ORDER : Jayachandran, J. Whether a trial court or an appellate court, as the case may be, having exercised the option under clause (a) of Section 335(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (referred to as 'Cr.P.C.' hereinafter) at the time of delivery of judgment of acquittal on the ground of unsoundness of mind, can re-exercise the option under clause (b) at a later point of time on the application of a relative/friend, is the question involved in the above Criminal Miscellaneous Application. The petitioner, the wife of the accused, who seeks an answer in the affirmative, places heavy reliance upon the judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court in In re : Saji v. [OP No.16667/1996], reported in 2009 (2) KLT 892 . 2. The attendant facts:- The husband of the petitioner is the sole accused in S.C. No.190/2015 of the Additional Sessions Court-I, Kalpetta for offences alleged under Sections 302, 307, 324 and 326 of the Indian Penal Code (referred to as 'I.P.C.', hereinafter). Negating the defence plea under Section 84 of the I.P.C., learned Sessions Judge convicted the accused for the offences above referred and inter alia sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life. In appeal (Crl.Appeal No.1344/2016), a Division Bench of this Court reversed the judgment impugned, set aside the conviction and sentence, and acquitted the accused, finding that he was incapable of knowing the nature of the act alleged to have been committed by him, or that it was wrong, or contrary to law, by reason of unsoundness of mind. The rest of the directions in the judgment of the Division Bench, relevant in the context are, as extracted herein below: “35. ………… We direct that the appellant shall be kept in safe custody for the present as provided under Section 335 of the Cr.P.C. Subsection (2) of Section 335 provides that the order for detention shall be in accordance with the rules framed by the State Government under the Lunacy Act, 1912. As the Lunacy Act, 1912 is not in force at present and it has been repealed and the relevant Act in force is the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017, we find that the latter Act is applicable in this case. As the Lunacy Act, 1912 is not in force at present and it has been repealed and the relevant Act in force is the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017, we find that the latter Act is applicable in this case. We, therefore, direct that the appellant is to be detained in one of the mental health establishments in the State in accordance with the rules, if any, framed by the State Government. It is open to the State Government to direct the appellant to be delivered to any of his relatives or friends in accordance with law. A copy of this judgment shall also be sent to the Director General of Prisons and the Secretary, Home Department, Government of Kerala in terms of Section 335(4) for taking further action in terms of Sections 338 and 339 of the Cr.P.C. The said authorities are directed to submit a report of action taken by them from time to time before the trial court within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. The court below is directed to take further follow up action and issue necessary orders in the best interest of the appellant in accordance with Chapter XXV of the Cr.P.C.” (underlined for emphasis) 3. The Division Bench delivered the judgment on 10.01.2020. On 3.12.2021, the petitioner, the wife of the accused, filed the instant Criminal Miscellaneous Application under Section 335(1)(b), Cr.P.C. seeking to release the accused to the legal custody of the petitioner. The petitioner, essentially, relies on Annexure-A2 report on the mental condition of the accused, issued by the second respondent (Superintendent, Government Mental Health Centre, Kozhikkode). The petitioner contends that as per Annexure-A2 report, the accused is fit to be released from hospital, as also, for out Crl. patient management. The petitioner is ready and willing to take care of her husband at her house, to which course, their children, a son aged 26 years and a daughter aged 19 years, have no objection. 4. It is in the back drop of the above facts and circumstances that the question posed at the beginning of the Order surfaces. In the given situation, is it for the appellate court to act under Section 335(1)(b); or for the State Government to issue necessary order delivering the accused to the relative/friend in terms of Section 339, Cr.P.C? 5. It is in the back drop of the above facts and circumstances that the question posed at the beginning of the Order surfaces. In the given situation, is it for the appellate court to act under Section 335(1)(b); or for the State Government to issue necessary order delivering the accused to the relative/friend in terms of Section 339, Cr.P.C? 5. It is profitable to extract herein below Section 335 of the Cr.P.C: “335. Person acquitted on such ground to be detained in safe custody.— (1) Whenever the finding states that the accused person committed the act alleged, the Magistrate or Court before whom or which the trial has been held, shall, if such act would, but for the incapacity found, have constituted an offence,— (a) order such person to be detained in safe custody in such place and manner as the Magistrate or Court thinks fit; or (b) order such person to be delivered to any relative or friend of such person. (2) No order for the detention of the accused in a lunatic asylum shall be made under clause (a) of sub-section (1) otherwise than in accordance with such rules as the State Government may have made under the Indian Lunacy Act, 1912 (4 of 1912). (3) No order for the delivery of the accused to a relative or friend shall be made under clause (b) of sub-section (1) except upon the application of such relative or friend and on his giving security to the satisfaction of the Magistrate or Court that the person delivered shall— (a) be properly taken care of and prevented from doing injury to himself or to any other person; (b) be produced for the inspection of such officer, and at such times and places, as the State Government may direct. (4) The Magistrate or Court shall report to the State Government the action taken under sub-section (1).” Section 335 falls under Chapter XXV of the Code, which contains provisions as to accused persons of unsound mind. Section 328 to Section 333 contain provisions to deal with an accused person of unsound mind at the trial stage. To understand the true scope and ambit of Section 335, it is seminal to take note of the purport of the preceding Section - Section 334 - which provides for judgment of acquittal on ground of unsoundness of mind. Section 328 to Section 333 contain provisions to deal with an accused person of unsound mind at the trial stage. To understand the true scope and ambit of Section 335, it is seminal to take note of the purport of the preceding Section - Section 334 - which provides for judgment of acquittal on ground of unsoundness of mind. The Section mandates that if a person is acquitted, on the ground of unsoundness of mind at the time at which he is alleged to have committed the offence, the court shall specifically enter a finding as to whether he committed the act or not. 6. Section 335 is to be read in conjunction with and in continuation of the mandate under Section 334, as could be seen from the opening sentence of Section 335. In other words, Section 335 operates on the strength of the finding that the accused person had committed the act alleged, which is to be recorded while delivering a judgment of acquittal on the ground of unsoundness of mind. The purpose of the above discussion is only to point out that an Order under Section 335 Cr.P.C. is to be passed at the time when a judgment of acquittal on ground of unsoundness of mind of the accused is delivered. 7. Again, this conclusion derives considerable force from the person or authority, on whom the power to pass an order under Section 335 Cr.P.C. is bestowed with. It is the Magistrate before whom, or the Court before which, the trial has been held, which is empowered to pass an order under Section 335(1), Cr.P.C. This, again, is a sure pointer as regards the point of time at which the power under Section 335(1) has to be exercised. 8. Section 335(1) confers two options before the trial court. The first, under Section 335(1)(a), is to order the accused to be detained in safe custody in such place and manner as the Magistrate or Court thinks fit. The second, under Section 335(1)(b), is to order the accused to be delivered to any relative or friend of such person. 8. Section 335(1) confers two options before the trial court. The first, under Section 335(1)(a), is to order the accused to be detained in safe custody in such place and manner as the Magistrate or Court thinks fit. The second, under Section 335(1)(b), is to order the accused to be delivered to any relative or friend of such person. It is relevant to point out that the two options are separated by the word 'or', from which it is axiomatic that the options under clause (a) and (b) are disjunctive and the trial court, at the time of delivering judgment of acquittal under Section 334 Cr.P.C., can order either of the two. It is further relevant to point out that an Order under sub-clause (a), that is for detaining in safe custody, should be passed necessarily in terms of the requirements of subsection (2) of Section 335. Similarly, an order under clause (b), that is delivery to relative/friend, should necessarily be in terms of the requirements under sub-section (3) of Section 335. 9. Clause (b) to sub-Section (3) of Section 335 is quite significant in ascertaining the scope of the power under Section 335, Cr.P.C. Section 335(3)(b) mandates that the relative/friend, who seeks custody of the accused person shall give security, among other things, to produce the accused for inspection by such officer, and at such times and places, as the State Government may direct. Sub-Section (4) to Section 335 is also important, inasmuch as it mandates the trial court to report the action taken under sub-Section (1) of Section 335 to the State Government. Thus, Section 335(3)(b) and Section 335(4) clearly indicate the domain of the State Government in the matter, once an Order in terms of clause (a) or (b) of Section 335(1) is passed by the trial court, which is further made clear from the provisions under Sections 336, 338 and 339 of the Cr.P.C. Needless to say that all the powers of the trial court above referred can be exercised by an appellate court, appeal being the continuation of the original proceedings. 10. A closer scrutiny of clauses (a) and (b) to Section 335(1) would reveal a subtle distinction as regards the degree of unsoundness of the accused at the time of delivering the judgment. 10. A closer scrutiny of clauses (a) and (b) to Section 335(1) would reveal a subtle distinction as regards the degree of unsoundness of the accused at the time of delivering the judgment. If the accused person was labouring under unsoundness of mind at the time of commission of the offence, and his situation has considerably improved, as perceivable from materials on record, including medical opinion, option under clause (b) may be resorted to, provided a relative or friend had applied for delivery of the accused person and he satisfies the court as regards the requirements contemplated in sub-Section (3) to Section 335. However, if the degree of unsoundness is relatively high and the accused person requires constant or intermittent medical monitoring, then the appropriate option will be the one under clause (a) to Section 335(1). 11. Under Section 336, the State Government can empower the officer in charge of the Jail to discharge all or any of the functions of the Inspector General of Prisons under Section 337 or Section 338. Section 337 deals with a situation where a lunatic prisoner is reported capable of making his defence, about which we are not concerned herein. Sections 338 and 339 deal with the situation where the lunatic detained becomes fit to be released. Section 338 is triggered, upon the certificate of an Inspector General or visitors to the effect that in their judgment, the person detained can be released without danger of his doing injury to himself or to any other person. We, in the given facts, are concerned with Section 339(1), which is extracted herein below: “339. Section 338 is triggered, upon the certificate of an Inspector General or visitors to the effect that in their judgment, the person detained can be released without danger of his doing injury to himself or to any other person. We, in the given facts, are concerned with Section 339(1), which is extracted herein below: “339. Delivery of lunatic to care of relative or friend.— (1) Whenever any relative or friend of any person detained under the provisions of section 330 or section 335 desires that he shall be delivered to his care and custody, the State Government may, upon the application of such relative or friend and on his giving security to the satisfaction of such State Government, that the person delivered shall— (a) be properly taken care of and prevented from doing injury to himself or to any other person; (b) be produced for the inspection of such officer, and at such times and places, as the State Government may direct; (c) in the case of a person detained under sub-section (2) of section 330, be produced when required before such Magistrate or Court, order such person to be delivered to such relative or friend.” 12. It is clear from Section 339 that an application by a friend or relative of a person detained under Section 335 - which detention is obviously referable to clause (a) - seeking delivery of the accused to his care and custody is to be given to the State Government. The State Government, upon satisfaction of the conditions prescribed in clauses (a), (b) and (c), will order such person to be delivered to such a relative or friend. 13. Whether this power under Section 339 (though referred to as Section 335(1)(b) in the instant application) can be exercised by the trial court or the appellate court, as the case may be, is the moot question. The definite answer which occurs to our mind is emphatically in the negative. The scheme of Section 335 to Section 339 makes abundantly clear the stages at which, and the authority by which, the powers conferred therein are to be exercised. While the power under Section 335 is conferred on the trial Magistrate or the trial court (which includes the appellate court as well), the power under Section 339 is specifically conferred on the State Government. While the power under Section 335 is conferred on the trial Magistrate or the trial court (which includes the appellate court as well), the power under Section 339 is specifically conferred on the State Government. Merely because the power contemplated under Section 339 on the State Government to order delivery of an accused person to a friend or relative is one among the two options available to the trial court under Section 335 of the Cr.P.C., it cannot be said that such power can be exercised by such court irrespective of the context and point of time at which it is contemplated to be exercised. We are of the definite view that once a judgment of acquittal in terms of Section 334, Cr.P.C is delivered, with a further direction in terms of clause (a) or (b) of Section 335(1), by a competent trial court, such court becomes functus officio, rendering it incompetent to receive any further application of the nature referred to in Section 339, in purported exercise of the power under Section 335(1)(b). 14. We will also refer to the history of the relevant provisions under Sections 335 and 339. Section 335 of the present Code is, in essence, pari materia with Section 471 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. Similarly, Section 339 of the new Code is in pari materia with Section 475 of the 1898 Code. It is important to note that in Section 471 of the old Code, clause (b) to sub-Section (1) of Section 335 of the new code, which deals with the delivery of the accused person to a friend/relative of the accused person, was absent. The following extract from the 41st report of the Law Commission throws adequate light into the purpose behind the legislative change. “In England, the Criminal Law Revision Committee, while observing that the Home Office is in a better position than a Court to investigate question relating to treatment of the accused, and that in such matters uniformity of practice was desirable, nevertheless recommended that in both cases, i.e., when there is a “special verdict” (guilty but insane), and when there is a finding of unfitness to plead, the Court should have a discretion not to make an order for detention if it considers on medical evidence that it is safe for the public to order the immediate release of the accused. We feel that the recommendations of the English Committee are applicable to Indian conditions also. At least, the mandatory provision in section 471 should be replaced by a provision which would leave some discretion to the Court. The primary object of the detention order under section 471 is rehabilitation of the accused (now acquitted) and to prevent any trouble if he should relapse into insanity. It cannot be denied that the accused will receive more personal attention and care from his own relatives and friends than in a public lunatic asylum; and where his relatives or friends are ready to look after him and also undertake to ensure that he causes no injury to himself or others, there seems no reason why the accused should not be released to their custody. It can, no doubt, be said in favour of the present provision that if it is found after observation in the hospital that the person concerned is not a danger to others, he would be released under section 475. Even then, there should be no objection to a discretion being given to the Court.” 15. It is in the above setting that clause (b) to Section 335(1) happened to be incorporated to the new Code. Even when such power to deliver the accused person to any relative/friend is incorporated, Section 339 (corresponding to Section 475 of the old Cr.P.C) remains intact and unaffected. Similarly, the context and setting in which the power under Section 335 can be exercised by a trial court also remained as such, thus providing a sure pointer as to the context and point of time at which such power under Section 335(1), be it at under clause (a) or (b), has to be exercised. Thus, while the discretion of the Court under Section 335 has been expanded in the new Code, the contextual parameters as regards the exercise of such power remained the same, unaltered and unaffected. 16. We will now refer to a few precedents having a baring upon the issue under consideration. In Emperor v. Somya Hirya Mahar [1918 (20) Bom.L.R. 629 :: 46 Ind.Cas. 691], the Bombay High Court was petitioned by the Government Pleader seeking transfer of the accused person to a lunatic asylum, in modification of the Order passed by the High Court to detain the accused in custody in the Jail, until further orders are passed by the Government. 691], the Bombay High Court was petitioned by the Government Pleader seeking transfer of the accused person to a lunatic asylum, in modification of the Order passed by the High Court to detain the accused in custody in the Jail, until further orders are passed by the Government. The petition was essentially premised on the repeal of sub-Section (1) to Section 471 of the old Code. The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court found, in paragraph no.6, that the powers of the court and that of the Government were not altered by the repeal and the law practically remained the same, as it was before the repeal. Paragraph No.7 is relevant and the same is extracted herein below: “7. It is clear that under Sub-section (1) we can order the person concerned to be kept in safe custody in such place and manner as we think fit. The subsequent discharge, detention and transfer to any public lunatic asylum referred to in Section 474 and the delivery of the person to a relative under Section 475 are matters for the Local Government, and not for the Court to deal with. It is quite clear that we cannot exercise the powers conferred on the Local Government under Sections 474 and 475.” 17. We may reiterate in this context that Section 471 of the old Code corresponds to Section 335 and Section 475 to Section 339 of the new code. We take note that this decision is rendered on the basis of the provisions as existed in the old Code, where an enabling provision corresponding to clause (b) to Section 335(1) of the new Cr.P.C. was not there. However, the power to transfer the accused in that case to a lunatic asylum as requested by the Public Prosecutor is traceable to that provision in the old Code, which corresponds to clause (a) to Section 335(1) of the new Code. It is in that context that the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court held that once the power under Section 471(1) of the old Code is exercised, directing the accused person to be kept in safe custody, the subsequent discharge, detention and transfer referred to in Section 474 and the delivery of person to a relative under Section 475 are matters for the local Government, and not for the Court, to deal with. The Division Bench also made it clear that the Court cannot exercise the powers conferred on the local Government under Sections 474 and 475. The legal position remains the same, insofar as the new Code is concerned, except the availability of an enabling provision under clause (b) to deliver the accused person to a friend or relative at the time when the judgment of acquittal is delivered on the ground of unsoundness of mind. 18. Another judgment to be taken note of is, again, a Division Bench judgment of the Bombay High Court in Emperor v. Imam Hasan [AIR 1923 Bom. 261]. In a factual premise, more or less at par with Somya Hirya Mahar (supra), the Division Bench held thus in paragraph No.5 of the judgment: “5. Apart from the question whether as a matter of fact the Courts have now any power to make such a report, it seems to me that the intention of the Legislature, when amending Section 471 by leaving out those words, was that the Court, in a case where it has been found that an offence has been committed by a lunatic, should confine itself to making an order that he should be kept in safe custody in such place and manner as the Court thinks fit. Then it is for the Government under their own powers to decide the future fate of the person concerned. ………….” (underlined for emphasis) 19. In Provincial Government, Central Provinces and Berar v. Krishna Gopala Maratha [ AIR 1945 NAGPUR 77 ], the Sessions Judge, upon acquitting the accused on the ground of insanity, directed the Police and the Executive Officers to deal with him as per the provisions of the Lunacy Act, instead of directing him to be detained in safe custody under Section 471(1), Cr.P.C. In a revision preferred by the Provincial Government, the Nagpur High Court, speaking through Vivian Bose (J) (as His Lordship then was), held that the course adopted by the Sessions Judge is not permissible and observed thus: “........ The Legislature must have known this when it enacted Ss 470 and 471. The Legislature must have known this when it enacted Ss 470 and 471. Under these sections whenever the acquittal is based on the ground of insanity, the Court is bound “to order such person to be detained in safe custody in such place and manner as the Magistrate or Court thinks fit, and shall report the action taken to the Provincial Government.” The privilege of deciding whether the accused shall be released or not lies with the Provincial Government and not with the Court. ....” (underlined for emphasis) 20. We are quite aware that the above two judgments in Imam Hasan and Krishna Gopala Maratha were rendered in terms of the old Code, where there is no provision in Section 471 enabling delivery of the accused person to a friend or relative. However, we find that the introduction of clause (b) to Section 335(1) of the new Code only provides an alternative course for the trial court to deal with an accused person, who was acquitted on the ground of unsoundness of mind, which option, going by the statutory scheme of the Code, cannot be exercised, except when the judgment of acquittal is delivered, for, the power to deal with an accused person subsequently has been clearly conferred on the State Government. 21. Coming to the judgment in In Re : Saji (supra), heavily relied on by the petitioner, we would straight away notice that the said case arose from a report of the Member Secretary, Kerala State Legal Services Authority in OP No.16667/1996, registered in accordance with the directions of the Apex Court in Sheela Barse v. Union of India [ (1995) 5 SCC 654 ]. The High Court called for the relevant records to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality and propriety of the order passed by the trial court. The facts revealed are as follows: An accused person, who was alleged to have committed offences under Sections 302 and 307 of the I.P.C., was acquitted on the ground of unsoundness of mind. He was ordered to be detained in safe custody in the Mental Health Centre under Section 335 of the Cr.P.C. Later, the mother of the accused filed an application before trial court seeking delivery of the accused person to her care and custody. He was ordered to be detained in safe custody in the Mental Health Centre under Section 335 of the Cr.P.C. Later, the mother of the accused filed an application before trial court seeking delivery of the accused person to her care and custody. The application was dismissed by the trial court on the premise that, having exercised the option under clause (a) of Section 335(1), the Court cannot issue a further order under clause (b) thereof, directing delivery of the accused to a relative and that such order can be passed only by the Government as provided for in Section 339 of the Cr.P.C. The same issue, as we are called upon to consider in this Crl.M.A., has been framed by the learned Single Judge in paragraph No.4 of the judgment. After referring to the relevant provisions of the new Code, in juxtaposition with the provisions of the old Code, and after taking note of the 41st report of the Law Commission of India (already referred to in this order), the learned Single Judge traced the origin of the present provision under Section 335 of the new Code in paragraph No.8 of the judgment. In paragraph No.9, the learned Single Judge observed that the Government is only one of the limbs through which the sovereign nation exercises its sovereign power, going by the constitutional scheme of this Country. There exists no constitutional reason why the power to deliver a lunatic or a person acquitted on ground of unsoundness of mind to the care of the relative or friend should be exercised exclusively by the Government and not by the Courts. The learned Single Judge went on to observe that the courts are empowered and duty bound to exercise parens patriae jurisdiction in relation to persons of unsound mind. On such premise, the learned Single Judge found that there is no reason to isolate the Courts from exercising the power to order delivery of a person, who is acquitted on grounds of unsoundness of mind, to any relative or friend of such person. 22. We are in respectful agreement with the above referred findings of the learned Single Judge in paragraph No.9 of the judgment. However, the cleavage of opinion surfaces in the context of re-exercise of power under clause (b) to Section 335, after having exercised the option under clause (a). 22. We are in respectful agreement with the above referred findings of the learned Single Judge in paragraph No.9 of the judgment. However, the cleavage of opinion surfaces in the context of re-exercise of power under clause (b) to Section 335, after having exercised the option under clause (a). We are unable to persuade ourselves to agree with the further findings in paragraph No.10 of the judgment, which are extracted herein below: “10 ...... The exercise of the power to order detention in safe custody in terms of clause (a) of S.335(1) is one of the modalities of dealing with a person acquitted on grounds of unsoundness of mind. The exercise of such power under S.335(1)(a) does not extinguish or preclude the alternative mode by which he could be delivered to any relative or friend. There is nothing in S.335 of the 1973 Code to conclude that the Court cannot pass an order of delivery to any relative or friend under S.335(1)(b) merely because it had early issued an order under S.335(1)(a) for detention in safe custody in a mental health centre, as in the case in hand. All that has to be ensured is that the Court is satisfied, upon an application by the relative or friend, that an order is to be made and that the conditions stipulated in S.335(3) are satisfied.” 23. The learned Single Judge also found that an order under clause (b) directing delivery of the accused person to a friend or relative, after ordering a direction under clause (a) to detain the accused person in safe custody, will not amount to altering or reviewing the judgment, and hence, not hit by the provisions of Section 362 of the Code. 24. The further findings in paragraph No.12 of the judgment are extracted herein below : “12. The Court below has, however, taken the view that no application under S.335 of the Code was filed by any relative or friend when the judgment was passed and therefore, the application for delivery of the accused is to be filed before the State Government under S.339 of the Code since the accused had already been ordered to be retained in safe custody in a mental health centre. This decision has been rendered on the assumption that once a Court exercises power under S.335(1)(a) and orders that a person be detained in safe custody under that provision, no further order could be passed by the Court under S.335(1)(b) and the person could be released to a relative or friend only by the Government. By the issuance of the order under S.335(1)(a), the Court below is not precluded of the authority to further act under S.335(1) (b) on an application in terms of S.335(3). .....” 25. We find ourselves unable to accede to the above proposition. No ratio is deducible to arrive at the conclusion that exercise of power under Section 335(1) does not extinguish or preclude the alternative mode by which the accused can be delivered to a relative or friend. Of course, we note with appreciation the recommendations of the English Committee – which was adopted in Indian conditions as well, pursuant to the 41st Report of the Law Commission of India – to afford adequate discretion to the court as well to deal with an accused, who stands acquitted on the ground of unsoundness of mind, not merely by detaining him in safe custody, but also by delivering such person to any relative or friend, subject to satisfaction of the legal requirements in this regard. It is accordingly that such power is seen engrafted in clause (b) of Section 335(1) of the new Code. However, that does not mean that such power can be exercised otherwise than in accord with the setting and parameters culled out in Section 335, read with Section 334 of the Code. In fact the legislative mandate is otherwise and when, either of the options under Section 335 is exercised, the Courts are deprived of the power to deal with the fate of the accused; ie: his release or continued confinement, which power is exclusively conferred on the Government. There is absolutely no legislative vacuum to further deal with an accused person, who has been ordered to be detained in safe custody by the trial court under clause (a) to Section 335(1). Sections 338 and 339 afford adequate statutory back up to deal with such persons, once they are fit to be released. Pertinently, such power is seen specifically given to the State Government under Section 338 and also under Section 339. Sections 338 and 339 afford adequate statutory back up to deal with such persons, once they are fit to be released. Pertinently, such power is seen specifically given to the State Government under Section 338 and also under Section 339. Therefore, the legislative intent is plain and clear and any interpretation enabling the court to be a repository for re-exercise of such power would indubitably amount to violence to the statute. The principle laid down in Taylor v. Taylor [(1875) 1 Ch.D 426] that when the statute prescribes the performance of a thing in a particular manner, the same shall be done in that manner only, or shall not be done at all, applies on all fours to the interpretation adopted by us. 26. We, therefore, hold that the dictum laid down in In re : Saji (supra) is not good law and overrule the same, insofar as the interpretation of Section 335 Cr.P.C. is concerned. 27. In the teeth of the interpretation, we are unable to consider the prayer in the application. Be that as it may, we invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction conferred on us under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, especially in the context of the report at Annexure – A2, reiterated in the report we obtained from the Mental Health Care Centre, Kozhikode, which we mark as Court Exhibit C1. As per Annexure-A2, the mental condition of the accused person, Mr.Raveendran, is stable, that he is maintaining improvement with drugs, that he does not require institutional care and he is fit for discharge from the hospital, for being managed as a outpatient. The opinion has been reiterated in Ext.C1 report of the same authority, which would further state that the accused person requires regular follow up in the outpatient department once in a month, which interval can be extended to two months, after he becomes more stable. As per Ext.C1 report, the accused can be referred to the Psychiatry Department of the Government Mental Hospital, Kalpetta for further follow up, after a period of three months of regular follow up at the Government Mental Health Centre, Kozhikode. 28. In the circumstances, we direct the Government to consider Annexure-A2 and to pass orders thereon in accordance with law, as expeditiously as possible, at any rate, within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this Order. 28. In the circumstances, we direct the Government to consider Annexure-A2 and to pass orders thereon in accordance with law, as expeditiously as possible, at any rate, within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this Order. Needless to say that the State Government will attach due weightage to Annexure-A2 & Ext.C1 reports. The Criminal Miscellaneous Application is disposed of as above.