ORDER : L.P.A. No. 166 of 2021 Perused the office note. 2. In view of the statement made in paragraph 3 of the supplementary affidavit dated 05.03.2022, defect no. 2 stands rectified. L.P.A. No. 166, 253, 254, 365 and 366 of 2021 3. Learned counsel for the parties submitted that this Court vide order dated 15.06.2022 directed to list all these appeals together considering the involvement of similar issues in the matter and as such, the same have been listed today for hearing. 4. Accordingly, with the consent of learned counsel for the parties, these intra-court appeals have been heard together and are being disposed of by a common order. 5. The instant intra-court appeals, under clause 10 of the Letters Patent, have been preferred against common order/judgment dated 12.02.2021 in W.P. (C) No. 4192 of 2012 and batch matters whereby and whereunder the writ petitions have been dismissed declining to interfere with Clause 6 of Resolution No. 1382 dated 20.05.2004 issued by the Human Resource Development Department, Government of Jharkhand prescribing minimum age for taking admission in Primary Teachers Training Programme as 18 years, which shall be counted on 1st July of every academic session on the ground of same being not in consonance with the norms of National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993. 6. The brief facts of the case, as per pleadings made in the writ petition, which are required to be enumerated read as hereunder: In L.P.A. No. 166 of 2021, the petitioner-appellant is College-Radha Govinda Primary Teachers Training College whereas in rest of the appeals, the petitioners-appellants are the students, who got training in the relevant year from the concerned Primary Teachers’ Training Colleges. The appellants-students claimed to have taken admission for diploma in primary teachers’ training course in Primary Teachers’ Training College and after completion of their training, the process of registration of students was started by the Jharkhand Academic Council (JAC), for which, requisite fees etc. for registration was paid by the appellants-students. The appellants-students claimed to have taken admission for diploma in primary teachers’ training course in Primary Teachers’ Training College and after completion of their training, the process of registration of students was started by the Jharkhand Academic Council (JAC), for which, requisite fees etc. for registration was paid by the appellants-students. But, it was informed to the appellants-students that their forms have not been accepted, therefore, admit card is not issued by the Jharkhand Academic Council because their age is below 18 years at the time of admission to the concerned primary teachers training college, which is in violation of Clause 6 of Resolution No. 1382 dated 20.05.2004 issued by the Human Resource Development Department, Government of Jharkhand prescribing minimum age for taking admission in Primary Teachers Training Programme as 18 years. Therefore, it was informed that they would not be allowed to appear in the final examination. Aggrieved thereof, the appellant-college as also appellants-students filed batch of writ petitions, in which, interim order was passed, by which, the petitioners-students were permitted to submit their application to respondent-Jharkhand Academic Council, who in turn was directed to issue admit card to them and permit them to appear in the examination. Pursuant thereto, the petitioners appeared in the examination but their result was withheld on the ground that they were below 18 years of age at the time of admission in primary teachers training course. It is in that background, the writ petitions were filed by the writ petitioners assailing the condition as stipulated under Clause 6 of Resolution No. 1382 dated 20.05.2004 issued by the Human Resource Development Department, Government of Jharkhand prescribing minimum age for taking admission in Primary Teachers Training Programme as 18 years for admission in teachers training colleges i.e. B.Ed, C.P. Ed, PTT etc. It has been contended that the Government of Jharkhand, Human Resource Development Department amended the Resolution No. 1382 dated 20.05.2004 and the minimum educational qualification marks for admission in two years Primary Teachers Training Programme was raised to 50% from earlier 45%, but no amendment was made in Clause 6 of the Resolution dated 20.05.2004, as such the concerned college had taken admission of some of such students who had not attained 18 years of age on 1st of July of the academic session of two years Primary Teachers Training Programme. Therefore, the condition stipulated under Clause 6 of Resolution dated 20.05.2004 may be quashed holding it to be unreasonable. In this regard, it was further contended that Appendix 2 of notification dated 31.08.2009 issued by National Council for Teachers Education (NCTE) does not prescribe any age embargo for admission in Diploma in Primary Teachers Training Course, as such fixation of minimum age of 18 years for admission in Diploma in Primary Teachers Training Course vide impugned Clause 6 of Resolution dated 20.05.2004 issued by the State Government is contrary to the norms of NCTE. The learned Single Judge, on consideration of submissions advanced on behalf of parties, refused to interfere with the policy decision of the Government, wherein the eligibility of minimum 18 years of age at the time of admission has been prescribed under Clause 6, holding it to be exclusive domain of the State Government and further hold that unless the policy decision is shown to be arbitrary, unreasonable, there cannot be any interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which is subject matter of instant intra-court appeal. 7. Mr. Ajit Kumar, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants has submitted that the learned Single Judge has not appreciated the fact in right prospective as even though NCTE does not prescribe any age embargo for admission in Diploma in Primary Teachers Training Course but the State Government vide impugned Clause 6 of Resolution dated 20.05.2004 imposed such embargo contrary to the norms of NCTE fixing minimum age of 18 years for taking admission in such courses. It has further been submitted that the NCTE being a regulatory body if not having any such eligibility criteria inserting such condition which the State Government has imposed, cannot be said to be reasonable one and in that view of the matter, the eligibility criteria fixed as per Clause 6 of Resolution dated 20.05.2004 is fit to be held invalid. 8. Mr. Manoj Tandon, learned counsel for the appellants appearing in L.P.A. No. 254 of 2021, apart from assailing Clause 6 of Resolution dated 20.05.2004 has also sought for direction upon the respondents to declare the admission of the writ petitioners-students to be in order even though such writ petitioners have taken admission in the said primary teachers training college having less than 18 years of age. Mr. Mr. Tandon, has further submitted that since petitioners have already completed the course and participated in the examination but merely because they having the age less than 18 years the result have not been published, as such appropriate direction may be issued upon the State of Jharkhand and Jharkhand Academic Council. 9. Per contra, Mr. Munna Lal Yadav, learned counsel appearing for the State of Jharkhand has submitted, defending the order passed by learned Single Judge, that merely because the rule as contained under Clause 6 of Resolution dated 20.05.2004 is not in accordance with the suitability of one or the other appellants-writ petitioners it cannot be held to be invalid. It has been submitted that any statutory provision cannot be held to be invalid if it does not suit one or the other. It has further been submitted that framing of policy since is within the exclusive domain of the State Government and unless the rules suffer from mala fide or unreasonableness there cannot be any interference with the rule framed by the State Government. Learned counsel therefore submits that the learned Single Judge, after taking into consideration these legal issues has correctly not interfered with the provision as contained under Clause 6 of Resolution dated 20.05.2004, therefore, the impugned order may not be interfered with. 10. Mr. Sunil Kumar, learned counsel for the NCTE and Mrs. Richa Sanchita, learned counsel for the JAC have jointly submitted that since the issues pertains to consideration of legality of the rule framed by the State Government and unless the said rule is amended or reversed by the competent authority of the State Government, the admission of such candidates who have taken admission even though less than 18 years of age cannot be regularized. 11. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the documents available on record as also the finding recorded by learned Single Judge. 12. The fact, leading to filing of these litigations, in insertion of Clause 6 in Resolution dated 20.05.2004 by the Human Resource Development Department, Government of Jharkhand wherein provision has been made making the minimum eligibility criteria for taking admission in Diploma in Primary Teachers Training Course to be 18 years. 12. The fact, leading to filing of these litigations, in insertion of Clause 6 in Resolution dated 20.05.2004 by the Human Resource Development Department, Government of Jharkhand wherein provision has been made making the minimum eligibility criteria for taking admission in Diploma in Primary Teachers Training Course to be 18 years. For ready reference, Clause 6 of Resolution dated 20.05.2004 is quoted hereunder as: 6- mez lhek % bu izf'k{k.k egkfo|ky;ksa esa ;ksxnku gsrq U;wure vk;qlhek 18 o"kZ gksxhA vk;q dh x.kuk izR;sd o"kZ 1 yh tqykbZ dks dh tk,xhA vFkkZr 'kS{kf.kd l= 2004&2005 ds fy, mez 1 yh tqykbZ ls 18 o"kZ gksxhA 13. Mr. Ajit Kumar, learned senior counsel for the petitioner has assailed the rule as contained under Clause 6 of the Resolution dated 20.05.2004 on the ground of arbitrariness and unreasonableness while Mr. Manoj Tandon, learned counsel for the petitioner apart from questioning clause 6 of the resolution has sought for direction by way of mandamus to regularize admission of such candidates who have appeared even though their age having been less than 18 years of age. 14. Therefore, two issues have been raised; first issue is with respect to validity of clause 6 of resolution dated 20.05.2004, and second to declare the admission of petitioners-appellants regular. 15. This Court is of the view that the second issue with respect to declaration that the admission of petitioners-appellants is regular is the outcome of first issue, meaning thereby, if provision as contained in clause 6 of resolution 20.05.2004 is held to be valid, the relief sought for regularizing the admission of the petitioners-appellants will automatically be granted. 16. This Court, therefore, is proceeding to decide the issue of validity of clause 6 of resolution dated 20.05.2004 first. The law is well settled so far as interference by the Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the affairs of the State in the policy decision.. It is settled position of law that the policy decision of the State Government is least to be interfered by the High Court in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India unless it is arbitrary and suffers from malice or any other vice. It is settled position of law that the policy decision of the State Government is least to be interfered by the High Court in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India unless it is arbitrary and suffers from malice or any other vice. In the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in K.Nagaraj and Others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Another [ (1985) 1 SCC 523 ] wherein the issue was regarding reduction of the age of retirement from 58 to 55 years. The Hon'ble Apex Court has been pleased to hold that the same was taken by virtue of policy decision in order to provide employment opportunity to the younger sections of the society and the need to open up promotional opportunities to employees at the lower levels early in their career and since it is based upon reasonable consideration, it was declined to be interfered with. In the case of State of Jharkhand and Others v. Ashok Kumar Dangi and Others [ (2011) 13 SCC 383 ], the Hon'ble Apex Court has been pleased to hold at paragraph 17 and 18 which are quoted hereunder:- “17. The High Court has found that the Government of Jharkhand, till date, had not framed any policy regarding the number of posts to be filled by physical trained candidates. How many posts of primary school teachers be filled up by physical trained candidates, in our opinion, is essentially a question of policy for the State to decide. In framing of the policy, various inputs are required and it is neither desirable nor advisable for a court of law to direct or summarise the Government to adopt a particular policy which it deems fit or proper. It is well settled that the State Government must have liberty and freedom in framing policy. Further, it also cannot be denied that the courts are illequipped to deal with competing claims and conflicting interests. Often, the courts do not have the satisfactory and effective means to decide which alternative, out of the many competing ones, is the best in the circumstances of the case. 18. One may contend that providing primary education to the children is essential for the development of the country. Whereas others argue that physical training of the children in the primary schools is must as that would make the nation healthy. 18. One may contend that providing primary education to the children is essential for the development of the country. Whereas others argue that physical training of the children in the primary schools is must as that would make the nation healthy. As in the present case, the candidates trained in teaching claim that the posts of primary school teachers be filled by them and physical trained candidates be considered for posts of physical trained teachers only as they in the absence of any training in education are not equipped to teach in primary schools, whereas physical trained teachers contend that they should be considered for appointment against both the posts. These competing claims, in our opinion, need to be addressed by the policy-makers. Further, we do not have the statistics as regards to the number of primary schools, the resources which the Government can spend for providing physical trained teachers and their need. In such a situation, any direction in matters of policy is uncalled for.” Thus, it has been laid down that the State Government must have liberty and freedom in framing policy and further, it has been held that the courts are ill-equipped to deal with competing claims and conflicting interests. Often, the courts do not have the satisfactory and effective means to decide which alternative, out of the many competing ones, is the best in the circumstances of the case. In the case of Census Commissioner and Others v. R.Krishnamurthy [ (2015) 2 SCC 796 ], Their Lordships at the Hon'ble Apex Court have been pleased to hold at paragraph 25 as under :- “25. Interference with the policy decision and issue of a mandamus to frame a policy in a particular manner are absolutely different. The Act has conferred power on the Central Government to issue notification regarding the manner in which the census has to be carried out and the Central Government has issued notifications, and the competent authority has issued directions. It is not within the domain of the court to legislate. The courts do interpret the law and in such interpretation certain creative process is involved. The courts have the jurisdiction to declare the law as unconstitutional. That too, where it is called for. The court may also fill up the gaps in certain spheres applying the doctrine of constitutional silence or abeyance. The courts do interpret the law and in such interpretation certain creative process is involved. The courts have the jurisdiction to declare the law as unconstitutional. That too, where it is called for. The court may also fill up the gaps in certain spheres applying the doctrine of constitutional silence or abeyance. But, the courts are not to plunge into policy-making by adding something to the policy by way of issuing a writ of mandamus. There the judicial restraint is called for remembering what we have stated in the beginning. The courts are required to understand the policy decisions framed by the executive. If a policy decision or a notification is arbitrary, it may invite the frown of Article 14 of the Constitution. But when the notification was not under assail and the same is in consonance with the Act, it is really unfathomable how the High Court could issue directions as to the manner in which a census would be carried out by adding certain aspects. It is, in fact, issuance of a direction for framing a policy in a specific manner.” In Delhi Subordinate Services Selection Board v. Praveen Kumar [2016 SCC OnLine SC 1549], it has been held that it is the employer's prerogative to decide the age limit and academic suitability of candidates which they wish to employ and so long as the same are not contradictory to the academic eligibility as prescribed by the NCTE Act. In the case of Chandigarh Administration through the Director Public Instructions (Colleges), Chandigarh v. Usha Kheterpal Waie and Others [ (2011) 9 SCC 645 ], the Hon'ble Apex Court has held at paragraph 22 and 23 which read as under :- “22. It is now well settled that it is for the rulemaking authority or the appointing authority to prescribe the mode of selection and minimum qualification for any recruitment. The courts and tribunals can neither prescribe the qualifications nor entrench upon the power of the authority concerned so long as the qualifications prescribed by the employer is reasonably relevant and has a rational nexus with the functions and duties attached to the post and are not violative of any provision of the Constitution, statute and rules. (See J. Ranga Swamy v. Govt. (See J. Ranga Swamy v. Govt. of A.P. [ (1990) 1 SCC 288 : 1990 SCC (L&S) 76] and P.U. Joshi v. Accountant General [(2003) 2 SCC 632 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 191].) In the absence of any rules, under Article 309 or statute, the appellant had the power to appoint under its general power of administration and prescribe such eligibility criteria as it is considered to be necessary and reasonable. Therefore, it cannot be said that the prescription of PhD is unreasonable. 23.The Tribunal and the High Court have held that in the years 1989 and 1991, the Tribunal had accepted that the earlier administrative instructions dated 20-8-1987 which required the UT cadre employees to be considered for the post have to be followed. The fact that at that time PhD degree was not insisted upon, does not mean that for all times to come, PhD degree could not be insisted. PhD degree was made a qualification because UGC guidelines required it for direct recruitment post and the UPSC approved the same. Therefore, merely because on some earlier occasions, the posts of Principal were filled by UT cadre lecturers without PhD degree, it cannot be argued that the PhD degree cannot be prescribed subsequently.” Thus, it is evident that the interference by way of exercise of power under judicial review is only to the extent if it has been found that the action of the State is arbitrary and suffers from the vice or malice. 17. It is further settled position of law that constitutionality or validity of a subordinate legislation and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that it is invalid as has been held by Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment rendered in State of T.N. and Another v. P. Krishnamurthy and Others reported in (2006) 4 SCC 517 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has held at paragraphs 15 and 16 as hereunder :- “15. There is a presumption in favour of constitutionality or validity of a subordinate legislation and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that it is invalid. It is also well recognised that a subordinate legislation can be challenged under any of the following grounds : (a) Lack of legislative competence to make the subordinate legislation. (b) Violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India. It is also well recognised that a subordinate legislation can be challenged under any of the following grounds : (a) Lack of legislative competence to make the subordinate legislation. (b) Violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India. (c) Violation of any provision of the Constitution of India. (d) Failure to conform to the statute under which it is made or exceeding the limits of authority conferred by the enabling Act. (e) Repugnancy to the laws of the land, that is, any enactment. (f) Manifest arbitrariness/unreasonableness (to an extent where the court might well say that the legislature never intended to give authority to make such rules). 16. The court considering the validity of a subordinate legislation, will have to consider the nature, object and scheme of the enabling Act, and also the area over which power has been delegated under the Act and then decide whether the subordinate legislation conforms to the parent statute. Where a rule is directly inconsistent with a mandatory provision of the statute, then, of course, the task of the court is simple and easy. But where the contention is that the inconsistency or non-conformity of the rule is not with reference to any specific provision of the enabling Act, but with the object and scheme of the parent Act, the court should proceed with caution before declaring invalidity.” It is evident from the judgment as referred hereinabove that there is a presumption in favour of constitutionality or validity of a subordinate legislation and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that it is invalid. It is also well recognised that a subordinate legislation can be challenged under any of the following grounds:- (a) Lack of legislative competence to make the subordinate legislation. (b) Violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India. (c) Violation of any provision of the Constitution of India. (d) Failure to conform to the statute under which it is made or exceeding the limits of authority conferred by the enabling Act. (b) Violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India. (c) Violation of any provision of the Constitution of India. (d) Failure to conform to the statute under which it is made or exceeding the limits of authority conferred by the enabling Act. Further, it is evident from the aforesaid judgment that the court considering the validity of a subordinate legislation, will have to consider the nature, object and scheme of the enabling Act, and also the area over which power has been delegated under the Act and then decide whether the subordinate legislation conforms to the parent statute, where a rule is directly inconsistent with a mandatory provision of the statute, then, of course, the task of the court is simple and easy. But where the contention is that the inconsistency or nonconformity of the rule is not with reference to any specific provision of the enabling Act, but with the object and scheme of the parent Act, the court should proceed with caution before declaring invalidity. 18. This Court has proceeded to examine the validity of provision in the light of the aforesaid proposition of law as settled in the judgment referred hereinabove. The issue has been raised of rationality of arbitrary exercise of power in fixing the minimum age for admission to be held to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 19. Mr. Ajit Kumar, learned senior counsel for the petitioners has submitted that as of now age up-to 14 years of age a candidate is support to pass + 2 Examination and for taking admission in diploma in primary teachers training course, candidate will have to wait for 4 years if the conditions stipulated under Clause 6 of the resolution dated 20.05.2004 will be there. 20. 20. This Court, after going through the impugned order has found from the discussion made therein about the aforesaid argument wherein the learned Single Judge after perusing the stand taken by the State in the counter affidavit that as per CBSE norms and also as per the State Government norms, minimum age for entering in Class 1 is 5 years, completed on 31st March of the year and thereby the student will be completing 10+2 at the age of 17 years or more as on 31st March and for entering into the course involved in this case, the required age is 18 years as on 1st of July, has held that the classification on the basis of age in the instant case is a reasonable classification as the minimum age prescribed is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable and further fixation of minimum age is essentially a matter of policy of the State and the NCTE having not fixed any minimum age for admission to Diploma in Elementary education, the State of Jharkhand has acted within its powers under entry 25 List III of the Constitution of India to fix the minimum age for admission in Diploma in Elementary education. 21. This Court, on the basis of finding recorded by learned Single Judge holding the decision not to be an arbitrary, is of the view that such finding cannot be said to suffer from an error merely because the aforesaid age is non-suitable for a section of students. Further, the State Government, since has come out with the aforesaid provision, merely on saying the aforesaid provision to be arbitrary, cannot be said to be an acceptable argument raised on behalf of petitioners, reason being that the students, as per the petitioners, will have to wait for a year or two cannot be a ground to hold the statutory provision to be unreasonable or arbitrary. The meaning of arbitrariness, as per the provision of Article 14 of the Constitution of India can be said to be available while formulating the statute by way of policy decision if aforesaid policy decision is in the teeth of any statutory provision or not consistent with the constitutional provision. The meaning of arbitrariness, as per the provision of Article 14 of the Constitution of India can be said to be available while formulating the statute by way of policy decision if aforesaid policy decision is in the teeth of any statutory provision or not consistent with the constitutional provision. But, merely because some of the students has got admission, contrary to the impugned provision, as per the prayer made in the writ petitions and for regularizing their admission since the students have taken admission they were less than 18 years of age the policy decision of the State Government, cannot be said to be arbitrary. According to considered view of this Court if the students have taken admission contrary to the provision as contained under Clause 6 of the resolution dated 20.05.2004 even knowing the fact very well that their admissions are in the teeth of the statutory provision as contained under Clause 6 of the impugned provision and took admission even in course of existence of the said statutory provision and after taking admission, they are now seeking declaration from this Court to hold the statutory provision to be arbitrary, only for the purpose of regularizing their admissions, the same cannot be said to be permissible in law. 22. This Court, in view of the discussions made hereinabove as also considering the finding recorded by learned Single Judge, is of the considered view that the impugned order requires no interference. 23. Accordingly, the instant intra-court appeals fail and are dismissed.