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2022 DIGILAW 673 (JHR)

Police – 761 Eklavya Kumar Yadav, S/o. Shri Basudev Yadav v. State of Jharkhand

2022-06-16

RAVI RANJAN, SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD

body2022
JUDGMENT : I.A. No.7673 of 2019 This interlocutory application has been preferred under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay of 85 days in preferring this Letters Patent Appeal. 2. Heard parties. 3. Having regard to the averments made in the application and submissions made on behalf of the parties, we are of the view that the appellant was prevented from sufficient cause in filing the appeal within the period of limitation. As such, the delay of 85 days in preferring the appeal is hereby condoned. 4. I.A. No. 7673 of 2019 stands allowed. L.P.A. No.522 of 2019 5. The instant appeal, preferred under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent, is directed against the order/judgment dated 04.04.2019 passed by learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(C) No.865 of 2019 whereby and whereunder the order dated 27.11.2008 passed by the Commandant, Jharkhand Armed Police-4, Bokaro, by which the petitioner has been inflicted with the punishment of withholding of one annual increment, has been declined to be interfered with having assailed the same after inordinate delay of about 11 years. 6. Brief facts of the case as per the pleadings made in the writ proceeding, which are required to be enumerated herein, read as under :- It is the case of the writ petitioner that while working as Constable in the Jharkhand Armed Police-4, Bokaro, a departmental proceeding was initiated which was culminated into the order of punishment dated 27.11.2008. The writ petitioner, being aggrieved with the order of punishment, assailed the said order by filing writ petition being W.P.(S) No.865 of 2019. The learned Single Judge, after taking into consideration the fact that the order of punishment has been assailed after lapse of almost 11 years, has dismissed the writ petition by declining to interfere with the impugned decision of the administrative authority of inflicting punishing of withholding one annual increment, against which the present intra-court appeal has been preferred. 7. Mr. Mohan Kumar Dubey, learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner-appellant, has submitted that the learned Single Judge has erred in dismissing the writ petition by putting reliance upon the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Jammu & Kashmir v. R.K. Zalpuri & Others [ (2015) 15 SCC 602 ]. 7. Mr. Mohan Kumar Dubey, learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner-appellant, has submitted that the learned Single Judge has erred in dismissing the writ petition by putting reliance upon the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Jammu & Kashmir v. R.K. Zalpuri & Others [ (2015) 15 SCC 602 ]. According to the learned counsel, the fact of the said case is quite different to that of the fact of the given case since in that case the order of dismissal was challenged after inordinate delay but, in the instant case, withholding of one annual increment is under challenge which is having the recurring cause of action, therefore, the dismissal of the writ petition based upon the factual aspect of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Jammu & Kashmir v. R.K. Zalpuri & Others (Supra), cannot be said to be sustainable in the eyes of law. 8. Mr. Gaurang Jajodia, learned A.C. to S.C.-I, appearing for the respondent – State of Jharkhand, has submitted that the contention which has been raised on behalf of the writ petitioner – appellant about non-applicability of the judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Jammu & Kashmir v. R.K. Zalpuri & Others (Supra) merely because in the said case the issue of dismissal order was under consideration but the general principle of entertaining a writ petition is that the writ petition may not be entertained after lapse of reasonable period since, in the case in hand, the writ petition has been filed about lapse of almost 11 years, therefore, the learned Single Judge has taken the view of filing the writ petition after inordinate delay of almost 11 years and the view take by the learned Single Judge cannot be said to suffer from an error and, as such, the order impugned may not be interfered with. 9. We have heard learned counsel for the appellants-State, perused the documents available on record as also the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order. 10. The undisputed fact in this case is that the writ petitioner being aggrieved with the order of punishment dated 27.11.2008, assailed the order inflicting punishment whereby and whereunder one annual increment has been withheld having future effect of the same, after lapse of about 11 years. 10. The undisputed fact in this case is that the writ petitioner being aggrieved with the order of punishment dated 27.11.2008, assailed the order inflicting punishment whereby and whereunder one annual increment has been withheld having future effect of the same, after lapse of about 11 years. The learned Single Judge, after taking into consideration the delay in filing the writ petition, has refused to interfere with the impugned order against which the present intra-court appeal has been preferred. 11. The principle of entertaining a writ petition in a case of inordinate delay is no more res integra. It is settled position of law that the Limitation Act is not applied to writ jurisdiction but certainly the principle of delay and laches is an essential ingredient for entertaining a writ petition, as has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court in New Delhi Municipal Council v. Pan Singh & Ors. [ (2007) 9 SCC 278 ] in particular paragraph 17, which is quoted hereunder as : “17. Although, there is no period of limitation provided for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, ordinarily, writ petition should be filed within a reasonable time. (See Lipton India Ltd. v. Union of India).” The Hon’ble Apex Court in State of M.P. & Ors. v. Nandlal Jaiswal & Ors. [ AIR 1987 SC 251 ] has observed that the power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is discretionary and if there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing the writ petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to interfere and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. Emphasis was laid down on the principle of delay and laches stating that the High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction because it is likely to cause confusion and inconvenience in bringing the justice. In this context, further reference is made to the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in Baljeet Singh (Dead) through Lrs. And Others v. State of U.P. and Others [ (2019) 15 SCC 33 ] wherein the land losers had approached the Court of law after inordinate delay seeking enhanced compensation which the Hon’ble Apex Court has refused to condone. In this context, further reference is made to the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in Baljeet Singh (Dead) through Lrs. And Others v. State of U.P. and Others [ (2019) 15 SCC 33 ] wherein the land losers had approached the Court of law after inordinate delay seeking enhanced compensation which the Hon’ble Apex Court has refused to condone. In the aforesaid case, the Hon’ble Apex Court at paragraph 7 has held as under:- “7. The matter requires examination from another aspect, viz., laches and delay. It is a very recognised principle of jurisprudence that a right not exercised for a long time is nonexistent. Even when there is no limitation period prescribed by any statute relating to certain proceedings, in such cases, courts have coined the doctrine of laches and delay as well as doctrine of acquiescence and non-suited the litigants who approached the court belatedly without any justifiable explanation for bringing the action after unreasonable delay. In those cases, where the period of limitation is prescribed within which the action is to be brought before the court, if the action is not brought within that prescribed period, the aggrieved party loses remedy and cannot enforce his legal right after the period of limitation is over, however, subject to the prayer for condonation of delay and if there is a justifiable explanation for bringing the action after the prescribed period of limitation is over and sufficient cause is shown, the court may condone the delay. Therefore, in a case where the period of limitation is prescribed and the action is not brought within the period of limitation and subsequently proceedings are initiated after the period of limitation along with the prayer for condonation of delay, in that case, the applicant has to make out a sufficient cause and justify the cause for delay with a proper explanation. It is not that in each and every case despite the sufficient cause is not shown and the delay is not properly explained, the court may condone the delay. To make out a case for condonation of delay, the applicant has to make out a sufficient cause/reason which prevented him in initiating the proceedings within the period of limitation. Otherwise, he will be accused of gross negligence. To make out a case for condonation of delay, the applicant has to make out a sufficient cause/reason which prevented him in initiating the proceedings within the period of limitation. Otherwise, he will be accused of gross negligence. If the aggrieved party does not initiate the proceedings within the period of limitation without any sufficient cause, he can be denied the relief on the ground of unexplained laches and delay and on the presumption that such person has waived his right or acquiesced with the order. These principles are based on the principles relatable to sound public policy that if a person does not exercise his right for a long time then such right is non-existent.” Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The Court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional Court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the Court at his own leisure or pleasure, the Court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. It is evident from the aforesaid position of law, as has been settled by Hon'ble Apex Court, that the writ court is not meant for such litigants who are waking from slumber after long lapse of time since the writ court, being the court of equity, is meant for vigilant litigants and not for the loath one. 12. Here, in the given facts of the case, admittedly the order of punishment was passed against the writ petitioner on 27.11.2008 by which one annual increment has been withheld although the same is having its future effect, but the question herein is that once the order of punishment has been accepted by the writ petitioner fairly for a period of nearly 11 years, can he be allowed to assail the order of punishment after lapse of about 11 years? The answer of this Court will be in negative taking into consideration the ratio laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court and the principle for entertaining the writ petition whereby and whereunder the applicability of delay and laches in entertaining the writ petition is required to be seen by the writ court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 13. The writ petitioner has accepted the order of punishment dated 27.11.2008 fairly for a period of 11 years and thereafter he has assailed the said order, which according to our considered view, correctly has not been entertained by the writ court by entering into its merit. However, learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner-appellant has taken the plea that since the order or punishment of withholding one annual increment, having the future effect, therefore, the same is having the future prospect and, therefore, the writ petition was required to be entertained by the learned Single Judge, but this Court is not in agreement with such submission, reason being that, even if the order of punishment is having recurring cause of action but when the writ petitioner was knowing about the adverse order passed against him and he cautiously not assailed the said order for a period of about 11 years, he cannot be allowed to take the ground of recurring cause of action. 14. Therefore, this Court, on the basis of entirety of facts and circumstances of the case as also taking into consideration the reason for not entertaining the writ petition, is of the view that the order passed by the learned Single Judge requires no interference. 15. Accordingly, the instant appeal fails and is dismissed.