JUDGMENT : S.K. Medhi, J. The present appeal has been preferred by the State of Arunachal Pradesh and one of his Officer for setting aside and quashing the judgment and order dated 04.12.2019 passed by this Court in WP(C)/14(AP)/2015. By the aforesaid judgment, the Hon'ble Single Judge while allowing the writ petition had directed the respondent authorities to pass appropriate orders on the issue of back wages to the petitioner within a period of 3(three) months. 2. Before going to the impugned judgment, the brief facts of the case may be stated in the following manner. 3. The writ petitioner is a Diploma Holder and was working as a Junior Engineer. Alleging that the petitioner and another who were Diploma Holders were given out of turn promotion to the post of Assistant Engineer, one Shri Punyo Tungu had filed WP(C)/115(AP)/2001. It was contended that Diploma Holders would come within the zone of consideration for promotion to the post of Assistant Engineer after continuous service of eight years and on the other hand, a Graduate Engineer requires five years length of service as Junior Engineer. The aforesaid writ petition was allowed vide order dated 23.03.2004 by interfering with the recommendation of the DPC and the consequent promotion of the petitioner dated 30.03.2021. The aforesaid case was however decided ex-parte the petitioner. 4. Coming to know about the said position, the writ petitioner preferred WA/8(AP)/2007 by taking leave from the Appellate Court. The said writ appeal was allowed vide order dated 25.04.2011 by holding that the petitioner was entitled to notice and on that ground alone, the impugned judgment dated 23.03.2004 was set aside and the matter was remanded back to the learned Single Judge. 5. Upon such remand, WP(C)/115(AP)/2001 was taken up afresh and vide order dated 06.12.2012 the writ petition was dismissed. It was held that when the vacancies arose in the year 1997, the relevant Recruitment Rules was applicable under which the petitioner was a Technical Assistant and by the time the DPC had sat, the petitioner had already completed three years of qualifying service. It further transpires that the order dated 06.12.2013 of dismissal of the writ petition was challenged in the Hon’ble Division Bench by filing writ appeal No. 1(AP)/ 2013 which vide order dated 08.05.2014 dismissed the same and upheld the order of the learned Single Judge dated 06.12.2013. 6. It further transpires that the order dated 06.12.2013 of dismissal of the writ petition was challenged in the Hon’ble Division Bench by filing writ appeal No. 1(AP)/ 2013 which vide order dated 08.05.2014 dismissed the same and upheld the order of the learned Single Judge dated 06.12.2013. 6. Before the aforesaid judgment on remand was delivered, as per the order dated 23.03.2004 the writ petitioner was reverted from the post of Assistant Engineer (Civil) to the post of Junior Engineer (Civil) vide order dated 31.05.2004. However, after the dismissal of the writ petition on remand (subsequently confirmed by the Hon’ble Division Bench vide order dated 08.05.2014) the petitioner was reinstated vide order dated 20.12.2013. While reinstating the petitioner to the promoted post of Assistant Engineer, no arrears were allowed for the intervening period of 31.05.2004 to June, 2007. Accordingly, the petitioner had instituted the present writ petition being WP(C)/14(AP)/2015. 7. The writ petitioner contended that for no fault of his, he has to suffer because of an order passed by this Court which was however interfered with by the Hon’ble Division Bench and the matter was remanded back for a fresh decision. On such remand, the writ petition was dismissed. The said dismissal was also upheld by the Hon’ble Division Bench in WA/ 01(AP)/2013. Consequently, the petitioner cannot be deprived of the back wages. 8. The contention on the behalf of the State which had filed affidavit-in-opposition was that such prayer was barred by the principles of “No work No pay” as the petitioner admittedly did not work for the said period as Assistant Engineer. 9. After hearing, the learned Single Judge came to a finding that on the first occasion, WP(C)/115(AP)/2001 filed against the petitioner was allowed in his absence. However, on remand, the challenge to the promotion of the petitioner was negated and therefore, the Court was under a duty to pass appropriate orders including payment of arrears. The writ petition was accordingly allowed vide the judgment and order dated 04.12.2019. It is the correctness of the said order which is the subject matter of the present appeal. 10. We have heard Shri S. Tapin, learned Senior Government Advocate, Arunachal Pradesh appearing for the appellants. We have also heard Shri D. Panging, learned counsel appearing for the respondent / writ petitioner. The materials placed before this Court have been duly examined. 11. 10. We have heard Shri S. Tapin, learned Senior Government Advocate, Arunachal Pradesh appearing for the appellants. We have also heard Shri D. Panging, learned counsel appearing for the respondent / writ petitioner. The materials placed before this Court have been duly examined. 11. Shri Tapin, the learned Senior Government Advocate, AP submits that on two broad grounds the impugned order dated 04.12.2019 is unsustainable and the writ petition itself WP(C)/14(AP)/2015 is liable to be dismissed. Firstly, it is urged that the petitioner was reverted to the post of Junior Engineer on 31.04.2004. From the date of such reversion, the petitioner discharged his duties as Junior Engineer for about two years without any objection and the first challenge was only in the year 2006. It is accordingly argued that on the ground of inordinate delay in asserting the right, the petitioner is not entitled to the relief. It is categorically submitted that exercise of judicial discretion should be based on the attending facts and circumstances which, in the instant case, were not in favour of the petitioner. 12. Secondly, the learned Senior Government Advocate, AP has submitted that the issue of qualification was not there before the DPC and had come in only before the Court proceedings. As a corollary, it is urged that when a particular issue is not before an authority whose decision is the subject matter of challenge, the said issue cannot be urged in the adjudicating process. 13. Apart from the aforesaid two grounds which have been primarily urged in support of the appeal, the learned Senior Government Advocate, AP has also taken the point of applicability of the principle of “No work No pay”. Shri Tapin submits that admittedly the petitioner did not discharge his duties as Assistant Engineer in the relevant period and therefore, he is not entitled to the remuneration meant for Assistant Engineer for the said period. It is accordingly prayed that the appeal be allowed and the impugned judgment and order 04.12.2019 be set aside. 14. In support of his submission, Shri S. Tapin, learned Senior Government Advocate, AP places reliance upon the following case laws- i. State of Kerala and Ors. Vs. E.K. Bhaskaran Pillai [ (2007) 6 SCC 524 ]; ii.Ramesh Kumar Vs. Union of India and Ors. [ (2015) 14 SCC 335 ]; iii. Reshmi Metaliks Ltd. Vs. 14. In support of his submission, Shri S. Tapin, learned Senior Government Advocate, AP places reliance upon the following case laws- i. State of Kerala and Ors. Vs. E.K. Bhaskaran Pillai [ (2007) 6 SCC 524 ]; ii.Ramesh Kumar Vs. Union of India and Ors. [ (2015) 14 SCC 335 ]; iii. Reshmi Metaliks Ltd. Vs. Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority [ (2013) 10 SCC 95 ] and iv. Odisha Forest Development Corporation Ltd. Vs. Anupam Traders [ (2020) 15 SCC 146 ]. 15. In the case of EK Bhaskaran Pillai (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, after discussing the principle of “No work No pay” has laid down that so far as the situation with regard to payment of back wages, the same depends on the facts and circumstances of the case. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has gone to the extent of giving some instances to explain that various facets are required to be considered. It has also been held that it is very difficult to lay down any hard and fast rule and the principle cannot be accepted as the Rule of thumb. In the said case, the petitioner’s case was considered and as it was found that the persons junior to him were appointed, he was also directed to be promoted with retrospective effect. However, he was not paid the arrears of salary. The learned Single Bench of the High Court also declined such benefit. However, in the review, the benefit was given from the date of filing of the petition. The Court had noticed that the petitioner therein did not approach the Court for the back wages in 1961 but had filed a petition in 1972 and the Court granted the benefit from the date of filing of the petition in the Court in the year 1972. Since the petitioner had retired, in the meantime, the Hon’ble Supreme Court came to a conclusion that the view taken by the High Court appears to be justified. 16. In the case of Reshmi Metalicks (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has reiterated that exercise of the powers of judicial review would revolve around the decision-making process while coming to the conclusion. 17. 16. In the case of Reshmi Metalicks (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has reiterated that exercise of the powers of judicial review would revolve around the decision-making process while coming to the conclusion. 17. In the case of Ramesh Kumar(supra), the principle of "No work No pay" has been discussed and explained that the said principle is the rule but there can be exception also carved out by judicial pronouncement if it can be established that the incumbent was wrongfully denied of the promotion or restrained from working by the authority. 18. In the case of Anupam Traders (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court dealt with the doctrine of actus curiae neminem gravabit means that no party should suffer due to the act of Court. It is submitted that since the petitioner choose to remain silent for more than two years without challenging the reversion order and therefore, he is not entitled to any relief. 19. Per contra, Shri D. Panging, the learned counsel for the opposite party / writ petitioner submits that the order dated 04.12.2019 impugned in the appeal is a reasoned one which has been passed by taking into consideration all the relevant facts and circumstances and therefore there is no scope for interference with the same. By drawing the attention of this Court to the discussions made in paragraph 10 of the impugned judgment, it is submitted that the learned Single Judge came to a finding that when the subsequent judgment passed by the learned Single Judge on remand was in variance with the earlier order, the petitioner is entitled to the consequential benefits and such findings are in consonance with law. 20. Shri Panging, the learned counsel submits that the case of EK Bhaskaran Pillai (supra) was clearly distinguishable as in the instant case, the aspect of alleged delay has attained finality after the matter was remanded by the Hon’ble Division Bench. It is submitted that the second ground regarding qualification was also considered in the earlier round of litigation and therefore the said issue is not liable to be re-opened. 21. It is submitted that the second ground regarding qualification was also considered in the earlier round of litigation and therefore the said issue is not liable to be re-opened. 21. By referring to Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 with regard to the application for restitution, the learned counsel for the writ petitioner submits that the same principle would also be applicable in a writ proceeding as the initial order of the learned Single Judge by which the promotion of the petitioner was set aside was not only interfered with by Hon’ble Division Bench and remanded, on such remand, the writ petition was dismissed. Further, the said dismissal was also later on upheld by the Hon’ble Division Bench. On the aforesaid principle, Shri Panging has placed reliance upon the case of South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others reported in (2003) 8 SCC 648 . In the said case the principle of restitution has been explained. For ready reference, the relevant paragraph is extracted hereinbelow- “26. In our opinion, the principle of restitution takes care of this submission. The word 'restitution' in its etymological sense means restoring to a party on the modification, variation or reversal of a decree or order, what has been lost to him in execution or decree or order or the court or in direct consequence of a decree or order (See :Zafar Khan and Ors. v. Board of Revenue, U.P., and Ors.). In law, the term 'restitution' is used in three senses : (i) return or restoration of some specific thing to its rightful owner or status; (ii) compensation for benefits derived from a wrong done to another; (iii) compensation or reparation for the loss caused to another. (See Black's Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, p.1315). The Law of Contracts by John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo has been quoted by Black to say that 'restitution' is an ambiguous term, sometimes referring to the disgorging of something which has been taken and at times referring to compensation for injury done. "Often, the result in either meaning of the term would be the same. .... Unjust impoverishment as well as unjust enrichment is a ground for restitution. "Often, the result in either meaning of the term would be the same. .... Unjust impoverishment as well as unjust enrichment is a ground for restitution. If the defendant is guilty of a non-tortuous misrepresentation, the measure of recovery is not rigid but, as in other cases of restitution, such factors as relative fault, the agreed upon risks, and the fairness of alternative risk allocations not agreed upon and not attributable to the fault of either party need to be weighed." The principle of restitution has been statutorily recognized in Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Section 144 of the C.P.C. speaks not only of a decree being varied, reversed, set aside or modified but also includes an order on par with a decree. The scope of the provision is wide enough so as to include therein almost all the kinds of variation, reversal, setting aside or modification of a decree or order. The interim order passed by the Court merges into a final decision. The validity of an interim order, passed in favour of a party, stands reversed in the event of final decision going against the party successful at the interim stage. Unless otherwise ordered by the Court, the successful party at the end would be justified with ail expediency in demanding compensation and being placed in the same situation in which it would have been if the interim order would not have been passed against it. The successful party can demand (a) the delivery of benefit earned by the opposite party under the interim order of the court, or (b) to make restitution for what it has lost; and it is the duty of the court to do so unless it feels that in the facts and on the circumstances of the case, the restitution would far from meeting the ends of justice, would rather defeat the same. Undoing the effect of an interim order by resorting to principles of restitution is an obligation of the party, who has gained by the interim order of the Court, so as to wipe out the effect of the interim order passed which, in view of the reasoning adopted by the court at the stage of final decision, the court earlier would not or ought not to have passed. There is nothing, wrong in an effort being made to restore the parties to the same position in which they would have been if the interim order would not have existed.” 22. We have given our anxious consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the rival parties. 23. What transpires from the records is that the initial order dated 23.04.2004 by which the promotion of the petitioner as Assistant Engineer was interfered with in the writ petition filed against the petitioner was an ex parte one. The Hon’ble Division Bench however allowed the appeal filed by the petitioner and remanded the matter before the learned Single Judge and on such remand, the writ petition against the petitioner being WP(C)/115(AP)/2001 was dismissed. Further, the said dismissal was also upheld by the Hon’ble Division Bench vide judgment dated 08.05.2014 passed in WA/01(AP)/2013. That being the position, this Court is of the opinion that when the challenge to the promotion of the petitioner as Assistant Engineer has ultimately been rejected, any prejudice suffered by the petitioner for the litigation has to be redressed. In other words, an incumbent cannot be allowed to suffer any prejudice because of a litigation in the Court which ultimately ends up in a verdict in his favour. 24. In the instant case, the petitioner was promoted as Assistant Engineer by a duly constituted DPC on 30.03.2001. Alleging the same to be out of turn promotion, a process of litigation started against the petitioner by filing WP(C)/115(AP)/2001. Due to an intervening ex-parte order, the petitioner was reverted back to the post of Junior Engineer. However, the said ex-parte judgment dated 23.03.2004 was interfered with by the Hon’ble Division Bench and the matter was remanded. The learned State Counsel has urged that the petitioner remain silent for two years and only thereafter had filed the appeal in the year 2006. However, it transpires that the delay in approaching the Hon’ble Division Bench was condoned and therefore, debarring the petitioner from his entitlement on the ground of delay would amount to sitting over in appeal by the authority on the judgment of this Court. In view of the said finding, the first ground of this appeal objecting to the grant of back wages for alleged delay cannot be countenanced. 25. In view of the said finding, the first ground of this appeal objecting to the grant of back wages for alleged delay cannot be countenanced. 25. With regard to the second submission on the issue of qualification, the said point being a point of law wherein under the existing Rules, the petitioners were in the cadre of Technical Assistant which was later abolished, there is no bar for the learned Single Judge to take such point of law. 26. The doctrine of “No work No pay” has also been urged. However, the decision relied upon by the appellant in the case of EK Bhaskaran Pillai(supra) itself make it clear that it cannot be a Rule of thumb and all would depend on the facts and circumstances of the case. Moreover, in the instant case, the order of reverting to the post of Junior Engineer was pursuant to the exparte judgment of this Court which was subsequently set aside by the Hon’ble Division Bench. The case of Anupam Traders (supra) relied upon by the appellants would rather support the case of the writ petitioner, as the petitioner cannot be made to suffer because of the act of the Court as explained by the doctrine of actus curiae neminem gravabit. 27. We are also of the view that the present appeal being an intra Court one, unless the view expressed by the learned Single Judge is wholly unreasonable or perverse, merely on the ground that another view is plausible, the appellate Court would be loath to substitute the view taken by the learned Single Judge. In the instant case, as discussed above, the learned Single Judge has not only painstakingly compiled all the facts including the numerous rounds of prior litigation but has also assigned cogent and justifiable grounds to come to the conclusion. In this connection, it would be gainful to refer to a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Management of Narendra & Company Private Ltd. Vs. Workmen of Narendra and Companyreported in (2016) 3 SCC 340 , wherein it has been held as follows: “4………. Be that as it may, in an intra-court appeal, on a finding of fact, unless the appellate Bench reaches a conclusion that the finding of the Single Bench is perverse, it shall not disturb the same. Workmen of Narendra and Companyreported in (2016) 3 SCC 340 , wherein it has been held as follows: “4………. Be that as it may, in an intra-court appeal, on a finding of fact, unless the appellate Bench reaches a conclusion that the finding of the Single Bench is perverse, it shall not disturb the same. Merely because another view or a better view is possible, there should be no interference with or disturbance of the order passed by the Single Judge, unless both sides agree for a fairer approach on relief.” 28. In that view of the matter and taking into consideration all the attending facts and circumstances, we do not find any reasons to interfere with the impugned judgment and order dated 04.12.2019 passed in WP(C)/14(AP)/2015 and accordingly the present appeal is dismissed. 29. No order, as to cost.