ORDER : Ajithkumar, J. Common are the issues involved and hence these rent control revisions are disposed of by this common order. The rent control revisions are filed by the respective tenants against common judgment dated 19.03.2020 in R.C.A.Nos.95, 98, 101 and 111 of 2018 on the file of the Rent control Appellate Authority (Additional District Judge–II), Thalassery. The respondent filed R.C.P.Nos.12, 13, 14 and 15 along with two other petitions seeking eviction of the tenants from the respective petition schedule shop rooms, which are part of a larger building belonging to the respondent. Eviction was sought under Sections 11(3) and 11(4)(iv) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. The order of eviction granted by the Rent Control Court as per the common order dated 11.07.2018 which stands confirmed by the common judgment of the Appellate Authority dated 19.03.2020 is challenged in these revisions filed under Section 20 of the Act. 2. These revision petitions were admitted on 14.01.2021. The order of eviction was stayed initially for a period of one month. The order of stay has been extended from time to time and is still in force. 3. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and the learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 4. In the rent control petitions, the contention of the respondent-landlady was that the petition schedule building belonged to Sreedevi Amma and she leased out the premises to the respondents in the Rent Control Petitions on monthly rent. Sreedevi Amma died and the right of Sreedevi Amma devolved upon the revision petitioner as per a registered Will. After the death of Sreedevi Amma, the petitioners in these revision petitions attorned to the respondent as the landlady. The petition schedule building is old and dilapidated. The respondent intends to construct a residential-cum-commercial complex in the place of the existing building and a plan for the proposed construction is approved by the Municipality. The husband of the respondent is now working as Vice President of ITC at Calcutta. He intends to retire from service, settle down at Thalassery and start professional consultancy services and a coaching centre for Chartered Accountancy students. So, the existing old building has to be demolished and a new residential-cum-commercial building has to be constructed in its place to suit the needs of the husband of the respondent. He intends to retire from service, settle down at Thalassery and start professional consultancy services and a coaching centre for Chartered Accountancy students. So, the existing old building has to be demolished and a new residential-cum-commercial building has to be constructed in its place to suit the needs of the husband of the respondent. The second floor of the proposed building is to be used for residential purposes and the first floor is to be used as office room, room for staff, room for conducting classes and room for visitors. The respondent needs to demolish the existing building and construct a new building to suit the bona fide need of her husband. There are other rooms available in the locality for shifting the business now conducted by the petitioners in the petition schedule shop rooms. Moreover, the petitioners are having possession of other rooms for doing the business now conducted in the petition schedule premises. On such grounds, eviction was sought under Sections 11(3) and 11(4)(iv) of the Act. 5. The petitioners admitted the title and tenancy. They contended that there is no serious damage to the existing building and there is no need for reconstruction of the building. The existing building is only 35 years old. A portion of the existing building was acquired by the Government for widening the road. The petitioner had obtained the plan approved by the Municipality before acquisition proceedings. As per the present Building Rules, no residential building or commercial complex could be constructed at the place where the present building is situated after leaving the road margin. No vacant rooms are available in the locality for shifting the business now conducted in the petition schedule building. The petitioners are depending upon the income derived from the business conducted in the petition schedule premises. The respondent has got other buildings of her own and it could be used for the proposed purpose. The respondent can construct the proposed building even without demolishing the existing building. There is no intention for the husband of the respondent to come over to Thalassery and settle down. He is getting a pension and his children are well off. So, there is no need for starting a professional consultancy of his own. The intention of the respondent is to evict the petitioners and to sell the property to strangers. There is no intention for the husband of the respondent to come over to Thalassery and settle down. He is getting a pension and his children are well off. So, there is no need for starting a professional consultancy of his own. The intention of the respondent is to evict the petitioners and to sell the property to strangers. So, the respondent is not entitled to get any order of eviction as claimed by her. 6. The petitioners challenging the common order of eviction dated 02.11.2012 of the Rent Control Court filed R.C.A.Nos.43, 47, 48 and 49 of 2013 before the Appellate Authority. Those appeals were allowed as per a common judgment dated 13.02.2015. The respondent took up the matter before this Court by filing R.C.R Nos.132, 134, 135 and 136 of 2015. Those revision petitions were considered along with two other connected revisions. As per the common order dated 08.09.2016, this Court set aside the common judgment of the Appellate Authority and remanded the matter to the Rent Control Court. Paragraph Nos.12 and 13 of the order of remand read as follows: “12. It is true that the nature of the need projected by PW1 in his evidence does not form a part of the rent control petitions. However, it is also admitted by the parties that the entire plot including the proposed building as well as the existing building in which the premises of the tenants are situated has an extent of only about 12 cents. The plot has road access on two sides. It is the common case of the parties that going by Exhibit A12 plan, frontage onto Thalassery-Coorg road would be possible only if the existing building were to be pulled down. A contention is also raised as regards the pendency of acquisition proceedings over a portion of the property and it is stated in evidence that a peg mark is seen affixed on the staircase portion of the existing building. 13. On a consideration of the contentions of the parties, we are of the opinion that the Rent Control Appellate Authority, on coming to a conclusion as to the deficiency of pleadings ought to have given the parties an opportunity to join issues on proper pleadings to be placed on record. 13. On a consideration of the contentions of the parties, we are of the opinion that the Rent Control Appellate Authority, on coming to a conclusion as to the deficiency of pleadings ought to have given the parties an opportunity to join issues on proper pleadings to be placed on record. In the nature of the dispute between the parties and the admissions made by the respective parties before the original authority, the landlady was clearly entitled to an opportunity to rectify the deficiency in the pleadings before the Rent Control Court. In the above circumstances, we are of the opinion that this is a fit case where the revision petitioner/landlady should be given an opportunity to amend her pleadings appropriately so that a proper adjudication of the issues involved in the matter is made possible. For this purpose, we set aside the common judgments in Rent Control Appeals as also the Rent Control Petitions and remand the matter to the Rent Control Court for fresh consideration. The revision petitioner shall be allowed to suitably amend the rent control petitions and the matter shall be considered afresh by the Rent Control Court after such due process as may be found necessary. The nature of the acquisition proceedings, if any, on the property and the element of holding of any property or rights by the Government shall also be considered by the Rent Control Court. The parties shall mark appearance before the Rent Control Court on 03.10.2016.” 7. In obedience to the said directions, Rent Control Court considered the matter afresh. The respondent got the Rent Control Petitions amended by adding paragraph No.6(a), which reads as follows: "6(a) The petitioner submits that there is no sufficient space for car parking and safe road access for the proposed new construction. The petition schedule buildings have to be demolished for providing sufficient space for car parking and access from Thalassery-Coorg Highway, besides the order access from Thalassery Town Hall Road to make the user convenient and safe. The said need is bona fide and genuine. The acquisition proceedings which carved out only the negligible portion of the steps of some of the rooms in the ground floor shops in the petition scheduled building and some space on the main road side (0.66 cents in all) were over as early as in the year 2006. The said need is bona fide and genuine. The acquisition proceedings which carved out only the negligible portion of the steps of some of the rooms in the ground floor shops in the petition scheduled building and some space on the main road side (0.66 cents in all) were over as early as in the year 2006. The need of demolition of the petition scheduled building and the construction of a gate and parking space arose only after the said acquisition proceedings. The acquisition proceedings which culminated in 2006 as aforesaid have no impact or bearing on the need and proposed demolition and the reconstruction of the plaint scheduled building the 11.41 cent plot. At the time of institution of RCP and subsequently and as of now there are no acquisition proceedings touching the petition scheduled building and the premises." 8. After the remand, no further evidence was let in by the respondent. Upon considering the evidence in the light of the pleadings, the Rent Control Court as per the order dated 11.07.2018, ordered eviction of the petitioners under Sections 11(3) and 11(4)(iv) of the Act. The Rent Control Court found that although the eviction was sought under Sections 11(3) and 11(4)(iv), it essentially was for bona fide need coming under Section 11(3) of the Act for which the decision in Krishna Menon v. District Judge [ 1988 (1) KLT 131 ] was placed reliance on. The need urged by the respondent was found to be bona fide and on further finding that none of the petitioners was entitled to get the benefit of the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act, ordered eviction. 9. In the appeal, the petitioners seriously challenged the said findings of the Rent Control Court. They categorically contended that the tenanted premises need not be demolished in order to put up the building as proposed by the respondent in terms of Ext.A9 permit and Ext.A10 plan. The property of the respondent has now an area of 11.41 cents after acquisition of 0.66 cents for widening the road. That along with the position of the tenanted premises as reflected from Ext.A12 site plan has been highlighted to contend that demolition of the said building is quite unnecessary and the demand for eviction of the petitioners on that ground is untenable. That along with the position of the tenanted premises as reflected from Ext.A12 site plan has been highlighted to contend that demolition of the said building is quite unnecessary and the demand for eviction of the petitioners on that ground is untenable. The Appellate Authority considered the correctness and legality of the order of eviction of the Rent Control Court in the light of the contentions of the petitioners. The Appellate Authority re-appreciated the evidence in great detail. After such a detailed analysis of the evidence and circumstances in the light of the pleadings of the parties, the Appellate Authority concurred with the findings of the Rent Control Court. The said findings are now challenged by the petitioners. 10. There was a direction in the order of remand dated 08.09.2016 that the nature of acquisition proceedings, if any, on the property and the element of holding of any property or rights by the Government should also be considered by the Rent Control Court. In the amended paragraph No. 6(a) in the rent control petition, the respondent contended that the acquisition proceeding culminated in 2006 and the same has no impact or bearing on the proposed demolition of the petition schedule building and the reconstruction envisaged by the respondent. It is true that PW1 deposed that Ext.A9 permit was obtained before the acquisition. But it is factually incorrect. Ext.A9 was issued on 05.09.2010. The site plan, Ext.A12 was issued by the Municipal Engineer, Thalassery Municipality during that period. The petitioners did not bring in any evidence to show that there has been any subsequent acquisition. Going by the peg-mark noticed in Ext.C1 report also, it cannot be said that more area than what has been pointed out by PW1 would be taken over in acquisition. In the said circumstances, the case set forth by the respondent that the acquisition would not in any way impede the respondent from proceeding with the construction as per Ext.A9 permit can only be accepted. 11. The precise case of the respondent is that the building to which the petition schedule rooms form a part is to be demolished for the purpose of a convenient access to the proposed building from Thalassery-Coorg road and also to provide sufficient parking for the convenience of the respondent and also the persons coming to the commercial area of the proposed building. The building proposed to be constructed by the respondent is for accommodating her residence and also office, classrooms, guest area and other facilities required for the professional consultancy services and coaching centre for Chartered Accountant students to be started by PW1. The area occupied by the existing building may not be absolutely necessary for providing, as per the statutory rules, setback and car parking area for the building proposed to be constructed by the respondent. But her definite case is that the tenanted building is old and dilapidated, and the respondent wanted to use the land occupied by the building after its demolition for the purposes of convenient access to the new building and car parking area. Whether the tenanted building requires reconstruction on account of old age and dilapidation is not a point for consideration in the nature of the need urged by the respondent. 12. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would contend that when eviction of a building is sought only for the purpose of demolition and using the land where it is situated as an access, the same cannot be a ground for eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act. In A.S.Parvathy Krishnan v. Jose and others [ 2007 (4) KLT 1062 ], this Court took the view that the word 'occupation' in Section 11(3) has to be given a liberal construction. The contention raised in that case was that the access to be provided after the demolition of the tenanted premises was intended to be used by the tenants in another building of the landlord. The tenant contended that such need cannot be a reason for eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act. The Court did not accept that contention and held that if the need put forward is bona fide, the mere fact that the pathway made after demolition of the building would be used by several persons, including the landlord, or by his tenants, would not take the need out of the purview of Section 11(3) of the Act. In Gopalakrishnan K. v. K.Maqbool Sha [ 2019 (4) KHC 521 ] this Court has considered whether eviction of a tenant can be claimed under Section 11(3) of the Act for the purpose of using the land by the landlord after demolition of the tenanted premises. In Gopalakrishnan K. v. K.Maqbool Sha [ 2019 (4) KHC 521 ] this Court has considered whether eviction of a tenant can be claimed under Section 11(3) of the Act for the purpose of using the land by the landlord after demolition of the tenanted premises. After referring to the decision of the Apex Court in Kunhamma v. Akkali Purushothaman [ (2007) 11 SCC 181 ], this Court held that “the principle that a landlord can secure eviction of a tenant under Section 11(3) of the Act to demolish an existing structure for providing a pathway to a property or building of his own falls within the ground under Section 11(3) of the Act is no more res intergra.” 13. The oral testimony of PW1 stands reliable, despite searching cross-examination. He was a Vice President of ITC. He is a Chartered Accountant. It has come out in evidence that the respondent or PW1 has no other property or building suitable for the need urged by them. Whether the respondent can satisfy with an entry to the proposed building from the eastern side road alone or she has to provide a more convenient access from the Thalassery-Coorg road is a matter within her realm and wisdom alone. The tenant has no right to dictate on the choice of the respondent in the matter. Whether the need urged by the landlord is bona fide or not, can be looked into in the light of the law laid down by the Apex Court and this Court. 14. Section 11 of the Act deals with eviction of tenants. As per Section 11(1), notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract a tenant shall not be evicted, whether in execution of a decree or, except in accordance with the provisions of this Act. As per Section 11(3) of the Act, a landlord may apply to the Rent Control Court, for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building if he bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him. As per Section 11(3) of the Act, a landlord may apply to the Rent Control Court, for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building if he bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him. As per the first proviso to Section 11(3), the Rent Control Court shall not give any such direction if the landlord has another building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village except where the Rent Control Court is satisfied that for special reasons, in any particular case it will be just and proper to do so. As per the second proviso to Section 11(3), the Rent Control Court shall not give any direction to a tenant to put the landlord in possession, if such tenant is depending for his livelihood mainly on the income derived from any trade or business carried on in such building and there is no other suitable building available in the locality for such person to carry on such trade or business. 15. In Adil Jamshed Frenchman v. Sardur Dastur Schools Trust [ (2005) 2 SCC 476 ] the Apex Court reiterated that, as laid down in Shiv Samp Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta [ (1999) 6 SCC 222 ] a bona fide requirement must be an outcome of a sincere and honest desire in contradistinction with a mere pretext for evicting the tenant on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any member of the family which would entitle the landlord to seek ejectment of the tenant. The question to be asked by a judge of facts by placing himself in the place of the landlord is whether in the given facts proved by the material on record the need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere and honest. The concept of bona fide need or genuine requirement needs a practical approach instructed by the realities of life. As reiterated in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal [ (2001) 5 SCC 705 ] bona fide requirement has to be distinguished from a mere whim or fanciful desire. The concept of bona fide need or genuine requirement needs a practical approach instructed by the realities of life. As reiterated in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal [ (2001) 5 SCC 705 ] bona fide requirement has to be distinguished from a mere whim or fanciful desire. The bona fide requirement is in praesenti and must be manifested in actual need so as to convince the court that it is not a mere fanciful or whimsical desire. 16. In Ammu v. Nafeesa [ 2015 (5) KHC 718 ] a Division Bench of this Court held that, it is a settled proposition of law that the need put forward by the landlord has to be examined on the presumption that the same is a genuine one, in the absence of any materials to the contra. In Gireeshbabu T. P. v. Jameela and others [2021 (5) KHC SN 30] this Court reiterated that in order to satisfy the requirement of Section 11(3) of the Act, a bona fide need must be an outcome of a sincere and honest desire of the landlord in contradistinction with a mere pretext on the part of the landlord for evicting the tenant, claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him. Once, on the basis of the materials on record, the landlord has succeeded in showing that the need to occupy the premises is natural, real, sincere and honest, and not a ruse to evict the tenant from the said premises, the landlord will certainly be entitled for an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act, of course, subject to the first and second provisos to Section 11(3) of the Act. 17. Viewed in the light of the prepositions of law laid down in the aforesaid decisions, it can say without any hesitation that the need urged by the respondent is bona fide and the concurrent findings of the court below are neither perverse nor illegal. 18. The findings with reference to the first and second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act of the courts below are also concurrent. The petitioner in R.C.Rev.No.122 of 2020 is RW1. The petitioner in R.C.Rev.No.127 of 2020 is RW2. 18. The findings with reference to the first and second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act of the courts below are also concurrent. The petitioner in R.C.Rev.No.122 of 2020 is RW1. The petitioner in R.C.Rev.No.127 of 2020 is RW2. Their oral testimony unsupported by any other evidence is insufficient to find that either they or other petitioners are depending for their livelihood solely on the income derived from their business in the respective petition schedule shop rooms. The petitioner did not venture to adduce any independent evidence regarding non-availability of any other building or room in the locality suitable for shifting their businesses. 19. As per the second proviso to Section 11(3), the Rent Control Court shall not give any direction to a tenant to put the landlord in possession, if such tenant is depending for his livelihood mainly on the income derived from any trade or business carried on in such building and there is no other suitable building available in the locality for such person to carry on such trade or business. A Full Bench of this Court in Francis v. Sreedevi Varassiar [ 2003 (2) KLT 230 ] held that it is for the tenant to prove both the limbs of the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act and that the tenant cannot insist that alternative accommodation should be similar to that of the tenanted premises in terms of the rate of rent and convenience. 20. This view regarding the burden of proof has been approved by the Apex Court in Kunhamma @ Lakshmi Ammas Children and another v. Akkali Purushothaman and others [ (2007) 11 SCC 181 ], where it was observed, “From a perusal of the judgment of the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court reported in Francis v. Sreedevi Varassiar [ 2003 (2) KLT 230 ] we observe that theonus lies on the tenant to prove that he was dependent on the income derived from the business being carried on from the demised premises and that there was no other suitable building to which he could shift his business.” 21. In the light of the law laid down in the aforesaid decisions, it is the absolute burden of the tenants to prove both limbs of the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. But the petitioners did not succeed in proving such facts. In the light of the law laid down in the aforesaid decisions, it is the absolute burden of the tenants to prove both limbs of the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. But the petitioners did not succeed in proving such facts. After taking all such aspects into consideration only the courts below concurrently ordered eviction. The scope of interference by this Court in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 20 of the Act with such concurrent findings is limited. 22. In Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana [ (1993) 1 SCC 499 ], the scope of revisional powers of the High Court under Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 came up for consideration before the Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court. While considering whether the High Court could have re-appreciated the entire evidence, the Apex Court held that, even the wider language of Section 20 of the Act cannot enable the High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. Otherwise, the distinction between appellate and revisional jurisdiction will get obliterated. Hence, the High Court was not right in re-appreciating the entire evidence both oral or documentary in the light of the Commissioner's report. The High Court had travelled far beyond the revisional jurisdiction. Even by the presence of the word ‘propriety’ it cannot mean that there could be a re-appreciation of evidence. Of course, the revisional court can come to a different conclusion but not on a re-appreciation of evidence; on the contrary, by confining itself to legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it. 23. In Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Dilbahar Singh [ (2014) 9 SCC 78 ] a Five-Judge Bench of the Apex Court considered the revisional powers of the High Court under Rent Acts operating in different States. After referring to the law laid down in Rukmini Amma Saradamma the Apex Court reiterated that even the wider language of Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 does not enable the High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. After referring to the law laid down in Rukmini Amma Saradamma the Apex Court reiterated that even the wider language of Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 does not enable the High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. The Constitution Bench agreed with the view of the Three-Judge Bench in Rukmini Amma Saradamma that the word ‘propriety’ does not confer power upon the High Court to re-appreciate evidence to come to a different conclusion, but its consideration of evidence is confined to find out legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it. 24. In Thankamony Amma v. Omana Amma [ AIR 2019 SC 3803 : 2019 (4) KHC 412 ] after considering the matter in the backdrop of law laid down in Rukmini Amma Saradamma, Ubaiba and Dilbahar Singh (supra) the Apex Court held that when the findings rendered by the courts below were well supported by evidence on record and could not be said to be perverse in any way, the High Court could not re-appreciate the evidence and interfere with the concurrent findings by the courts below while exercising revisional jurisdiction. 25. Viewed so, we are of the view that there is no reason warranting interference with the order of eviction of the petitioners from the respective petition schedule shop rooms by the Rent Control Court as per the common order dated 11.07.2018, which stands confirmed by the common judgment dated 19.03.2020 of the Appellate Authority. We accordingly, dismiss these revision petitions. 26. At the time of pronouncement of this Order, the learned counsel for the petitioners has made a request to afford eight months' time for vacating the premises pointing out the difficulty in finding out another room and making necessary arrangements for shifting the business. The learned counsel for the respondent is agreeable to grant three months’ time. 27. 26. At the time of pronouncement of this Order, the learned counsel for the petitioners has made a request to afford eight months' time for vacating the premises pointing out the difficulty in finding out another room and making necessary arrangements for shifting the business. The learned counsel for the respondent is agreeable to grant three months’ time. 27. Having considered all the aspects, we deem it appropriate to grant six months’ time to surrender vacant possession of the petition schedule shop rooms, subject to the following conditions: (i) The respondents-tenants in the Rent Control Petitions shall file an affidavit before the Rent Control Court or the Execution Court, as the case may be, within two weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order, expressing an unconditional undertaking that they will surrender vacant possession of the petition schedule shop rooms to the petitioner-landlady within six months from the date of this order and that, they shall not induct third parties into possession of the petition schedule shop rooms and further they shall conduct any business in the petition schedule shop rooms only on the strength of a valid licence/permission/ consent issued by the local authority/statutory authorities; (ii) The respondents-tenants in the Rent Control Petitions shall deposit the entire arrears of rent as on date, if any, before the Rent Control Court or the Execution Court, as the case may be, within four weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order, and shall continue to pay rent for every succeeding months, without any default; (iii) Needless to say, in the event of the respondents-tenants in the Rent Control Petitions failing to comply with any one of the conditions stated above, the time limit granted by this order to surrender vacant possession of the petition schedule shop rooms will stand cancelled automatically and the petitioner-landlady will be at liberty to proceed with the execution of the order of eviction.