JUDGMENT : I.A. No. 2718 of 2022 1. Heard learned counsel appearing for the parties. 2. As prayed for, learned counsel for the appellant is permitted to make necessary correction in course of the day with respect to quantum of delay as there is difference in between such quantum in paragraph 1 and prayer portion of the Interlocutory Application and as per the stamp report it should be 177 days. 3. The instant Interlocutory Application has been filed for condonation of delay of 177 days in filing the instant appeal. 4. No counter affidavit to the Interlocutory Application has been filed on behalf of the respondent. 5. Having regard to the averments made in this application, we are of the view that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the period of limitation. 6. Accordingly, I.A. No. 2718 of 2022 is allowed and delay of 177 days in preferring the appeal is condoned. L.P.A. No. 723 of 2019 7. The instant intra-court appeal, under clause 10 of the Letters Patent, has been preferred against order/judgment dated 27.08.2019 in W.P. (L) No. 670 of 2013 whereby and whereunder the learned Single Judge refused to interfere with Award dated 26.05.2012 passed in Reference Case No. 09 of 2010 by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jamshedpur, by which, the reference has been answered against the petitioner for appointment on the basis of dependency. 8. The brief facts of the case, as per pleadings made in the writ petition, which require to be enumerated reads as hereunder: The original writ petitioner, namely, Shiva Kant Jha was in the employment of respondent-company since 1959 and retired from service w.e.f. 30.12.1988 on attaining the age of superannuation. It is the case of the petitioner that as per the rule of respondents-company the employee, who has completed 25 years of continuous service, was entitled to keep one of his dependant in the dependent register and employment is to be provided to such dependent, as and when vacancy arises or work is available. As per scheme floated by the company, the name of dependent-daughter, namely, Renu Devi was entered in dependent register. Accordingly, her case was considered for employment and she was asked to appear in the examination for ascertaining the suitability for the job. As per scheme floated by the company, the name of dependent-daughter, namely, Renu Devi was entered in dependent register. Accordingly, her case was considered for employment and she was asked to appear in the examination for ascertaining the suitability for the job. She appeared in the Examination conducted in the year 1992-93 but failed as such her case was not considered for employment. Being aggrieved, the appellant-writ petitioner raised a dispute which culminated to reference being Reference Case No. 9 of 2010 which was answered against the workman thereby employment to dependent-daughter was denied. Aggrieved thereof, the petitioner approached this Court invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for redressal of this grievance by filing writ petition being in W.P. (L) No. 670 of 2013. The learned Single Judge, considering the fact that dependent-daughter, namely, Renu Devi had crossed the age of 50 years while passing the Award as such reference was answered in negative vide Award dated 26.05.2012 and as of now, the dependent-daughter has crossed the age of superannuation, did not interfere with the Award passed by the Labour Court and dismissed the writ petition, against which, the instant intra-court appeal has been filed. 9. Mr. Sanjay Prasad, learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner-appellant has submitted that the learned Single Judge, without appreciating the factual aspect in right prospective, has declined to interfere with the Award taking into consideration the fact that on the date when the Award was passed the dependent-daughter, namely, Renu Devi, had crossed the age of 50 years, but if there is any delay in conclusion of the Industrial Dispute for which the writ petitioner cannot be made to suffer and as such on this ground alone, since the same has not been considered by learned Single Judge, the impugned order passed by learned Single Judge is fit to be quashed and set aside. 10. Mr. 10. Mr. G.M. Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the respondents-company has defended the order passed by learned Single Judge making submission that there is no error in the Award since the maximum age limit for appointment as per Standing Order applicable to the company is 40 years for the female candidates on the date of award and since the dependent-daughter had crossed the age of 50 years on the date of Award, therefore, Award was passed negating the claim of the workman answering the reference against the workmen, as such the same cannot be said to suffer from error. Learned counsel for the respondent has further submitted that the writ petitioner herself has disclosed her as 60 years on the date of filing of appeal in the year 2019, as such on this ground also there cannot be any direction for appointment of dependent-daughter. Therefore, order passed by the learned Single Judge may not be interfered with. 11. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the documents available on record as also the finding recorded by learned Single Judge. 12. The undisputed fact, in this case, is that the original writ petitioner, namely, Shiva Kant Jha, was in the employment of respondent-company since 1959 and retired from service w.e.f. 30.12.1988 on attaining the age of superannuation. The workman-original writ petitioner under the provisions of Rule 7 C of the ‘Works Standing Order’, where there is provision to provide employment to the ward of the employee who has completed 25 years of continuous service, got registered the name of her daughter, namely, Renu Devi (writ petitioner) on 25.05.1989 in the dependent register. The management of the company considered the case of the petitioner for employment and asked to appear in the examination in the year 1992-93 for ascertaining the suitability for the job, in which, she appeared but failed as such she was not provided employment. Thereafter, the workman-writ petitioner raised a dispute which culminated to reference being Reference Case No. 9 of 2010, wherein term of reference was drawn as under: “Whether to raise the demand for giving employment to his daughter by Ex-supervisor Shri Shiva Kant Jha is unjustified? Thereafter, the workman-writ petitioner raised a dispute which culminated to reference being Reference Case No. 9 of 2010, wherein term of reference was drawn as under: “Whether to raise the demand for giving employment to his daughter by Ex-supervisor Shri Shiva Kant Jha is unjustified? If not, what relief the concerned workman is entitled to?” The aforesaid reference was answered in favour management-company and against the workman vide Award dated 26th May, 2012 taking into consideration the fact that; (i).Even though the daughter of the workman, namely, Renu Kumari appeared for written and typing test for the post of Assistant-cum-Typist conducted in the year 1992 and 1993 but she did not qualify and as such she got no employment, (ii). She crossed the age limit for recruitment in the company i.e., the age of 40 years. Against the Award dated 26th May, 2012 passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jamshedpur, the workman-writ petitioner preferred writ petition being W.P.(L) No. 670 of 2013. The learned Single Judge, taking into consideration the fact that the dependent-daughter, namely, Renu Devi appeared in the examination in the year 1992-93 ascertaining the suitability for the job but failed and as such her case for employment was not considered at that time and further she has crossed the age of 50 years while passing the Award and as of now cross the age of superannuation, declined to interfere with the Award passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jamshedpur. 13. Submission has been made that the dependent-daughter is entitled to get appointment on the ground that there is no laches on the part of the workman-original writ petitioner or dependent-daughter rather it is due to pendency of the litigation before the concerned Tribunal as also before this Court wherein the writ petitioner was pending since 2013 and during its course the writ petitioner even if has crossed age of 40 years then also the dependent-daughter is entitled to get employment under the aforesaid scheme but the same has not been considered by the learned Single Judge, therefore, the instant intra-court appeal. 14. 14. While on the other hand, the aforesaid submission has seriously been disputed by learned counsel for the respondent-company by submitting that on any ground whatsoever if a candidate has crossed the maximum age for recruitment such candidate will not be entitled to get appointment, otherwise such appointment if granted even after crossing the maximum age applicable will be considered to be illegal appointment. As such, taking into consideration the aforesaid aspect of the matter, if the learned Single Judge has passed the order, the same requires no interference by this court. 15. We, on appreciation of the rival submissions, are of the considered view that the objection which has been raised on behalf of learned counsel for the respondent-company is considered to be a valid ground for showing no interference by this Court; reason being that if the maximum age has been made applicable i.e., 40 years in the facts of the given case and even on any ground whatsoever a candidate whose name has been kept in the dependent-register awaiting for the vacancy crossed the maximum age limit for recruitment, herein, the writ petitioner on the date of Award has crossed the age of 50 years and in that circumstance, such candidate will not be entitled to get appointment being age barred and considering the same, if reference has been answered against the workman-original writ petitioner the same cannot be said to suffer from any error. Further, in the year 1992 and 1993 her case for appointment on the post of Assistant-cum-Typist was considered and she was allowed to appear in the test but she failed. The Tribunal, taking into consideration these aspects of the matter answered the reference against the workman-original writ petitioner vide Award dated 26.05.2012 passed in Reference Case No. 09 of 2010. The learned Single Judge has appreciated the aforesaid finding recorded by the Tribunal in the Award and refused to interfere with the same. 16. The Tribunal, taking into consideration these aspects of the matter answered the reference against the workman-original writ petitioner vide Award dated 26.05.2012 passed in Reference Case No. 09 of 2010. The learned Single Judge has appreciated the aforesaid finding recorded by the Tribunal in the Award and refused to interfere with the same. 16. This Court, therefore, is of considered view that the finding recorded by the Tribunal, being affirmed by the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and more so as on Today, as per the declaration furnished by the appellant, she has crossed the age of 60 years, there is no question of providing appointment otherwise also it is settled position of law that scope of interference with the Award passed by the Tribunal is very limited, as has been held by Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment rendered in Syed Yakoob Vrs. K.S. Radhakrishnan & Ors, reported in A.I.R. 1964 SC 477, wherein at paragraph no. 7 their Lordships have been pleased to held as follows:- “7.The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals : these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal Acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point 11 and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised.” In another judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the Case of Sawarn Singh & Anr. Vrs. State of Punjab & Ors reported in (1976) 2 SCC 868 their Lordships while discussing the power of writ under Article 226 for issuance of writ of certiorari has been please to hold at paragraph nos.12 and 13 as under: “12. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it will be useful to notice the general principles indicating the limits of the jurisdiction of the High Court in writ proceedings under Article 226. It is well settled that certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction. It is well settled that certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction. The Court exercising special jurisdiction under Article 226 is not entitled to act as an appellate court. As was pointed out by this Court in Syed Yakoob case,- “this limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior court or tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be.” “13.In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law. The writ jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice.” Likewise, in the case of Pepsico India Holding Private Limited Vrs. Krishna Kant Pandey reported in (2015) 4 SCC 270 their Lordships while discussing the scope of Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in the matter of interference with the finding of the tribunal has been pleased to hold by placing reliance upon the judgment rendered in the case of Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao Vrs. Ashalata S. Guram reported in (1986) 4 SCC 447 at paragraph 14 has held as under:- “14.While discussing the power of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution interfering with the facts recorded by the courts or the tribunal, this Court in Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram [ (1986) 4 SCC 447 ] , held as under: “17. In case of finding of facts, the Court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Reference may be made to the observations of this Court in Bathutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarta [ (1975) 1 SCC 858 : AIR 1975 SC 1297 ] where this Court observed that the High Court could not in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal. The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and re-appreciating. Speaking for the Court, Bhagwati, J. as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed at AIR p. 1301 of the Report as follows: “7. The special civil application preferred by the appellant was admittedly an application under Article 227 and it is, therefore, material only to consider the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the High Court under that article. Did the High Court have jurisdiction in an application under Article 227 to disturb the findings of fact reached by the District Court? It is well settled by the decision of this Court in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath [ AIR 1954 SC 215 ] (AIR p. 217, para 14) that the “power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. v. Sukumar Mukherjee [ AIR 1951 Cal 193 ], to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors”. This statement of law was quoted with approval in the subsequent decision of this Court in Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commr. of Hills Division [ AIR 1958 SC 398 ] and it was pointed out by Sinha, J., as he then was, speaking on behalf of the Court in that case: (AIR p. 413, para 30) “30. … It is, thus, clear that the powers of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature, are not greater than the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226, the power of interference may extend to quashing an impugned order on the ground of a mistake apparent on the face of the record. Under Article 226, the power of interference may extend to quashing an impugned order on the ground of a mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeing that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority.” 17. It is thus, evident from bare perusal of the judicial pronouncement, as referred hereinabove, that the award if passed by the tribunal based upon the cogent evidence, it could not be proper for the writ Court to re-appreciate the evidence by substituting the view already taken by the Tribunal while answering the reference, otherwise the High Court in exercise of power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India will be said to be exercising the appellate jurisdiction. 18. It has been settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court about the jurisdiction of the writ Court to interfere with the award, if there is perversity of finding or award is based on erroneous evidence. But, according to our considered view after going through the award, it cannot be said that the award passed by Tribunal while answering the reference is based upon the perverse finding or on the extraneous consideration of the evidence produced by the parties, rather, according to our considered view the award is based upon after consideration of the documentary as well as oral evidence produced before it. 19. This Court, on the basis of discussions made hereinabove and considering the legal position, as has been propounded by Hon’ble Apex Court, referred hereinabove, is of the considered view that no case is made out for interference either with the order passed by the Tribunal or order passed by the learned Single Judge. 20. Accordingly, the instant appeal fails and is dismissed.