentions of the parties and they may raise these issues before the learned Tribunal at the time of hearing. 56. For the reasons discussed above, the present petitions, WP(C) No.6176/2019 and WP(C) No.6145 are allowed by setting aside the impugned common order dated 15.02.2018 passed by learned Foreigners Tribunal No.4th, Barpeta in F.T. Case No.103/17 [Ref.IM(D)T Case No.11076/98] and F.T. Case No.104/17 [Ref.IM(D)T Case No.11074/98]. 57. 56. For the reasons discussed above, the present petitions, WP(C) No.6176/2019 and WP(C) No.6145 are allowed by setting aside the impugned common order dated 15.02.2018 passed by learned Foreigners Tribunal No.4th, Barpeta in F.T. Case No.103/17 [Ref.IM(D)T Case No.11076/98] and F.T. Case No.104/17 [Ref.IM(D)T Case No.11074/98]. 57. Petitioners will appear before the learned Foreigners Tribunal No.4th, Barpeta within a period of 1(one) month from today. 58. Petitioners will continue to remain on bail on similar terms and conditions as directed by this Court vide order dated 04.08.2021 and 29.11.2019 passed in both the writ petitions till a fresh opinion is rendered by the learned Foreigners Tribunal No.4th, Barpeta as regards the citizenship status of the petitioners. 59. The present petitions are, accordingly, disposed of. 60. LCRs be remitted forthwith to the concerned Foreigners Tribunal.