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2022 DIGILAW 663 (GAU)

Laltluangpuia, S/o Laibuanga v. Union of India

2022-06-20

NELSON SAILO

body2022
JUDGMENT : This order will dispose of all the 3 (three) writ petitions. Heard Mr. Joseph Mangsuanhau, learned counsel for the petitioners and Ms. Zairemsangpuii, learned CGC appearing for the respondent Union of India. Also heard Mr. C. Zoramchhana, learned Addl. Advocate General for the State respondents. 2. By filing this writ petition, the petitioners have sought for payment of compensation for their land, which was acquired by the respondents for construction/extension of road from Farkawn to Thekte Village in the year 2010. According to the petitioners, although some amount of compensation was given to them, but the same is insufficient and it was also not assessed in terms of the relevant law on land acquisition including the relevant Schedule of Rates (SOR) to be followed for assessing property damage as followed by the State Public Works Department. 3. A brief background in respect of the petitioners in WP(C) No. 140/2019 is that they initially approached this Court by filing WP(C) No. 98/2014, which however was dismissed vide Order dated 01.07.2015. The petitioners then preferred W.A. No. 1/2016, which came to be disposed of along with WP(C) No. 9/2018 filed by one Mr. Lalbuka, represented by Mr. Laltluangpuia vide Order dated 30.07.2018. The appellants/petitioners were asked to approach the Deputy Commissioner with their claim for compensation. However, the appellants/petitioners instead approached the Supreme Court by filing SLA (C) Nos. 28196 & 28197 of 2018. The Supreme Court vide Order dated 02.11.2018 disposed of the Special Leave Applications by granting liberty to the petitioners to approach and pursue their representations before the Deputy Commissioner concerned as was directed by the Writ Appellate Court. 4. The petitioners then made their representations to the Deputy Commissioner, Champhai on 17.12.2018, which however came to be rejected by the said authority vide Order dated 23.09.2019. Aggrieved, the petitioners have filed the present WP(C) No. 140/2019 challenging the order of the Deputy Commissioner dated 23.09.2019, while also seeking a direction for payment of adequate compensation as per the relevant laws after declaring the earlier acquisition made in 2010 as null and void. There are 22 (twenty two) petitioners in all in WP(C) No. 140/2019. Petitioner No. 1 is the Power of Attorney holder while the petitioner Nos. 2 to 22 are land owners claiming compensation. There are 22 (twenty two) petitioners in all in WP(C) No. 140/2019. Petitioner No. 1 is the Power of Attorney holder while the petitioner Nos. 2 to 22 are land owners claiming compensation. Be it stated herein that none of the petitioners in WP(C) No. 140/2019 possess any pass in one form or the other for the land, which they claim belongs to them. According to their counsel, they are contended to press only for enhanced compensation for their crops, plants and their residential houses. 5. In WP(C) No. 91/2014, there are 13 (thirteen) petitioners. Petitioner No. 1 is the Power of Attorney holder while the remaining petitioners are the land owners having Land Settlement Certificates and Mining Pass for their respective land. 6. In WP(C) No. 49/2015, there is only 1 (one) writ petitioner and according to the petitioner, the issuance of Land Settlement Certificate for his land is/was under process and therefore, he may be given appropriate compensation but not on the value of the land. 7. Mr. Joseph Mangsuanhau, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the respondent authorities have not invoked any provision of the law on land acquisition to assess the amount of compensation payable to each of the land owners. Therefore, the purported acquisition done by the respondents in 2010 should be set aside and the respondent authorities directed to initiate afresh acquisition proceedings under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (Act of 2013). He submits that the earlier law in this regard, i.e., the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Act of 1894) has been repealed by the Act of 2013 as can be seen from Section 114 of the Act of 2013, which is a repeal and saving clause. The learned counsel also refers to Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 to make his point. He therefore submits that the respondents may be directed to initiate afresh acquisition proceedings under the Act of 2013. The learned counsel in support of his submission relies upon the following authorities:- (i) Khub Chand & Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors., AIR (1967) SC 1074. (ii) Pune Municipal Corporation & Anr. Vs. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki & Ors (2014) 3 SCC 183 . (iii) Tukaram Kana Joshi &Ors. Vs. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation & Ors., (2013) 1 SCC 353 . 8. Mr. C. Zoramchhana, learned Addl. Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors., AIR (1967) SC 1074. (ii) Pune Municipal Corporation & Anr. Vs. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki & Ors (2014) 3 SCC 183 . (iii) Tukaram Kana Joshi &Ors. Vs. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation & Ors., (2013) 1 SCC 353 . 8. Mr. C. Zoramchhana, learned Addl. Advocate General appearing for the State respondents submits that if the prayer of the petitioners is to be allowed, the amount already paid to them will have to be refunded. He submits that the Act of 2013 is to be applied prospectively and not retrospectively. Section 114 of the Act of 2013 is only a repealing and saving clause, which provides that whatever was done under the Act of 1894 is saved by the repealing Act of 2013, as if it was done under the new Act. He also submits that the petitioners have approached this Court without clean hands as they have concealed the payments that they have already received. He further submits that no objection was raised by the petitioners against the process that was undertaken in the year 2010 and therefore, they are estopped from questioning the same at this belated stage. In other words, he submits that the petitioners are barred from claiming any further compensation by the principals of estoppel. Referring to the counter affidavit filed by the State respondents on 29.05.2018, the learned Addl. Advocate General submits that the petitioners did not raise any objection on the cost assessment sheet and in fact in the actual payment receipt, it was clearly stated that the petitioners have received the amount of compensation without any reservation while stating that their land is handed over for the construction and widening of the road concerned without objection and free from encumbrances. 9. The learned Addl. Advocate General submits that the petitioners cannot now make a ‘U’ turn after accepting the earlier proceeding and the amount of compensation given to them. He submits that if the same is allowed, the same would amount to the petitioners approbating and reprobating their claim, which is not permissible in law. He also submits that the petitioners cannot be granted relief beyond what they have pleaded in their writ petition. He submits that if the same is allowed, the same would amount to the petitioners approbating and reprobating their claim, which is not permissible in law. He also submits that the petitioners cannot be granted relief beyond what they have pleaded in their writ petition. It is true that the provision of Land Acquisition Act was not applied but the process and method of computation of the compensation was done in a transparent manner and as agreed to by the parties. In support of his submission, Mr. C. Zoramchhana, learned Addl. Advocate General relies upon the following authorities:- (i) Kedar Shashikant Deshpande & Ors. vs. Bhor Municipal Council & Ors., (2011) 2 SCC 645. (ii) K.D. Sharma Vs. Steel Authorities of India Ltd. & Ors., (2008) 12 SCC 481. (iii) State of Orissa & Anr. Vs. Mamata Mohanty, (2011) 3 SCC 436 . (iv) Dalip Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors., (2010) 2 SCC 114 . 10. Ms. Zairemsangpuii, learned CGC appearing for the respondent Union of India adopts the argument of Mr. C. Zoramchhana, learned Addl. Advocate General. She submits that the length of Farkawn to Thekte road was initially calculated as 16 kms tentatively and provisionally. However, later on, after the formation cutting was completed, the actual length of the road between Farkawn and Khankawn was measured as 8.200 kms and the existing jeepable road length between Khankawn and Thekte is 3.220 kms totalling to 11.420 kms only. That the total length of 11.420 kms was taken up as the Border Roads Development Board (BRDB) programme and approved by the Director General Boarder Roads (DGBR). The work was taken up as General Staff Works and fund was to be provided accordingly. The learned CGC submits that the road was handed over to the Border Roads Organization (BRO) by the State PWD on 01.04.2010. 11. The learned CGC submits that against the assessment made by the BDO concerned for an amount of Rs. 1,51,44,141/- to be paid to the affected parties, there was an objection in respect of 4 (four) claims and therefore, a sum of Rs. 1,33,79,929/- was only sanctioned and deposited by the BRO. However, after a re-verification was done against the objection for the 4 (four) claims, an amount of Rs. 14,24,386/- was again sanctioned and paid on 17.01.2013. 1,51,44,141/- to be paid to the affected parties, there was an objection in respect of 4 (four) claims and therefore, a sum of Rs. 1,33,79,929/- was only sanctioned and deposited by the BRO. However, after a re-verification was done against the objection for the 4 (four) claims, an amount of Rs. 14,24,386/- was again sanctioned and paid on 17.01.2013. She submits that in between the amount of solatium calculated by the Deputy Commissioner, Champhai amounting to Rs. 40,13,979/- was also deposited before the said authority on 10.02.2012. Therefore, the BRO in all, deposited or paid a sum of Rs. 1,88,18,294/-. Beyond this amount, the BRO has no further liability. She therefore submits that under the facts and circumstances of the case, the writ petitions should be dismissed. 12. I have heard the submissions made by the learned counsels for the rival parties and I have perused the materials available on record, which goes to show that initially, the petitioners only prayed for payment of solatium and interest. But later, after filing, withdrawing and re-filing their writ petitions, they have now sought for a direction from this Court to quash the acquisition of their land done in the year 2010. 13. From the case projected by the petitioners and the materials available on record, it is clear that the petitioners in WP(C) No. 140/2019 and WP(C) No. 49/2015 do not possess any land pass in one form or the other. It was, in fact, for this reason that when they approached this Court initially by filing WP(C) No. 98/2014 that the same was dismissed vide Order dated 01.07.2015. The petitioners then filed W.A. No. 1/2016 and the Writ Appellate Court vide Order dated 30.07.2018 along with WP(C) No. 9/2018 disposed of the matter by directing the petitioners to approach the Deputy Commissioner with a representation. The petitioners then submitted their representations before the Deputy Commissioner, Champhai on 17.12.2018, which was then considered and disposed of vide the impugned Order dated 23.09.2019 by the said authority. 14. From a perusal of the impugned order, it can be seen that according to the Deputy Commissioner, no valid document was produced by them to prove that they were indeed the owners of the land or they were in legal possession of the land. 14. From a perusal of the impugned order, it can be seen that according to the Deputy Commissioner, no valid document was produced by them to prove that they were indeed the owners of the land or they were in legal possession of the land. The petitioners also could not establish how much area of the land claimed was in their possession and for how long and in what capacity they were occupying the said land. It is further stated that the District Administration did not act strictly in accordance with the Act of 1894, as the occupants of the land did not have any legal claim over the land and it is mandatory to produce legal document of ownership of land in order to follow the said Act. There is no record of preliminary notification issued under Section 4 nor a declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 1894 and not to speak of an Award under Section 11 of the Act of 1894. The office of the Deputy Commissioner only acted as a facilitator in public interest for the exchange of the land from the willing occupants to the BRTF in lieu of the money offered as compensation for vegetation and built structures. It was also ensured that the interest of the Villagers was protected and no rights were violated. The cost of vegetation was assessed as per the then market value of the produce for 1 (one) year and the cost assessment of the structures built on land was done as per the then existing local market rate. The assessment was jointly conducted by the office of the Deputy Commissioner, the occupants of the land and the BRTF in the presence of the Village Council. Accordingly, an amount of Rs. 1,33,79,929/- only was released by the BRTF by Demand Draft bearing No. 0041406881 dated 13.12.2011 and this amount was disbursed to 31 (thirty one) occupants. Subsequently, an additional amount of compensation was again deposited by the BRTF through Account Pay Cheque bearing No. 61646200000200000018716 dated 17.01.2013 amounting to Rs. 14,24,386/- only which was disbursed to 13 (thirteen) occupants. 1,33,79,929/- only was released by the BRTF by Demand Draft bearing No. 0041406881 dated 13.12.2011 and this amount was disbursed to 31 (thirty one) occupants. Subsequently, an additional amount of compensation was again deposited by the BRTF through Account Pay Cheque bearing No. 61646200000200000018716 dated 17.01.2013 amounting to Rs. 14,24,386/- only which was disbursed to 13 (thirteen) occupants. It was therefore stated that even though the actual exchange of land was not done as per the Act of 1894, but all the process of cost assessment was done in accordance with the said Act based on understanding, mutual trust and in good faith between the interested parties. 15. From the above background, what is clear is that the petitioners in respect of WP(C) No. 140/2019 and WP(C) No. 49/2015 have no documents to show that the land which they claim to be theirs indeed belongs to them but at the same time, taking into account the type of building and the crops or vegetation belonging to them, a cost assessment was made for each of them and they were accordingly paid compensation as was assessed. It can be seen that the petitioner Nos. 2 - 5, 7, 8 & 9 were paid compensation for their crops from the annexure annexed by the petitioners at page Nos. 84-86. As for the petitioner Nos. 6, 10-21, their names are shown in the compilation of cost assessment for acquisition of land and building annexed by the petitioners at page Nos. 52 & 53. 16. The Apex Court in K.D Sharma (supra), held that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32 and of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is extraordinary, equitable and discretionary and it is imperative that the petitioner approaching the Writ Court must come with clean hands, put forward all the facts before the Court without concealing or suppressing anything and seek an appropriate relief. If there is no candid disclosure of relevant and material facts or the petitioner is guilty of misleading the Court, his petition may be dismissed at the threshold without considering the merits of the claim. The same Rule to reiterated in G.Jayashree & Ors vs Bhagwandas S.Patel & Ors. (2009) 3 SCC 141 and Dalip Singh (supra). The Addl. If there is no candid disclosure of relevant and material facts or the petitioner is guilty of misleading the Court, his petition may be dismissed at the threshold without considering the merits of the claim. The same Rule to reiterated in G.Jayashree & Ors vs Bhagwandas S.Patel & Ors. (2009) 3 SCC 141 and Dalip Singh (supra). The Addl. Advocate General has relied upon these decisions to contend that the petitioners have failed to mention the fact that they have already received the compensation amount from the respondent authorities concerned in their writ petition, which amounts to concealment of the true facts from this Court. 17. In the case of Kedar Shashikant Deshpande & Ors. vs. Bhor Municipal Council & Ors (2011) 2 SCC 645, the Apex Court held that it is well settled that if a person has submitted to the jurisdiction of the Authority, he cannot challenge the proceedings, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of said authority in further appellate proceedings. 18. In the case of Mamata Mohanty (supra), the Apex Court in the given facts of that case held that pleadings and particulars are required to enable the court to decide the rights of the parties in the trial. Thus, the pleadings are more to help the court in narrowing the controversy involved and to inform the parties concerned to the question in issue, so that the parties may adduce appropriate evidence on the said issue. It is a settled legal proposition that as a rule, relief not founded on the pleadings should not be given. 19. The learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon the case of Khub Chand & Ors (supra), Pune Municipal Corporation & Anr. (supra) and Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. (supra) to contend that in order to take over possession of the land belonging to the land owners, the State must either comply with the procedure laid down for acquisition, or requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode. It may, however, be seen that in the present case, for improvement of the road, the assessment was made by the respondent authorities in the presence and co-operation of all concerned including the writ petitioners. The amount assessed, thereafter, was deposited and disbursed to the petitioners. The grievance initially raised by them was only in respect of non-payment of solatium and interest. The amount assessed, thereafter, was deposited and disbursed to the petitioners. The grievance initially raised by them was only in respect of non-payment of solatium and interest. Later on, their prayer developed to setting and quashing of the assessment. The conduct of the petitioners therefore only speaks for itself. 20. The learned counsel for the petitioners has also relied upon the case of Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. (Supra) to contend that delay cannot be a ground to debar the land owners from making a claim for compensation through land acquisition proceedings. It is however noticed that in Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. (Supra), the location, measurement and ownership of the land in question were not in dispute. In fact, the authority concerned initially issued a notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 on 2 (two) occasions after the first one had lapsed. Despite issuance of the second notification, the acquisition proceedings did not proceed any further and as a result, the land owners approached the High Court by filing writ petition. However, the writ petition was dismissed on the ground of delay and none availability of certain documents. When the matter was taken to the Supreme Court, the respondent authority concerned conceded the matter by deciding to complete the acquisition proceedings within a time frame. The facts in the present case are different. The petitioners do not have any document whatsoever to show that they are the legal owners of the land they claim to be theirs. Despite this, an assessment was done with the cooperation of all concerned involving the petitioners themselves and the amount that was assessed has been paid to them. Therefore, the petitioners in WP(C) Nos. 140/2019 are not found to be entitled to any further compensation. 21. In respect of the petitioners in WP(C) No. 91/2014, it may be seen that the cost assessment for acquisition of the land and buildings was done in a similar manner and all the petitioners have been given their respective share of compensation as admitted by the petitioners themselves. Apart from a sum of Rs. 1,33,79,929/- deposited by the BRTF as compensation, 30% of the said amount which is Rs. 40,13,979/- has been deposited by the BRTF towards solatium as computed by the Deputy Commissioner, Champhai. Apart from a sum of Rs. 1,33,79,929/- deposited by the BRTF as compensation, 30% of the said amount which is Rs. 40,13,979/- has been deposited by the BRTF towards solatium as computed by the Deputy Commissioner, Champhai. Instead of disbursing this amount to the land owners, the same was diverted to the Public Health Engineering Department (PHED) of the State, Champhai Watsan Division, which is to the tune of Rs. 34,65,000/- for dismantling and repairing the water pipe lines including construction of water tank, which was demolished during the construction/improvement of Farkawn to Thekte road. Out of the solatium amount deposited by the BRTF, another amount of Rs. 5,48,979/- was also disbursed to the District Local Administration Officer (DLAO) for the construction of retaining wall and side drain. These two facts have been clearly stated and admitted by the State respondent Nos. 4 & 5 in their common affidavit filed on 12.02.2021 in WP(C) No. 91/2014. After noticing this, this Court had also directed the PHED (respondent Nos. 6 & 7) to file an affidavit regarding disbursement of the aforesaid amount to the Department. The respondent Nos. 6 & 7 have filed their affidavit accordingly on 28.09.2021 and 18.09.2021 respectively, admitting that the amount has been received by the Department. It is noticed that in the compilation of cost assessment for acquisition of land and buildings for the work “improvement of Farkawn to Thekte Road (0.00 kmp - 11.42 kmp),” in respect of Farkawn village, an estimate/assessment for Rs. 1,14,925/- was made for Power & Electricity Department Transformer at Theirekawn. In fact, similar assessment could have been made for PHED pipelines that was likely to be damaged but surprisingly, the same was not done. 22. As already stated herein above, an amount of Rs. 40,13,979/- was sanctioned and deposited before the Collector concerned as the solatium payable to the land owners concerned having their respective land passes and therefore, the same could not have been diverted for some other purpose for which it was not sanctioned. Therefore, while declining not to entertain the writ petition towards the claim for initiating a fresh proceeding for acquisition of their land, the amount that was diverted will have to be refunded for payment to the land owners concerned. Therefore, while declining not to entertain the writ petition towards the claim for initiating a fresh proceeding for acquisition of their land, the amount that was diverted will have to be refunded for payment to the land owners concerned. Accordingly, the State respondents in the PHED and the Local Administration Department are directed to refund the solatium amount which was disbursed to them by depositing the same before the District Collector, Champhai within a period of 3 (three) months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order failing to which, the amount shall carry interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of this order till it is fully paid. The amount deposited shall be disbursed to the land owners concerned without delay. 23. As for WP(C) No. 49/2015, as already stated herein above, the petitioner does not possess any sort of pass for his claim over the land in question and therefore, the findings arrived at in WP(C) No. 140/2019 will also cover this case. In other words, his claim for further compensation or for initiating acquisition proceedings afresh for the reasons already assigned in the foregoing paragraphs is rejected. 24. With the above observations and directions, all the writ petitions are disposed of.