JUDGMENT : I.A. No.228 of 2022 1. This interlocutory application has been preferred under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay of 23 days in preferring this Letters Patent Appeal. 2. Heard. 3. No counter affidavit has been filed opposing the prayer for condoning the delay. 4. Having regard to the averments made in this application, we are of the view that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the period of limitation. 5. Accordingly, I.A.No.228 of 2022 is allowed and delay of 23 days in preferring the appeal is condoned. L.P.A. No.724 of 2019 6. The instant intra-court appeal preferred under Clause-10 of Letters Patent is directed against the order/judgment dated 06.08.2019 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(L) No.1795 of 2014, whereby and whereunder, the order dated 14.11.2013 passed by the Appellate Authority contained in memo no.PG Appeal (13)/2013 and order dated 18.03.2013 passed by the Controlling Authority in Application No.36/(34)/2012.E.4 under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, whereby, the interest claimed by the employee was disallowed, has been quashed and set aside by holding that the order passed by the Controlling Authority as well as Appellate Authority is not in accordance with the statutory provision as contained under the provision of Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, therefore, the order impugned was quashed and accordingly, 6 per cent interest per annum upon the gratuity amount for the period 05.05.2010 till 19.07.2012 to be paid in favour of the writ petitioner. 7. The brief facts of the case, as per the pleading made in the writ petition, required to be enumerated, are as hereunder:- The writ petitioner, claims to be permanent employee under the respondents had been dismissed from service w.e.f. 08.07.1985. The order of dismissal has been disputed and finally had been preferred for adjudication under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 vide Ref. No.15/1999. The said reference has been answered in favour of the writ petitioner-employee vide award dated 22.11.2000 directing the reinstatement in service with 50 per cent back wages. The aforesaid order was challenged by the Management by filing W.P.(L) No.3969 of 2002, which was dismissed vide order dated 13.11.2009 upholding the award. In the meanwhile, the writ petitioner has attained the age of superannuation on 30.04.2009. The aforesaid order was challenged by the Management by filing W.P.(L) No.3969 of 2002, which was dismissed vide order dated 13.11.2009 upholding the award. In the meanwhile, the writ petitioner has attained the age of superannuation on 30.04.2009. The award has been implemented by the respondent-Management vide order dated 05.05.2010 by reinstating the writ petitioner in service from 08.07.1985 to 30.04.2009, i.e., till the age of superannuation. The service dues as well as retiral dues has been released in favour of the writ petitioner except gratuity. The writ petitioner, in consequence of non-disbursement of amount of gratuity, has made an application under the prescribed Form-N before the Controlling Authority under the provisions of Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, vide application dated 27.02.2012. During pendency of the application, the employer has deposited the gratuity amount of Rs.8,37,985/-. The Controlling Authority has condoned the delay for depositing the amount by the employer by considering the sequence of event and litigation period and has denied the interest to the employee. Being aggrieved with the same, the writ petitioner has preferred an appeal being PG Appeal (13)/2013 which has been dismissed vide order dated 14.11.2013 upholding the order of the Controlling Authority. The employee, being aggrieved with the decision of the Controlling Authority as also the Appellate Authority, passed under the Payment of Gratuity Act, denying the interest has approached this Court by filing the writ petition being W.P.(L) No.1795 of 2014 seeking therein direction to disburse interest over the amount of gratuity, which admittedly has not been paid as per the statutory provision as contained under Section 7 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. The learned Single Judge has appreciated the aforesaid provision and taking into consideration the fact that the gratuity has not been paid, rather, the amount of gratuity has been calculated as per the service norms, while as per the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1947, an employee was entitled for gratuity of an amount of Rs.3,50,000/-at that point of time while an amount of Rs.8,37,985/-has been paid under the head of gratuity and as such, considering the delay attributable to the employer, the same having not been considered by the Controlling as also the Appellate Authority, the writ petition has been allowed with a direction holding the writ petitioner entitled for 6 per cent interest per annum upon the gratuity amount for the period from 05.05.2010 till 19.07.2012, the aforesaid order is under challenged in the instant intra-court appeal. 8. Mr. Vijay Kant Dubey, learned counsel appearing for the appellant-respondent has submitted that the learned Single Judge has not appreciated the fact that there are two concurrent findings of the quasi-judicial authority, one by the Controlling Authority and second by the Appellate Authority and without taking it into consideration, the writ petition has been allowed holding the writ petitioner entitled for 6 per cent interest per annum upon the gratuity amount for the period from 05.05.2010 till 19.07.2012, therefore, the order impugned is to be quashed on this ground alone. It has further been submitted that there is no delay said to be attributable to the employer, since, it is the writ petitioner who has been dismissed from service and subsequently, the order of dismissal has been reversed, in pursuant thereto, the workman has been reinstated in service and immediately thereafter, amount has been deposited, therefore, there is delay committed on the part of the employer and as such, there is no question of applicability of the provision of sub-section (2) of Section 7 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, but without taking it into consideration, since, the learned Single Judge has quashed the impugned decision passed by the Controlling Authority as also the Appellate Authority, therefore, the order passed by the learned Single Judge suffers from material illegality and hence, not sustainable in the eyes of law. 9. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant, perused the documents available on record as also considered the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order. 10. 9. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant, perused the documents available on record as also considered the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order. 10. The undisputed facts in this case are that the employee was working under the appellant-respondent and while, discharging his duty as such, he was dismissed from service w.e.f. 08.07.1985. The order of dismissal has been disputed and finally the dispute has been referred for adjudication under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 being reference case no.15/1999. The said reference has been answered in favour of the writ petitioner-employee vide award dated 22.11.2000 directing the reinstatement in service with 50 per cent back wages. The aforesaid order was challenged by the Management-appellant by filing W.P.(L) No.3969 of 2002, which was dismissed vide order dated 13.11.2009 upholding the award. In the meanwhile, the writ petitioner has attained the age of superannuation on 30.04.2009. The award has been implemented by the Management vide order dated 05.05.2010 by reinstating the writ petitioner in service from 08.07.1985 to 30.04.2009 i.e., till the age of superannuation. The service dues as well as retiral dues has been released in favour of the writ petitioner except gratuity. The writ petitioner for disbursement of the amount of gratuity, has approached before the Controlling Authority as per the provision provided under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 by filing an application on 27.02.2012. During the pendency of the application, the employer has deposited the gratuity amount of Rs.8,37,985/-, but, the interest has not been awarded. Being aggrieved, the writ petitioner has preferred an appeal being PG Appeal (13)/2013, but the said appeal was dismissed upholding the order of Controlling Authority. The writ petitioner, being aggrieved with both the orders i.e., the orders dated 18.03.2013 and 14.11.2013, has assailed the same by filing the writ petition being W.P.(L) No.1795 of 2014 and the said writ petition was allowed, against which, the present intra-court appeal. 11. The issue has been raised that there is no delay said to be attributable to the employer and therefore, the order passed by the learned Single Judge on this ground alone is not sustainable. 12. 11. The issue has been raised that there is no delay said to be attributable to the employer and therefore, the order passed by the learned Single Judge on this ground alone is not sustainable. 12. The fact which is not in dispute in this case as has been referred hereinabove that admittedly, after the award having been passed and declined to interfere by this Court, the writ petitioner has been reinstated in service and all retiral benefits have been paid except gratuity. The appellant has not disclosed before the learned Single Judge as to why, the amount of gratuity has not been paid at the time when the other retiral dues have been paid, rather, the writ petitioner has to approach before the authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 seeking therein the prayer for interest to be paid from 05.05.2010 till 19.07.2012. The further admitted fact is that the amount has not been paid from 05.05.2010 till 19.07.2012 and the amount of gratuity has been deposited before the concerned authority on 19.07.2012, then the question herein is that why such amount has been deposited on 19.07.2012, while, the writ petitioner has been allowed to be superannuated w.e.f. 30.04.2009 and other retiral benefits has been paid as on 05.05.2010. The learned Single Judge has considered the aforesaid facts and appreciated the legal provision as provided under Section 7 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. Section 7 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, contains a provision of making an application by an employee in case of non-payment of the amount of gratuity. The provision as contained under Section 7 (1) (2) (3) and (4) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 reads as under:- “7. Determination of the amount of Gratuity.-(1) A person who is eligible for payment of gratuity under this Act or any person authorised, in writing, to act on his behalf shall send a written application to the employer, within such time and in such form, as may be prescribed, for payment of such gratuity. (2) As soon as gratuity becomes payable, the employer shall, whether an application referred to in sub-section (i) has been made or not, determine the amount of gratuity and give notice in writing to the person to whom the gratuity is payable and also to the controlling authority specifying the amount of gratuity so determined. (2) As soon as gratuity becomes payable, the employer shall, whether an application referred to in sub-section (i) has been made or not, determine the amount of gratuity and give notice in writing to the person to whom the gratuity is payable and also to the controlling authority specifying the amount of gratuity so determined. [(3) The employer shall arrange to pay the amount of gratuity within thirty days from the date it becomes payable to the person to whom the gratuity is payable. (3-A) If the amount of gratuity payable under subsection (3) is not paid by the employer within the period specified in sub-section (3) the employer shall pay, from the date on which the gratuity becomes payable to the date on which it is paid, simple interest at such rate, not exceeding the rate notified by the Central Government from time to time for repayment of long term deposits, as that Government may, by notification specify: Provided that no such interest shall be payable if the delay in the payment is due to the fault of the employee and the employer has obtained permission in writing from the Controlling Authority for the delayed payment on this ground]. (4)(a) If there is any dispute as to the amount of gratuity payable to an employee under this Act or as to the admissibility of any claim of, or in relation to, an employee for payment of gratuity, or as to the person entitled to receive the gratuity, the employer shall deposit with the Controlling Authority such amount as he admits to be payable by him as gratuity. 23[***] [(b) Where there is a dispute with regard to any matter or matters specified in Clause (a), the employer or employee or any other person raising the dispute may make an application to the Controlling Authority for deciding the dispute.] [(c)] The Controlling Authority shall, after due inquiry and after giving the parties to the dispute a reasonable opportunity of being heard, determine the matter or matters in dispute and, if, as a result of such inquiry any amount is found to be payable to the employee, the Controlling Authority shall direct the employer to pay such amount or, as the case may be, such amount as reduced by the amount already deposited by the employer.] [(d)] The Controlling Authority shall pay the amount deposited, including the excess amount, if any, deposited by the employer, to the person entitled thereto. [(e)] As soon as may be after a deposit is made under Clause (a), the Controlling Authority shall pay the amount of the deposit- (i) to the applicant where he is the employee; or (ii) where the applicant is the employee, to the [nominee or, as the case may be, the guardian of such nominee or] heir of the employee if the Controlling Authority is satisfied that there is no dispute as to the right of the applicant to receive the amount of gratuity.” It is, thus, evident that from the aforesaid legal provision that the person who is eligible for payment of gratuity under the Act, is entitled for interest for delayed payment with stipulation that if fault lies with the employee, the interest can be denied. 13. Therefore, this Court is to see as to whether the fault lies on the part of the employee holding the writ petitioner not entitled for interest over the gratuity amount. As has been referred hereinabove about the undisputed fact that the writ petitioner has been reinstated in service and all the retiral benefits have been paid, save and except, the amount of gratuity. The employer has not come forth with the explanation as to why the amount of gratuity has not been paid at the time when the other retiral dues have been paid. The amount of gratuity has only been deposited when the writ petitioner has made an application before the Controlling Authority under the provision of Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 i.e., on 19.07.2012. The amount of gratuity has only been deposited when the writ petitioner has made an application before the Controlling Authority under the provision of Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 i.e., on 19.07.2012. Therefore, the question herein is that when the amount of gratuity which was to be paid in favour of the employee being the statutory right of an employee, ought to have been paid along with the other retiral benefits but without any explanation the same has been deposited before the Controlling Authority, when the writ petitioner has made an application in view of the provision of Rule 7 of the Payment of Gratuity Rules, 1972. For ready reference, Rule 7 of the Payment of Gratuity Rules, 1972 reads as under:- “7. Application for gratuity:- (1) An employee who is eligible for payment of gratuity under the Act, or any person authorised in writing, to act on his behalf, shall apply, ordinarily within thirty days from the date the gratuity became payable, in Form ‘I’ to the employer: Provided that where the date of superannuation or retirement of an employee is known, the employee may apply, to the employer before thirty days of the date of superannuation or retirement. (2) A nominee of an employee who is eligible for payment of gratuity under the second proviso to subsection (1) of section 4 shall apply, ordinarily, within thirty days from the date of gratuity become payable to him, in Form ‘J’ to the employer. Provided that an application in plain paper with relevant particulars shall also be accepted. The employer may obtain such other particulars as may be deemed necessary by him. (3) A legal heir of an employee who is eligible for payment of gratuity under the second proviso to subsection (1) of section 4 shall apply, ordinarily within one year from the date of gratuity became payable to him, in Form ‘K’ to the employer. (4) Where gratuity becomes payable under the Act before the commencement of these rules, the periods of limitation specified in sub-rules (1), (2) and (3) shall be deemed to be operative from the date of such commencement. (4) Where gratuity becomes payable under the Act before the commencement of these rules, the periods of limitation specified in sub-rules (1), (2) and (3) shall be deemed to be operative from the date of such commencement. (5) An application for payment of gratuity filed after the expiry of the periods specified in this rule shall also be entertained by the employer, if the applicant adduces sufficient cause for the delay in preferring his claim, and no claim for gratuity under the Act shall be invalid merely because the claimant failed to present his application within the specified period. Any dispute in this regard shall be referred to the controlling authority for his decision. (6) An application under this rule shall be presented to the employer either by personal service or by registered post acknowledgement due.” The Rule does not provide that the amount of gratuity can only be paid when the application has been made by the concerned employee, rather, the provision says as would appear from sub-rule (1) of Rule 7 that an employee who is eligible for payment of gratuity under the Act, or any person authorized in writing to act on his behalf, shall apply, ordinarily within thirty days from the date of the gratuity became payable, in Form ‘I’ to the employer. Provided that where the date of superannuation or retirement of an employee is known, the employee may apply, to the employer before thirty days of the date of superannuation or retirement. Further, it is evident from sub-rule (2) of Rule 7 thereof that a nominee of an employee who is eligible for payment of gratuity under the second proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 4 shall apply, ordinarily, within thirty days from the date of gratuity become payable to him, in Form ‘J’ to the employer. Provided that an application in plain paper with relevant particulars shall also be accepted. The employer may obtain such other particulars as may be deemed necessary by him. Provided that an application in plain paper with relevant particulars shall also be accepted. The employer may obtain such other particulars as may be deemed necessary by him. It is further evident from sub-rule (5) thereof that an application for payment of gratuity filed after the expiry of the periods specified in this rule shall also be entertained by the employer, if the applicant adduces sufficient cause for the delay in preferring his claim, and no claim for gratuity under the Rule shall be invalid merely because the claimant failed to present his application within the specified period. 14. This Court, therefore, is of the view by taking into consideration the aforesaid legal provision as also the object and intent of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 as well as the Payment of Gratuity Rule, 1972 that it is not mandatory on the part of the employee to make an application for getting the amount of gratuity, rather, the application as required to be filed under Section 7 of the Act, 1972, will be said to be requirement for filing an application only in a case where the amount of gratuity, has not been paid since the respondent cannot be allowed to wait for filing an application for disbursement of the amount of gratuity. 15. Here, in the facts of the given case, admittedly, the amount of gratuity has not been paid by the employer on the date when other retiral benefits have been paid without any rhyme and reason, rather, the same has been deposited before the Controlling Authority on 19.07.2012, that too without any explanation to that effect. 16. It is the specific case of the writ petitioner that the application has been filed as provided to be filed under sub-rule (1) and sub-rule (2) of Rule 7 and when the amount has not been paid, even after filing of application as per requirement, then the Controlling Authority was approached for an appropriate direction. 16. It is the specific case of the writ petitioner that the application has been filed as provided to be filed under sub-rule (1) and sub-rule (2) of Rule 7 and when the amount has not been paid, even after filing of application as per requirement, then the Controlling Authority was approached for an appropriate direction. The Controlling Authority, in that view of the matter, taking into consideration the fact that even after filing of an application for disbursement of the amount of gratuity ought to have passed an order for disbursement of the aforesaid amount along with interest, considering the attributability in making payment of amount of gratuity with delay and therefore, the aforesaid admitted fact clearly shows that the delay in non-disbursement of the amount is attributable to the employer, and in that view of the matter, the interest over the amount of gratuity has been directed to be paid by the learned Single Judge, the same according to our considered view, cannot be said to suffer from an error. 17. It requires to refer herein the principle, basis upon which, the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is to issue the Writ of Certiorari, reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered in Syed Yakoob Vrs. K.S. Radhakrishnan and Ors., A.I.R. 1964 Supreme Court 477, wherein at paragraph no.7 Their Lordships have been pleased to hold as follows:- “7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals : these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal Acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal Acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, 1955-1 SCR 1104 : ((S) AIR 1955 SC 233 ); Nagendra Nath v. Commr. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, 1955-1 SCR 1104 : ((S) AIR 1955 SC 233 ); Nagendra Nath v. Commr. Of Hills Division, 1958 SCR 1240 : ( AIR 1958 SC 398 ) and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1960 SC 1168 . Reference in this regard also may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hari Vishnu Kamath Vs. Ahmad Ishaque and Ors., AIR 1955 Supreme Court 233, it has been held at Paragraph-21, as hereunder :- “…….as to the character and scope of the writ of ‘certiorari’ and the conditions under which it could be issued. The question has been considered by this Court in ‘Parry and Co. v. Commercial Employees’ Association, Madras,’ AIR 1952 SC 179 (L):-‘Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd.’ AIR 1952 SC 192 (M); ‘Ebrahim Aboobaker v. Custodian General of Evacuee Property New Delhi,’ AIR 1952 SC 319 (N), and quite recently in AIR 1954 SC 440 (C). On these authorities, the following propositions may be taken as established: (1) ‘Certiorari’ will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it. (2) Writ of certiorari will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. (3) The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal even if they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a Court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when the Legislature does not choose to confer a right of appeal against that decision, it would be defeating its purpose and policy, if a superior Court were to rehear the case on the evidence and substitute its own findings in “certiorari”…….” In another judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Sawarn Singh and Anr. Vrs. Vrs. State of Punjab and Ors., (1976) 2 SCC 868 their Lordships while discussing the power of writ under Article 226 for issuance of writ of certiorari has been pleased to hold at paragraph nos.12 and 13 as under: “12. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it will be useful to notice the general principles indicating the limits of the jurisdiction of the certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction. The Court exercising special jurisdiction under Article 226 is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. As was pointed out by this Court in Syed Yakoob's case (supra)……… 13. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law. The writ jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice.” Here, in the given facts of the case, according to our considered view, the provision as contained under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, which contains a provision for filing of an application, as would appear from Section 7 of the Act, 1972 for disbursement of the amount of gratuity, admittedly, the same has been filed and when the amount of gratuity has not been paid, which led the employee concerned to make an application before the Controlling Authority and therefore, the fact about attributability of the delay committed on the part of the employer cannot be disputed, but the said aspect of the matter has not been considered by the quasi-judicial authority i.e., the Controlling Authority as also the Appellate Authority. 18. 18. Therefore, there is non-consideration of the statutory provision and as such, taking into consideration the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court as quoted and referred above laying down the principle to issue the Writ of Certiorari, according to our considered view, it is a fit case where the Writ of Certiorari has correctly been issued by the learned Single Judge showing interference with the impugned decision passed by the Controlling Authority as also the Appellate Authority, which according to the considered view, cannot be said to suffer from an error. 19. This Court, taking into consideration the aforesaid submissions and in the entirety of the facts and circumstances of the case is of the considered view that the order passed by the learned Single Judge requires no interference. 20. In the result, the instant appeal fails and is, dismissed.