JUDGMENT : [R. Phukan, J.] 1. Heard Mr. N. N. Mishra, learned counsel for the appellant and also heard Mr. P. B. Paul, learned counsel for the respondent. 2. This appeal, under Section 21 (4) of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 is preferred by National Investigation Agency (NIA), against the order dated 09.11.2020, passed by the learned Special Court, NIA, Dimapur, Nagaland in I.A. No. 235/2020 in connection with NIA Case R.C-01/2016/NIA-GUW. 3. It is to be mentioned here that vide impugned order, dated 09.11.2020, the learned Special Judge, NIA, Dimapur had granted bail to accused/respondent Victo Swu @ V.K. Sumi @ Z. Victo Swu @ Akuto @ V.Ashumi (A-2). 4. The factual background leading to filing of the present appeal is adumbrated herein below:- “On 31.07.2016, at 04.45 hours, Assam Rifle has apprehended one S. Khetoshe Sumi, a cadre of NSCN (K) from Signal Basti, Dimapur and seized from his possession some documents related to extortion, tax collection, war like stores and also drugs. Then an FIR has been lodged with the O.C. Sub Urban Police Station, Dimapur, upon which FIR No. 90/2016, dated 01.08.2016, under Section 384 IPC, read with Section 25 (1B) of the Arms Act and Section 7 & 8 of Nagaland Security Regulation (herein after referred ‘NSR’) and Section 13 of the Drugs and Cosmetic Act has been registered and investigation was being carried out. In the meantime, pursuant to an order of the Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India, vide order No. 11011/23/20 16-IS.IV, dated 17.08.2016, the case was re-registered as RC-01 /2016/NIA-GUW, dated 18.08.2016, at NIA Branch, Guwahati, under Section 384 IPC read with Section 10 & 13 of the UA(P) Act read with Section 7 and 8 of NSR and Section 25 (1B) of the Arms Act and Section 13 of Drugs and Cosmetic Act. During investigation, the NIA has arrested respondent/accused A-2, on 28.09.2016, from Kohima and after investigation laid charge-sheeted with co-accused Khetoshe Sumi (A1) vide Charge-Sheet No. 01/2017, dated 25.01.2017, to stand trial under Section 120B/384 IPC read with Section 17,20,38 & 40 of the UA(P) Act, 1967. During investigation, the NIA has arrested respondent/accused A-2, on 28.09.2016, from Kohima and after investigation laid charge-sheeted with co-accused Khetoshe Sumi (A1) vide Charge-Sheet No. 01/2017, dated 25.01.2017, to stand trial under Section 120B/384 IPC read with Section 17,20,38 & 40 of the UA(P) Act, 1967. During investigation, it has been found that respondent/accused V.K. Shumi @ Victo Swu @ V.K. Sumi @ Z. Victo Swu @ Akuto @ V.Ashumi (A-2) and A1 were involved along with other co-accused persons i.e. Isac Shumi@ Isak Shumi @ Isak Sema (A-3) of NSCN (K) and other accused person in illegal tax collection and extortion from the Govt. offices, individuals and business persons with intent to support the NSCN (K), a proscribed organization in its illegal and anti national activities. Thereafter, accused Victo Swu @ V.K. Sumi @ Z. Victo Swu @ Akuto @ V. Ashumi (A-2) filed a petition under Section 437 Cr.P.C. for granting bail before the learned Court below, and the learned Court below granted regular bail to the respondent/accused vide order, dated 09.11.2020. 5. Being highly aggrieved by the said order, the NIA filed the present appeal on the following grounds:- (a) That, the finding recorded by the learned Court below is against the principle laid down not only in the Statutory provision, but also laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in its various judgments and thereby caused miscarriage of justice; (b) That, the learned Court below failed to consider that primafacie materials were collected by the NIA against the accused; (c) That, the learned Court below failed to follow the mandate of law as provided under Section 43 (d) (5) (6) of the U.A.(P) Act and as laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of National Investigation Agency -vs.- Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (MANU/SC/0458/2019 and Jayanta Kumar Ghosh -vs.- State of Assam (MANU/GH/0540/2010) and National Investigation Agency -vs.- Victo Swu (MANU/GH/0796/2017); (d) That, the learned Court below has granted bail on the ground of illness of the accused/respondent as well as delay of proceeding in trial whereas two witnesses have already been examined and due to pandemic the delay of examination of witnesses occurred not due to fault of the prosecution. Therefore, it is contended to allow the appeal and to set aside the impugned order. 6. Mr. Therefore, it is contended to allow the appeal and to set aside the impugned order. 6. Mr. N. N. Mishra, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the learned Court below has allowed the bail application of the accused/respondent on the ground that the accused was suffering from illness and that there was delay in examination of the witnesses. And that none of the grounds, so assigned by the learned Court below, are just ground to enlarge the accused of such an serious offence on bail, and that the learned Court below has failed to consider the mandate of Section 43 (d) (5) (6) of the U.A.(P) Act and also failed to consider the ratio/principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of (i) Zahoor Ahmed Shah Watali (supra), (ii) Victo Swu (Supra). Mr. Mishra further submits that enlarging the accused on bail in such a serious cases pause a threat to the national security. Mr. Mishra, therefore, contended to allow the appeal. 7. On the other hand, Mr. P. B. Paul, learned counsel for the respondent defended the impugned bail order passed by the learned court below and submits that the learned Court below while considering all the facts and circumstances, granted bail to the accused, and imposed some conditions and the appellant side has failed to show violation of any such terms and conditions, by the respondent/accused and also failed to show that he has misused the liberty granted to him by the learned Court below and not a single word has been whispered in this regard. Mr. Paul further submits that the accused was behind the bar for more than 3 years and 80 days and during this period, the prosecution side has been able to examine only two witnesses out of 126 witnesses cited in the charge-sheet. Mr. Paul further submits that if 3 years time is taken to examine only two witnesses, then the prosecution side will require more than 50 years in examining the remaining 124 witnesses and as such, no fault can be found with the impugned order passed by the learned Court below. Mr. Paul also relied upon following decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court to make good of his submission; (1) Union of India-vs.-K.A. Najeeb (Crl. A. No. 98/2021 arising out of Special Leave Petition (CRL. Mr. Paul also relied upon following decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court to make good of his submission; (1) Union of India-vs.-K.A. Najeeb (Crl. A. No. 98/2021 arising out of Special Leave Petition (CRL. No. 11616 of 2019); (2) Angela Harish Sontakke -vs.- State of Maharashtra (Crl. A. No. 440/2016 arising out of Special Leave Petition (CRL. No.6888/2015). (3) Sagar Tatyaram Gorkhe and Anr-vs.-The State of Maharashtra (Crl. A. No. 11/2017 and Crl. A. No. 12/2017 ; (4) Bhagirathsinh Judeja -vs.-State of Gujurat ( AIR 1984 SC 372 ). 8. Having heard the submission of the learned Advocates of both sides, we have carefully gone through the petition and the documents placed on record. Also we have carefully gone through the case laws, referred by the learned Advocates of both the sides and also perused the impugned order, dated 09.11.2020, passed by the learned Court below. 9. It appears that the learned Court below, besides considering the illness of the accused also considered the ground of delay in completion of trial imposing, following conditions:- (1) The accused shall execute bail bond of Rs.50,000/- each with two local sureties of like amount; (2) The accused shall provide his PRC as well as PRC of the two sureties; (3) Sureties to file their affidavits to produce the accused as and when summoned; (4) The accused shall furnish 2 (two) cell phone numbers to the CIO, NIA, on which, he can be contacted at any time and which shall be switch on at all times; (5) The accused shall not leave the jurisdiction of this Court without permission; (6) The accused shall appear before this Court whenever summoned, without fail; (7) The accused shall not directly or indirectly contact any of the witnesses or persons acquainted with the case and he shall not tamper with evidence; (8) In the event of any witnesses being contacted or approached by the accused, the I.O. shall bring it to the knowledge of this Court; and (9) In the event of violation of above conditions, the bail is liable to be cancelled automatically. 10. Here in this case we find from the record that the appellant has neither whispered any word in the appeal petition nor whispered any word at the time of hearing, about violation of any of the aforementioned terms and conditions of bail by the respondent/accused. 10. Here in this case we find from the record that the appellant has neither whispered any word in the appeal petition nor whispered any word at the time of hearing, about violation of any of the aforementioned terms and conditions of bail by the respondent/accused. Nor it has been able to cite any instances of misusing the liberty granted to the respondent/accused vide impugned order. The learned counsel for the respondent/accused has rightly pointed this out during his argument and we find substance in the same and we also record our concurrence to the same. 11. Further, we find that the learned Court below has also taken into account the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sagar Tatyaram Gorkhe (supra) and also Angela Harish Sontakke (supra) and balanced the gravity of the charges leveled against the accused with that of the period of custody suffered by him and likely the period, within which the trial can be expected to be completed, in considering his application for bail. It is to be noted here that in the aforesaid cases, Hon’ble Supreme Court had observed that if the trial is not expected to be completed soon, the accused person should be granted the privilege of bail, with appropriate condition so as to ensure that the accused is available for trial. 12. It also appears from the record that the accused was arrested on 28.09.2016, and he was granted interim bail vide order, dated 07.12.2016, by the learned Court below and regularized the same on 11.01.2017, on the ground of illness of his daughter. Thereafter, the appellant filed one appeal before this Court on 11.01.2017, and this court, vide order, dated 07.10.2017, had cancelled the bail and thereafter, the respondent/accused surrendered before the learned Court below on 13.10.2017, and since then he was in the judicial custody. It also appears that the first chargesheet was filed on 25.01.2017, and supplementary charge-sheet was filed on 31.05.2017, and the charges were framed against him on 20.07.2018, and in both the charge-sheet as many as 126 witnesses have been cited and till the date of granting bail, the prosecution side has been able to examine only 2 witnesses. He was behind the bar for 3 years and 80 days and without much progress in the trial. 13. He was behind the bar for 3 years and 80 days and without much progress in the trial. 13. Besides, he was suspected to be suffering from Tuberculosis in his neck which has metastasized to his lung and liver and he was in urgent need of specialized medical intervention. Moreover, at the relevant time, COVID-19 Pandemic was also prevalent and he also had tested COVID-19 positive. And along with other co-morbid conditions, which led to his deterioration of his health requiring proper treatment in Hospital with good facilities. Thus, we find that the grounds, so assigned by the learned Court below for extending the privilege of bail to the respondent/accused, appears to be logical and based on sound principle of law and in the given facts and circumstances on the record and we find no just ground to take a different view from that of the learned court below. 14. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that while considering the petition for bail, the learned Court below has failed to take into account the ratio laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (supra) and arrived at an erroneous finding. It is to be noted here that in the aforesaid case it has been observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that:- “In the present case, however, we are called upon to consider the prayer for bail in the context of the purport of the proviso to Section 43D (5) of the 1967 Act, which mandates that the accused person involved in the commission of offence referable to Chapters IV and VI of the 1967 Act shall not be released on bail or on bond. However, the Court may release such accused on bail only if it is of the opinion, on perusal of the case diary and/or the report made under Section 173 of Cr.P.C. that there are “no reasonable grounds” for believing that the accusation against such person is prima facie true. Conversely, if in the opinion of the Court, there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is prima facie true, the question of granting bail would not arise as the bar under the first part of the proviso of no bail in such cases would operate. 14.1. Conversely, if in the opinion of the Court, there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is prima facie true, the question of granting bail would not arise as the bar under the first part of the proviso of no bail in such cases would operate. 14.1. It is further held that:- “The fact that there is a high burden on the accused in terms of the special provisions contained in Section 43D (5) to demonstrate that the prosecution has not been able to show that there exists reasonable grounds to show that the accusation against him is prima facie true, does not alter the legal position expounded in K. Veeraswami (supra), to the effect that the charge sheet need not contain detailed analysis of the evidence. It is for the Court considering the application for bail to assess the material/evidence presented by the Investigating Agency along with the report under Section 173 of Cr.P.C. in its entirety, to form its opinion as to whether there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the named accused is prima facie true or otherwise.” 15. It is a fact that in the case in hand, the accused has been chargesheeted and the charges are also framed against respondent/accused and two witnesses have also been examined by the prosecution side. So, there is no ground to hold that the accusation leveled against him is prima facie not true, and while granting bail to the accused, the learned Court below has not recorded any findings to this effect. But, we find that the learned court below has not considered the petition on merit. Even otherwise, this alone cannot be a ground to dismiss the bail application as in view of ratio laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court the case of Union of India-vs.- K.A. Najeeb reported in (2021) 3 SCC 713 . In the said case, a 3 Judge Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “At commencement of proceedings, the Court are expected to appreciate the legislative policy against grant of bail, but the rigorous of such provision will melt down where there is no likelihood of trial being completed within a reasonable time and the period of incarceration already undergone has exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed sentence.” 15.1. It is further held:- “Yet, another reason which persuades us to enlarge the respondent on bail is that section 43 (d) (5) of the U.A. (P) Act is comparatively less stringent than Section 37 of the NDPS Act. Unlike, the NDPS Act where the competent Court needs to be satisfied that prima facie the accused is not guilty and that he is unlikely to commit another offence while on bail, there is no such pre-condition under the U.A.(P) Act. Instead Section 43(d) (5) U.A. (P) Act provides another possible ground for the competent Court to refuse bail, in addition, to the well settled consideration like gravity of the offence, possibility of tampering with evidence, influencing the witnesses or chance of the accused evading the trial by abscondence etc. 16. Here, in this case, we has already held that the learned Court below, while granting bail to the accused, has balanced the gravity of the offence with that of the period the accused had already undergone in judicial custody, and the reasonable time required for completion of the trial. It needs to be reiterated here that, the accused was behind the bar for 3 years and 80 days and out of 126 witnesses, the prosecution could have been able to examine only 2 witnesses. This being factual position, we are unable to agree with the submission of Mr. Mishra, the learned counsel for the appellant and we are of the considered opinion that the ratio laid down in Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (supra), which is a decision of 2 Judge Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court, would not come into his aid, in view of the decision in K.A. Najeeb (supra) which is a decision of 3 Judge Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court. Rather, we find force in the submission of Mr. P.B. Paul, the learned counsel for the accused and the ratio laid down in the case of K.A. Najeeb (supra), fully endorsed his view. We have also gone through the other case laws cited by Mr. Mishra and we find that the same would not come into his aid and therefore and also for the sake of brevity we are not inclined to burden this judgment with elaborate discussion of the same. 17. As already indicated, there is no whisper in the memo of appeal about violation of any of the terms and conditions of bail by the respondent/accused. 17. As already indicated, there is no whisper in the memo of appeal about violation of any of the terms and conditions of bail by the respondent/accused. And during hearing, also the learned counsel for the appellant has not whispered a single word about violation of any terms and condition of the bail by the respondent/accused, since the time of his granting bail till date. 18. It is worth mentioning in this context that while dealing with cancellation of bail, Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Raguber Singh-vs.-State of Bihar, reported in ( 1986 4 SCC 481 ) held that bail can be cancelled where:- (i) The accused misuse his liberty by indulging in similar criminal activities; (ii) Interferes with the course of the investigation; (iii) Attempts to tamper with evidence or witnesses; (iv) Threatens witnesses or indulging similar activities which would hamper smooth investigation; (v) There is likelihood of his fleeing to any country; Attempts to make himself scarce by going underground or becoming unavailable to the investigating agency; and (vi) Attempts to place himself beyond the reach of his surety etc. and it is further held that this grounds are illustrated not exhausted. 19. Again in the case of Myakala Dharmarajam and Others-vs.- State of Telenga and Ors. (Crl. A. No. 1974-1975 of 2019) arising out of SLP (8882-8883 of 2019), it is held that:- “It is trite law that cancellation of bail can be done in cases where the order granting bail suffers from serious infirmity resulting in miscarriage of justice. If the Court granting bail ignores relevant materials indicating prima facie involvement of the accused or takes into account irrelevant materials which have no relevance to the question of grant of bail to the accused, the High Court or the Sessions Court would be justified in cancelling the bail”. 20. Here, in this case, none of the aforesaid conditions shown to be existed by the appellant side. Of course, we are not oblivious of the fact that we are now dealing with an appeal preferred under Section 21 (4) of NIA Act, 2008 and not a petition under Section 439 (2) Cr.P.C. But, the appeal is preferred against the bail order, and allowing the appeal would have the consequence of cancellation of bail and therefore, while deciding the appeal, we are constrained to take note of the well established principles in cancellation of bail also. 21. In view of the above discussion and findings, we find this appeal bereft of merit and accordingly, the same stands dismissed. The parties have to bear their own cost(s).